Showing papers on "Counterfactual conditional published in 2004"
Book•
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: The counterfactual analysis of causation became a focus of philosophical debate after the 1973 publication of the late David Lewis's groundbreaking paper, "Causation," which argues against the previously accepted "regularity" analysis and in favor of what he called the "promising alternative" of the counterfactually analysis as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: One philosophical approach to causation sees counterfactual dependence as the key to the explanation of causal facts: for example, events c (the cause) and e (the effect) both occur, but had c not occurred, e would not have occurred either. The counterfactual analysis of causation became a focus of philosophical debate after the 1973 publication of the late David Lewis's groundbreaking paper, "Causation," which argues against the previously accepted "regularity" analysis and in favor of what he called the "promising alternative" of the counterfactual analysis. Thirty years after Lewis's paper, this book brings together some of the most important recent work connecting--or, in some cases, disputing the connection between--counterfactuals and causation, including the complete version of Lewis's Whitehead lectures, "Causation as Influence," a major reworking of his original paper. Also included is a more recent essay by Lewis, "Void and Object," on causation by omission. Several of the essays first appeared in a special issue of the Journal of Philosophy, but most, including the unabridged version of "Causation as Influence," are published for the first time or in updated forms.Other topics considered include the "trumping" of one event over another in determining causation; de facto dependence; challenges to the transitivity of causation; the possibility that entities other than events are the fundamental causal relata; the distinction between dependence and production in accounts of causation; the distinction between causation and causal explanation; the context-dependence of causation; probabilistic analyses of causation; and a singularist theory of causation.
444 citations
TL;DR: In contrast to statistical methods, a number of case study methods, collectively referred to as Mill's methods, used by generations of social science researchers, only consider deterministic relationships.
Abstract: In contrast to statistical methods, a number of case study methods—collectively referred to as Mill’s methods, used by generations of social science researchers—only consider deterministic relationships. They do so to their detriment because heeding the basic lessons of statistical inference can prevent serious inferential errors. Of particular importance is the use of conditional probabilities to compare relevant counterfactuals. A prominent example of work using Mill’s methods is Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions. Barbara Geddes’s widely assigned critique of Skocpol’s claim of a causal relationship between foreign threat and social revolution is valid if this relationship is considered to be deterministic. If, however, we interpret Skocpol’s hypothesized causal relationship to be probabilistic, Geddes’s data support Skocpol’s hypothesis. But Skocpol, unlike Geddes, failed to provide the data necessary to compare conditional probabilities. Also problematic for Skocpol is the fact that when one makes causal inferences, conditional probabilities are of interest only insofar as they provide information about relevant counterfactuals.
110 citations
TL;DR: This article found that counterfactual mind-sets increased the discussion of unshared information and helped groups to identify the correct murder suspect, regardless of whether the direction of the counter-factual thoughts was upward or downward.
89 citations
TL;DR: The authors examines some counterexamples to Pearl's theory, and argues that the theory can be modified in a natural way to overcome them, in a way similar to The authors.
Abstract: Judea Pearl (2000) has recently advanced a theory of token causation using his structural equations approach. This paper examines some counterexamples to Pearl’s theory, and argues that the theory can be modified in a natural way to overcome them.
86 citations
TL;DR: The authors explored factors that affect the difficulty of counterfactual reasoning in 3-5-year-old children and shed light on the reason why counterfactually reasoning relates to understanding false belief.
76 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that children, similar to adults, generated certain types of counterfactuals with more ease than others, and that children were more likely to generate certain types than others.
74 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the counterfactual approach is more basic than the mechanistic approach, though the former will benefit from a better understanding of the mechanisms that are at work in causal connections.
