Showing papers on "Judicial opinion published in 1989"

Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy in the United States

Abstract: When comparing states in the United States, one finds little correlation between state opinion and party control of the state legislature or between party control and state policy. Although these low correlations seeming to indicate that partisan politics is irrelevant to the representation process, the opposite is true. State opinion influences the ideological positions of state parties, and parties' responsiveness to state opinion helps to determine their electoral success. Moreover, parties move toward the center once in office. For these reasons, state electoral politics is largely responsible for the correlation between state opinion and state policy.

Understandings of justice: Institutional legitimacy, procedural justice, and political tolerance.

Abstract: This research examines the linkages among institutional legitimacy, perceptions of procedural justice, and voluntary compliance with unpopular institutional decisions within the context of political intolerance and repression. Several questions are addressed, including: To what degree do judicial decisions contribute to the acceptance of unpopular political decisions? Do court decisions have a greater power to legitimize than the decisions of other political institutions? Are courts perceived as more procedurally fair than other political institutions? Do perceptions of procedural fairness-be it in a court or legislative institution-contribute to the efficacy of institutional decisions? The basic hypothesis of this research is that to the extent that an institution employs fair decisionmaking procedures, it is viewed as legitimate and citizens are more likely to comply with its decisions, even when they are unpopular. Based on an analysis of national survey data, I conclude that, although perceptions of institutional procedure have little impact on compliance, institutional legitimacy does seem to have some effect. The United States Supreme Court in particular seems to have some ability to elicit acceptance of public policies that are unpopular with the mass public. This effect is greatest among opinion leaders. I conclude with some observations about how these findings fit with the growing literature on procedural justice and with some thoughts about the implications of the findings for the protection of democratic liberty.

Justice unbalanced : gender, psychiatry, and judicial decisions

Abstract: The discrepancy and its analysis responsibility and the verdict no offence intended doctoring the sentence playing the labels treatment versus punishment.

Federal District Judges and Presidential Power During the Postwar Era

Abstract: Analysis of nearly two hundred federal district court decisions in cases involving the exercise of presidential power during the postwar era reveals two very different models of judicial decision making. In cases concerning presidential control of foreign and military policy, judicial decision making appears to be dominated by the recognition of fixed rules. So clear are these rules of deference to the executive that identification of the policy-making area alone constitutes an excellent predictor of case outcomes. By contrast, the statistical importance of such predictor variables as presidential prestige and whether the judge was appointed by the same president as that whose powers are at issue in the case suggests much greater relativism in the judicial response when the president is challenged as a domestic policymaker. As far as the federal district courts are concerned, presidential power over foreign and military affairs may aptly be called "the power to command," while the executive's power in dom...

On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers

Abstract: THE relative independence of the judiciary in the American political system is taken for granted by both its critics and its defenders. Most would agree that the courts are effectively insulated from daily politics as a consequence of constitutional provisions that tend to reduce the ability of other government branches to influence their decisions. At the federal level, for example, judges are given life tenure and can only be removed by means of impeachment; at the state level, most judges serve for more limited periods but generally have a high level of security of office because they are very difficult to remove from the bench prior to the expiration of their terms. Both state and federal justices face heavy sanctions in cases of detected corruption, and it is therefore not surprising that most observers accept that bribery plays a negligible role in the process of judicial decision making. There are two major noneconomic views concerning judicial independence. The independence of the judiciary is sometimes portrayed as necessary to ensure that this branch of government functions as an effective counterweight to the legislative and executive branches. Put crudely, the role of the judiciary is to protect society from unconstitutional actions by the other branches, and judges are motivated in this pursuit by concern

