Who bears the brunt? Distributional effects of climate change mitigation policies
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Citations
European Environmental Taxes and Charges: Recent Experience, Issues and Trends
A Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform to Increase Demand for Public Transport Services
Distributional effects of carbon taxation
Residential energy expenditures and the relevance of changes in household circumstances
The determinants of residential energy expenditure in Italy
References
CO2 cost pass-through and windfall profits in the power sector
The carbon footprint of UK households 1990–2004: A socio-economically disaggregated, quasi-multi-regional input–output model
Quantifying the global and distributional aspects of American household carbon footprint
Household energy consumption in the UK: A highly geographically and socio-economically disaggregated model
A comparative multivariate analysis of household energy requirements in Australia, Brazil, Denmark, India and Japan
Related Papers (5)
Who emits most? Associations between socio-economic factors and UK households' home energy, transport, indirect and total CO2 emissions
Frequently Asked Questions (14)
Q2. What are the future works in "Who bears the brunt? distributional effects of climate change mitigation policies" ?
However, there are several issues related to this which require further debate and research: i. Further research is required to identify the characteristics of low income groups at risk of losing out under lump-sum recycling arrangements. One possibility could be the application of ‘ contraction and convergence ’ ( Meyer, 2000 ) frameworks which envisage equal per capita allowances at a later point in time, thus implying less immediate redistributions between rich and poor nations. The literature indicates that, for a variety of reasons, there will still be a substantial proportion of lower income losers owing to high direct or indirect fossil fuel energy use under lump-sum recycling arrangements.
Q3. What are the main factors that influence the study results?
Study results are often influenced by the choice of country as climatic conditions, energy efficiency of the housing stock, level of car-ownership, public transport infrastructure, levels of poverty and income inequality and so on all make a difference to potential distributional effects.
Q4. What is the main reason for higher emissions in rural areas?
DEFRA (2008a: 4) claims, for example, that less access to mains gas (which has lower emissions per energy unit than any other fossil fuel) and less well insulated houses in rural areas are the main reasons for higher rural emissions, rather than greater dependency on cars.
Q5. How can initial emission budgets be allocated?
Initial emission budgets can be allocated to the participants in the scheme free of charge, through auctioning, or through a mix.
Q6. How many income groups would lose out under a cap and share scheme?
Several studies also report that even with full and equal per capita revenue recycling, that is an equal per capita payment to all citizens financed through the revenue from the emissions reduction policy, a substantial proportion of low income households would still lose out under such a scheme (DEFRA, 2008a: 3; Dresner and Ekins, 2004: 4; 2006: 55).
Q7. What is the main reason for increasing per capita emissions in many rich countries?
The trend towards smaller household sizes is therefore a driving factor behind increasing per capita emissions in many rich countries, particularly if indirect emissions are included (Druckman and Jackson, 2008: 3184).
Q8. What is the definition of revenue neutral?
If the entire revenue is earmarked to decrease/remove other taxes, the tax reform is termed ‘revenue neutral’, meaning that the costs of the new source of revenue are completely compensated through the reduction of other taxes or charges.
Q9. What is the main argument that regulation is less cost-efficient than market-based instruments?
It is frequently argued that regulation is less cost-efficient than market-based instruments because it does not reflect differing abatement costs of the various polluters.
Q10. What is the potential power of adverse public reactions to policies?
The potential power of adverse public reactions to policies is evident in the UK, for example, in the abandonment of the poll tax and more recently the fuel tax escalator.
Q11. How much of the UK’s emissions are indirect?
For indirect emissions comprise a considerable share of households’ overall emissions, in some cases more than 50% (Druckman and Jackson, 2009: 2074; Reinders et al., 2003) whilst overall expenditure including consumer goods generally increases less than proportionally with income (see, for example, ONS, 2009, table A9, for the UK case).
Q12. What is the effect of auctioning emission permits?
auctioning emission permits to the participants creates a revenue stream for the government or organization that issues the permits.
Q13. Why would international equal allowance and lump-sum rebate schemes be regressive?
This is because international equal allowance and lump-sum rebate schemes would be regressive in rich countries, and trigger an enormous transfer of resources from the developed to the less developed world.
Q14. What are the main reasons for the lack of public support for lump-sum rebates?
Whilst lump-sum rebates are likely to attract wide public support, they are likely to be opposed by (high emitting) wealthier people and businesses.