Abstract: Among the current philosophical attempts to understand causation two seem to be the most prominent. The first is James Woodward’s counterfactual approach; the second is the mechanistic approach advocated by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, Carl Craver, Jim Bogen and Stuart Glennan. The counterfactual approach takes it that causes make a difference to their effects, where this difference-making is cashed out in terms of actual and counterfactual interventions. The mechanistic approach takes it that two events are causally related if and only if there is a mechanism that connects them. On the face of it, the two approaches need not be in conflict. The mechanisms might satisfy (or depend on) certain interventionist counterfactuals and, conversely, the interventionist counterfactuals might be made true by the presence of certain mechanisms. But, overall, both approaches tend to be imperialistic. Advocates of each argue that their own approach fairs much better than their opponents’. The question then is this: are we forced to choose between the mechanistic approach and the counterfactual one? In this paper, I argue that, as they stand, both approaches face some important problems that need to be fixed. I shall also argue that there is a sense in which the counterfactual approach is more basic than the mechanistic, though the former will benefit from a better understanding of the mechanisms that are at work in causal connections. So both approaches can work together to offer a better understanding of causation. If they work in tandem, they can offer us a glimpse of what Hume famously called “the secret connexion”. But in so far as the ‘secret connexion’ is an intrinsic relation between the causal relata, neither of the above approaches tells us what this relation is.
69 citations
TL;DR: Bittner and Bittner as discussed by the authors showed that if-clauses are definite descriptions of possible worlds, and that they can be topicalized to make them definites.
Abstract: In Counterfactuals David Lewis noticed that definite descriptions and conditionals display the same kind of non-monotonic behavior. We take his observation literally and suggest that if-clauses are, quite simply, definite descriptions of possible worlds [related ideas are developed in M. Bittner (2001) Proceedings from SALT XI, CLC, Cornell University, Ithaca, pp. 36–55]. We depart from Lewis,s analysis, however, in claiming that if-clauses, like Strawsonian definite descriptions, refer. We develop our analysis by drawing both on Stalnaker,s Selection Function theory of conditionals and on von Heusinger,s Choice Function theory of definiteness, and by generalizing their analyses to plural Choice/Selection Functions. Finally, we explore some consequences of this referential approach: being definites, if-clauses can be topicalized; the word then can be analyzed as a pronoun that doubles the referential term; the syntactician,s Binding Theory constrains possible anaphoric relations between the if-clause and the word then; and general systems of referential classification can be applied to situate the denotation of the descriptive term, yielding a distinction between indicative, subjunctive and ‘double subjunctive’ conditionals.
69 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the coherence of children' s explanatory systems by eliciting explanations of possible and impossible physical, psychological, and biological events, and found that children were better at generating explanations for why events were impossible than recognizing that no alternative could be generated for impossible events.
Abstract: Researchers who advocate the hypothesis that cognitive development is akin to theory formation have also suggested that young children possess distinct systems for explaining physical, psychological, and biological principles (see, e.g., Wellman & Gelman, 1992). One way this has been investigated is by examining how children explain human action: Children explain intentional and accidental actions by appealing to psychological principles, and explain impossible physical or biological action in terms of the underlying principles of those domains (Schult & Wellman, 1997). The current investigation examined the coherence of children’ s explanatory systems by eliciting explanations of possible and impossible physical, psychological, and biological events. Then, in a separate set of stories, children were asked to generate counterfactual alternatives for characters who wanted to perform an event, but did not, either because of a mishap or because the event was impossible. Overall, children were better at generating explanations for why events were impossible than recognizing that no alternative could be generated for impossible events. However, there was some evidence that children’ s explanatory abilities predicted whether they could correctly reject cases where no counterfactual alternative could be generated. The results lend support to the hypothesis that children’ s causal knowledge is coherently organized in domain-specific knowledge structures.
58 citations
TL;DR: The authors examined the impact of counterfactual thinking on persuasion and found that the saliency of a counter-factual was manipulated by either explicitly or implicitly including it in the narrative or not including it.
