Showing papers on "Ingroups and outgroups published in 2022"
TL;DR: This paper examined the effects of political elite cues and affective polarization on support for policies to manage the COVID-19 pandemic in seven countries (n = 12,955): Brazil, Israel, Italy, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Abstract: Significance Political polarization impeded public support for policies to address the spread of COVID-19, much as polarization hinders responses to other societal challenges. The present cross-country study demonstrates how the cues from political elites and affective polarization are analogous across countries addressing COVID-19. Far from being an outlier, the United States faces polarization challenges similar to those of other countries. Importantly, the results demonstrate that policies to combat public health crises are more supported when proposed by nonpartisan experts and bipartisan coalitions of political leaders. These results provide clear guidance on depolarizing communication strategies to improve global responses to health crises. Political polarization impeded public support for policies to reduce the spread of COVID-19, much as polarization hinders responses to other contemporary challenges. Unlike previous theory and research that focused on the United States, the present research examined the effects of political elite cues and affective polarization on support for policies to manage the COVID-19 pandemic in seven countries (n = 12,955): Brazil, Israel, Italy, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Across countries, cues from political elites polarized public attitudes toward COVID-19 policies. Liberal and conservative respondents supported policies proposed by ingroup politicians and parties more than the same policies from outgroup politicians and parties. Respondents disliked, distrusted, and felt cold toward outgroup political elites, whereas they liked, trusted, and felt warm toward both ingroup political elites and nonpartisan experts. This affective polarization was correlated with policy support. These findings imply that policies from bipartisan coalitions and nonpartisan experts would be less polarizing, enjoying broader public support. Indeed, across countries, policies from bipartisan coalitions and experts were more widely supported. A follow-up experiment replicated these findings among US respondents considering international vaccine distribution policies. The polarizing effects of partisan elites and affective polarization emerged across nations that vary in cultures, ideologies, and political systems. Contrary to some propositions, the United States was not exceptionally polarized. Rather, these results suggest that polarizing processes emerged simply from categorizing people into political ingroups and outgroups. Political elites drive polarization globally, but nonpartisan experts can help resolve the conflicts that arise from it.
39 citations
TL;DR: The authors examined the possibility that higher national identification commonly found among political conservatives can make them more, rather than less, accepting towards immigrants and minorities, based on the theoretical reasoning that national attachment, net of national narcissism, provides a secure and stable sense of national belonging that forms a basis for a more open attitude towards outgroups.
17 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors examine associations of COVID-19 conspiracy theories with prejudice, support for violence, and other and negative social outcomes, and highlight the potential social problems which are associated with the wide-spread endorsement of these conspiracy theories.
Abstract: One of the appeals of conspiracy theories in times of crises is that they provide someone to blame for what has happened. Thereby, they increase distrust, negative feelings, and hostility toward implicated actors, whether those are powerful social outgroups or one’s own government representatives. Two studies reported here examine associations of COVID-19 conspiracy theories with prejudice, support for violence, and other and negative social outcomes. In Study 1 (N = 501), the endorsement of the more specific conspiracy theories about the alleged role of China was associated with more prejudiced views of Chinese and Italian people. In Study 2 (N = 1024), lowered trust in government regulations and increased hostility associated with the COVID-19 and generic conspiracy beliefs were correlated with justification of and willingness to engage in non-compliance with regulations, violent attacks on 5G masts, and anti-government protests. Across both of the studies, higher exposure to news about COVID-19 was associated with lower endorsement of conspiracy theories, but also with increased feelings of anxiety and lack of control, which in turn were correlated with higher COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs endorsement. We highlight the potential social problems which are associated with the wide-spread endorsement of COVID-19 conspiracy theories.
15 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the possibility that higher national identification commonly found among political conservatives can make them more, rather than less, accepting towards immigrants and minorities, based on the theoretical reasoning that national attachment, net of national narcissism, provides a secure and stable sense of national belonging that forms a basis for a more open attitude towards outgroups.
