Showing papers on "Military threat published in 2007"

The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers

Abstract: TODAY'S GLOBAL liberal democratic order faces two challenges. The first is radical Islam-and it is the lesser ofthe two challenges. Although the proponents of radical Islam find liberal democracy repugnant, and the movement is often described as the new fascist threat, the soci eties from which it arises are generally poor and stagnant. They represent no viable alternative to modernity and pose no significant military threat to the developed world. It is mainly the potential use of weapons of mass destruction-particularly by nonstate actors-that makes militant Islam a menace. The second, and more significant, challenge emanates from the rise of nondemocratic great powers: the West's old Cold War rivals China and Russia, now operating under authoritarian capitalist, rather than communist, regimes. Authoritarian capitalist great powers played a leading role in the international system up until 1945. They have been absent since then. But today, they seem poised for a comeback. Capitalism's ascendancy appears to be deeply entrenched, but the current predominance of democracy could be far less secure. Capitalism has expanded relentlessly since early modernity, its lower-priced goods and superior economic power eroding and transforming all other socioeconomic regimes, a process most memorably described by Karl Marx in The Communist Manifesto. Contrary to Marx's expectations, capitalism had the same effect on communism, eventually "burying"

Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure

Abstract: Military intervention in a conflict without a reasonable prospect of success is unjustifiable, especially when it is done in the name of humanity. Couched in the debate on the responsibility to protect civilians from violence and drawing on traditional 'just war' principles, the central premise of this book is that humanitarian military intervention can be justified as a policy option only if decision makers can be reasonably sure that intervention will do more good than harm. This book asks, 'Have past humanitarian military interventions been successful?' It defines success as saving lives and sets out a methodology for estimating the number of lives saved by a particular military intervention. Analysis of 17 military operations in six conflict areas that were the defining cases of the 1990s-northern Iraq after the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor-shows that the majority were successful by this measure. In every conflict studied, however, some military interventions succeeded while others failed, raising the question, 'Why have some past interventions been more successful than others?' This book argues that the central factors determining whether a humanitarian intervention succeeds are the objectives of the intervention and the military strategy employed by the intervening states. Four types of humanitarian military intervention are offered: helping to deliver emergency aid, protecting aid operations, saving the victims of violence and defeating the perpetrators of violence. The focus on strategy within these four types allows an exploration of the political and military dimensions of humanitarian intervention and highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each of the four types. Humanitarian military intervention is controversial. Scepticism is always in order about the need to use military force because the consequences can be so dire. Yet it has become equally controversial not to intervene when a government subjects its citizens to massive violation of their basic human rights. This book recognizes the limits of humanitarian intervention but does not shy away from suggesting how military force can save lives in extreme circumstances.

Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict

Abstract: Economic sanctions are frequently used as a tool of foreign policy, described by some as falling between diplomacy and military force. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary, or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals, the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. The results show that after a sanction occurs, there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. Democracies, because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs, while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender, are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions.

Entering the Dragon's Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States

Abstract: : This monograph describes the types of antiaccess measures one particular country -- China -- might employ in a future conflict with the United States, how these measures might affect U.S. military operations in the event of a conflict between the United States and China, and possible ways the United States can reduce the effects of these measures. For purposes of this discussion, an "antiaccess" measure is considered to be any action by an opponent that has the effect of slowing the deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing them from operating from certain locations within that theater, or causing them to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than they would normally prefer. Potential Chinese actions that could affect U.S. access to areas around China were identified through the analysis of Chinese military doctrinal writings. These included books on military doctrine, articles from Chinese military journals, reports from Chinese military newspapers, and recent Western studies of Chinese strategic thinking. The potential effects of Chinese antiaccess measures were assessed by examining the capability of the Chinese military to actually implement these measures and by analyzing how such implementation would affect U.S. military operations. Possible U.S. measures to reduce the effects of these measures were identified by consulting with RAND Corporation and external experts on the associated areas of military operations.

