Showing papers on "Limit price published in 1991"

Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States

Abstract: A matching problem is considered in which sellers can publicly commit to a trading price that differs from the price at which buyers expect to trade elsewhere in the market. When demand and supply are nearly equal, the equilibrium ex ante price offer lies below the price associated with the Nash bargaining split. This relationship reverses when the level of excess demand is large. Sellers always have an incentive to make ex ante offers when prices elsewhere are determined by Nash bargaining. This can be interpreted to mean that Nash bargaining is an unstable pricing institution. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration

Abstract: The hypothesis that price discrimination based on willingness to pay for quality can occur in multifirm markets is confirmed using microdata on gasoline retailing. A test that discriminates between price structures associated with discrimination and with cost-driven, competitive differentials is developed and implemented with controls for variation in outlet and market characteristics. A second test based on profitability variation rejects a competitive, peak-load pricing explanation for the observed price dispersion. The data suggest that price discrimination at the retail level adds at least 9¢ a gallon to the average price of full-service gasoline.

Some Further Evidence on the Law of One Price: The Law of One Price Still Holds

Abstract: International trade models often postulate the existence of a representative price, i.e., the price which prevails at all markets. This is known as the "Law of One Price." In this paper, the law of one price is tested for seven commodities among four countries by explicitly considering transaction costs. The empirical evidence suggests that, in most cases, the law of one price cannot be rejected asa maintained hypothesis. Furthermore, for the remaining cases transaction costs seem to cause the failure.

Marketing Margins, Market Power, and Price Uncertainty

Abstract: This paper provides a conceptual and empirical framework for analyzing marketing margins in a noncompetitive food-processing industry facing output price uncertainty. The framework allows the decomposition of observed margins into components reflecting the marginal cost of the processing industry, oligopoly/oligopsony price distortions, and an output price risk component. The empirical procedure is applied to a time series of spreads between wholesale pork prices and farm prices of market hogs. The principal finding is that, while farm/wholesale margins are more consistent with competitive performance now than they were fifteen years ago, the output price risk component persisted throughout the sample period.

Irreversible Investment with Price Ceilings

Abstract: A model of irreversible investment in a competitive industry under demand uncertainty is developed. In the absence of restrictions, investment by itself will keep the price from rising above a natural ceiling that exceeds the long-run average cost by an option value factor. When a lower ceiling is imposed, investment is triggered only by the observation of an even higher "shadow" price. As the imposed ceiling is reduced to the long-run average cost, this shadow price goes to infinity and investment ceases completely. Because investment is depressed, a tighter price ceiling generally leads to a higher long-run average price.

The price elasticity of demand for common stock

Abstract: We study the price elasticity of demand for the common stock of an individual corporation. Despite the prevelance of assumptions that demand is perfectly elastic, there is little if any direct evidence in the literature to either support or reject that contention. Consistent with the notion of finite price elasticities, we find that the announcement of primary stock oferings by regulated firms depresses their stock prices and little if any evidence that this decline is the result of adverse information about future cash flows. Attempts to relate offer announcement effects directly to possible determinants of price elasticities, however, are inconclusive.

Oligopoly limit pricing

Abstract: We expand Milgrom and Roberts' (1982) limit pricing model to allow for multiple incumbents. Each incumbent is informed as to the level of an industry cost parameter and selects a preentry price while a single entrant observes each incumbent's preentry price. We find that incumbents are unable to coordinate deception, which results in a separating equilibrium in which preentry prices are not distorted. Further, introducing the refinement of unprejudiced beliefs, we show that the no-distortion equilibrium is the only refined separating equilibrium. Plausible pooling equilibria fail to exist or involve downward distortions in preentry prices.

Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market for Pharmaceuticals

Abstract: Empirical studies suggest that entry of generic competitors results in minimal decreases or even increases in brand-name drug prices as well as sharp declines in brand-name advertising This paper examines circumstances under which this empirical pattern could be observed The analysis focuses on models where the demand for brand-name pharmaceuticals is divided into two segments, only one of which is cross-price-sensitive Brand-name firms are assumed to set price and advertising in a Stackelberg context; they allow for responses by generic producers but the latter take decisions by brand-name f inns as given Brand-name price and advertising responses to entry are shown to depend upon the properties of the reduced-form brand-name demand function Conditions for positive price responses and negative advertising responses are derived We also examine the implications for brand-name price levels, and for the brand-name price response to entry, of health sector trends (such as increasing HMO enrollments) that may have the effect of expanding the size of the cross-price-sensitive segment of the market The paper concludes with a review of recent empirical research and suggestions for future work on the effects of generic entry

Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist

Abstract: Should a multiproduct monopolist whose "average price" is capped by regulation be allowed to engage in (third-degree) price discrimination? If the cap applies to a price index with weights proportional to demands at uniform prices, then price discrimination benefits consumers as well as the firm. But if -- perhaps more realistically -- it is the firm's average revenue that is capped, then consumers prefer uniform pricing. In this case total output is higher when discrimination is allowed, which increases welfare, but marginal utilities differ across markets, which is inefficient, and the overall effect is ambiguous. A small amount of discrimination is desirable, however. It is better not to allow price discrimination if the price cap is close to the level of marginal cost. The consequences of tightening the price cap when discrimination is allowed are also examined.

Multiple Market Entry, Cost Signalling and Entry Deterrence

Abstract: A low-cost incumbent may limit price to informatively signal her cost to an uncertain potential entrant, and therefore deter entry. We enrich this model by investigating the strategic pricing behavior of the incumbent when she operates in multiple markets. We demonstrate that the low-cost incumbent's ability to separate from a ghost high-cost type is enhanced when she combines her signalling effort across markets, instead of independent signalling in each market. We show that, in the combined least-cost signalling, the low-cost incumbent limit prices in each market. In an attempt to minimize dissipative but informative signalling costs, the low-cost incumbent may enter unprofitable markets, but exit after credible separation.

Feeder cattle price differentials in georgia teleauctions

Abstract: Three Georgia feeder cattle teleauction markets were analyzed from 1977 to 1988 to estimate the impacts of cattle characteristics and market conditions on prices. Cattle characteristic price impacts were similar to those in previous studies. The impact of feeder cattle futures price on teleauction price was positive but varied across markets. Optimal lot size ranged from 143 to 276 head. In one market, 14 lots were necessary to generate positive price impacts. Additional buyers were estimated to have a $.30/cwt per buyer impact on price.

Resale Price Maintenance and Manufacturer Competition for Exclusive Dealerships

Abstract: Two manufacturers distribute their brands through exclusive retail dealers and must compete for consumers indirectly by inducing retailers to carry their brands. The authors compare equilibrium outcomes with and without resale price maintenance. Maximum resale price maintenance lowers the retail price if manufacturers cannot employ franchise fees. Minimum retail price maintenance raises the retail price if manufacturers cannot set a wholesale price above marginal cost and must employ only a franchise fee. However, these traditional insights are reversed if manufacturers can set both a wholesale price and a franchise fee in the equilibrium without retail price maintenance. Copyright 1991 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

An empirical model of capacity expansion and pricing in an oligopoly with barometric price leadership: a case study of the newsprint industry in north america*

Abstract: The weak form of oligopolistic coordination in pricing and capacity expansion of the North American newsprint industry is examined. A dynamic model consisting of demand, price and regional capacity equations is estimated for the years 1965 to 1986. The reference price in the industry is hypothesized to be based on either adjusted full-cost pricing or mark-up over marginal cost pricing. Neither hypothesis was rejected confirming that either pricing rule better describes industry practices than marginal cost pricing. The determinant of mark-up levels was the industry operating rate. The model also showed that capacity expansion was negatively related to the concentration ratio.

Price discrimination and monopolistic competition

Abstract: An examination of imperfect price discrimination, modelled as a linear combination of perfect price discrimination and uniform pricing, is used to analyze the impact of imperfect discrimination on firm size and product diversity. Additionally, claims that perfect price discrimination leads to the welfare optimum are shown to be generally false.