12 citations
TL;DR: In this article , the authors examined two types of outgroups that might be at risk of becoming victims of intergroup hostility: the "ultimate scapegoat" outgroup which has a long history of negative relations with the ingroup and the "context-dependent" group which is viewed as an outgroup only in certain contexts.
10 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the role of two types of ingroup commitment (national narcissism and national identification) as predictors of attitudes towards immigrants and refugees (disadvantaged groups) and intentions to engage in collective action against them.
10 citations
TL;DR: In this article , the authors focused on antecedents of collective nostalgia and its consequences for collective action in the context of national identity, and hypothesized that collective nostalgia for the country's past is triggered by a sense of collective discontinuity and subsequently engenders collective action intentions to protect the national ingroup and limit the presence of immigrant outgroups.
Abstract: Abstract Global trends surveys suggest that collective nostalgia for one's country is widespread. Moreover, research indicates that collective nostalgia is used by populist radical‐right parties to mobilize their voters against immigration. We focused on antecedents of collective nostalgia and its consequences for collective action in the context of national identity. In particular, we hypothesized that collective nostalgia for the country's past is triggered by a sense of collective discontinuity and subsequently engenders collective action intentions to protect the national ingroup and limit the presence of immigrant outgroups. We tested this hypothesis in a three‐wave longitudinal cross‐lagged panel study (N = 1489) among native Dutch majority members. The results were consistent with the hypothesis. The findings highlight the relevance of collective nostalgia as an emotional response to collective discontinuity that drives collective action intentions aimed at protecting ingroup continuity. We discuss implications of the findings for the literature on collective nostalgia and group dynamics as well as the broader literature on collective action and provide directions for future research.
10 citations
08 Apr 2022
TL;DR: In a recent systematic review and meta-analysis as discussed by the authors , the authors synthesize the relationships between psychological motives and conspiracy beliefs and find that conspiracy beliefs are related to epistemic concerns, demonstrated through a reliance on automatic thinking styles and compensation for experiences of epistemic uncertainty.
Abstract: In the current systematic review and meta-analyses, we aimed to synthesise the relationships between psychological motives and conspiracy beliefs. We focused on epistemic concerns for understanding and knowledge (k = 114, Nobv = 361; Nparticipants = 48,697), existential threats to security (k = 121, Nobv = 414; Nparticipants = 51,517.30), and social needs to defend the self- and group image (k = 100, Nobv = 201; Nparticipants = 34,241.30). Results indicated that conspiracy beliefs are related to epistemic concerns, demonstrated through a reliance on automatic thinking styles and compensation for experiences of epistemic uncertainty. Furthermore, we showed that low cognitive abilities, existential threats (both ongoing personal distress and perceived threats from the world around us), and social needs to maintain interpersonal bonds and defend the self- and group image can explain the formation of conspiracy beliefs. Among other findings, moderation analyses revealed that defensive ingroup identity is only linked to conspiracy measures that capture belief in specific conspiracy theories, but not more general measures of conspiracy mentality. Our findings support the notion that conspiracy beliefs appeal to certain psychological motives. We discuss limitations and avenues for future research. We also discuss the implications of the current findings for efforts to extend theoretical considerations in the literature, pinpointing particularly influential variables and providing recommendations on which to base interventions that reduce susceptibility to conspiracy beliefs.
9 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors focus on outgroup prosocial behaviour targeting conflict rivals in political conflict and find that children are politically socialised and show intergroup biases that dampen helping behaviours towards conflict rivals, which continue into adulthood.
Abstract: More than 420 million children live amid political conflict. In such settings, understanding the development of prosocial behaviours, specifically directed at outgroups, can provide opportunities for peacebuilding. Informed by research on intergroup competition and structural inequality, we focus on outgroup prosocial behaviour targeting conflict rivals. Already from a young age, children are politically socialised and show intergroup biases that dampen helping behaviours towards conflict rivals, which continue into adulthood. We review factors that shape youth's interpersonal helping and broader forms of prosociality, such as civic engagement, across group lines. We conceptualise outgroup prosocial behaviour along a continuum, ranging from interpersonal acts to broader structural and cultural constructive change. We conclude with directions for future research.
