Showing papers on "Military threat published in 1995"

Security studies and the end of the cold war

Abstract: The end of the cold war has generated numerous reflections on the nature of the world in its aftermath. The reduced military threat to American security has triggered proposals for expanding the concept of national security to include nonmilitary threats to national well-being. Some go further and call for a fundamental reexamination of the concepts, theories, and assumptions used to analyze security problems. In order to lay the groundwork for such a reexamination, the emergence and evolution of security studies as a subfield of international relations is surveyed, the adequacy of the field for coping with the post—cold war world is assessed, and proposals for the future of security studies are discussed. It is argued that a strong case can be made for reintegration of security studies with the study of international politics and foreign policy.

American Public Support for U.S. Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad

Abstract: : The support of the American public is widely held to be a critical prerequisite for understanding military action abroad. As shown in this report, however, the absence of support for military operations from a majority of Americans has not hindered presidents from undertaking those operations in the past, nor does it seems likely to prove much of a barrier in the future. The purpose of the present study is to describe American public opinion toward wars and other large military operations over the last decade, to delineate the sources of support and opposition for each war or operation, to identify the principal fault lines in support, and to illuminate those factors that are consistent predictors of support for and opposition to military operations.

Neutralising the Use of Force in Uganda: the Rôle of the Military in Politics

Abstract: Bullets rather than ballots have dominated politics in Uganda since independence, where two governments have been removed by coups, one by a foreign invasion, and another by an armed rebellion. Force has not only dominated the formal political system, but also threatened the economic and social basis on which democratic processes and progressive development depends. For 25 years predatory military rule and civil war have destroyed lives, skills, and assets, undermined institutional competence and accountability, caused widespread per sonal trauma, suppressed autonomous organisations in civil society, and intensified ethnic hostility and conflict. And Uganda is not alone in this – the middle of the twentieth century was dominated by fascism and war, while sectarian or ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, Ulster, Sri Lanka, Somalia, the Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Zai, Burundi, and Rwanda have inflicted untold damage on people and property.1

The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies

Abstract: The primary concern of this volume is to examine how the discourses and practices of security might have changed or be changing from the dominant understanding of the concept. What constitutes this dominant understanding is perhaps easily recognized. It is a notion of security rooted firmly within the realist tradition, or what Ken Booth has termed as the “ intellectual hegemony” of realism.1 During the Cold War era, its main reference point was the concept of national security. Although marked by considerable ambiguities and fuzziness,2 the concept of national security did provide a dominating strand of security analysis, one that tended to equate “ security with the absence of a military threat or with the protection of the nation [state] from external overthrow or attack.” 3Many recent critics of the national security paradigm have found the intellectual lens of realism too restrictive and advocated a redefinition and broadening of security studies. As a result, a debate continues over which phenomena should be included within the purview of the new security studies agenda and which should not. While the advocates of a broader notion of security call for the inclusion, among other things, of economic, ecological, demographic (refugees and illegal migration), narcotic, or gender issues,4 others (such as Mohammed Ayoob in his contribution to this volume) warn against too much broadening, citing the danger of security becoming acatchall concept, and urging the retention of the original state-centric and war-centric focus of security studies.5

Civil-military relations in Israel

Abstract: A small nation surrounded by often hostile states, Israel has kept a well-trained military force to defend its borders. This study discusses the alarming possibility of a military takeover of the Israeli government. The author explores the advancing presence of the military in Israeli politics.

The New Calculus: Analyzing Airpower's Changing Role in Joint Theater Campaigns

Abstract: : The collapse of the Soviet Union has transformed the nature of America's 'strategic problem'. This provides both an opportunity and a need to reexamine U.S. military forces with an eye toward designing a posture suited to the nation's needs in the post-Cold War period. The new emphasis in U.S. military planning on regional conflicts is an appropriate starting point that presents several challenges, including numerous potential locales, smaller forward deployments, short warning times, long deployment distances, and increasingly lethal weapons in the hands of adversaries. This report's main objective is to evaluate the capabilities of U.S. forces for achieving key operational objectives in future major regional conflicts. In particular, it focuses on means of improving airpower's potential capabilities in the context of joint operations. We recognize that the capabilities of ground- and sea-based forces can be enhanced by new operational concepts and technologies and have highlighted some relevant areas. But we did not explore the full range of options for improving army and naval forces in the same depth.

Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability

Abstract: : The author argues that insurgency is mutating in response to changes in the global security environment, thus making much of U.S. strategy and doctrine obsolete. Even though counterinsurgency is not currently a high priority in U.S. national security policy, the military must keep abreast of such changes and preserve some expertise so that American capability could be reconstituted should policymakers again opt for active counterinsurgency support. He states that if the military ignores global developments in insurgency and counterinsurgency, the reconstitution of capabilities would be more difficult.

SEAN's security cooperation: Searching for a regional order

Abstract: This article examines ASEAN's security concerns and its efforts at security cooperation in response to such concerns. From the outset, ASEAN has defined security comprehensively and this has been reflected in its various attempts at security cooperation. In its early days, when security concerns were focused on domestic challenges and consequent opportunities for external power intervention, a number of concepts and instruments were introduced. These included ZOPFAN, SEANFZ, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 1976. Security cooperation in the early stages mainly consisted of bilateral operations against communist insurgents. The most notable success was the building of a ‘security community’. With Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, ASEAN cooperated against the external military threat by non‐military means. In the post‐cold war era, while ASEAN countries seek security self‐reliance in the form of growing arms acquisition and modernization, ASEAN members are ...

The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs

Abstract: These are turbulent times for The People's Republic of China How will the Chinese military play a pivotal role in the changing of the guard?

National Power and the Interagency Process

Abstract: : Inhibitions about using force can distance the military from participation in interagency decision making. As a result other instruments of national power may be exhausted before serious attention is given to the unique capabilities of the Armed Forces, and then only with a deep sense of having failed in employing other means. The interagency process, especially when military planners are involved throughout, can represent a significant force multiplier, but it suffers from deficiencies in methods, actors, and structure. Military officers, accustomed to a settled and demanding system of staff work, may be frustrated by governmental mechanisms which are known for elasticity and ambivalence. But the military should remain engaged in the interagency process both to make it more effective and to ensure that the military voice is heard at the table. Officers can educate the interagency community about military capabilities and, more importantly, about the limitations of force.

National Interests and Geopolitics: A Primer on the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation

Abstract: : The emergence of the new multi-ethnic nation-state--the Russian Federation on the geostrategic map-- is one of the most important realities of the contemporary world. Though the Russian Federation was proclaimed as the successor of the Soviet Union as one of the great powers, in the matter of international economic and political obligations it is not the same country. Moreover, as a result of the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Russia faces new realities and evolutionary changes in international and domestic arenas that inevitably shape and will continue to shape its domestic and foreign policy. Three themes influence the changes. Foremost is the reduced military threat; one that was primarily based on the ideological rivalry between socialist and capitalist systems during the Cold War. Second, it is critical for Russia to join the international market system and democratic environment. Such participation will be the main guarantee of the future of the democracy and market economy in the country and political stability in the region. Lastly, there is a deep economic, political cultural crisis inside the country because of the rapid dissolution of the ineffective state institutions of the former Soviet Union and the necessity to formulate and pursue national goals on the basis of compromise between the interests of different social groups

The Arms Trade, Military Assistance, and Recent Wars: Change and Continuity:

Abstract: Military assistance patterns generally reflect the character of power relations among nations and states. This article analyzes the patterns of military assistance in recent wars, using them as indicators of continuities and changes in the post-Cold War world. Surveyed are the ways in which combatants obtained military supplies, training, and other kinds of political, economic, and military support between 1990 and 1993. During this period, a curious blend of new and old patterns of behavior emerged. Military support continued to flow to former clients from both the East and the West, but reduced levels of aid and changed security perceptions prompted combatants to turn to other, less traditional sources of aid. Ultimately, the shape and character of the global arms trade will be determined by the new power structure that unfolds. Evolving patterns of military assistance, however, provide some suggestion of what that new world order may look like.

