Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 2008"

Competitive intelligence: A practitioner, academic and inter‐disciplinary perspective

Abstract: Purpose – The article traces the origins of the competitive intelligence fields and identifies both the practitioner, academic and inter‐disciplinary views on CI practice. An examination of the literature relating to the field is presented, including the identification of the linear relationship which CI has with marketing and strategic planning activities. Design/methodology/approach – Bibliometric assessment of the discipline. Findings reveal the representation of cross disciplinary literature which emphasises the multi‐faceted role which competitive intelligence plays in a modern organization. Findings – The analysis supports the view of competitive intelligence being an activity consisting dominantly of environmental scanning and strategic management literature. New fields of study and activity are rapidly becoming part of the competitive intelligence framework. Research limitations/implications – The analysis only uses ABI Inform as the primary sources for literature alongside Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) and Competitive Intelligence Foundation (CIF) publications, particularly the Journal of Competitive Intelligence and Management. A more comprehensive bibliometric analysis might reveal additional insights. Simple counts were used for analytical purposes rather than co‐citation analysis. Practical implications – Attention is drawn to the need for the integration of additional, complementary fields of study and competitive intelligence practice. It is clear that today's competitive intelligence practitioner cannot afford to rely on what they learned 20 years ago in order to ensure the continued competitive advantage of their firm. A keen understanding of all business functions, especially marketing and planning is advocated. Originality/value – While there have been bibliographies of competitive intelligence literature there have been few attempts to relate this to the three distinct areas of practice. This article is of use to scholars in assisting them to disentangle the various aspect of competitive intelligence and also to managers who wish to gain an appreciation of the potential which competitive intelligence can bring to marking and business success.

Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War

Abstract: By the time the United States officially entered World War II, more than half of American anthropologists were using their professional knowledge and skills to advance the war effort. The range of their war-related work was extraordinary. They helped gather military intelligence, pinpointed possible social weaknesses in enemy nations, and contributed to the army’s regional Pocket Guide booklets. They worked for dozens of government agencies, including the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of War Information. At a moment when social scientists are once again being asked to assist in military and intelligence work, David H. Price examines anthropologists’ little-known contributions to the Second World War. Anthropological Intelligence is based on interviews with anthropologists as well as extensive archival research involving many Freedom of Information Act requests. Price looks at the role played by the two primary U.S. anthropological organizations, the American Anthropological Association and the Society for Applied Anthropology (which was formed in 1941), in facilitating the application of anthropological methods to the problems of war. He chronicles specific projects undertaken on behalf of government agencies, including an analysis of the social effects of postwar migration, the design and implementation of OSS counterinsurgency campaigns, and the study of Japanese social structures to help tailor American propaganda efforts. Price discusses anthropologists’ work in internment camps, their collection of intelligence in Central and South America for the FBI’s Special Intelligence Service, and their help forming foreign language programs to assist soldiers and intelligence agents. Evaluating the ethical implications of anthropological contributions to World War II, Price suggests that by the time the Cold War began, the profession had set a dangerous precedent regarding what it would be willing to do on behalf of the U.S. government.