9 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on outgroup prosocial behaviour targeting conflict rivals in political conflict and find that children are politically socialised and show intergroup biases that dampen helping behaviours towards conflict rivals, which continue into adulthood.
Abstract: More than 420 million children live amid political conflict. In such settings, understanding the development of prosocial behaviours, specifically directed at outgroups, can provide opportunities for peacebuilding. Informed by research on intergroup competition and structural inequality, we focus on outgroup prosocial behaviour targeting conflict rivals. Already from a young age, children are politically socialised and show intergroup biases that dampen helping behaviours towards conflict rivals, which continue into adulthood. We review factors that shape youth's interpersonal helping and broader forms of prosociality, such as civic engagement, across group lines. We conceptualise outgroup prosocial behaviour along a continuum, ranging from interpersonal acts to broader structural and cultural constructive change. We conclude with directions for future research.
9 citations
TL;DR: The model of ethnification as mentioned in this paper posits that in post-socialist contexts ethnic identities are used as a source for political mobilization against ethnic outgroups, and this is further amplified in Croatia.
Abstract: The model of ethnification posits that in post-socialist contexts ethnic identities are used as a source for political mobilization against ethnic outgroups. In Croatia, this is further amplified b...
TL;DR: The authors explored the relationship between identity leadership and social identification in sport teams over the course of a season using social network analysis and found evidence of a mutually reinforcing bidirectional link such that teammates who are seen as actively contributing to promote a sense of "us" among team members are also more likely to be seen as identifying strongly with the team.
TL;DR: The authors show that majority members misperceive diversity policies as unbeneficial to their ingroup, even when policies benefit them, and that majority group membership itself predicts misperceptions, such that both Black and White participants accurately perceive non-zero-sum diversity policy as also benefiting the majority when participants are represented as members of the minority group.
Abstract: Six studies show that majority members misperceive diversity policies as unbeneficial to their ingroup, even when policies benefit them. Majority members perceived nonzero-sum university admission policies-policies that increase acceptance of both URM (i.e., underrepresented minority) and non-URM applicants-as harmful to their ingroup when merely framed as "diversity" policies. Even for policies lacking a diversity framing (i.e., "leadership" policies), majority members misperceived that their ingroup would not benefit when policies provided relatively greater benefit to URMs, but not when they provided relatively greater benefit to non-URMs. No consistent evidence emerged that these effects were driven by ideological factors: Majority members' misperceptions occurred even when accounting for self-reported beliefs around diversity, hierarchy, race, and politics. Instead, we find that majority group membership itself predicts misperceptions, such that both Black and White participants accurately perceive nonzero-sum diversity policies as also benefiting the majority when participants are represented as members of the minority group. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
TL;DR: In this paper , meta-analytical evidence indicates that the robust association between collective narcissism and conspiracy theories is moderated by the content of conspiracy theories, which creates compensatory motivations to believe in conspiracy theories that protect the committed belief.
Abstract: Meta-analytical evidence indicates the robust association between collective narcissism and conspiracy theories is moderated by the content of conspiracy theories. Belief in conspiracies of specific outgroups fits collective narcissistic posture of intergroup hostility but collective narcissism is also bound to other conspiracy theories because it simultaneously comprises a committed belief (that the ingroup is great) and a threatening belief (that the ingroup is unrecognized). This creates compensatory motivations to believe in conspiracy theories that protect the committed belief and to seize on any conspiracy theory as a meaning-making activity. Collective narcissism and conspiracy theories may also co-occur because they serve to coordinate undemocratic leaders and their constituencies. They produce threatening environments that justify coercion, violence and undemocratic governance.
TL;DR: This paper found that perceived group-based discrimination against conspiracy theorists would strengthen identification with the 'conspiracy theorist' ingroup and suggested that this relationship might be mediated by meta-conspiracy beliefs, that is, the belief that the discrimination of conspiracy theorists is itself a conspiracy.