Why War Is Not Enough: Military Defeat, the Division of Labor, and Military Professionalization

Abstract: Does war make states? If it does, it does not make professional militaries. Scholars have often linked war and state development, but one important process of state development—military professionalization—does not seem to follow the “war makes states” logic. There are two reasons for this. First, states are most likely to begin professionalizing the military in response, not to war or the threat of war, but to dire military defeats, or defeats resulting in the occupation of national territory, abnormally high casualties, and the recognition of military incompetence. The humiliation associated with these dire defeats seems to spur political systems into action. Second, the division of labor tends to concentrate the population in urban centers and increase society’s human capital and the level of resources available to the state. Thus, an advanced division of labor enables long-term military professionalization. The division of labor thus seems to be a necessary condition, and dire military defeats a sufficient condition, for thorough military professionalization. To evaluate these propositions, I use original data on military professionalism—compiled in a data set spanning from 1800 to 2005—and case studies of military professionalization in Prussia, France, Turkey, and Egypt. The findings of this study suggest that we should rethink how states develop professional military institutions in response to war.

Assessing the Assignment Policy for Army Women

Abstract: : The current U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) policy for assigning military women dates to a 1994 memorandum from then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. During the ensuing years, the U.S. military has undergone significant technological and organizational transformation that has resulted in changes in how the military organizes and fights. Specifically, the Army's recent transformation to modular brigades, as well as the differences between military missions in Iraq -- and the global war on terrorism (GWOT) more generally -- and military missions fought on linear battlefields during past military engagements, prompted concern among some members of Congress about the role of women in military operations in Iraq. Reflecting that, Section 541(b) of Public Law 109-163 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the current and future implementation of DoD policy for assigning military women. This monograph is intended as input into DoD decision making and focuses on Army operations in Iraq. In particular, it focuses on the Army's brigade combat teams (BCTs) that deployed to Iraq in a modular configuration, paying specific attention to the new organic relationships of these BCTs with brigade support battalions (BSBs). This research was sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and was conducted within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute.

North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missiles

Abstract: : This monograph will examine the armed forces of the DPRK, both conventional and unconventional. The official North Korean name of all branches of North Korea's armed forces is the Chosen Inking or KPA. This monograph will address the following topics: the political context of the military in the DPRK; the origins and evolution of the armed forces; and the KPA's command and control structure and its WMD and conventional components, including doctrines. Pyongyang's capabilities and intentions also will be assessed.

Militaries in Business State-Making and Entrepreneurship in the Developing World

Abstract: Over the course of the twentieth century, militaries in the developing world adopted roles as owners and managers of economic enterprises that constitute an important source of financial and institutional autonomy from the state and society. This article identifies several distinct types of military entrepreneurship and argues that their development depends on patterns of state capacity, military professionalization, and threat conditions facing the country. Case studies of Pakistan, El Salvador, and China test the argument, exploring both the origins of military business activities and their current condition. The study finds that military entrepreneurship is harmful to the achievement or maintenance of military professionalism and that it is quite durable because it adapts to prevailing market conditions and therefore can weather major shifts toward democracy and the market.

The Global Reorganization of Legitimate Violence: Military EntrepreneursAnd the Private Face of International Humanitarian Law

Abstract: Although long hidden from the public gaze of international humanitarian law, military entrepreneurialism has played a key role in the global organization of legitimate violence. By examining historical changes in the role and legal treatment of military entrepreneurs, the author sheds light on the contemporary ''resurfacing'' of privately organized violence in the form of private military companies, and its broader implications for international humanitarian law.