Analyzing intelligence : origins, obstacles, and innovations

Abstract: PrefaceIntroduction: Intelligence Analysis -- The Emergence of a DisciplineJames B. Bruce and Roger Z. George Part One: The Analytic Tradition 1. The Evolution of Intelligence AnalysisJohn H. Hedley 2. The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950-2000Richard J. Kerr 3. Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline?Rebecca Fisher and Rob Johnston Part Two: The Policy--Analyst Relationship 4. Serving the National PolicymakerJohn McLaughlin 5. The Policymaker's Perspective: Transparency and PartnershipJames B. Steinberg 6. Intelligence Analysis: Between "Politicization" and IrrelevanceGregory F. Treverton Part Three: Enduring Challenges 7. The Art of Strategy and IntelligenceRoger Z. George 8. Foreign Denial and Deception: Analytical ImperativesJames B. Bruce and Michael Bennett 9. U.S. Military Intelligence Analysis: Old and New ChallengesDavid Thomas Part Four: Diagnosis and Prescription 10. Why Bad Things Happen to Good AnalystsJack Davis 11. Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to IntelligenceJames B. Bruce 12. The Missing Link: The Analyst-Collector RelationshipJames B. Bruce Part Five: Leading Analytic Change 13. Managing Analysis in the Information AgeJohn C. Gannon 14. Intelligence in Transition: Analysis after September 11 and IraqMark M. Lowenthal 15. The New AnalysisCarmen A. Medina Part Six: New Frontiers of Analysis 16. Computer-Aided Analysis of Competing HypothesesRichards J. Heuer Jr. 17. Predictive Warning: Teams, Networks, and Scientific MethodTimothy J. Smith 18. Homeland Security Intelligence: Rationale, Requirements, and Current StatusBruce Berkowitz Conclusion: The Age of Analysis Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce Glossary of Analytic TermsContributorsIndex

Open Source Intelligence OSINT: Issues for Congress

Abstract: : Open source information (OSINT) is derived from newspapers, journals, radio and television, and the Internet. Intelligence analysts have long used such information to supplement classified data, but systematically collecting open source information has not been a priority of the U.S. Intelligence Community. In recent years, given changes in the international environment, there have been calls, from Congress and the 9/11 Commission among others, for a more intense and focused investment in open source collection and analysis. However, some still emphasize that the primary business of intelligence continues to be obtaining and analyzing secrets. A consensus now exists that OSINT must be systematically collected and should constitute an essential component of analytical products. This has been recognized by various commissions and in statutes. Responding to legislative direction, the Intelligence Community has established the position of Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Open Source and created the National Open Source Center. The goal is to perform specialized OSINT acquisition and analysis functions and create a center of excellence that will support and encourage all intelligence agencies. The effort has been only underway since late 2005 but the Center is up and running, and providing support, including training, to OSINT professionals throughout the Intelligence Community. Administrative mechanisms are in place to ensure that there is a comprehensive community-wide open source effort. It appears, however, to some observers that not all agencies have as yet made comprehensive commitments to acquiring and using open source information, nor that the ODNI has taken sufficient steps to ensure that open sources are appropriately exploited. Observers suggest that congressional oversight of the OSINT process might provide insight into current progress as well as identify areas that need modification.

The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: frameworks and operational parameters

Abstract: In the early 21st century we are witnessing the increasing globalization of intelligence The phenomenon of international intelligence liaison is central to this process, an area where intelligence and international relations connect This article highlights the key themes that are currently developing within international intelligence liaison relationships It asserts that we can identify a trend towards ‘homogenization’ of intelligence and other law enforcement and security initiatives It even suggests we may speak of something close to ‘international standardization’ among a widening group of partners These processes are underway to establish viable frameworks and operational parameters for the intelligence liaison arrangements, together with addressing counterintelligence and other security considerations These convergent ‘regimes’ contribute to the important processes of trust and confidence building, as well as their subsequent maintenance over time In short, a ‘best practice’ approach is becomi

The Contribution of Economists to Military Intelligence During World War II

Abstract: Economists played a crucial role in military intelligence during World War II. Economists working at the Office of Strategic Services estimated enemy battle casualties, analyzed the intentions and capabilities of both enemies and allies, and helped to prepare for negotiations regarding the postwar settlement. Economists working at the Enemy Objectives Unit helped to select enemy targets for bombing. Finally, economists working at the Statistical Research Group worked on a variety of problems brought to them by the U.S. military services. As a consequence of their usefulness during the war, the military continued to employ economists after the war.