Abstract: We examined how individuals who may be labelled 'conspiracy theorists' respond to discrimination against 'conspiracy theorists'. In line with the Rejection-Identification Model (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 135, 1999), we hypothesized that perceived group-based discrimination against conspiracy theorists would strengthen identification with the 'conspiracy theorist' ingroup. We propose that this relationship might be mediated by meta-conspiracy beliefs, that is, the belief that the discrimination of conspiracy theorists is itself a conspiracy. Three studies (Ns = 97, 364, 747) among participants who had been labelled as 'conspiracy theorist' in the past (Studies 1 and 2) or who had been labelled as such at the beginning of the experiment (Study 3) revealed robust positive relationships between perceived discrimination of conspiracy theorists, meta conspiracy beliefs, and identification. Furthermore, in Studies 2 and 3, identification was strongly associated with positive intergroup differentiation and pride to be a conspiracy theorist. However, there was no evidence that a manipulation of discrimination with bogus public opinion polls affected 'conspiracy theorist' identification or meta-conspiracy beliefs. A Bayesian internal meta-analysis of the studies returned moderate (for group identification) to strong (for meta-conspiracy beliefs) support for the null hypothesis. In contrast, in Study 3, a manipulation of discrimination by powerholders enhanced both identification and meta-conspiracy beliefs. This suggests that the source of discrimination moderates the causal relationship between perceived discrimination of conspiracy theorists and group identification.
TL;DR: In this article , a sample of 138 White Dutch families from the urban Western region of the Netherlands with children aged 6-10 years (53% girls), observations and questionnaires on maternal colorconsciousness and measures of children's attitudes toward Black and Middle-Eastern ethnic-racial outgroups were collected in 2018-2019.
Abstract: Abstract A prerequisite to anti‐racist socialization in families is acknowledging ethnic‐racial (power) differences, also known as color‐consciousness. In a sample of 138 White Dutch families from the urban Western region of the Netherlands with children aged 6–10 years (53% girls), observations and questionnaires on maternal color‐consciousness and measures of children's attitudes toward Black and Middle‐Eastern ethnic‐racial outgroups were collected in 2018–2019. Variable‐centered analyses showed that maternal color‐conscious socialization practices were related to less negative child outgroup attitudes only. Person‐centered analysis revealed a cluster of families with higher maternal color‐consciousness and less prejudiced child attitudes, and a cluster with the opposite pattern. The mixed results emphasize the importance of multiple methods and approaches in advancing scholarship on anti‐racism in the family context.
TL;DR: This article found that religious believers attribute universalizing moral attitudes to God, compared to themselves, and document how thinking about God's views can promote more positive intergroup attitudes, and extend these findings by demonstrating that thinking aboutGod's views reduces the extent to which religious believers personally dehumanize outgroup members.
Abstract: In seven studies, six with American Christians and one with Israeli Jews (total N = 2,323), we examine how and when belief in moralizing gods influences dehumanization of ethno-religious outgroups. We focus on dehumanization because it is a key feature of intergroup conflict. In Studies 1-6, participants completed measures of dehumanization from their own perspectives and also from the perspective of God, rating the groups' humanity as they thought God would rate it, or wish for them to rate it. When participants completed measures from both their own and God's perspectives, they reported believing that, compared with their own views, God would see (or prefer for them to see) outgroup members as more human. In Study 7, we extend these findings by demonstrating that thinking about God's views reduces the extent to which religious believers personally dehumanize outgroup members. Collectively, results demonstrate that religious believers attribute universalizing moral attitudes to God, compared to themselves, and document how thinking about God's views can promote more positive intergroup attitudes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
TL;DR: In this article , the authors examined the mental health implications of the acting white accusation (AWA) from ethnic-racial ingroup versus outgroup perpetrators and found that AWA insults from ethnic racial ingroup members were associated with more severe mental health outcomes (greater anxiety and depressive symptoms).