Competition for customers

Abstract: We consider an oligopolistic market with a given finite number of price setting firms. We study the dependence of the market share of a firm on its own price and give conditions on the distribution of consumers' characteristics such that the profit of a firm becomes a quasiconcave function of its price.

New Goods and Index Numbers: U.S. Import Prices

Abstract: Researchers constructing index number frequently face the problem of new (or disappearing) goods, for which the price and quantity are not available in some periods. In theory, the correct way to handle a new good is to treat its price before it appears as equal to the reservation price (i.e., where demand is zero); in practice, this method can be difficult to implement. However, if the underlying aggregator function is CES then the reservation price is infinity, and we show that the corresponding price index takes on a very sensible form. We apply this formula to measure the price index for six disaggregate U.S. imports, which have been supplied from many new countries over the past several decades. We find that by incorporating the new supplying countries, the price index for developing countries is significantly lower than would otherwise be measured.

An Inventory Model with Planned Shortages and Price Dependent Demand

Abstract: Previous research has yielded a procedure for a retailer to determine the optimal lot size and selling price when a supplier offers all-unit quantity discounts and demand is a decreasing function of price. In this paper, we extend that research by allowing for shortages. An algorithm is presented that determines the optimal lot size, order level, and selling price for a class of demand functions, including the constant price-elasticity and linear demand functions.

Peak-Load Pricing with Continuous and Interdependent Demand

Abstract: Issues concerning time-of-use (TOU) pricing with continuous and interdependent demand are examined in a context where increasing marginal costs of production, as opposed to capacity constraints, provide the major incentive for flattening the load curve. The analysis develops the underlying consumer preferences sufficient to insure a continuously varying load curve and generalizes previous considerations of the peak load pricing problem by simultaneously considering continuous and interdependent demand in determining optimal prices and pricing period lengths. A profit incentive for TOU pricing as a form of price discrimination is revealed, which is tempered as substitution across pricing periods allows limited intertemporal arbitrage. The profit incentive leads a price-regulated firm, ceteris paribus, to choose a peak pricing period longer than the social optimum.

Price competition and node-linkage association

Abstract: This paper presents a short-run model of price competition for markets defined as networks (node-linkage associations) under perfectly inelastic consumer demand Analytical and simulation analyses show an inverse relationship between firms' equilibrium price schedules and the number of directly connected rival firms As the degree of network connectivity increases, holding the size of the overall market constant, average equilibrium mill prices tend to decrease at a decreasing rate This implies that the intensity of competition in a network increases as the network becomes more fully connected, and equilibrium price levels converge at some theoretical minimum that is specific to the prevailing market conditions Price-connectivity relations are shown to be highly sensitive to network structure and the distribution of price conjectural parameters In addition, the paper briefly discusses the welfare implications of price reductions from an accessible and cost-efficient firm in a network

(Monopolistic) resource extraction and limit pricing: The market penetration of competitively produced synfuels

Abstract: This paper analyzes the market penetration of a competitively produced synfuel, e.g., solar energy, in a market that is initially dominated by a resource extracting monopoly. The availability of the renewable substitute depends not only on the price/cost ratio but also on the installed capacities, which reflect historical investments. As a consequence, the resource monopoly faces a discontinuous residual demand schedule. The dynamic interactions between the resource cartel and the synfuel industry are modelled as a differential game; the (open loop) Nash equilibrium is applied to this game. It will be shown that the commodity price will exceed the production costs of the backstop and that the transition from the periods of resource dependence to the backstop technology will be gradual.

The algebra of price stability

Abstract: In this paper, we propose two definitions of price stability that encompass the interpretations of price stability found in the economic literature. To determine the conditions under which monetary policy can achieve price stability, we examine several well-known classes of monetary rules including the targeting of monetary aggregates, nominal GNP, prices, and interest rates. In addition, we use a linear rational expectations model to explore the degree to which price stability constrains short-term stabilization policy. We find that price stability does not necessarily prevent the monetary authority from pursuing short-term stabilization goals.