Avatars, Virtual Reality Technology, and the U.S. Military: Emerging Policy Issues

Abstract: : This report describes virtual reality technology, which uses three-dimensional user- generated content, and its use by the U.S. military and intelligence community for training and other purposes. Both the military and private sector use this new technology, but terrorist groups may also be using it to train more realistically for future attacks, while still avoiding detection on the Internet. The issues for Congress to consider may include the cost-benefit implications of this technology, whether sufficient resources are available for the communications infrastructure needed to support expanded use of virtual reality technology, and whether there might be national security considerations if the United States falls behind other nations in developing or adopting this new technology. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Adapting information operations to a changing world: Future options for the United States government

Abstract: In 1998, the Department of Defense in the United States released the first of a series of seminal policies on Information Operations (IO). Entitled Joint Publication 3-13, this instruction laid out for the first time, in an unclassified format, how the American military forces could utilise this particular element of power. As a relative newly defined activity, this publication proposed to revolutionise the manner in which warfare, diplomacy, business and a number of other areas are conducted. However, this radical transformation in the United States government with regard to IQ has not occurred over the last decade and a significant gap exists in the capability of the federal bureaucracy to support operations in this arena. While strategic policy and doctrine have been developed and promulgated, in most cases only by the Department of Defense, the actual conduct of IO activities and campaigns across the United States, are normally performed at a much more tactical level. This delta between theory and reality exists because the interagency organisations are often unwilling or unable to make the transformational changes that are needed to best utilise information as an element of power. In this research, the author has developed definitions and models that articulate not only why this delta exists, but also specific strategies for utilising IO in a manner by the United States federal organisations that best optimises the inherent capabilities of this element of power. Specific recommendations are noted below, and will be laid out in greater detail throughout the paper : Develop an Academic Theoretical Construct for IO; Understand that Different Approaches and Processes are Needed to Support IO; Establish an International IO Standards Effort & Meeting the IO Training Needs.

Intelligence Analysis: Once Again

Abstract: : This paper provides a sense of the literature written specifically about intelligence analysis, including general definitions, themes, divergent views, and observations on gaps in literature coverage. A comprehensive review of the literature indicates that while much has been written, largely there has not been a progression of thinking relative to the core aspect and complexities of doing intelligence analysis; hence, the title, "Once Again," with all its connotations. The essay focuses on the core aspect of analysis, the determination of meaning. After a brief review of Sherman Kent's comprehensive work, the role of mental models in determining meaning is discussed, followed by recurring alternative views of analysis processes and their chronologies. Key elements of the analysis processes are then discussed, including hypotheses, information research, and the marshalling of evidence, including how they influence the determination of meaning. The literature on rigor in intelligence analysis is reviewed, including the role of structured analytic techniques and automated tools. The paper concludes with observations on the state of the literature.

British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources

Abstract: Introduction 1. Domestic Intelligence 2. International Intelligence 3. Military Intelligence 4. Naval Intelligence 5. Air Intelligence 6. The Special Operations Executive 7. Scientific Intelligence 8. Communications Intelligence 9. Intelligence in a Changing World.

Content and end-state-based alteration in the practice of political violence since the end of cold war: the difference between the terrorism of the cold war and the terrorism of al Qaeda: the rise of the "transcendental terrorist"