Marbury V. Madison and Judicial Review

Abstract: Few Supreme Court decisions are as well known or loom as large in our nation's history as "Marbury v. Madison." The 1803 decision is widely viewed as having established the doctrine of judicial review, which permits the Court to overturn acts of Congress that violate the Constitution; moreover, such judicial decisions are final, not subject to further appeal. Robert Clinton contends that few decisions have been more misunderstood, or misused, in the debates over judicial review. He argues that the accepted view of "Marbury" is ahistorical and emerges from nearly a century of misinterpretation both by historians and by legal scholars. "This book is without doubt one of the half dozen recent works that will be central to the scholarly dispute about judicial review." "Political Science Quarterly." "Clinton offers a resounding correction of the prevailing orthodoxy on the "Marbury" case that has dominated scholarship in law, history, and political science for roughly the last century. . . . If he contended only 'that Marbury was not a political decision but was based on sound constitutional doctrine and existing legal precedent', this book would still make a quite valuable contribution to the literature. . . . But there is more: the constitutional doctrine and legal precedents Clinton has rediscovered, in which the Marbury ruling is firmly grounded, reveal judicial review to be . . . of profoundly narrower scope than is admitted today by right or left, by originalists or nonoriginalists. . . . Clinton has done [much] to blow away a good deal of fog surrounding Marshall, Marbury, and the scope of judicial power." "Review of Politics." "Every student of judicial review should read this book. Even those who disagree with its main thesis will find it very stimulating." Christopher Wolfe, author of "The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law." "An important book. Clinton's new and unorthodox look at Marbury v. Madison is interesting, provocative, and controversial. He presents clearly, forcefully, and persuasively a great amount of evidence to support his thesis." "Social Science Quarterly." "Clinton's reconstruction of the legal academicians' wrangling over Marbury makes delightful reading. . . . He is witty, subtle, and makes points with great deftness." "William and Mary Quarterly." "A coherent, provocative, and welcome challenge to the liberal-Progressive interpretation of judicial review." "Journal of American History.""

Judicial Role Orientations, Attitudes and Decision Making: a Research Note

Abstract: UDICIAL role orientations are judges' measurable attitudes regarding the legal and political functions of courts, and their perceptions of the institutional norms governing judicial decision making. Role orientations have received considerable attention from researchers interested in the judicial process (see, e.g., Becker 1965, 1966; Berry 1974; Flango, Wenner, and Wenner 1975; Galanter, Palen, and Thomas 1979; Gibson 1978, 1981, 1983; Glick 1971; Glick and Vines 1969; Howard 1977; Ish 1975; James 1968; Jaros and Mendelsohn 1967; Scheb 1984; Scheb and Ungs 1987; Ungs and Baas 1972; Vines 1969; Wold 1974). J. Woodford Howard (1977) has defined judicial role orientations as "normative expectations shared by judges and related actors regarding how a given judicial office should be performed" (p. 916). Similarly, but more succinctly, James Gibson (1983) defines judicial role orientations as what judges "think they ought to do" (pp. 9, 17). Gibson sees role theory as "a means of moving beyond an exclusive focus on individuals to consider the influence of institutional constraints on

Legal requirements for social impact assessment: Assessing the social science fallout from Three Mile Island

Abstract: The passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) has been followed by a long series of judicial decisions clarifying and defining the applicability of the statute. Throughout the 1970s, most of these decisions indicated a relatively broad if not expanding view of NEPA's implications. Nevertheless, in a key decision—Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE)— the Supreme Court ruled that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was not required to issue an environmental impact statement before restarting the undamaged nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island. The verdict was interpreted by many as narrowing NEPA's requirements for agencies to consider the social science implications of their activities; others saw the verdict merely as reaffirming the existing regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality that social and economic impacts by themselves do not require the preparation of an environmental impact statement. The article reviews the PANE decision, the l...

Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social Framework Evidence

Abstract: Copyright ? 1989 by Law and Contemporary Problems * Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Duke University I would like to thank David Kaye, Toni Massaro, and Neil Vidmar for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article and Michael Carroll for his assistance with the research 1 Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA L REV 559, 570 (1987) (emphasis removed) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan] See also Walker & Monahan, Social Facts Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CALIF L REV 877 (1988) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan, Scientific lethodology as Precedent]; Walker & Monahan, Social Authority Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U PA L REV 477 (1986) 2 Because some of the most sophisticated empirical research has been conducted in the area of eyewitness identification, I will on occasion use that research to analyze some issues 3 Because of the widespread assumption that the problem of overvaluation of scientific and technical evidence is chiefly a problem that affects lay factfinders, I assume throughout this article that the jury is the factfinder It should not necessarily be assumed, however, that judges are immune to the effects of myths and misconceptions, particularly in the highly charged areas of rape and child sexual abuse See Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape The Rape Trauma Syndtome Issue and Its Implicationsfor Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN L REV 395, 468 (1985) (arguing that myths and fears concerning rape may influence judicial decisions not to admit expert evidence concerning the rape trauma syndrome) 4 My construction of social framework evidence is broader than that used by Walker and Monahan For a more complete discussion of the differences between my construction of social framework evidence and that of Monahan and Walker and my reasons for a broader construction of framework evidence, see infra Part III

Simulating Supreme Court Decision Making.