Abstract: The "acting white" accusation (AWA) is a cultural invalidation commonly experienced by people of color that challenges their ethnic-racial authenticity for demonstrating behaviors that are not traditionally associated with their ethnic-racial group. Prior research shows that the AWA has negative implications for mental health and ethnic-racial identity (ERI). Cultural betrayal trauma theory also suggests that harmful events perpetrated by ingroup members have unique harm due to the violation of (intra)cultural trust. Prior research has yet to examine the distinct mental health implications of the AWA from ethnic-racial ingroup versus outgroup perpetrators. The present study examines this gap in the literature using longitudinal data and investigates whether ERI centrality moderates the relationship between AWA perpetrators and mental health outcomes. Emerging adults (N = 401; 43% Black, 57% Latina/o; 65% female) were recruited upon enrollment at five predominantly White universities in the Midwest U.S. and surveyed multiple times over their first year of college. Results indicated that AWA insults from ethnic-racial ingroup members were associated with more severe mental health outcomes (greater anxiety and depressive symptoms). Further, ERI centrality provided a protective buffering effect that reduced depressive symptoms, but this effect only occurred for students who received the AWA from White perpetrators and ERI centrality was not protective against AWA insults from ingroup perpetrators. Study findings highlight that specific AWA perpetrators and a person's level of ERI centrality should be taken into consideration when determining the best strategies for helping Black and Latina/o college students cope with cultural invalidations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
TL;DR: This article explored the role of culture and art expertise in the aesthetic evaluation of Indian and Western paintings and dance depicting both abstract and representational content, by inviting expert and art-naïve Indian and western participants to rate stimuli on beauty and liking.
Abstract: Is art appreciation universal? Previous evidence suggests a general preference for representational art over abstract art, and a tendency to like art originating from one's own culture more than another culture (an ingroup bias), modulated by art expertise. However, claims about universality are difficult given that most research has focused on Western populations. Across two pre-registered and statistically powered experiments, we explore the role of culture and art expertise in the aesthetic evaluation of Indian and Western paintings and dance depicting both abstract and representational content, by inviting expert and art-naïve Indian and Western participants to rate stimuli on beauty and liking. Results suggest an ingroup bias (for dance) and a preference for representational art (for paintings) exists, both modulated by art expertise. As predicted, the ingroup bias was present only in art-naïve participants, and the preference for representational art was lower in art experts, but this modulation was present only in Western participants. The current findings have two main implications: (1) they inform and constrain understanding of universality of aesthetic appreciation, cautioning against generalising models of empirical aesthetics to non-western populations and across art forms, (2) they highlight the importance of art experience as a medium to counter prejudices.
TL;DR: The authors found that higher-status recognition advantage even appeared to override the other-race effect, such that participants better recognized members of higher status outgroups, but not an outgroup of equivalent status compared to members of their own ingroup.
Abstract: The other-race effect (ORE) is a recognition memory advantage afforded to one's racial ingroup versus outgroup. The motivational relevance of the ingroup-because of relationships, belonging and self-esteem-is central to many theoretical explanations for the ORE. However, to date, the motivational relevance of outgroups has received considerably less attention in the ORE literature. Across six experiments, Black, White, Asian and Latinx American participants consistently demonstrated better recognition memory for the faces of relatively higher-status racial/ethnic group members than those of lower-status groups. This higher-status recognition advantage even appeared to override the ORE, such that participants better recognized members of higher-status outgroups-but not an outgroup of equivalent status-compared to members of their own ingroup. However, across a variety of self-reported perceived status measures, status differences between the high- and low-status groups generally did not moderate the documented recognition advantage. These findings provide initial evidence for the potential role of group status in the ORE and in recognition memory more broadly, but future work is needed to rule out alternative explanations.
TL;DR: For instance, this article investigated behavioral and endocrine correlates of male strategies during intergroup encounters in bonobos, Pan paniscus, and found that males rarely engaged in coalitionary attacks against outgroup individuals and their testosterone levels did not rise during inter-group encounters.
TL;DR: This paper developed an integrated theory to account for the two types of mediated intergroup contact (parasocial and vicarious) that have been shown to help with prejudice reduction and delineated the process of prejudice reduction.
