Template protection for HMM-based on-line signature authentication
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Citations
Secure Speech Biometric Templates
Using genetic algorithms and ensemble systems in online cancellable signature recognition
Protezione dei template biometrici per sistemi di autenticazione basati su firma biometric template protection for signature based authentication systems
Fuzzy Sets Theory Approach for Recognition Handwritten Signatures
An empirical analysis of cancellable transformations in a behavioural biometric modality
References
A tutorial on hidden Markov models and selected applications in speech recognition
A fuzzy commitment scheme
Enhancing security and privacy in biometrics-based authentication systems
A fuzzy vault scheme
Biometric template security
Related Papers (5)
Frequently Asked Questions (14)
Q2. What is the proposed system with protected templates?
The proposed authentication system with protected templates is based on the on-line signature verification system presented in [16], where a function-based approach is employed to perform signature-based authentication, using HMMs to represent and match the signature discrete time sequences.
Q3. What is the dangerous treat regarding the privacy and the security of the users?
The unauthorized acquisition of the employed biometric data, which represents one of the possible consequences of the attacks to a biometric recognition system, is probably the most dangerous treat regarding the privacy and the security of the users.
Q4. What is the proposed approach for the protection of signature templates?
A function-based authentication approach is then implemented in order to perform the matching, directly applying Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) for the modelization of the transformed templates.
Q5. How many signatures are used to estimate the EER?
Performing the transformations keeping W = 3 results in an EER of about 19.24%, while if each signature function is divided in W = 4 segments before performing the convolutions, the EER raises to 24.92%.
Q6. What is the common way to deal with deconvolutions?
Deconvolution prob-lems are typically coped with in the frequency domain, being the convolutions transformed into simple multiplications.
Q7. How many signatures are used to compute the FAR for skilled forgeries?
Systems’ FAR for skilled forgeries (FARSF ) was computed using the available 25 skilled forgeries for each user, while the FAR for random forgeries (FARRF ) has been computed taking, for each user, one signature from each of the rest of the users.
Q8. What is the way to retrieve the function r[n]?
In order to retrieve the function r[n], the attacker should be able to obtain the segments r(1)1,N (1) 1[n] and r(1) 2,N(1) 2[n], where N (1)1 = b (1) 1 andN (1) 2 = N − b(1)1 , or the segments r(2)1,N(2)1 [n] and r (2) 2,N (2) 2 [n], withN (2)1 = b (2) 1 and N (2) 2 = N − b(2)1 , from the available transformed functions f (1)[n] = r(1) 1,N(1) 1[n]∗ r(1) 2,N(1) 2[n]and f (2)[n] = r(2) 1,N(2) 1[n] ∗ r(2) 2,N(2) 2[n].
Q9. What is the performance for an unprotected approach?
As it can be seen, the best performance achievable with an unprotected approach consists in an EER of 10.29%, and it occurs for H = 12 and M = 16.
Q10. How many sessions are used to estimate the FRR?
Each user is enrolled using the E = 5 signatures from the first session, while the other four sessions are employed to estimate the FRR.
Q11. What is the proposed approach for the protection of online signature templates?
As already pointed out, in this paper a non-invertible transform approach is proposed for the protection of online signature templates.
Q12. How many users are used to estimate the EER for skilled forgeries?
As it can be seen from the reported Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, the EER for skilled forgeries in an unprotected system is equal to 10.74%, and it increases only slightly to 14.03% when the protection of the templates is introduced, considering W = 2.
Q13. How can one analyze the security of the proposed approach?
In order to analyze the security of the proposed approach in the worst considerable case, it is assumed that, from a stored HMM λ, it is possible to synthesize exactly the same functions from which the model has been estimated.
Q14. What is the first non-invertible transform-based approach for the protection of biometric?
The first practical non-invertible transform-based approach for the protection of biometric data was presented in [9], where the minutiae pattern extracted from a fingerprint undergoes a key-dependent geometric transform.