Showing papers on "Legislature published in 1982"
TL;DR: The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AHA) were passed by Congress in the spring of 1933, during the heady "Hundred Days" of intense legislative activity that followed FDR's inauguration amidst the depths of the depression.
Abstract: descent from parliamentary democracy into the Nazi dictatorship. No such radical change of regime occurred in the United States. Yet the "New Deal" of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first two presidential terms (1933-1940) was one of the most innovative sets of measures put through by any of the liberaldemocratic governments caught up in the maelstrom of the Great Depression. In the context of U.S. history, moreover, the New Deal-along with the national mobilizations for World Wars I and II-was a major watershed in the establishment of an economically interventionist national state. Two of the New Deal's most ambitious efforts at economic intervention -one destined to be shortlived and the other to prove more enduring -were launched right at the start. Both the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act were passed by Congress in the spring of 1933, during the heady "Hundred Days" of intense legislative activity that followed FDR's inauguration amidst the depths of the depression. These acts were an extraordinary new departure for the U.S. national government, which abandoned
392 citations
Book•
31 Dec 1982
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors conducted interviews with 220 members of houses of representatives in nine selected states and asked each legislator how he kept in touch with his constituents, how he resolved matters of policy and how he sought government resources for his district, and what services he provided for individual constituents.
Abstract: Every two years American voters turn out to elect several thousand representatives to state legislatures. Only now in this book do we have a detailed examination of how these officials perceive their jobs and how they attempt to do them. To provide answers to these questions Malcolm E. Jewell conducted intensive interviews with 220 members of houses of representatives in nine selected states. He asked each legislator how he kept in touch with his constituents how he resolved matters of policy, how he sought government resources for his district, and what services he provided for individual constituents. State legislatures differ greatly, and they are not institutionalized to the same degree as the national congress. It is difficult, therefore, to generalize on such effects as partisanship. Likewise it appears that past explanatory models do not adequately describe the complex relationships seen by most legislators in their work. The state legislature is changing. It is becoming more institutionalized. It is becoming more stable as fewer members retire and more are reelected. The trend is toward longer sessions, increased staff, and more activity. With this trend the legislator is becoming more visible; he can deal with lawmaking while having greater opportunities to provide services and to gain publicity for them. If the move by the Reagan administration to put more responsibility for programs on the states continue, then the state legislatures will assume a place of greater importance in the governing of the United States. This pioneering study of representation will thereby gain significance both for the understanding it imparts and for the new questions it raises.
170 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined several possible reasons for differing levels of cosponsorship activity and found that a representative's cosponsoration activity is influenced by ideology, the representative's measure of good public policy, and her re-election prospects if in the Senate and seniority in the House.
Abstract: Since the mid-1930s in the Senate and the late-1.960s in the House, members of Congress have been permitted to cosponsor legislation. Many members have become very active in cosponsoring legislation, while others have shown some reluctance. This article investigates several possible reasons for differing levels of cosponsorship activity. The goals of securing re-election, gaining influence within the Congress, and producing good public policy, as well as the member's general level of legislative activity, are examined as influences on cosponsorship activity. The findings indicate that the representative's cosponsorship activity is influenced by ideology (the representative's measure of good public policy), by the representative's general level of legislative activity, and by the representative's re-election prospects if in the Senate and seniority if in the House.
167 citations
01 Dec 1982
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the relationship between dimensions of voting (e.g., composites of votes on several issues) and measures of general district opinion such as referendum results (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Erickson, 1978, Kuklinski, 1977, 1978; Kuklininski and McCrone, 1980; and Markus, 1974).