The Coming Military Revolution: Opportunities and Risks

Abstract: : The course of history should leave little doubt that the ongoing pace of technological change will culminate at some point in another military revolution. By definition, our failure to innovate and adapt successfully to this new regime of warfare will have potentially catastrophic consequences on some future battlefield. Our military will be facing some significant changes in the coming decades. We must be careful not to deter ourselves from profound innovation because of what might appear to be serious problems or challenges. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the future battlefield are not predestined, but rather will depend upon specific choices that we and other nations will be making from an expanding array of technological, operational, and organizational options. Our pursuit of an increasing tempo of combat operations is not necessarily a bad choice, but at present it is being driven more by opportunity than necessity. What is important for us to remember is that the ultimate value of any innovation is measured by its success on the battlefield relative to the enemy, and many seemingly brilliant conceptions have failed miserably in that test. More important, as the German blitzkrieg revealed, the "goodness" of a military capability is ultimately determined by its contribution to the nation's strategic goals and the success of the strategic outcome. That is indeed the criterion by which our exploitation of the ongoing military revolution must be measured.

Beyond the Range of Military Operations

Abstract: : Doctrine must be clear and logical. However, the current joint doctrine model, known as the range of military operations, is confusing and ambiguous and should be replaced. It is time to move beyond the range of military operations in search of a model that properly portrays the Armed Forces as the military instrument of national power. Toward that end, a new model entitled the military operational framework is proposed here. It signifies a return to basics in combat and noncombat operations, as well as the continuing preparation needed for both.

The limits of coercive diplomacy: The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war

Abstract: In 1979, China waged a brief but bloody war with Vietnam, with the hopes of punishing Hanoi for its invasion and occupation of Cambodia the previous year. Beijing’s attempt at coercive diplomacy was an embarrassing failure, however, resulting in tens of thousands of casualties for both sides. This article, using Alexander George’s models of coercive diplomacy and crisis management, examines the reasons for China’s failed coercion and confirms that the most important variable was the omnipresent military threat from the Soviet Union, which prevented China from successfully escalating the crisis to its advantage.

China as a military power

Abstract: Conclusions The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a force of slowly improving, but still limited capabilities. Doctrinal and financial deficiencies will delay the PLA's ability to conduct sustained force projection for at least a decade. PLA leaders have been forced to pursue selective modernization. Specific improvements in naval, air, and ground force capabilities will enable the PLA to maintain the credibility of Chinese claims in the South China Sea and influence the decisions of Taiwan's leaders. But the PLA cannot seize and hold territories in the South China Sea. If China were to unch a war of attrition against Taiwan, China could eventually prevail, at a very high cost. A blockade might enable China to gain a political settlement on its terms. However, either action could fail if Taiwan were to receive significant external assistance. Economic development imperatives will motivate civilian and military leaders to avoid conflict unless China's sovereignty is directly challenged. Substantive relations between the U.S. military and the PLA are essential. PLA leaders need to make critical professional, technical, and political decisions about the future. It is important that the United States engage the PLA while it is possible to affect outcomes. Military Modernization and Regional Uncertainties Among the many uncertainties of the Asian security environment, none is more compelling than that surrounding the modernization program of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. For some observers, the combination of economic growth and force improvement signals Beijing's intention to establish regional hegemony. Others acknowledge that the PLA can "spoil" United States' interests. But, citing the selective nature of PLA force improvements, Beijing's interest in regional stability, and the growing conventional capabilities of other regional powers, they tend to discount a PLA military threat. Chinese secrecy compounds the difficulty. China has greater military power today than it did a decade ago. If Beijing were willing to pay the price, the PLA could wreak great damage. However, in assessing China's future threat potential, it is essential to consider the economic, political, and strategic constraints on PLA modernization. Such considerations suggest that the PLA is years away from achieving the capability to project military force in a sustained manner. Strategic Intentions: National Objectives and National Strategy PLA officers enthusiastically support the defining objective of Beijing's national strategy, which is to see China assume the status of a great power. Nationalism and the weight of the past are important factors. A strong China will never again be subject to the humiliations of the past. China's leaders believe that the key to great power status is to build a world-class economy and military. This requires maintaining a stable external environment to support high levels of economic growth. Conflict is to be avoided. Obvious exceptions involve sovereignty issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, or the South China Sea. PLA leaders actively support China's present economic policies. Military leaders feel that, in addition to serving national strategic objectives, the policies provide the best means of acquiring the capabilities required in high-technology warfare. Reconstituting the PLA into a modern military force has been the goal of the military modernization program the PLA has pursued since the early 1980s. Lack of information about the military modernization program, in turn, is also the source of much of the uncertainty about China's future intentions. Uncertain Progress During the last decade, the military reduced its numbers by more than one million, introduced ranks, reformed education and training systems, implemented a reserve system, began to modernize its doctrine, and entered upon a modest program of weapons and equipment modernization. …