Abstract: Abstract. The current paper describes an effort to develop an integrated theory – integrated mediated intergroup contact (IMIC) model – to account for the two types of mediated intergroup contact (parasocial and vicarious) that have been shown to help with prejudice reduction. To this end, our model applies concepts from intergroup contact theory, parasocial and vicarious research, and narrative transportation theory. The present research expands our theoretical understanding of how entertainment media can function as a tool for reducing prejudice toward various outgroups. The IMIC model accounts for the effects of the two types of mediated contact – parasocial and vicarious – and delineates the process of prejudice reduction.
TL;DR: This review concludes with a call for research on cooperation to include more non-WEIRD nations and more systematically cover national background as one important social category determining the willingness to cooperate.
Abstract: In this article, we outline the current state of research concerning cooperation in the cross-national context. We present several theoretical approaches and empirical findings regarding national differences in cooperation, as well as how cooperation may depend on the national background of the interaction partner. In addition, we discuss the influence of (national) group norms, cultural similarity, and ingroup membership. This review concludes with a call for research on cooperation to include more non-WEIRD nations and more systematically cover national background as one important social category determining the willingness to cooperate.
TL;DR: In this article , the results of a lab-in-the-field experiment run with ex-combatants, victims, and non-victims of conflict in Colombia are presented.
Abstract: We present the results of a lab-in-the-field experiment run with ex-combatants, victims, and non-victims of conflict in Colombia. In our setting, subjects make contributions to a public good paired with members of the three groups. By comparing contributions when paired with members of their own group with contributions when paired with members of the other two groups, we elicit both outgroup discrimination (towards ex-combatants) and discrimination of the ‘other ingroup’ (non-victims for victims, and victims for non-victims). As participants make contribution decisions first unconditionally and then conditionally using the strategy method, we distinguish beliefs-based from preferences-based discrimination. We also elicit empirical and normative expectations of all participants in the different interactions, for which we study the role played by social norms. Our results suggest that victims and non-victims discriminate against ex-combatants significantly more than they discriminate each other, and that the discrimination of ex-combatants is preference-based. Consistently with needs-based and inclusive victimhood models, victims discriminate against ex-combatants significantly less than non-victims. In line with stigma reversal, victims are discriminated by non-victims, even when they do not discriminate against them, and discrimination is driven by high status individuals. While victims and non-victims hold different expectations about each other, and act accordingly, they both exhibit the same discriminatory empirical and normative expectations towards ex-combatants, but non-victims discriminate against them more intensely.
TL;DR: This paper examined the role of different forms of in-group identity in predicting conspiracy thinking in the context of the coronavirus pandemic and found that conspiracy thinking was positively predicted by national narcissism, but negatively by national identification.
Abstract: Since March 2020, when the World Health Organization declared the spread of COVID-19 a global pandemic, conspiracy theories have continued to rise. This research examines the role of different forms of in-group identity in predicting conspiracy thinking in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. We hypothesized that conspiracy thinking would be predicted positively by national narcissism (i.e., a belief in in-group's greatness which is contingent on its external validation and makes in-group members sensitive to psychological threats) but negatively by secure national identification (i.e., a confidently held ingroup evaluation, which serves as a buffer against psychological threats). In a three-wave longitudinal study conducted on a representative sample of adult Poles (N = 650), conspiracy thinking was positively predicted by national narcissism, but negatively by national identification. Further, we found evidence that conspiracy thinking strengthened national narcissism (but not national identification) over time. Implications for intra- and intergroup processes are discussed.
01 Apr 2022
TL;DR: In this article , the authors outline the current state of research concerning cooperation in the cross-national context and present several theoretical approaches and empirical findings regarding national differences in cooperation, as well as how cooperation may depend on the national background of the interaction partner.
Abstract: In this article, we outline the current state of research concerning cooperation in the cross-national context. We present several theoretical approaches and empirical findings regarding national differences in cooperation, as well as how cooperation may depend on the national background of the interaction partner. In addition, we discuss the influence of (national) group norms, cultural similarity, and ingroup membership. This review concludes with a call for research on cooperation to include more non-WEIRD nations and more systematically cover national background as one important social category determining the willingness to cooperate.