Abstract: -M W fANY MEMBERS of the press and the public apparently believe that interest groups "buy" influence by contributing to political campaigns. This belief has been cited as reason for Congress either publicly to finance congressional campaigns or to place a limit on the amount of monies that a candidate may receive from political action committees. In spite of this public discussion, few scholars have investigated systematically whether campaign contributions directly affect public policy or, more specifically, whether the likelihood that a legislator will vote for a bill favored by an interest group increases upon receiving a contribution from the group. Empirical research on legislative voting can be categorized into two groups. The first group of studies has investigated the relationship between dimensions of voting (e.g. composites of votes on several issues) and measures of general district opinion such as referendum results (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Erickson, 1978; Kuklinski, 1977, 1978; Kuklinski and McCrone, 1980; and Markus, 1974). The second group has focused on the relationship between a congressman's vote on specific bills and the opinions (or self-interest) of sections of his constituency (Bernstein and Anthony, 1974; Danielson and Rubin, 1977; Kau and Rubin, 1978, 1979; and Abrams, 1977). Opinion is usually measured by socioeconomic characteristics. To elaborate on Kuklinski's (1979) criticism, the presumption is that legislative voting is influenced by constituents' opinions but socioeconomic characteristics are no more than proxy variables for such opinions. Most of those used are poor proxies because a priori it is not clear which of many characteristics will predict voting and because the ability of a characteristic to predict voting presumably varies over issues. To be an adequate proxy, a socioeconomic characteristic must be sufficiently refined so that it is related to opinion on a specific bill. In the case of a vote on a specific piece of legislation, the size of a group for whom the issue is salient may be a convincing measure of its influence; and the more precisely the group is defined, the better the variable as a proxy. For instance, in this study dairy industry characteristics arguably are better measures of opinion on dairy price supports than general district characteristics such as percentage of the population which is rural. Furthermore, dairy industry characteristics presumably are poor measures of the relevant dimensions of district opinion on issues such as civil rights. For issues involving specific subgroups of votes, the relationship between a proxy variable and voting is not necessarily a black box. However, district level measures of
126 citations
TL;DR: The most popular interpretation of the 1980 presidential election was that the election provided a mandate to bring about several fundamental changes in the role of government in American social and economic life as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: As the Reagan administration neared the end of its first full year in office, interpretations of the meaning of the 1980 presidential election were still as varied as the political positions of analysts and commentators. The politically dominant interpretation, promoted by the new administration and its supporters, was that the election provided a mandate to bring about several fundamental changes in the role of government in American social and economic life. In recommendations whose scope had not been matched since the first days of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, the Reagan administration set about responding to what it understood to be popular demands for reduced government spending and taxes, expansion of the national defence establishment, limitation of environmental protection in favour of the development of energy resources, and a myriad of other tasks designed to encourage free enterprise by ‘getting government off the backs of the people’. With varying degrees of enthusiasm for the new administration's programmes, scores of Democratic politicians shared the interpretation of Reagan's victory as a new electoral mandate which rejected many of the fundamental policies of Democratic administrations from Roosevelt to Carter. This interpretation of the ‘meaning’ of the 1980 election was expressed by Democratic congressmen of many political colours who decried the bankruptcy of their own leadership and affirmed the victor's sense of mandate by supporting the President's various legislative programmes.
93 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a model of centralized vote-trading in a legislature, where each legislator trades away votes on bills of little concern to him and of high concern to leaders, and purchases promises from the leaders to pass (or defeat) particular bills of high interest to the legislator.
Abstract: This paper presents a model of centralized vote-trading in a legislature. In this model, legislators trade only with party leaders, who set prices at which they will buy needed vote-changes and sell promises to pass or defeat particular bills. Each legislator trades away votes on bills of little concern to him and of high concern to leaders, and purchases promises from the leaders to pass (or defeat) particular bills of high concern to the legislator, relative to the price the leguslator must pay.
91 citations
TL;DR: For example, the authors found that worsening aggregate economic conditions significantly increase the legislative vote for leftist parties, which have traditionally played an opposition role, and these models seem strong enough to provide good prediction of the actual legislative vote share.
Abstract: For the United States, the issue of the impact of aggregate economic conditions on legislative election returns has received extensive research. For European countries, however, research is much less plentiful. In particular, multiparty systems such as France and Italy lack study. For both these nations, we find that worsening aggregate economic conditions significantly increase the legislative vote for leftist parties, which have traditionally played an opposition role. Further, these models seem strong enough to provide good prediction of the actual legislative vote share. For example, they manage to forecast the 1981 victory of the left in France, and the 1980 Communist party support in Italy.
46 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors take an initial stab at the delegation question and develop a simple framework in which the later discussion can be conducted, but their focus is on political incentives to delegate.
Abstract: This paper takes an initial stab at the delegation question. What incentives lead legislators to delegate not only the administration but even the formulation of public policy to unelected officials? A variety of considerations are relevant, but my focus will be on political (rather than managerial) incentives to delegate. The next section of the paper develops a simple framework in which the later discussion can be conducted.