Abstract: Two experiments examined the impact of counterfactual thinking on persuasion. Participants in both experiments were exposed to short video clips in which an actor described a car accident that resulted in serious injury. In the narrative description, the salience of a counterfactual was manipulated by either explicitly including the counterfactual in the narrative or by not including it. An examination of attitudes related to traffic safety supported the hypothesis that the inclusion of a counterfactual in narrative enhances the persuasive impact of the narrative. The first study (N= 50) demonstrated this effect in the short-term, and the second study (N= 61) replicated the short-term effects while also demonstrating the temporal persistence of the initial changes in attitudes. Both studies highlighted potential limiting conditions of these effects. The first study showed that the impact of counterfactuals on persuasion is most potent when the self, rather than another person, is the focus of blame in the counterfactual. The second study revealed that attitude changes persist over time when the counterfactuals are self-generated, but not when they are spoon-fed to the participant. Results are discussed in the context of understanding the characteristics of counterfactual thoughts that enable them to enhance the persuasive impact of narrative.
52 citations
TL;DR: The authors defend the use of interventionist counterfactuals to elucidate causal and explanatory claims against criticisms advanced by James Bogen and Peter Machamer, and argue that these arguments are meaningful and have determinate truth values, even in a deterministic world.
Abstract: This article defends the use of interventionist counterfactuals to elucidate causal and explanatory claims against criticisms advanced by James Bogen and Peter Machamer. Against Bogen, I argue that counterfactual claims concerning what would happen under interventions are meaningful and have determinate truth values, even in a deterministic world. I also argue, against both Machamer and Bogen, that we need to appeal to counterfactuals to capture the notions like causal relevance and causal mechanism. Contrary to what both authors suppose, counterfactuals are not “unscientific”—a substantial tradition within statistics and the causal modelling literature makes heavy use of them.
TL;DR: The authors argue that causal claims cannot be fuitfully analyzed by including the truth or falsity of counterfactuals among their truth conditions, and derive from their understanding of Nuel Belnap's and his co-authors discussion of predictions about indeterministic systems.
Abstract: Using Jim Woodward's counterfactual dependency account of causality as an example, this paper argues that causal claims cannot be fuitfully analyzed by including the truth or falsity of counterfactuals among their truth conditions. The main reasons this derive from my understanding of Nuel Belnap's and his co-authors discussion of predictions about indeterministic systems.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that scientific essentialism can do so only by resorting to devices that are just as ad hoc as those that essentialists accuse Humean regularity theories of employing.
Abstract: Scientific essentialism aims to account for the natural laws' special capacity to support counterfactuals. I argue that scientific essentialism can do so only by resorting to devices that are just as ad hoc as those that essentialists accuse Humean regularity theories of employing. I conclude by offering an account of the laws' distinctive relation to counterfactuals that portrays laws as contingent but nevertheless distinct from accidents by virtue of possessing a genuine variety of necessity.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present the counterfactual account of causation in terms of Lewis's possible-world semantics, and reformulate the statistical potential-outcome framework using counterfactuallyconditionals.
Abstract: Causal inference in the empiricalsciences is based on counterfactuals. The mostcommon approach utilizes a statistical model ofpotential outcomes to estimate causal effectsof treatments. On the other hand, one leadingapproach to the study of causation inphilosophical logic has been the analysis ofcausation in terms of counterfactualconditionals. This paper discusses and connectsboth approaches to counterfactual causationfrom philosophy and statistics. Specifically, Ipresent the counterfactual account of causationin terms of Lewis's possible-world semantics,and reformulate the statistical potentialoutcome framework using counterfactualconditionals. This procedure highlights variousproperties and mechanisms of the statisticalmodel.
TL;DR: The authors showed that behaviours deviating from a social category's behavioural standard (social norm) are also likely to trigger counterfactuals, which may be called the nonconformity effect.
Abstract: Past research has shown that counterfactual thinking (‘if only ... ’) is related to judgements of responsibility for negative events. It has also shown that behaviours deviating from the target’s own behavioural standard (intrapersonal norm) are likely to trigger counterfactuals—the so-called exceptional-routine effect. In the present research, we demonstrate that behaviours deviating from a social category’s behavioural standard (social norm) are also likely to trigger counterfactuals—what may be called the nonconformity effect. Two studies investigated counterfactual thinking regarding a rape case, classifying counterfactuals according to their conformity versus nonconformity to relevant social norms, and their focus on actions versus inactions. In Study 1, participants with higher endorsement of the rape victim stereotype generated more counterfactuals on the victim’s nonconforming inactions than did participants with lower stereotype endorsement. The presence of a nonconformity effect was confirmed in Study 2, where participants rated their agreement with externally generated counterfactuals. Moreover, in Study 2, counterfactuals focused on the victim’s non-conforming inactions predicted responsibility attribution to the victim through the mediating role of perceived avoidability of the event. Copyright # 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the hypothesis that upward counterfactuals reinforce feelings of self-efficacy toward similar future events, whereas downward co-authors found that counterfactuality reinforced feelings of pessimism toward future events.