The Building Blocks of Russia's Future Military Doctrine

Abstract: : This report examines the political, ideological, and geopolitical building blocks of Russia's future military doctrine. It provides an overview of internal and external security challenges to Russia's national security interests in Europe and Asia; explains the connection between Russia's internal crisis and the future direction of its national security policy and military doctrine; and outlines alternative solutions to its current crisis and national security challenges. The report concludes with summary implications for U.S. policy. This report was prepared as part of the project titled 'After the Warsaw Pact. The Transformation of Military Policy and Security Environment in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union'. It should be of interest to analysts and policymakers concerned with Russia's future military doctrine. The report was completed in February 1994.

Trends in the Global Balance of Airpower

Abstract: : The end of the Cold War era has introduced new and significant challenges for U.S. military forces. The focus of U.S. national military strategy has shifted from the threat to U.S. interests posed by the former Soviet Union to those posed by regional powers. As laid out in the Department of Defense's recent 'Bottom-Up Review,' the vast majority of U.S. defense resources will be devoted to raising and equipping forces to fight major theater conflicts against potential regional foes.

The US army in operations other than War: A time to revive military geography

Abstract: This paper revisits and interrelates the scope of military geography and the changing role of the military, two themes previously addressed in the 1993 and 1994 special editions ofGeoJournal. I begin by tracing the evolution of military geography in the US from World War I through the end of the Gulf War to reveal the demise of the subfield within American academic geography. Within the context of the post-Cold War era, I describe the military's reorientation and emphasize the need and opportunity to broaden the scope of military geography accordingly. The military's current operating environment is best characterized by “operations other than war”, undertaken on an unprecedented scale. Military geographers and regional, systematic, and technical experts throughout the discipline now have an unparalleled opportunity to contribute to the success of peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster assistance missions with which the military is currently preoccupied. Initiatives by academic geographers would not only enhance mission accomplishment from the military and federal government's perspective, but might also help to revive military geography as a legitimate subfield by demonstrating that military geographic endeavors can be both “socially responsible” and “politically correct”, particularly within “operations other than war.”

Military Man in Space Essential to National Strategy.

Abstract: : The United States has never had a consistent policy regarding the use of military men and women in space. At a time when the United States, and much of the developed world,has become critically dependent on space assets, continued inconsistency may prove detrimental to U.S. national interests. This paper proposes that using military "soldiers" in space is important to the national security of the United States. It begins with a review of the way space systems impact national policy today, and how that might change over the next few decades. Subsequent chapters focus on the unique talents humans bring to space operations, citing case histories in which astronauts and cosmonauts made the difference between mission success or failure. Following is a history of previous military programs designed to use or explore the use of military astronauts. Despite the cancellation of those programs, there are still potential roles for military personnel in space, and they are discussed as well. Space doctrine should be the same as that for air, sea or land. Space is simply another potential battlefield.

Time's Cycle and National Military Strategy: The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change.