Modern Military Necessity: The Role and Relevance of Military Lawyers

Abstract: Modern warfare presents an array of legalistic overtones that require the presence and participation of attorneys of exceptional courage and breadth of expertise in demanding and austere conditions. Military lawyers today must confront complex missions and competing operational demands in representing the needs of operational commanders. The legal dimension of conflict has at times overshadowed the armed struggle between adversaries as the nature of conflict itself has changed. The overall mission will often be intertwined with political, legal, and strategic imperatives that cannot accomplished in a legal vacuum or by undermining the threads of legality that bind diverse aspects of a complex operation together. The newly promulgated United States doctrine for counterinsurgency operations makes this clear in its opening section. Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare. Globalization, technological advancement, urbanization, and extremists who conduct suicide attacks for their cause have certainly influenced contemporary conflict; however, warfare in the 21st century retains many of the characteristics it has exhibited since ancient times. Warfare remains a violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the use of force. Achieving victory still depends on a group's ability to mobilize support for its political interests (often religiously or ethnically based) and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences. Means to achieve these goals are not limited to conventional forces employed by nation-states. Even in light of the nonnegotiable necessity for accomplishing the mission and the culture that correspondingly prizes the selfless pursuit of duty, lawyers have a vital role that supports rather than impedes the effort to create and sustain combat ready forces. This Article will address the range of responsibilities incumbent on lawyers in the military and their necessity to the functioning of the military. Though the phrase is most commonly associated with the jus in bello principle that governs the conduct of conflict, Part II addresses lawyers as a military necessity. Military legal expertise provides an irreplaceable source of guidance and insight to military commanders during times of armed conflict. Part III addresses the law of lawyers regarding the implementation of humanitarian law along with the military lawyer's challenge in making legal aspects integral to the actions of military commanders. In Part IV, the continued necessity of military lawyers is discussed due to the military lawyer's ongoing roles as trainers, negotiators, enforcers and reporters.

The Civil-Military Gap in the United States: Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter?

Abstract: What is the potential for a divergence in views among civilian and military elites (sometimes referred to as the civil-military gap) to undermine military effectiveness? Although a variety of differences were found among the views of military and civilian survey respondents, these differences mostly disappeared when the authors focused on the attitudes that are pertinent to civilian control of the military and military effectiveness.

Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing States

Abstract: : Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 identified stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) as core missions for future US military operations. This policy envisions military operations in a variety of complex pre- and post-conflict environments. It commands military planners to expand their arsenal of resources for achieving this mission to include elements of economic, social, and political, as well as military, power. Thus, future strategic military plans will necessarily assume a kind of hybrid nature, embracing a spectrum of elements of national power. Historically, projection of the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power and development of the programs that sustain them has been the jurisdiction of the interagency, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs). However, where a hostile environment precludes deployment of civilians to implement such, the DoD becomes the only viable agency likely to succeed in the task. This paper develops a strategic concept for use by the US military in its future stability and security missions in pre-conflict environments. Further, this concept is adaptable for use in a variety of unstable environments. Finally, this strategic concept is designed to coordinate and transition to more traditional civilian programs as soon as the security environment permits.

Authorization For Use Of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-40): Legislative History [Updated January 16, 2007]

Abstract: This report provides a legislative history of the legislation, S.J.Res. 23 , the “Authorization for Use of Military Force” (AUMF), which, as Congress stated in its text, constitutes the legislative authorization for the use of U.S. military force contemplated by the War Powers Resolution. It also is the statute which the President and his attorneys have subsequently cited as an authority for him to engage in electronic surveillance against possible terrorists without obtaining authorization of the special Court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, as amended.

The current state of military history

Abstract: Military history is often misconstrued as a field requiring little intellectual skill, in which the historian provides little more than a chronology of generals and battles. Analysis of one hundred of the twenty-first century's best military histories reveals that military history today goes well beyond such subject matter, incorporating social, cultural, and political history. Common areas of inquiry for contemporary historians include the impact of society, culture, and politics on a country's ability to wage war; the social, cultural, and political after-effects of war; the society and culture of military organizations; and the relationship between military organizations and the communities from which they spring. While historians continue to devote considerable attention to the conventional militaries of Europe and the United States, many also are studying small armies, irregular forces, non-state actors, civil wars, and non-Western armed forces. Within the military realm, historians frequently tackle subjects of much greater complexity than the generals-and-battles stereotype would suggest, to include the relationship between technological and human factors, the interdependency of land and naval warfare, and the influence of political direction on the military.

Military Knowledge and Weak Civilian Control in the Reality of Low Intensity Conflict \-\- The Israeli Case