Abstract: Three experiments examined the hypothesis that, in the aftermath of a performance event, upward counterfactuals reinforce feelings of self-efficacy toward similar future events, whereas downward co...
TL;DR: In this paper, a uniqueness property of states, explosion views and link observables is introduced, and a context translation principle is defined and critically evaluated with regard to its non-empirical content.
Abstract: Counterfactual reasoning and contextuality is defined and critically evaluated with regard to its nonempirical content. To this end, a uniqueness property of states, explosion views and link observables are introduced. If only a single context associated with a particular maximum set of observables can be operationalized, then a context translation principle resolves measurements of different contexts.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors add counterfactuals to the framework of knowledge-based programs and design a protocol in which an agent stops sending messages once it knows that it is safe to do so.
Abstract: This paper adds counterfactuals to the framework of knowledge-based programs of Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi [3,4]. The use of counterfactuals is illustrated by designing a protocol in which an agent stops sending messages once it knows that it is safe to do so. Such behavior is difficult to capture in the original framework because it involves reasoning about counterfactual executions, including ones that are not consistent with the protocol. Attempts to formalize these notions without counterfactuals are shown to lead to rather counterintuitive behavior.
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: The authors argues that the war remained avoidable up to its very outbreak, and presents other grounds for considering it unavoidable, and even argues that in a certain objective sense the war was avoidable even before its outbreak.
Abstract: This essay, though it may seem to do so, does not take a determinist stand either on counterfactual reasoning and contingency in history in general or on the origins of World War I. On the war, though its conclusions differ from R. N. Lebow’s argument that it could readily have been avoided,1 it agrees with Lebow’s views on many points and concedes a large causal role in all great events in history, including World War I, to contingency, chance, and particular choices. It even argues that in a certain objective sense the war remained avoidable up to its very outbreak, and presents other grounds for considering it unavoidable.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: Stapp's paper in American Journal of Physics, 2004, replies to objections raised against earlier expositions of this strategy and proposes a simplified demonstration as discussed by the authors, which is criticized, several subtleties in the logic of counterfactuals are pointed out, and the proofs of J. P. Bell and his followers are advocated.
Abstract: H. P. Stapp has proposed a number of demonstrations of a Bell-type theorem which dispensed with an assumption of hidden variables, but relied only upon locality together with an assumption that experimenters can choose freely which of several incompatible observables to measure. In recent papers his strategy has centered upon counterfactual conditionals. Stapp's paper in American Journal of Physics, 2004, replies to objections raised against earlier expositions of this strategy and proposes a simplified demonstration. The new demonstration is criticized, several subtleties in the logic of counterfactuals are pointed out, and the proofs of J. S. Bell and his followers are advocated.
Book Chapter•
01 Jun 2004
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify some simple counterexamples to Lewis's account of indeterministic causation in terms of chance and counterfactuals and propose a different account to handle these problems, by way of introducing a notion of "overall world chance".
Abstract: This paper identifies some simple counterexamples to Lewis's account of indeterministic causation in terms of chance and counterfactuals. It proposes a different account to handle these problems, by way of introducing a notion of 'overall world chance'.
TL;DR: This paper developed a model of a normal form game where counterfactuals of this sort are evaluated as in the philosophical literature (cf. Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968).