42 citations
TL;DR: For example, this article argued that the United States Congress is too closely tied to the interests of members' local constituency, which weakens national agents of representation such as the political parties.
Abstract: Many students of the United States Congress have contended that the institution is too closely tied to the interests of members' local constituencies. While the responsiveness this charge implies may seem laudable, the localism said to exist, especially in the House, weakens national agents of representation such as the political parties. Institutional features like seniority and the norm of reciprocity are often criticized for the premium they place upon members' success in their local constituencies, and the narrow, particularistic policy which results. Those who prefer a legislature responsive to national interests lament the disproportionate influence of constituencies with well-placed representatives on the committees and subcommittees in the House, and the fragmented, ‘distributive’ character of the legislative process.
38 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1982
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an overview of the history of the American system and its role in the regulation of nuclear energy, and present a critique of NRC Regulatory Procedures.
Abstract: Administrative Law: An Introduction. Administrative Law in the American system. The Growth of Administrative Power and Its Impact on the American System. Legislative Attempts to Acheive Democratic Accountability in the Administrative Process. Protecting Administrators from Undue Interference and Harassment. Rule-making: Agencies as Legislative Bodies. Order-Making: Agencies as Judicial Bodies. Administering Public Policies: Discretionary Agency Action. Judicial Review of Agency Behaviour. Suing the Government and Its Administrators. An Administrative Law Challenge: Balancing Societal and Individual Rights. Administrative Law and the Regulation of Nuclear Energy: A Critique of NRC Regulatory Procedures. Appendix A: Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
TL;DR: The authors investigates the impact of the modem presidency on presidential programmatic success with Congress and finds that war, presidential activism, presidential electoral margins, and the strength and cohesion of the president's party have had an effect on the ability to have his legislative program enacted by Congress.
Abstract: This study investigates the impact of the modem presidency on presidential programmatic success with Congress. Specifically, this study tests for the effects that war, presidential activism, presidential electoral margins, and the strength and cohesion of the president's party have had on the president's ability to have his legislative program enacted by Congress. Much change consistent with theory about the modern presidency is found, though continuity of party effects across both premoder and modern presidencies is also found.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify the voting cues used by state legislators when they are deciding how to vote on a specific roll call and apply that strategy to the lower houses of three state legislatures: Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania.
Abstract: This paper seeks to identify the voting cues used by state legislators when they are deciding how to vote on a specific roll call. It follows a research strategy suggested by John Kingdon's study of congressional voting decisions. The paper applies that strategy to the lower houses of three state legislatures: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. The findings are that certain cue sources are consistently important (fellow legislators and interest groups) or consistently unimportant (the executive branch and personal reading) in all three legislatures, but other cue sources (party leadership, committee reports, and constituency) vary in importance quite substantially from one legislature to another. The data also suggest that some of these differences in the relative importance of cue sources may be related to differences in the level of legislative professionalization. Particularly interesting is the finding that the importance of constituents as a source of voting cues is highest in the least ...
TL;DR: In 1950, two events occurred that, though given little public attention, may well have been harbingers of major ideological changes in the world of corporate America as discussed by the authors, and one of them was an action by the New Jersey Legislature, which in 1950 declared it to be part of public policy that corporations organized under the laws of this state should be specifically empowered to contribute such monies as, in a judgment of the governing boards, will conduce to the betterment of social and economic conditions, thereby permitting such corporations, as creations of this State, to discharge their obligations to
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored attitudes of women state legislators toward ERA in terms of social, institutional political and cultural correlates and found that women were heavily in support of ERA as a group, with lower education, less legislative seniority, from states with legislative party leadership opposed to ERA, in states which elect relatively large percentages of women legislators, and who are from countries with moralistic as opposed to traditionalisme political cultures.