Abstract: The changes in the nature of warfare and its transformation toward intrastate conflicts—known in military jargon as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)—pose a challenge to the nature of the interaction between the political and the military echelons in general and in Israel—where such a conflict has been a protracted reality since 2000—in particular. While, in these instances, political supremacy is maintained on institutional and formal levels, on the substantial level, which requires reliance on knowledge and systematic staff work, the political position is weakened and substantive civilian control is wanting. I characterize the interactions between the political and the military echelons in Israel during the last half-decade as a "discourse space" imbued with military content and characterized by a blurred political directive. The concept of "epistemic authority" is borrowed from the field of social psychology. Showing how Israel's military echelon has become an "epistemic authority" with regard to the confrontation with the Palestinians, in the eyes of both the general public and the political echelon in Israel, is elucidated through both the nature of the political-military interaction during this period and the weakness of civilian control of the military. The operations launched by the Israeli military, according to its own interpretation of the politicians' intentions and following its newly developed knowledge, helped shape the conflict environment and were perceived by politicians and by most of the Israeli public as justified. The military's hegemonic role in the conflict, in its turn, resulted from the inherent weakness of political control of the military and, at the same time, was a fresh indication of it. The weakness of civilian control of the military in this period suggests that political thinking in Israel is inadequate and attests to the threat to both the supremacy of its civilian sphere and the delimitation of the military's influence over its politics.

Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2007

Abstract: : This report lists hundreds of instances in which the United States has used its armed forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict or for other than normal peacetime purposes. It was compiled in part from various older lists and is intended primarily to provide a rough survey of past U.S. military ventures abroad, without reference to the magnitude of the given instance noted. The listing often contains references, especially from 1980 forward, to continuing military deployments especially U.S. military participation in multinational operations associated with NATO or the United Nations. Most of these post-1980 instances are summaries based on Presidential reports to Congress related to the War Powers Resolution. A comprehensive commentary regarding any of the instances listed is not undertaken here.

Constructing the Co-Ed Military

Abstract: I. INTRODUCTION A. The Importance of Objective Analysis B. Standard of Review II. DOUBLE STANDARDS INVOLVING WOMEN (DSIW) UNDERMINE MILITARY STRUCTURE A. Current Department of Defense (DoD) Regulations and Law 1. The Tailhook Turning Point 2. Ground Combat: Violations of Policy and Law 3. The Congressional Debate: 2005 B. Incrementalism + Consistency = Radical Change 1. Costs of Confusion 2. What Do Women Want? C. Complications on Co-Ed Submarines 1. Feminist Engineering and the "Silent Service" 2. The Bartlett Amendment Mandating Oversight D. Double Standards in Naval Aviation 1. Death of an Aviator 2. The Dangers of DSIW in Carrier Aviation Training III. GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE A. Aberdeen to Abu Ghraib 1. Co-Ed Basic Training 2. The "Ungendered" Military B. The Military Service Academies 1. Mixed Signals on the Severn River 2. Rape and Victimology C. The 1993 Law Regarding Homosexual Conduct 1. Congressional Oversight 2. Enforcement Regulations Inconsistent with the Law 3. Campaign to Repeal the Law IV. CONCLUSION A. The Military/Civilian Connection 1. What Our Military Says About Cultural Values 2. Rumpelstiltskin Recruiting B. Constructing a Stronger Military 1. Recommendations for the Secretary of Defense 2. The Only Military We Have APPENDIX A I. INTRODUCTION The armed forces of the United States are organizationally strong. All branches and communities have proud histories, cultural traditions, and members motivated by patriotism as well as personal career goals. The institutional strength of the military, however, also makes it vulnerable to political pressures that can undermine its culture. Because everyone must follow orders, the armed forces are a prime venue for social engineering. Some civilians believe in "social constructionism" the idea that fundamental human characteristics, including gender differences other than obvious anatomy, are learned behaviors that can be radically changed. Some want to construct a new gender-free military, putting to the ultimate test theories about the interchangeability of women and men in all roles. Independent review of social change in the armed forces is critically important. Our gender-integrated volunteer force is at war and undergoing radical organizational and cultural change at the same time. Individual men and women stand between our nation and enemies who would do us harm, but the success of their mission depends on a complex organization that is more demanding than anything in civilian life. This institution asks courageous men and women to surrender their individuality and independence, many of their personal rights, and sometimes their very lives. The rest of us should lend support by guarding the strength and integrity of the institution in which they serve. A. The Importance of Objective Analysis On January 27, 1967, a deadly accident occurred that could have stalled America's program of space exploration indefinitely. During a pre-launch test of the Apollo One spacecraft, (1) an electrical spark ignited the pure-oxygen atmosphere inside the cramped capsule, killing astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chafee. (2) Critics demanded to know why the mechanical and electrical engineers of the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) failed to recognize the inherent dangers of operating in a pure-oxygen environment. In the aftermath of that tragedy, NASA made choices that are instructive to another institution today: the United States military. In 1967, a pure-oxygen atmosphere was thought to be the best for sustaining human life in orbit; pure-oxygen systems weighed less than mixed-gas systems and had been deployed successfully in the Mercury and Gemini missions. …