Abstract: For more than two generations the world was defined in international political terms by the label, the Cold War. This phrase was shorthand for many phenomena, including the division of the East and West into two blocs and the ideologicallybased definition of said blocs. Whilst we cannot state that the whole of the world was divided in an iron-clad fashion into two separate camps – the neutral and nonaligned nations representing a sizeable constituency – the fact remains that for North America, Western Europe, the USSR and the Soviet controlled satellite nations, the bipolarity of the Cold War geostrategic environment had an overarching impact upon several areas of policy, including national security, foreign affairs, defence and attitudes to the use of force. The influence of the bipolar stand-off had a significant shaping effect with regard to how government was organised on both sides of the Iron Curtain and on the ways in which threat perceptions were managed and influenced national policies concerning security. Fundamentally, the effect can be summarised as follows: Internally: National governments secured the law and order and domestic stability of their state system primarily through the agency of the police (or militia). These authorities were mandated to fight common crime and, in the West, to assist in the fight against terrorism. Additionally a threat was posed by the intelligence agents and subversives of the other bloc. As a result the domestic element of this threat was responded to with counter-intelligence agencies. Externally: The threat of a conventional war (World War III) meant that the armed forces of each bloc had to prepare for a possible bloc on bloc conflict in which classic concepts of territorial defence against an outside aggressor were central. The external threat was dealt with fundamentally by means of intelligence. It was not adequate to simply prepare domestically for a war with the other bloc. To be able to deter and to prepare against the opposition it was necessary to gather pertinent information (intelligence) on the enemy. This intelligence could be either technical and military in nature – for example the nature and capabilities of a new piece of military equipment fielded by the opposing army – or political and economic, such as the inner workings and intentions of the enemy’s political elite, or government and the state given industrial sectors. This distinction led to the fact that each type of information was gathered by a separate authority, the former being military intelligence and the latter being civilian intelligence.

The Domestic Intelligence Gap: Progress since 9/11?

Abstract: INTRODUCTION"Near-term policies have long-term consequences, and a central responsibility of grand strategy is a concern with the long term rather than merely the immediate."?Steven D. Biddle 1The purpose of a grand strategy is to "direct all the sources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object ... the goal defined by fundamental policy." 2 Strategic events, such as Pearl Harbor (1941) or the Sputnik launch (1957), can also serve as the impetus to reevaluate national policies. In other words, they can alter strategic policy in fundamental ways. The United States transitioned from an isolationist position to a global worldview as a result of Pearl Harbor; Sputnik was the catalyst to totally redefine the U.S. approach to space. Such events often serve as mandates for change.The attacks on 9/11 were another strategic event and mandate for change. The inability of the U.S. intelligence community to "connect the dots" due to inefficient information-sharing mechanisms and the gap in domestic intelligence led to a significant debate about improving the nation's intelligence apparatus. 3 These attacks also served as the rallying point for reformists to improve the ability to share information. As a result, the 9/11 attacks prompted the largest reorganization of the intelligence community since 1947. 4Intelligence reorganization and reform since 9/11 have resulted in numerous changes. Most significant were the creation of several national organizations - the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Director for National Intelligence (DNI), the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) - and the revamping of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) intelligence capability. 5 These changes, coupled with an emphasis on information sharing and the development of state and local fusion centers, have resulted in the significant application of resources and effort to address the domestic intelligence gap. 6Reorganization and reform, however, raise other questions, particularly as they relate to domestic intelligence. First, are these changes making the nation more secure? New and major organizational changes often lead to significant implementation issues. Second, has information sharing improved as a result of these efforts? Information sharing can carry multiple meanings within the intelligence community, which lead to a wide variety of implementation issues and differences in consumer expectations. Lastly, have there been corresponding improvements in the intelligence oversight mechanisms to prevent domestic intelligence abuse? Domestic intelligence collection remains a very sensitive issue for the U.S. public.While organizational mechanisms , information sharing , and intelligence oversight are the critical components for ensuring an effective domestic intelligence capability, 7 there is also a temporal issue. Are these efforts transforming the intelligence community over time to reach an envisioned goal? In other words, is the community meeting its projected milestones while progressing towards a well understood objective? Transformation is another term that can frequently be misinterpreted and is often equated with implementing technological change. For purposes of this inquiry, the question is whether the domestic intelligence community is transforming by reorganizing itself optimally, developing improved processes and implementing cutting-edge technological solutions? 8 In this case, organizational approaches , process development, and technology within the context of an envisioned outcome would constitute the elements of transformation.Figure 1: Transformation FrameworkExamining the critical elements of domestic intelligence - organizational mechanisms, information sharing, and intelligence oversight - within the context of transformation will lead to a determination of what has been accomplished since 9/11. …