Abstract: : The author states that despite the vastly changed world order, basic principles of international relations still apply, and the United States would be ill-served by abandoning those principles. He argues that the current U.S. national security strategy and its derivative national military strategy are products of change and continuity resulting from the dynamics established in interstate relations over the past 50 years as well as by the end of the Cold War. The seeming end to the threat posed by the East-West confrontation of the past 50 years notwithstanding, the international community still looks to the United States, the world's only super- power, for leadership. (KAR) P. 3

The North-South Security Dialogue in Brazil's Technology Policy:

Abstract: During much of the Cold War era, the West kept critical advanced technology from flowing east for fear of the military threat such technology might pose to international security. With the end of the Cold War, attention has turned to the North-South dimension Armed Forces & Society/Sprin 1995 of technology flows and its implications for international security. This emerging security dialogue between technology suppliers and recipients has as its roots the rapid industrial development of certain Third World countries after World War II, and this article examines how Brazil fits into this North-South dialogue. Its main objective is to uncover the dynamic of Brazilian technological development and explore how that has affected its security relations with the United States.

National Security: Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region.

Abstract: : With the end of the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific region faces an uncertain security environment. China, once viewed as a counterweight to Soviet aggression, is now viewed as a country that aspires to fill the role of the leading regional power. China is pursuing long-range military modernization that emphasizes the upgrading of its air and naval power and a realignment of its force structure. These actions and China's lack of openness on military matters have raised questions about its intentions. GAO undertook a study of China's military modernization due to numerous, and often conflicting, reports of a military buildup in China. GAO's objectives during this study were to (1) assess the nature and purpose of China's military modernization, and (2) compare China's military modernization efforts with those of other Asian nations. GAO's work is intended to assist the Congress in decisions it faces concerning China and the region.

Operations Other Than War: Where Are We Heading?

Abstract: : The purpose of this research paper is to determine how to enhance the military's conduct of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). One characteristic of the U.S. involvement in OOTW, previously called Low-Intensity and Mid-Intensity Conflicts, is that it performs poorly, at least at the onset. To enhance the military planner's understanding of OOTW, this paper highlights the events that led to OOTW being incorporated as a means to accomplish the National Military Strategy of "Enhancement and Engagement." It will examine how the various agencies throughout the U.S. government do not properly interoperate to provide support to the lower and upper ends of the spectrum from civilian/military involvement to solely military involvement in operations just short of war. Historical cases will be provided to clarify problems that have occurred in the past, and to highlight actions taken or not taken to improve diplomatic relations and military operations. From this examination, recommendations are made to enhance the effectiveness of future U.S. Marine Corps actions in OOTW.

United States Foreign Military Sales Strategy: Coalition Building or Protecting the Defense Industrial Base.

Abstract: : Exporting American ideas, equipment, training and doctrine is nothing new and has numerous benefits for U.S. security interests. Two of the most recognizable benefits are U.S. access and influence. Since the end of the Cold War there has been an apparent shift in U.S. Government policy to sell more high-technology military equipment as opposed to the older, more obsolete, retired U.S. military equipment. This paper analyzes this apparent shift in government policy from two view points. The first premise is based on the idea of burden-sharing or coalition building. Supporters of this premise stress the need to insure that our allies are capable of carrying their fair share of the load in any future conflict. Thus, for an ally to adequately carry his share of the load in future conflicts, he must be equipped with state-of-the-art, high technology military equipment that is compatible. The second premise is that of preserving and protecting the U.S. defense industrial base. As U.S. defense spending continues its downward spiral, the Pentagon is unable to fully support its military industrial complex. Today, whether we like it or not, Foreign Military Sales procurements are the only purchases keeping many U.S. weapons production facilities open. Many feel that this is acceptable since the critical skills in the U.S. defense industrial base must be preserved and with reduced defense dollars, foreign military sales is the answer.

Unity of Effort in Peace Operations.