Civilian Contractors under Military Law

Abstract: Over the course of its efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has increasingly relied upon the work of civilian contractors. By the US Central Command's count at the end of 2006, there were nearly 100,000 contractors operating in Iraq alone. (1) An estimated 30,000--more than the number of non-US Coalition forces in Iraq--provide armed military services such as personal and site security. (2) The insertion of five words into Congress's fiscal year 2007 defense authorization act may now subject every civilian contractor operating in a combat zone to the discipline of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). This legislation ostensibly brings long-overdue regulation to contractor behavior, but it also raises a number of questions regarding interpretation and enforcement. By drawing on the lessons of past efforts to control contractors, the military should be able to craft a workable standard for the exercise of its expanded UCMJ jurisdiction. Expertise for a Price Civilian contractors have frequently played an important role in American military operations. George Washington hired civilians to haul the Continental Army's equipment; supply vendors followed the Union and Confederate armies during the Civil War. Indeed, today's military recognizes the use of civilian contractors as a force multiplier in stabilization efforts. (3) Although sometimes expensive, contractors are capable of supplying immediate expertise and manpower much more rapidly than the military can grow subject matter experts. In the second half of the twentieth century, a combination of technology, budget constraints, and personnel shortages forced the military to rely heavily on contractors for support services and even low-intensity combat skills. Technological innovation increasingly required the presence of contractors on the battlefield to maintain and repair their companies' sophisticated equipment, leading Business Week to label Vietnam a "war by contract" in March 1965. (4) The contractor facilities that exist on military installations today are legacies of that development. Even greater reliance on contractors came as a direct result of downsizing following the Cold War. This was a period when the military outsourced many of its basic support operations to civilian contractors. Even as the military turned over its support services to civilians, companies such as Blackwater USA began to offer more combat-related specialties. Brookings Institution fellow P. W. Singer has ably chronicled the rise of private military firms (PMFs), private-sector organizations that provide military services to people, corporations, and governments. Singer notes that although PMFs fiercely fight the label of "mercenaries," they also advertise themselves as being capable of supplying an alternative means of furthering US interests abroad. In recent years, PMFs have grown in size and power. At a conference in Jordan last year, Blackwater USA Vice Chairman J. Cofer Black announced that his firm can "have a small, nimble, brigade-size force ready to move into a troubled region on short notice." (5) Recent scholarship on the privatization of military force has emphasized the distinction between PMFs, such as Blackwater USA, and more logistics-oriented organizations, such as Kellogg, Brown, & Root (KBR). (6) Yet just as the difference between service support and combat arms can vanish on the asymmetric battlefield, the gap between PMFs and logistical contractors has narrowed. Given the current operational environment, military support personnel and their civilian counterparts are as vulnerable, if not more so, to attacks than combat units on patrol. The Geneva Conventions characterize contractors who accompany forces as noncombatants, but contractor tasks in today's combat zones bring these civilians into situations that force them to act in self defense. From the onset of the Coalition's presence in Iraq, the United States has depended on PMFs and their logistics-oriented brethren to supplement the force of uniformed service members. …

Busting the Icon. Restoring Balance to the Influence of Clausewitz

Abstract: : Many US military thinkers and practitioners have embraced a view of war that is out of touch with current circumstances--and, consequently, dangerous. This has a direct effect on the present global war on terror that is focused largely on Islamic extremists. There are two main problems. First, US military leaders--especially in the ground forces--continue to view war as a climactic, and usually bloody, clash of arms. "Muddy boots and bloody bayonets" and "occupation of territory" are the liturgies of these people, a maxim that current operations in Iraq against Muslim terrorists have shown to be increasingly bankrupt. In addition, the American military is culturally tone deaf. It does not sufficiently take into account the fundamentally distinct traditions, mores, behaviors, and beliefs of the people that we deal with around the world--especially those in Asia and the Middle East. These are not new problems, and the root of the military's myopia is the continued infatuation with the ground-centric and Eurocentric ideas of Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz has become an icon among military officers of all the services, and his ideas are taught in every war college, staff college, and service academy in the country. It is common for a military writer or briefer to begin or end an argument with a quote from Clausewitz, presumably lending the author/speaker an aura of credibility. We need to broaden our thinking. Clausewitz was a Prussian general who fought in the Napoleonic wars two centuries ago. Afterwards, he served as the director of the Prussian War Academy, where he wrote a number of historical and theoretical books. His most notable work was On War, universally considered the classic study of war.