Abstract: Students of the judiciary have long been concerned with the factors that contribute to decision-making at the individual and institutional levels. In particular, analysts have focused a great deal of attention on the Supreme Court and the behavior of its members. Despite this attention, analysts have differed as to the relative influence of the factors justices rely upon when making their decisions. Even the courses taught in a standard political science undergraduate curriculum send mixed signals about these factors to students. Basic constitutional law courses tend to overestimate the role of doctrinal interpretation and precedent and underestimate the impact of the values and attitudes of the Court's members. Courses on the judicial process and politics err in the opposite direction. When the decision-making literature is viewed as a whole, five basic determinants of judicial decisions emerge: the background of the justice (Tate 1981), the justice's attitudes and values (Rohde and Spaeth 1976), the dynamics inherent in small-groups (Murphy 1964; Woodward and Armstrong 1979), the member's conception of the role of the Court (Howard 1977), and the impact of external stimuli (Casper and Posner 1974). Some of these variables can be measured, but some are very difficult to gauge. As a consequence, analysts cannot accurately assess the relative impact of these five factors upon the individual's decision.

Is "substituted judgment" a valid legal concept?

Abstract: One of the most significant and controversial subjects in medicine today involves making decisions about the treatment of patients who are incompetent. That this has become a subject for debate at all is a tribute to those doctors and scientists who have brought about great advances in medical science in the last few decades. When there were no known treatments for persons with certain diseases or disabilities, there were no questions whether those persons should be treated. Our present problem, though a happy one, is that we now have a choice, whereas in the past there was none. Where there is choice, however, there is difficulty. The scope of treatment decisions now made available to us by new developments in medical and psychiatric science raises particularly complex problems. As great as our new knowledge is, it is not perfect. Predictive dicisionmaking imports value judgments. What were purely medical matters now involve philosophical, social, and moral issues. The difficulty of choice is compounded where one person is making a choice for another on a subject of crucial importance to that other person. Because of the crucial importance of these decisions and the difficulty in making them, it is imperative that we carefully consider what sort of process of decisionmaking we ought to use. Our consideration ought to be free from any prejudice, jealousy, or misunderstanding, either among or within the professions. We ought to be thinking not of ourselves, but of the people whose lives are at stake. In recent years, some courts have accepted a role overseeing what once were decisions made solely by doctors, patients, and family members. Some medical professionals feel that such court involvement represents an unwarranted intrusion into an area best reserved for the experts. Unfortunately, there has been a good deal of misunderstanding among professionals in the fields of medicine and law as to the meaning of some of the judicial opinions in the area. These decisions have held that in some circumstances it is the courts that must make the ultimate medical treatment decisions for people who are unable to do so themselves. This does not imply a lack of faith in the medical profession. The courts are not engaged in making medical judgments that they are not qualified to make. Nor is the involvement of the courts in making these decisions on whether to treat incompetent persons a compromise of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. The author's intention is to discuss the reasoning behind judicial views on treatment of incompetent persons and the criteria to be used in making such decisions. What the criteria should be, and who the decisionmaker should be, are inextricably related issues. The focus of this article is on the doctrine of substituted judgment. Two leading Massachusetts cases which utilized the substituted judgment doctrine are Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz(1) and Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc.(2) They present commonly recurring fact patterns which are useful to illustrate the applications of the substituted judgment doctrine. The Saikewicz case was decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1977. Joseph Saikewicz was a profoundly retarded man of sixty-seven who was diagnosed on April 19, 1976, as suffering from an acute form of leukemia. Mr. Saikewicz was a resident of the Belchertown State School, a facility of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health. He had lived in state institutions since 1923 and in this particular one since 1928. Mr. Saikewicz had a mental age of about two years and eight months and an IQ of ten, and was unable to communicate verbally.(3) A week after Mr. Saikewicz was diagnosed as suffering from leukemia, officials at the Belchertown State School petitioned the probate court for the appointment of a guardian for Mr. Saikewicz and for the immediate appointment of a guardian ad litem with authority to make the necessary decisions concerning his medical treatment. …