TL;DR: In this article , the authors investigate if and how limited resources can modulate the way these two competing motives affect individuals' decisions in intergroup situation and find that participants were more willing to accept the proposals in the ingroup advantageous condition than the outgroup advantageous condition, and also in the moderate inequality than the extreme inequality condition.
Abstract: Abstract Ingroup favoritism and fairness are two potentially competing motives guiding intergroup behaviors in human. Here, we investigate if and how limited resources can modulate the way these two motives affect individuals’ decisions in intergroup situation. In the present study, participants ( N = 58) were asked to accept or reject three types of resource allocation proposals generated by a computer: the ingroup advantageous condition, outgroup advantageous condition, and neutral condition. In general, participants were more willing to accept the proposals in the ingroup advantageous condition than the outgroup advantageous or the neutral conditions, and also in the moderate inequality than the extreme inequality condition. This may indicate that people sought a careful balance between ingroup favoritism and fairness, although we also found marked individual differences in their preferences for ingroup favoritism or fairness. Importantly, as predicted, participants were more likely to show ingroup favoritism only when limited resources affect the well-being of ingroup members. The present study provides novel insights into the situational and personality factors affecting human intergroup behaviors, shedding light on motives underlying intergroup conflicts prevalent in human societies.
TL;DR: This article found that imagined positive contact condition (vs. control/no contact condition) influenced intergroup support and positive emotions more for individuals who endorsed a conservative ideology and scored high for dehumanizing immigrants.
Abstract: Despite studies examining political ideology, group dehumanization, and intergroup contact as predictors of intergroup support and affect, research on their interplay in shaping such outcomes has been limited. In fact, considering the possibility that conservatives might view immigrants in various ways (as more or less human) is important to understand the impact of interventions (positive imagined contact) on intergroup relations. The results of two experiments (N = 671) with U.S. citizens in relation to two outgroups—Muslim immigrants in Experiment 1 and Mexican immigrants in Experiment 2—consistently showed that imagined positive contact condition (vs. control/no contact condition) influenced intergroup support (i.e., in both experiments) and positive emotions (i.e., in Experiment 2) more for individuals who endorsed a conservative ideology and scored high for dehumanizing immigrants. Participants’ willingness to attribute positive emotions to outgroup members ultimately explained the observed effects. In this research, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings for intergroup relations and outgroup dehumanization.
TL;DR: The authors examined the relationship between ideology and conspiratorial thinking and the related mediating effect of ingroup favoritism in a non-Western society, and found that conservative ideology was associated with conspiratorial beliefs in China regardless of the specific conspiracy theories related to ingroups or outgroups.
Abstract: This article examined the relationship between ideology and conspiratorial thinking and the related mediating effect of ingroup favoritism in a non-Western society. We investigated patriotism and nationalism as two favorable orientations toward national ingroups. We also examined their relationship with the general conspiracy mentality and the specific conspiracy beliefs that have emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic. The results revealed that conservative ideology was associated with conspiratorial beliefs in China regardless of the specific conspiracy theories related to ingroups or outgroups, which indicates such tendencies may exist universally across cultures. Patriotism was not associated with conspiracy theories about the origin of COVID-19, whereas nationalism was negatively associated with the conspiracy theories about China (an ingroup) and positively associated with conspiracy theories about the US (an outgroup). Moreover, nationalism mediated the relationship between ideology and specific conspiracy beliefs during the pandemic. The general conspiracy mentality did not predict conspiracy theories about the origin of COVID-19. The results indicate that believing conspiracy theories is not only the result of a stable conspiracy mentality but is also influenced by ideology and intergroup relations.
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors investigate whether the COVID-19 pandemic indeed increases anti-immigrant sentiments, or that this type of threat elicits other or no group related responses, and they also look at whether such responses are expressed more strongly among specific subgroups in Dutch society.