Abstract: Attitudes of women state legislators toward ERA are explored in terms of social, institutional‐political and cultural correlates. Data base is a mail survey of the 688 women serving in state legislatures in 1977. As a group, women state legislators were heavily in support of ERA. Opposition to ERA is significantly higher among female legislators with lower education, less legislative seniority, who are Republican, from states with legislative party leadership opposed to ERA, in states which elect relatively large percentages of women legislators, and who are from states with moralistic as opposed to traditionalisme political cultures. Group size, psychological and political security, and personal experience of sex discrimination are suggested as explanations.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors cluster campaign activities in state legislative elections into five empirically justified and conceptually meaningful clusters: direct attempts to persuade voters, obtaining the support of other elites, attempts to increase turnout, seeking endorsements from other political officials, and fund raising.
Abstract: This research first clusters campaign activities in state legislative elections into five empirically justified and conceptually meaningful clusters: direct attempts to persuade voters, obtaining the support of other elites, attempts to increase turnout, seeking endorsements from other political officials, and fund raising. Indices created from these clusters are then compared to the situational factors of incumbency and competition as predictors of election outcomes. Data are surveys of candidates for the Louisiana legislature in which they were asked about the conduct of their campaigns and their relative emphasis on various activities. Incumbency was by far the best predictor of what percentage of the vote a candidate obtained, and in open seat contests, expenditures and competition best predicted outcome. Overall, the campaign activities had very little relationship to outcome when controlling for situational factors. Variations occurred between the House and Senate races with implications for challengers' strategies and campaign financing.
TL;DR: In the summer of 1976, after more than thirteen years of legislative experience, suspended its constitution, abolished the legislature, and embarked on what it called an "evaluation" of its democratic experience as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In the summer of 1976 Kuwait, after more than thirteen years of legislative experience, suspended its constitution, abolished the legislature, and embarked on what it called an “evaluation” of its democratic experience. After the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the downfall of the shah, Kuwait set up a special advisory committee to study, evaluate, and recommend the political system most appropriate for Kuwait. In 1980 the committee recommended a return to representative institutions. In March 1981, a legislative assembly was elected and was entrusted with the responsibility of drafting a new constitution and ratifying the basic statutes of the country.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a background for understanding some of the procedural developments of the past and alternatives for the future, and conclude with a look at alternative future budgetary procedures, ranging from relatively weak budget controls to a constitutional amendment to balance the budget.
Abstract: Federal budget decisions not only reflect views about fiscal and social policy, but also are substantially shaped by electoral politics and by the processes of government. Breaking a budget stalemate appears to require that a compromise between quite divergent views be worked out by the president and the two houses of Congress in this election year using a still-evolving budget process. It will not be easy. Moreover, in the past year such actions as reconciliation and closing the government for a day have left the public more confused than ever at a time when calm judgment is needed to deal with the serious substantive issues raised by this year's budget. This article tries to provide a background for understanding some of the procedural developments of the past and alternatives for the future. It first discusses legislative developments through President Reagan's first year in office, then examines prospects for avoiding a stalemate, and concludes with a look at alternative future budgetary procedures, ranging from relatively weak budget controls to a constitutional amendment to balance the budget.
TL;DR: State legislators have about one chance out of four of winning a congressional seat and are most successful if they come from a more professional state legislature and run in an open seat as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Little is known about attempts by state legislators to advance to a U.S. House position. Data are presented which show that state legislators try for congressional nomination infrequently. When they run they are more likely to contest nonincumbent districts or primaries. State legislators have about one chance out of four of winning a congressional seat and are most successful if they come from a more professional legislature and run in an open seat.
TL;DR: In this article, the trans-Tasman relationships are examined: the interchange of plants and animals, New Zealand's nineteenth century peripheral relationship to a southeast Australian economic core, legislative borrowings concerning land and resources administration, population movements and trade connections.
Abstract: Although geographers frequently claim an interest in the study of spatial interactions there are few wide ranging studies of relationships between specific areas or countries. Australian and New Zealand geographers have treated their countries' inter-relationships as marginal asides rather than as serious research themes. From a wide possible agenda the following aspects of trans-Tasman relationships are examined: the interchange of plants and animals. New Zealand's nineteenth century peripheral relationship to a southeast Australian economic ‘core’, legislative borrowings concerning land and resources administration, population movements and trade connections. Since World War II growing cultural and political divergences have made the Tasman nations cautious about pursuing closer economic relationships.
TL;DR: The position taken by the United States as to the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act and other U.S. antitrust laws has caused considerable concern to the States belonging to the Commonwealth.