Budgeting Rights: The Case of Jail Litigation

Abstract: Judicial decisions are one element in the erosion of local government budgetary discretion. For example, litigation concerning constitutional rights forces local government officials to allocate resources toward the rights-based population. While rights-based allocation decisions may narrow the budgetary discretion of public officials, some managers may, paradoxically, be “better-off”—defined as the ability to protect and defend their budgets — when discretion is reduced. This thesis is tested through a case study of jail overcrowding litigation in a county government.

Affirmative action in the law of tort: the case of the duty to warn

Abstract: One of the principal features in the development of private law in recent years has been the dramatic increase in the variety of circumstances in which courts are willing to hold that one party owes a duty of care in tort to another. The view that the categories of relationship which attract a duty of care at common law are immutably fixed by precedent and that any decision to extend them must be left to the legislature, expressed by one Law Lord as recently as 1970, now seems somewhat quaint and it is generally accepted that courts can, in appropriate cases, extend the scope of liability for negligence to embrace new types of relationships, conduct and harm. As the boundaries of liability have been rolled back, old immunities have been removed and duties of care (albeit sometimes restricted) have been established in areas previously considered to be beyond the scope of the law of tort. But there are still areas of confusion and difficulty, perhaps the most prominent of which in recent years have been the extent of liability for economic loss and for nervous shock. Another area of doubt, however, is the extent of liability for omissions. While it has not attracted as much attention as economic loss or nervous shock, the distinction between acts and omissions still exercises a powerful influence on judicial decision making on the question of tortious liability. This article considers the question of liability for one such omission, namely liability for a failure to warn someone of imminent danger. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by an “omission.”

Normative Theory, the “New Institutionalism,” and the Future of Public Law

Abstract: In 1982 a panel of the Western Political Science Association meeting in San Diego took stock of postwar developments in the study of public law among American political scientists. The Western Political Quarterly has published the papers as a symposium intended to “revive a dialogue” among political scientists about the future of public law. The participants in this symposium generally take for granted the decline among political scientists, academic lawyers, and legal philosophers of the belief that judicial decision can be or even ought to be free of “political” considerations. All seem to agree about the justified triumph of something called “political jurisprudence.” Yet no consensus unites the symposium participants regarding all that political jurisprudence is or ought to be. The participants agree that political jurisprudence should be more than simply teaching and research that confines itself to the legal categories and research methods that dominate lawyers' legal briefs and judicial opinions. They also agree on the need for inquiry into the social-psychological factors of judicial choice, impact studies, alternative methods of conflict resolution, and the like. But the symposium reveals conflicting views regarding the philosophic questions of moral value that enter into legal judgments. Two views in particular stand out.

Perseverance in Courtroom Decisions

Abstract: Perseverance can be assumed to often have an appreciable effect on the thought processes involved in judicial decision making. The phenomenon reflects the everyday experience that “people often do not believe evidence that opposes some theory they hold” (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, p. 169). Perseverance can be described (cf. Ross et al., 1975) as the tendency for information the decision maker initially considered crucial to a decision to retain its influence even when shown to be useless or irrelevant. Obviously, such a tendency runs counter to the basic aim in the judicial process, that of searching for truth (cf. Herrmann, 1971; note that no distinction is made here between material and formal truth). It is often assumed, nevertheless, that a judge’s or jury’s processing of the information relevant to a case is done objectively and that “extra-legal variables” play no appreciable role.

Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat From Roe v. Wade

Abstract: The issue of abortion is of great importance for if present rates continue nearly half the women in this country will have an abortion at some time in their lives. It is the opinion of the author that the Webster v Reproductive Health Services decision of the Supreme Court deviated from the philosophical path set forth by 4 of the justices. Further it fails to meet a minimal standard of sound judicial decision making. Roe v Wade established the constitutional right for women to have abortions. It allowed the state to restrict this right only if it had a compelling reason to do so. The Webster plurality abandoned this standard of judicial protection but gave no serious justification for doing so. The Webster plurality allowed the Court to subvert Roe without actually overruling it. The decision neither rejected the line of reasoning supporting an interest in aspects of family relations and reproduction nor did it distinguish those rights from abortion. Further the Court did not offer any arguments to support the idea that the state has an overriding interest in all fertilized ova. All the decision does is remove the heightened level of judicial protection for a womans right to choose abortion. This allowed the court to remove the advantages gained in Roe without having to overrule it. The authors final conclusion is that Webster rejects the constitutional right for women to control procreation without a given reason for such a decision.

A question of honesty: Roe v. Wade, judicial decision making, and the abortion dilemma.

Abstract: : Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Roe V. Wade decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1973, the issue of the constitutional personhood of the fetus, was dispatched in only 500 words: this essay discusses that treatment and its implications for society. The Court only referred to personhood in terms of the age requirements for government office, the ability to be charged with crimes, and the individuals to be counted in the census, taxed or allowed to vote. The Court also stated that the constitution does not indicate any pre-natal application. The German, Californian and Illinois constitutions do define personhood in fetal terms. If constitutional personhood were dealt with seriously, and an essential difference were posited between the born and the unborn, serious problems would befall the Pro-Life movement. If no essential difference were found, society would be faced with reconciling dilemmas of human rights and abortional freedom. As Dr. Mortimer Adler wrote, \"all humans are equal in their potentiality to develop species-specific properties,\" and the unborn share in the quality. The most important consequence of treating the fetus as a person is that society must deal with problems honestly, directly and courageously, since a right to life and the right to abortion cannot coexist equally.

Freedom of Expression: Is It All Just Talk?

Abstract: In this article Wayne MacKay argues that effective interpretation of section 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires the weighing of real world impacts beyond the traditional liberal parameter of judicial decisions. The usual judicial unwillingness to acknowledge "freedoms" as opposed to "rights" limits governmental legal action while not recognizing political and economic barriers to freedom of expression. The trend toward limiting protected expression both at the definitional stage and through section 1 reasonable limits reflects this cautious approach. This article examines who the early beneficiaries of freedom of expression have been: those affected by criminal sanctions and those who can afford litigation. The latter group consists largely of business pursuing commercial free speech and the corporate controlled media pursuing "freedom of the press". Focusing on freedom of the press, the author asks the "crucial question": whose interests are being served? The tacit acceptable of liberalism is implicit in the usual notion of a free press. This fails to consider that the press is not neutral and most frequently favours business elites whose interests are already well-served by the political process without the protections of the Charter. The balancing of various interests by the courts is closely examined in sections covering media access to the courts and possible conflict between freedom of the press and other legal rights. In conclusion, MacKay calls for a shift away from the role of freedom of expression as an instrument in the democratic process, toward its use to promote primarily community self-actualization, entailing judicial willingness to stop relying on liberal theory and focus on actual life impacts on disparate, and often marginalized, groups in society.

Legal Opinions in International Transactions

Abstract: Sponsored by the Banking Law Committee (E) of the International Bar Association's Section of Business Law, this fourth edition is the result of extensive discussions at many IBA conferences of lawyers worldwide who provide commentary on a multitude of issues which may arise in the process of rendering legal opinions in international transactions. In most important international business transactions opinions of counsel are required as a condition precedent to the "closing" of the transaction. This book analyses and comments on the clauses of a typical legal opinion requested in an international transation. The book explains meaning given to such opinion clauses by US counsel, discusses under the law and practice of 25 countries whether such opinion can be given and whether or not modifications are advisable and addresses the investigation necessary to enable a lawyer to render a correct opinion. The book also contains a chapter discussing the opinion a non-US lawyer should request from a US lawyer. The fourth edition adds a discussion of the special issues involved in opinions rendered by in-house counsel. The principal purpose of the book is to improve the communications between the lawyer - frequently a US attorney - requesting the opinion and the lawyer rendering the opinion. Both must have a common understanding of the meaning of the terminology used in, and the scope of, the opinion. Another important purpose of the book is to analyse the interdependence of the opinions of counsel from several countries rendered in connection with one transaction. This frequently requires a conflict of laws analysis. Where the laws of several countries apply to a transaction, the various opinions must be put together like pieces of a puzzle before the recipient of the opinion can be certain that all relevant legal issues, under all relevant legal systems, have been fully addressed.