Abstract: When evaluating the rationality of a player in a game one has to examine counterfactuals such as "what would happen if the player were to do what he does not do?" In this paper I develop a model of a normal form game where counterfactuals of this sort are evaluated as in the philosophical literature (cf. Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968). According to this method one evaluates a statement like ``what would the player believe if he were to do what he does not do'' at the world that is closest to the actual world where the hypothetical deviation occurs. I show that in this model common knowledge of rationality need not lead to rationalizability. I also present assumptions that allow rationalizability to follow from common knowledge of rationality. These assumptions suggest that rationalizability may not rely on weaker assumptions about belief consistency than Nash equilibrium.
DOI•
24 Feb 2004
TL;DR: The authors defend a counterfactual analysis of causation against several difficulties raised recently, many rehearsed and developed further in this volume, including the issue of whether the semantics of counters can be characterized independently of causation, the proper way to deal with the nontransitivity of causation and a collection of counterexamples to the idea that causation involves chance-raising.
Abstract: My aim is to defend a counterfactual analysis of causation against purportedly
decisive difficulties raised recently, many rehearsed and developed further in this
volume. Although some of the moves I will make are available to any counterfactual theory, my principal aim is to explain how a theory I outlined elsewhere
can, with some adjustment and simplification for the purposes of discussion, deal
with a range of problems (see Noordhof 1999 for original presentation of the
theory). Specifically, I will be concerned with the issue of whether the semantics
of counterfactuals can be characterized independently of causation (raised by
Dorothy Edgington, this volume), the proper way to deal with the nontransitivity
of causation (raised by Michael McDermott 1995 and Murali Ramachandran, this
volume), and a collection of counterexamples to the idea that causation involves, at
its heart, chance-raising (discussed in this volume by Helen Beebee; Phil Dowe;
Doug Ehring; Chris Hitchcock and Michael Tooley, and by Jonathan Schaffer
(2000a, 2000b)). Obviously, in defending my own counterfactual theory, I am also
implicitly arguing that counterfactual approaches to causation in general have
the resources to capture its important features. The ambiguity in the title thus
accurately reflects the content of the present paper.
TL;DR: The authors used past counterfactual constructions of the type "If she had shut the cage, the rabbit wouldn't have escaped" with a large sample of UK 6- to 11-year-old children.
Abstract: Past counterfactual constructions of the type ‘If she had shut the cage, the rabbit wouldn’t have escaped’ form part of a wider set of conditional constructions expressing hypotheticality in English. Past counterfactual constructions were elicited from a large representative sample of UK 6- to 11-year-old children. They produced a total of 36 different ‘conditional-type’ constructions (as well as a number of non-conditional structures) in response to the task. Despite this variety, developmental trends were seen in the data as well as evidence of possible sociolinguistic variants on the standard English form given above. Moreover, children’s productions showed systematicity which revealed their tacit knowledge of the structure of conditional forms and their use. Wider implications, including children’s variable control of grammatical features thought to be earlier-acquired, and the possibility that adult usage is far more variable than is suggested by traditional hierarchies of conditional forms, are also discussed.
TL;DR: In this paper, a counterfactual account of causality is proposed, which treats our intuitions about cases merely as guides in the construction of a causal concept or concepts that will serve some useful theoretical purpose.
Abstract: Lewis’s work on causation was governed by a familiar methodological approach: the aim was to come up with an account of causation that would recover, in as elegant a fashion as possible, all of our firm “pre‐theoretic” intuitions about hypothetical cases. That methodology faces an obvious challenge, in that it is not clear why anyone not interested in the semantics of the English word “cause” should care about its results. Better to take a different approach, one which treats our intuitions about cases merely as guides in the construction of a causal concept or concepts that will serve some useful theoretical purpose. I sketch one central such purpose, suggesting, first, that an account of causation that, like Lewis’s, gives a central role to counterfactuals is well‐suited to fulfill it, and, second, that the most famous pre‐emption‐based counterexamples to a counterfactual account yield an important constraint on a successful account.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the use of single-observation case studies to develop causal explanations for significant legal events, detailing the evidential and inferential problems inherent in this methodology.