Identification of Adversarial Activities: Profiling Latent Uses of Facilities from Structural Data and Real-time Intelligence

Abstract: : Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) provides critical support for military planning and decision making. In both offensive and defensive operations, the IPB process gives a decision maker information about the enemy, including potential courses of action, as well as information about the environment in which he is working. Physical structures that can support repetitive crimes (such as IED supply chains or illegal drug trafficking) provide important information for C2 planning. Activities of interest must be situated somewhere, and the physical structures present in any given location change slowly. Knowledge of those structures and their capabilities therefore provide an effective lens through which to view activities, and therefore an effective means for attacking the problem. In this paper we discuss the Facility Identification via Networks with Adaptive Links (FINAL) technology that Aptima is developing to find facilities associated with adversarial actions and discover the intent for their use. Based on algorithms that perform probabilistic network pattern identification from partial knowledge about network nodes, links, and their attributes, FINAL profiles the use of facilities by combining networks of data describing actual conditions and more abstract network models of repetitive crimes.

Rethinking the Combined Force Air Component Commander's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Approach to Counterinsurgency

Abstract: : Success in the COINs in Iraq and Afghanistan is critical to securing our nation's defense. Key to achieving victory are the synchronization and optimization of all resources the United States commits to Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. the CFACC must also optimize the effectiveness of the ISR provided to U.S. forces as these troops pursue their goals in the security arena of these COIN operations. Unfortunately, the air component finds itself ill-equipped to handle the ISR challenges of COIN because it still adheres to its heritage of major theater war, which emphasizes the detection and destruction of conventional targets, a lengthy planning process, and support to operational-level commanders. However, the COINs in Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, centered around lower-echelon commanders who face a multitude of different insurgent groups fighting with asymmetric means, differ greatly from major theater war. U.S. ground commanders, therefore, need flexible, time-sensitive ISR support from the CFACC to assist them in combating an unconventional enemy. The current CFACC collection management system does not meet the COIN needs of ground commanders, but truncating request timelines, adjusting the ISR tasking process to mirror the CAS-request process, synchronizing collection with ground operations, and codifying these changes in joint doctrine would greatly increase the system's utility. By revamping the ISR approach to COIN, the CFACC will increase the value of the intelligence provided to ground commanders and play a valuable role in assisting supported JTF, land, and special operations forces components as they establish security in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, developing a successful CFACC ISR methodology for COIN not only will benefit the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also will serve the joint force well as it deals with the range of military operations in the long war and beyond.

Business Intelligence { Improving Performance of Reengineering Project

Abstract: Traditional competitive intelligence solutions are typically one-sided. Intelligence firms deliver either technology tools to facilitate the intelligence process, independent research deliverables that supplement internal analysis or general consulting to guide the process. Once the solution or report is delivered, the firm is on his own, to piece together these cookie-cutter components into an effective, integrated business intelligence function. The task of reengineering project is to produce intelligence - a unique combination of hardware, software, communications, information and human - and process facts and judgements, opinions and evidence through the complex calculus of human reasoning. It make the chaotic intelligible, the inchoate coherent and the disorganised clear-cut. In the course of a year, it will gather and evaluate millions of different pieces of information, improving reengineering project. They will organise each information element into one or more of more than 3,000 distinct categories and select the most salient items for distribution to the consumers who depend upon their work. The specific information may vary from day to day, but the results always have the impeccable, clock-like precision and reliability.

Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Abstract: : Chairman Rockefeller, Vice-Chairman Bond, Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to offer my assessment of threats to US national security. ... In addition to this unclassified Statement for the Record, I will submit a classified Statement and make an oral presentation to the Committee. Before I talk about specific threats, I want to raise an issue of immediate importance for the functioning of the Intelligence Community and protection of the nation. The authorities granted by the Protect America Act (PAA) which temporarily closed gaps in our intelligence collection and allowed the Intelligence Community to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance are critical to our intelligence efforts to protect the Nation from current threats. Briefly, some of the most important benefits include: * Better understanding of international al-Qa'ida networks; * Greater insight into future terrorist plans that have allowed us to disrupt attacks; * More extensive knowledge of instructions to foreign terrorist associates about entering the United States * Information on efforts to obtain guns and ammunition * Knowledge on terrorist money transfers. Expiration of the Act would lead to the loss of important tools the Intelligence Community relies on to discover the plans of our enemies. As reflected in your Committee report, merely extending the PAA without addressing retroactive liability protection for the private sector will likely have far reaching consequences for the Intelligence Community. At the request of members of Congress, I have provided letters discussing these matters in greater depth.

IMPRINT Analysis of an Unmanned Air System Geospatial Information Process

Abstract: : This study evaluated the streaming video analysis portion of the geospatial intelligence process associated with an unmanned aircraft system, which provides information to a four-person, military intelligence, geospatial analysis cell. The Improved Performance Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT) modeling program was used to understand this process and to assess crew workload during several test scenarios. Based on the use of IMPRINT, recommendations are made regarding the level of staffing for this type of system, based on crew workload characteristics discovered. This initial model was the first segment of a more comprehensive model to be developed to look at full mission conditions for a 12-hour shift.

A Preference for Deference: reforming the military's intelligence role in Argentina, Chile and Peru

Abstract: In the past decade an effort to reform the military's role in defence institutions such as intelligence services has been underway across Latin America. Utilising the cases of Argentina, Chile and Peru, this article will argue that reform has occurred, but has been limited in terms of expanding civilian authority, and will offer a means of understanding the dynamics of intelligence reform. In particular, incentives for civilians to pursue complicated reform have been absent. The military's proven ability to operate its own intelligence agencies constitutes a disincentive. To examine the dynamics of reform, the analysis centres on three variables: the number of institutions involved in overseeing intelligence, the degree of presidential control, and whether military intelligence activities are overseen by the civilian government.

The War on Terrorism: A Collision of Values, Strategies, and Societies

Abstract: Globalization, Ideology, and the Clash of Societies The Clash of Societies Religion, Moral Certainty, and Fundamentalism Our Fragile Environment: How Societies Collapse The Management and Mitigation of Risk The Role of the University and Research in the War on Terrorism Terrorism, Islamic Insurgency, and Religious War The Global War on Terrorism-Instruments of Statecraft Terrorism: Characteristics and Ideology Organizational Skills of the Terrorist Leader The World Wide Web and WorldWide Terrorism Targets of Terrorists The Challenge of Protecting Our Nation Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Focus on Targets, Not Terrorists Weapons of Mass Destruction Broken Borders and Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials Nuclear Terrorism Biological Terrorism Chemical Terrorism Agroterrorism Our Intelligence Community Office of the Director of National Intelligence National Intelligence Program Agencies Military Intelligence Program Agencies Congressional Oversight Committees The Intelligence Process The Reform and Reorganization of Our Intelligence Community Historical Emergence of Intelligence Organizations The Cold War Years: 1947-1989 Two Gulf Wars and Middle East Terrorist Activity September 11, 2001 Attack and Categories of Failure Transforming the Intelligence Community National Security and Counterterrorism Policy Formulation: Transformational Issues and Challenges Instruments of Statecraft Transformational Issues and Challenges Future Trends in Global Terrorism: Mapping the Strategy to Defeat an Ideology Globalization, Ideology, and Security Trends in Global Terrorism Global Trends-2015 and Mapping the Global Future-2020 21st Century Nation-State Issues and Challenges Bibliography Appendices Index