Legal Positivism and Natural Law Reconsidered, Again

Abstract: In my article “Legal Positivism and Natural Law Reconsidered” I suggested that we might be able to effect an interesting reconciliation of legal positivism (LP) and natural law theory (NL) by distinguishing two possible LP-NL debates. In particular, I suggested that we should distinguish, within legal philosophy, between theories of legal validity – that is, accounts of the existence conditions for valid law and theories (as I now would put it) of legal interpretation – and theories of adjudication – that is, accounts of how judges should decide cases. We can use this distinction to formulate two possible LPNL debates, one involving legal validity (LP1-NL1) and one involving adjudication (LP2-NL2). NL1 asserts and LP1 denies that the existence conditions for valid law and the theory of legal interpretation ensure that legal standards satisfy true or sound political morality to some significant extent. NL2 asserts and LP2 denies that the content of the correct or justifiable judicial decision must satisfy true or sound political morality to some significant extent. I sketched my own view of the relevant details of the theories of legal validity and adjudication and argued that these claims seem to vindicate LP1 and NL2 and so to allow a kind of reconciliation of LP and NL.

Public Relations in the Supreme Court: Justice Tom Clark's Opinion in the School Prayer Case.

Abstract: As Frederick Schauer observes, little empirical evidence exists that the Supreme Court ever consciously drafts an opinion for its likely audience. To be sure, Schauer notes, the audience frequently varies. Often, only lower courts and attorneys advising business clients are watching, while at other times officials for state and local governments are the primary audience. Sometimes a case might pique the curiosity of the academic world, while on other occasions the whole world-or at least the American public-seems to be watching. But, Schauer complains, the audience rarely if ever affects the manner of the message. Schauer's Court-watching has led him to conclude that "serious thought about this issue, let alone how to address these people once we decide who they are, seems conspicuously absent from the Supreme Court's processes." In Schauer's mind the Court's inattentiveness to its audience is unfortunate: "it would seem sensible, once it was decided what the Court was going to do and how it was going to do it, for the Court to devote some time to drafting an opinion that tried to talk to those to whom the opinion ought to talk." 1 I do not quarrel with Schauer's conclusion about the Court's tendency to neglect its readership. As an inductive generalization, Schauer's thesis is probably correct. My project is more modest and specific. I will focus on just one counterexample to Schauer's thesis, which is Justice Tom Clark's majority opinion in the school prayer case, School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.2 The historical evidence shows that Justice Clark very consciously addressed the Schempp opinion to its primary audience, the ordinary citizen.

A Legal Model of Judicial Decision Making

Abstract: The task of this chapter is to develop a legal model of judicial decision making describing, first, how judges decide whether a tariff sentence or an individualized measure is the more appropriate disposition in a particular case and, second, for tariff sentences, how judges determine the appropriate quantum of sentence (see Chapter 1). This discussion initially turns to the problem of scaling culpability in the course of determining a tariff sentence and then considers the choice between a tariff sentence and an individualized measure. The model is developed and particularized in relation to cases in which the legal offense category of burglary is the principal offense. Burglary is an apposite offense because it is an offense for which both offense and offender characteristics are ordinarily given substantial weight in the determination of sentence (Thomas, 1979).

Decisionmaking in authorizing and withholding life sustaining medical treatment: from Quinlan to Cruzan.

Abstract: Since the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down the first "right-to-die" opinion in 1976, in the celebrated case of Karen Ann Quinlan,1 advances in medicine and technology capable of holding death at bay have outpaced the development of legal rules and procedures to govern their use. The full impact of an estimated 10,000 patients who are comatose or in a persistent vegetative state is starting to be felt by the nation's trial courts.2 Most jurisdictions still have no published judicial opinion on the right-to-die, and in those that do, the case law has raised more questions than answers.3 Trial courts are left with