Abstract: This article critically examines the use of single-observation case studies to develop causal explanations for significant legal events, detailing the evidential and inferential problems inherent in this methodology. Most significant among these problems is that focus on a single case necessitates the use of counterfactual thought experiments to test causal hypotheses. The pitfalls of such thought experiments are illustrated through discussion of recent attempts to explain the collapse of Enron Corporation using this approach. Application of a set of normative criteria to the products of these Enron thought experiments reveals the suspect nature of causal explanations and policy prescriptions drawn from single-observation case studies.
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: The authors discusses the fake past tense morphology used for present state in Japanese and shows that counterfactuality is involved in such non-past past tense, even though the proposition expressed is factual.
Abstract: This paper discusses the fake past tense morphology used for present state in Japanese (Teramura 1984; Iatridou 2000). Unlike Korean and other languages, the past tense marker "ta" can express an unexpected finding or remembrance at the time of speech (Inoue and Ubukoshi 1997). I claim that this construction corresponds to subjunctive conditionals with a covert negative antecedent, and that counterfactuality is involved in such non-past past tense, even though the proposition expressed is factual. It is comparable to the counterfactual analysis of factive emotive predicates such as "sorry"and "glad" (Heim 1992; Giorgi and Pianesi 1997). I show that non-past past construction updates the information state, and revises the context.
TL;DR: The authors pointed out that the counterfactuals in question are both ''interlegal'' and ''indeterministic'' and raised doubts about whether this special class of counterfactuality has clear truth conditions.
Abstract: In rejecting the Principle of AlternatePossibilities (PAP), Harry Frankfurt makes useof a special sort of counterfactual of thefollowing form: ``he wouldn't have doneotherwise even if he could have''. Recently,other philosophers (e.g., Susan Hurley (1999,2003) and Michael Zimmerman (2002)) haveappealed to a special class of counterfactualsof this same general form in defending thecompatibility of determinism andresponsibility. In particular, they claim thatit can be true of agents that even if they aredetermined, and so cannot do otherwise, theywouldn't have done otherwise even if they couldhave. Using as a central case an argument ofSusan Hurley's, I point out that thecounterfactuals in question are both``interlegal'' and ``indeterministic'', and I raisedoubts about whether this special class ofcounterfactuals have clear truth conditions. Finally I suggest that acknowledging thesepoints leads to an appreciation of the realstrength of Frankfurt-style examples.
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare measures of causality with measures of regret and find that regret depends on the difference between an actor's perceived causality for the (negative) outcome given his actual decision and the imagined causal for that outcome had an alternative decision been made.
Abstract: The Relations Between Causal (x2) and Counterfactual Reasoning, the Hindsight Bias and Regret (and the kitchen sink) Barbara A. Spellman (spellman@virginia.edu) Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, P.O. Box 400400 Charlottesville, VA 22904-4400 USA The research areas of causal and counterfactual reasoning, hindsight bias and regret, have often been studied in isolation, sometimes studied in pairs, and occasionally studied in triads. I suggest that there are common mechanisms shared by these judgments that explain how, when, and why they will (a) be similarly or differently affected by information and (b) influence each other. To start, I distinguish two types of causal reasoning: the types of judgments we make in science when we have multiple examples of causes and effect and the types of judgments we make in law when we want to figure out the cause of a one-time only event. In the former, an important cue to causality is covariation -- a cause is something that increases the probability of an effect above its usual probability. I then draw an analogy to the latter -- and assume that a causality judgment about a person or event is a function of how much that person or event increases the probability of the eventual outcome above its baseline probability (i.e., its natural probability of occurring). particular, which kinds of counterfactuals should be most effective in doing so. Finally, I argue that regret is both a counterfactual and causal emotion -- it depends on knowing that what you might have done could have changed an outcome. Our studies compare measures of causality with measures of regret. We find that regret depends on the difference between an actor's perceived causality for the (negative) outcome given his actual decision and the imagined causality for that outcome had an