Abstract: THE position taken by the courts of the United States as to the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act' and other U.S. antitrust laws2 has caused considerable concern to the States belonging to the Commonwealth. At a meeting of Commonwealth Justice Ministers at Kingston, Jamaica in June 1980, the Australian Attorney-General presented a paper arguing that the States of the Commonwealth should adopt a uniform attitude to efforts by the United States courts to enforce the Sherman Act extraterritorially. 3 In the recent past, there have been several rebuffs by Commonwealth courts to efforts made by American courts seeking to secure evidence through letters rogatory4 and Commonwealth legislatures have enacted legislation which would prevent documents situated within their countries being made available to plaintiffs in the United States to prove violations of antitrust laws before United States courts.
Book•
30 Nov 1982
TL;DR: Spitzer's classic study of presidential power, "The Presidency and Public Policy" examines the annual domestic legislative programs of US presidents from 1954-1974 to show how and in what ways the characteristics of their proposals affected their success in dealing with Congress as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Spitzer's classic study of presidential power, "The Presidency and Public Policy" examines the annual domestic legislative programs of US presidents from 1954-1974 to show how and in what ways the characteristics of their proposals affected their success in dealing with Congress (success being defined as Congress's passing the presidents' legislative proposals in the forms offered). Presidential skills matter, but Spitzer demonstrates that the successful application of those skills is relatively easy for some policies and next to impossible for others. Certain consistent patterns predominate regardless of who sits in the Oval Office, and to a great extent those patterns prescribe prseidential behavior.
Book•
01 Jan 1982
05 Oct 1982
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide summary information on the child support enforcement program, established under title IV-D of the Social Security Act, including basic program statistics and a description of the administrative structure and major characteristics of the program.
Abstract: This report provides summary information on the child support enforcement program, established under title IV-D of the Social Security Act. It includes basic program statistics and a description of the administrative structure and major characteristics of the program.
TL;DR: In this paper, two legislative attempts to specify wage rates on government contracts are analyzed and the success of one and the failure of the other is due to differences in enforcement costs, special interest group support, the concentration of opposition, and the narrower scope of Davis-Bacon.
Abstract: Examples of divergence between the intended (stated) and actual consequences of government intervention in the marketplace abound. In this paper, two legislative attempts to specify wage rates on government contracts are analyzed. The Davis-Bacon Act has been successful in forcing government contractors to pay the prevailing union wage rate. In contrast, the Walsh-Healey Act has been ineffective in establishing minimum wage scales on most government contracts. Analysis indicates that the success of one and the failure of the other is due to differences in enforcement costs, special interest group support, the concentration of opposition, and the narrower scope of Davis-Bacon.
TL;DR: Diver and Diver as discussed by the authors discuss the role of the judge as political powerbroker in structural change in public institutions, a function that often requires them to order massive increases in expenditures, wholesale administrative reorganization, and complete revision of operational practices.
Abstract: *Law School, Duke University; Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellow, 1980-81. 'The past generation has witnessed a remarkable expansion of judicial participation in the implementation of public policy. Plaintiffs increasingly have asked courts not simply to correct isolated and discrete violations of law but also to effect systemic reform of entire institutions or programs. Courts have become the principal forum for the pursuit of structural reform by many groups most disaffected with the delivery of governmental services. In responding to these demands, judges have found themselves in the unfamiliar position of designing and superintending major changes in institutions, a function that often requires them to order massive increases in expenditures, wholesale administrative reorganization, and complete revision of operational practices. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 Va. L. Rev. 43, 44 (1979). In recent years, both popular and academic attention has begun to focus on the innovative and expansive remedies that federal courts have utilized with increasing frequency, especially against state governments. . . . Federal district courts largely have assumed the duties of administering a state mental health system and a state prison. Many federal courts are intimately involved with operating public school systems, and one court has placed a high school directly under judicial control. For some years, of course, courts have mandated state apportionment schemes. One court has ordered the reorganization of an entire city government. In short, courts have exercised traditionally executive functions by appointing executive officers responsible to the judiciary and by determining administrative processes in elaborately detailed decrees; they have exercised legislative functions by setting policy standards for the operation of state and federal programs, including the setting of budgetary requirements. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 Stanford L. Rev. 661, 661-62 (1978) (footnote omitted). In recent years, the judicial role in public policy has greatly expanded: courts have been actively involved in the administration of penal, welfare, education, mental health, and environmental protection policies. In remedying perceived wrongs, they have had to interact with the public bureaucracies operating in the particular policy arenas affected. Judges have not sought merely to monitor the activities of these institutions but have attempted to restructure them, to change their processes and policies. Note, Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89 Yale L. J. 513 (1980) (footnote omitted).