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: An Open Source Analysis

Abstract: : In The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, President George W. Bush singled out the Islamic Republic of Iran as perhaps the greatest challenge facing the United States today. Iran is specifically identified as a direct obstacle to accomplishing a majority of the Nation's strategic objectives. Among these are preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), promoting freedom by ending the rule of tyrannical regimes, denying terrorists state-sponsored support and sanctuary, and defusing regional conflicts. Despite, and in many instances because of, the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, perpetual conflicts on every continent, and the battle with terrorist organizations in every corner of the globe, the Iranian government has positioned itself to become the focus of the world's collective attention. Translating the strategic objectives outlined by the President into effective operational plans requires carefully studying the enemy and determining his centers of gravity (COG). The availability of accurate, relevant intelligence is a key element to correctly identifying a COG, which is a "source of moral or physical strength, power, or resistance." Knowledge of the enemy's culture, history, sociopolitical and economic infrastructures, and leadership is as important in COG determination as knowing his military capabilities and force disposition. After the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and the hostage crisis that lasted 444 days, access to information on the current political, military, and social structures within Iran has been severely limited, complicating the task of identifying COGs. By analyzing only open source material, (official statements, press releases, interviews, Internet-published documents, testimonies from exiled dissident groups and defectors), it is evident that the key center of gravity in Iran is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Sepah-e Pasdaran.

Information Technology and China's Naval Modernization

Abstract: : In recent years, the modernization of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has become a high priority for senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and high-ranking military officers. This growing urgency about modernization is focused largely, but by no means exclusively, on a possible conflict over Taiwan. At the same time, the navy must be prepared for a wider range of missions, including the protection of maritime resources and energy security issues. These missions drive PLAN requirements, not only for the new platforms China is putting into service with the navy, but also for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. Within this context, enhancing PLAN information technology and communications capabilities is seen as critical to China's overall naval modernization program.

Intelligence Informatics … Transforming the Australian Intelligence Community

Abstract: Australia is challenged with providing timely and accurate intelligence to decision‐makers amidst a dynamic global environment. People and products move constantly across country and regional boundaries, requiring increased sharing and coordination of information between domestic and international agencies. Information technology and communications advancement multiplies the complexity by creating information overload for the intelligence analyst and information architect. While the 2004 Flood Inquiry made several sensible and safe recommendations across the intelligence community, their report, and in all fairness their remit, fell short of addressing the best way to organise and equip the AIC given the emergent threats to Australia, the inefficiencies of intelligence collection and production, the lack of performance metrics and feedback, and the absence of cross‐community management tools. Although Australia's determination to bolster national security has manifested itself in different forms,...

Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness

Abstract: : A complex mosaic of forces will affect maritime security through 2020. These include economic forces such as (i) illegal international migration-fueled by tremendous population increases in developing countries, (ii) drug smuggling, and (iii) weapons proliferation, as well as (iv) military threats posed by hostile states, failed states, and transnational organizations engaged in intelligence gathering or terrorist activities. The President's National Security Strategy indicates that diverse threats such as these must be countered through an integrated approach: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA will engage and shape this dynamic and expansive environment by detecting anomalies and deviations from established trends and patterns in commercial and military traffic, and enabling commanders to take appropriate action before security is compromised or crises erupt. In line with the theme for this year's symposium, C2 for complex endeavors, MDA encompasses a diverse set of organizations, complex processes, and a variety of analytic and collaborative tools. This research reported here will advance organizational structures, procedures and C2 technologies to enhance global MDA. Our approach is to document current MDA capabilities, compare them with the next phase of expected capabilities based on integrating new technologies, and document the gains.

The Incisive Fight: Recommendations for Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence

Abstract: The intelligence community has evolved significantly since the failures of 9/11 and the inaccurate assessments on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Congressional action has resulted in multiple far-reaching reforms and tectonic organizational shifts. On the strategic level, however, counterterrorism intelligence policy has been muddled during the past eight years. The Bush administration, for example, called on the intelligence community to “bolster the growth of democracy.” The next president should cast aside political ideology and build on reform efforts to empower top-notch leaders. Strong new leaders in the intelligence community must energize the National Counterterrorism Center and provide the president with comprehensive and policy-relevant intelligence analysis. The United States cannot eliminate the global terrorist threat alone—the next president must boost cooperation with liaison security services. Finally, the intelligence community must bolster its operational capacity to find and detain t...

Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. National Interests. Volume 1: Executive Summary (Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study)

Abstract: : U.S. conventional military capability remains unmatched by any state. As a result, no adversary--peer, near peer, or powerful non-state actor--with objectives in conflict with U.S. interests will oppose our nation with conventional military means. The United States is too strong and capable. Yet, this strength in the conventional arena does not mean that the nation is unmatched across the spectrum of conflict. The proliferation of technology, technical information, and technical skills facilitates access to a range of weaponry, other than conventional, that can be used to attack the United States both at home and abroad. These include weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as biological, chemical, nuclear, radiological, electromagnetic pulse, directed energy, and high explosives, as well as cyber warfare. No longer are adversaries limited to nation states. Technology proliferation has afforded access to the tools of warfare to non-state actors, such as terrorists, insurgents, and groups not bound by geography and the traditional trappings and vulnerabilities of statehood. These asymmetric tools of war may well be employed using non-traditional concepts of operation. Moreover, the battlefield may no longer be limited to regions afar, but may include the U.S. homeland. The United States could well confront the possibility of going to war abroad in the face of significant devastation in the homeland?dividing forces between homeland catastrophe relief operations and combat abroad, or even facing the possibility that deploy and supply of U.S. military forces could be delayed and disrupted. How to contemplate this future over the next two decades was the focus of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study. The question asked by the study was this: Is the United States maintaining its capability to deter and defeat a nation or non-state actor who might employ unconventional or conventional means, in non-traditional as well as traditional ways to thwart U.S. interests?

Transforming USMC Intelligence to Address Irregular Warfare

Abstract: : Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the world has become significantly less polarized. The consequences of this condition have dynamically altered the balance of power that had existed after World War II and have left many countries without the economic and security blanket to which they had grown accustomed. This global instability, in addition to a dramatic increase in Islamic terrorism, has forced the United States to become increasingly involved in small conflicts around the globe. These conflicts have ranged in complexity as well as intensity, but the one consistent theme is that they rarely involve military action with a conventional foe. Another aspect of these conflicts is that they have a tendency to emerge quickly and with little warning. The Marine Corps' role as the nation's "911 force" demands that it be prepared to face these irregular warfare challenges with little or no preparation time. This presents a daunting challenge when considering that the deployed Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) will more than likely be expected to function both in a military capacity and as a conduit for other elements of national power. This places an extremely heavy burden on the intelligence units supporting these efforts. Intelligence support in irregular warfare demands precision, restraint, cultural familiarity, and linguistic competence that exceed what is required for conventional conflicts. These skills take a significant amount of time to cultivate as well as maintain. Fortunately, the preponderance of the new challenges can be achieved with existing resources; they revolve around building the capabilities of the individual Marine. To conduct intelligence collection and analysis in irregular warfare the Marine Corps will need to change certain aspects of intelligence structure, training, and doctrine. This will require staunch support from the Marine Corps' senior intelligence leadership to be successful.

East German Espionage in the Era of Détente

Abstract: East Germany was one of the main actors in Cold War military and security policy intelligence. Due to the opening of the archives of the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) of the German Democratic Republic it is possible today to analyse methods and goals of the East German civil and military intelligence services on this field in more detail. The article summarises the state of research on staff and sources of these services. Based on this information, main directions and operational fields are exemplified for military and international strategic intelligence in the era of detente of the 1970s. Contents and quality of intelligence results are focused with respect to their potential influence on East German and Warsaw Pact (i.e. Soviet) decision-making processes.

Finland'S Military Intelligence in War and Peace

Abstract: Finland affords an example of how a small country can create an effective intelligence and counterespionage service. Finnish military intelligence (MILINT) was flexible and creative; it allocated i...