alternative decision been made. (Again, such causality judgments are made in hindsight.) Our experiments use this relation to explain action and inaction effects in regret judgments. I hope to relate these analyses to other types of reasoning. Acknowledgments This research was supported by an NIMH Grant. C ≈ p(Oafter) − p(Obefore ) Relevant Publications The equation above represents how a causality judgment is a function of the estimated probability of the eventual outcome occurring after the target cause has occurred [p(Oafter)] and the estimated probability of the eventual outcome occurring before the target cause has occurred [p(Obefore)]. But for one-time events, how can people make probability judgments? I suggest that such judgments rely on pre- existing knowledge -- especially of previous covariations and causal mechanisms -- and counterfactual reasoning. The equation below expands the one above by putting each estimate over 1 (i.e., p(Oafter) + p(~Oafter) = 1). C ≈ Spellman, B. A., Kincannon, A., & Stose, S. (in press). The relation between counterfactual and causal reasoning. Invited chapter to appear in D. R. Mandel, D. J. Hilton, & P. Catellani (Eds.), The psychology of counterfactual thinking. London: Routledge Research. Spellman, B. A., & Mandel, D. R. (2003). Causal reasoning, psychology of. In L. Nadel (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Vol 1, pp. 461-466). London: Nature Publishing Group. Spellman, B. A., & Kincannon, A. (2001). The relation between counterfactual ( but for ) and causal reasoning: Experimental findings and implications for jurors' decisions. Law and Contemporary Problems: Causation in Law and Science, 64(4), 241-264. Spellman, B. A., Price, C. M., & Logan, J. (2001). How two causes are different from one: The use of (un)conditional information in Simpson’s paradox. Memory & Cognition, 29, 193-208. Spellman, B. A., & Mandel, D. R. (1999). When possibility informs reality: Counterfactual thinking as a cue to causality. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8, 120-123. Spellman, B. A. (1997). Crediting causality. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 126, 323-348. Spellman, B. A. (1996). Acting as intuitive scientists: Contingency judgments are made while controlling for alternative potential causes. Psychological Science, 7, p(Oafter) p(Obefore) p(Oafter) + p(~ Oafter) p(Obefore) + p(~ Obefore) That causality relies on counterfactual information in this manner explains the if-only and even-if effects -- ways in which considering counterfactuals affects causal judgments. For example, if someone takes an unusual route home, and then is in a car accident, she might think If only I had taken my usual route. That counterfactual thought would increase the estimate of p(~Obefore), decrease the fraction on the right, and increase the causality assigned to the decision to take the unusual route. The relation to the hindsight bias is clear: When do people make these probability estimates? Typically after events have unfolded. Thus, the hindsight bias is implicit in causality judgments. However, these equations also suggest ways in which the hindsight bias can be de-biased and, in
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show how counterfactual thinking is a very helpful tool to study estimation of treatment effect in the presence of time-dependent covariates, and they provide the cornerstone for the relaxation of treatment effects in e.g. Robins (1992, 1998), Keiding (1999) and Lok (2001, 2004).
Abstract: Large observational studies have become commonplace in medical research. Treatment may be adapted to covariates at several instances without a fixed protocol. Estimation or even definition of treatment effect is difficult in that case. Treatment influences covariates, which influence treatment, which influences covariates, etcetera. To distinguish between these options, even the famous time-dependent Cox-model cannot be used. Robins (1992, 1998), Keiding (1999) and Lok (2001, 2004) study Structural Nested Models to estimate treatment effects even in this difficult setting. Their methods are based on so-called counterfactuals: the outcome a patient would have had if treatment was withheld after a certain time. It is clearly impossible for these outcomes to be observed in all patients. Yet we will show how counterfactual thinking is a very helpful tool to study estimation of treatment effect in the presence of time-dependent covariates. Previous work on these models was usually based on the assumption that the correct model combined with observations made it possible to calculate all counterfactuals for each patient. This assumption was considered not plausible, since it assumes the exact same treatment effect for each patient. This paper provides the cornerstone for the relaxation of treatment effects in e.g. Robins (1992, 1998) or Keiding (1999) in that, at least if there is no censoring, the assumption that counterfactuals are connected with the observed data in a deterministic way is not necessary. We hope that this will contribute to the discussion about causal reasoning.