Book•
01 Jan 1982
TL;DR: State and Local Policymaking: Conflict and Accommodation Appendix as discussed by the authors The Setting of State and Local Government 2. Intergovernmental Relations 3. Political Parties and Interest Groups 4. Political Participation and Elections 5. State-and Local Legislatures 6. Governors, Bureaucrats and Mayors 7. Courts, Police, and Corrections 8. Financing state and local Government 9. Suburbs, Metropolitan Areas and Rural Communities 10.
Abstract: 1. The Setting of State and Local Government 2. Intergovernmental Relations 3. Political Parties and Interest Groups 4. Political Participation and Elections 5. State and Local Legislatures 6. Governors, Bureaucrats and Mayors 7. Courts, Police, and Corrections 8. Financing State and Local Government 9. Suburbs, Metropolitan Areas and Rural Communities 10. State and Local Policymaking: Conflict and Accommodation Appendix
TL;DR: The U. S. House and Senate differ in a number of fundamental respects, and procedural conflicts may arise in the process of resolving policy differences as mentioned in this paper, and one important difference between the two chambers concerns the germaneness of amendments.
Abstract: The legislative procedures of the U. S. House and Senate differ in a number of fundamental respects, and procedural conflicts may arise in the process of resolving policy differences. One important difference between the two chambers concerns the germaneness of amendments. House rules require that all floor amendments be germane; Senate rules impose no such requirement under most circumstances. Consequently, conference agreements may include provisions that violate a basic principle of House procedure. The House changed its rules during the 1970s to address this problem and sought accommodation rather than confrontation, attempting to isolate conflicts with the Senate and cope with them by means that protected the integrity of House proceedings.
TL;DR: In this paper, the interaction between a state's capacity to conduct oversight and the forces motivating oversight activity are analyzed in three states-Missouri, Tennessee, and Florida-and they substantiate the proposition that oversight activity in legislatures in which review procedures have been institutionalized is similar to other lawmaking functions-motivated by constituency and partisan concerns.
Abstract: This article examines legislative oversight activity at the state level. The interaction between a state's capacity to conduct oversight and the forces motivating oversight activity are analyzed in three states-Missouri, Tennessee, and Florida. Findings substantiate the proposition that oversight activity in legislatures in which review procedures have been institutionalized is similar to other lawmaking functions-motivated by constituency and partisan concerns. On the other hand, oversight activity in legislatures not so equipped is more a function of individual lawmakers' own norms concerning oversight.
TL;DR: In the early 1970s, Congress began to assert itself strongly in the foreign policy area, imposing restrictions on presidential action and initiating new policy objectives, and the early 1980s have brought a seeming retreat from that assertive role, as a variety of measures have been enacted to repeal certain restrictions imposed in the previous decade as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The constitution of the United States assigns power over foreign policy to both the legislative branch (congress) and the executive branch (the president). That separation, or sharing, of powers has led to differing views on the ability and desirability of congress to participate in making foreign policy. The pattern of legislativeexecutive relations is long and complex, with successive periods of congressional and presidential dominance. During the first twentyfive years after World War n, the congressional role in foreign policy progressed through four relatively distinct phases described as accommodation, antagonism, acquiescence, and ambiguity,1 but the president generally took the leading role throughout the period. Then in the 1970s, largely because of mounting dissatisfaction with the executive secrecy and abuse of power associated with Vietnam and Watergate, but in part because of internal changes within the legislative branch, congress began to assert itself strongly in the foreign policy area, imposing restrictions on presidential action and initiating new policy objectives. More recently, the early 1980s have brought a seeming retreat from that assertive role, as a variety of measures have been enacted to repeal certain restrictions imposed in the previous decade and to increase presidential flexibility. The important question remaining is whether these policy reversals mark a decline in the importance of the role of congress, or whether a qualitative change in the role of congress occurred in the 1970s,