Abstract: : This monograph maintains that the military is only one part of the peace operations environment, and not always the centerpiece. In addition, peace operations occur simultaneously at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This holds true for military, diplomatic, economic, informational and political components. Unity of effort can be achieved by the military working in cooperation with the other pillars of the peace operations environment. These other pillars include military allies, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO's), the United Nations (UN), parties to the conflict, politicians, media, influential visitors, and regional powers. To achieve unity of effort, and success in peace operations, the military must change its approach. This change entails looking at more than just military considerations. By using a non-military approach, in this case Peter Senge's model of systems thinking and the learning organization, the military will be better prepared for the challenges of peace operations. A good way to achieve unity of effort is to use the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), but that is not enough. Liaison is also helpful. In order to make the CMOC and liaison work, a commander must augment these efforts with interpersonal relationships with his colleagues and frequent formal and informal meetings. A commander must constantly revise the mental models he holds for the non-military pillars in a peace operation. There is much that can be learned from other pillars, they hold the keys to branches and sequels since every pillar of a peace operation contributes to the operation's maturity. Mission creep is a poor excuse for an inability to identify branches and sequels to plans. If one only looks at the military component, one will miss indicators of changes in the overall environment that will affect military operations.

Impacts on the Operational Commander in the Information Age.

Abstract: : As a matter of record most senior defense leaders have acknowledged that the United States military is experiencing a revolution in military affairs during what has been termed the information age. The debate in this revolution is based on how the integration of knowledge-based systems into U.S. military forces will effect force structure and future conflicts. However, the indeterminate influence of information age technology on the means of conducting warfare will have a significant impact on the way an operational commander employs his forces. Paradoxically, the information age commander will find a greater level of uncertainty and inflexibility to conduct major operations and campaigns with knowledge-based forces.

The RMA and Air Force Roles, Missions, and Doctrine

Abstract: : The latest techno-thriller from the master of the trade [Tom Clancy] portrays a United States vulnerable to an attack aimed not at its key military installations, but rather at its Wall Street economic brain. The target is information, and by manipulating the data fed into the vast computer network of the American stock market, a foreign businessman triggers financial chaos and threatens economic ruin. As usual, Tom Clancy's work focuses on a current national security concern. Debt of Honor highlights "information warfare," a central feature of the" Revolution in Military Affairs," or RMA, that many defense analysts and military officers associate with the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Those who acknowledge that Desert Storm marked a military revolution do not, however, agree on a standard interpretation of how warfare has changed. Indeed, the shade of one's uniform may color the view expressed. Most concur that the importance of information systems is a fundamental tenet of the RMA, and that the ability to control information gives a belligerent an inherent advantage over an adversary. The believers also tend to agree that technology provides the means to control information, which may then render current military systems, operations, and organizations obsolete. Yet a key question remains unanswered: Will acknowledging the RMA--and taking steps to exploit it--increase the likelihood of victory in the next conflict? From the perspective of the United States Air Force, the answer is unclear. Indications are that an Air Force geared to the perceived RMA may, in certain situations, be ill-suited to accomplish basic air power roles and missions, which could in turn hamper its ability to achieve the fundamental mission of defending the United States "through control and exploitation of air and space."

Force XXI and the American Way of War.

Abstract: : This study examines the Force XXI concept to determine whether it overturns old paradigms of warfare or is merely a continuation of a traditional American approach to war. The study begins by identifying the characteristics of the American military system and the sources or causes for those characteristics. Next, the study draws on key Force XXI literature to describe the concepts that are shaping current and emerging Army doctrine. Finally, by analyzing the emerging concepts and the data used to illustrate them in official publications, this study assesses whether the doctrine is truly a rational extension of these empirical observations or a derivation of traditional military views. The traditional American approach to war resulted from the convergence of American liberal ideology, the demands of the Western military profession, and an abundance of material resources. All of these factors exist today, and, not surprisingly, Force XXI continues to reflect them. Force XXI contains new ideas and places great emphasis on the incorporation of new technology, but it continues the Army's traditional emphasis on strategies of annihilation and offensive action. Rather than bringing fundamental change, technology provides the means for the Army to avoid changing its approach to warfare. Technology offers the possibility for the Army to win wars of annihilation despite reductions in its size during an era of fiscal restraint.