The Legal, Military and Political Consequences of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ Approach to UN Military Enforcement Action

Abstract: The UN Charter envisaged a centralised system of collective security in which the UN Security Council would have readily available forces of its own for the purpose of taking military enforcement action under its own authority and control. These forces were never created and the Security Council has had to rely heavily upon authorising willing coalitions of states to take action on its behalf. Although such an approach to military enforcement action is legally permissible, it gives rise to a series of consequences of a legal, military and political nature that call into question the extent to which it provides the Council with an effective means of exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This article considers these consequences of the coalition of the willing approach to military enforcement action, and seeks to show that its utility will vary from one situation to another. Although difficulties can arise from operations being subjected to insufficient levels of ultimate legal oversight by the Security Council, or through military operational problems, the limitations of the coalition of the willing as an effective tool of the Council are likely to lie primarily in the political sphere.

An endogenous growth model of capital and arms accumulation

Abstract: This paper attempts to examine the effect of an anticipated foreign military threat on the steady‐state growth rate and the transitional behavior of the economy. The modeling strategy follows the Sandler and Hartley (1995) and Dunne et al. (2005) viewpoints to emphasize the role of national defense in affecting growth from the perspective of both the demand and the supply sides. We thus combine the public capital version of endogenous growth with a framework of competitive arms accumulation. It is found that the key factor determining the steady state and the transitional effects of a rise in the foreign military threat on the home weapon–capital ratio, the consumption–capital ratio, and the rate of economic growth, is the degree of relative risk aversion.

Participation in Peace Support Operations for Small Countries: The Case of Norway

Abstract: Norway's growing participation in international missions has challenged both civilian and military perceptions of the ideal role of the Norwegian military. The armed forces' overall purpose has gone from homeland defence to being a security policy instrument. At the same time, the traditional humanitarian profile of Norway's foreign deployments has been replaced by a more distinct military role. Although politically initiated, the restructuring of the Norwegian armed forces has political implications that may be difficult to accept. A defence structure adapted to high-intensity operations abroad entails new political choices, but for small countries, such as Norway, political choices are also constricted as a result of closer integration with multinational force structures. Furthermore, a much smaller structure combined with high international ambitions places a heavy strain on military personnel and their families. Thus far, political and military leaders in Norway have largely agreed on the overall dire...

Military diversion in the 1978 uganda-tanzania war

Abstract: This article elaborates on the phenomenon of military diversion as a subset of domestic causes of international conflict. Specifically, we test a theory of whether there is a type of diversion that targets the military as the in-group, as opposed to the civil population dealt with by most other treatments. We seek to show that the military-type of diversion is manifested by an elite "unleashing" the military, once control over them is lost.

The Short Path and the Long Road: Explaining the Duration of US Military Operations

Abstract: US presidents have used military force short of war many times since World War II. While some military operations are finished in a fairly brief period of time, such as the evacuation of US citizens from an unstable foreign capital, other deployments may last much longer, as the US military is charged with accomplishing more ambitious foreign policy goals, such as promoting peace, democracy, or maintaining US influence. What explains why some of these uses of force short of war are fairly brief, while other military operations last much longer? The authors contend that the duration of such missions depends on the military resources available, the president’s political support at home, and crisis-specific factors. Using duration modeling techniques, they find that the availability of military resources and the characteristics of the international crisis matter a great deal, while US political and economic conditions mostly do not explain the duration of US military operations. As research has shown with re...

‘Munitions of the mind’: A brief history of military psychological operations

Abstract: Western militaries have been progressively employing psychological operations (PSYOPS) in support of their military missions for almost a century. This article introduces readers of this journal to a brief history and outline of some of the key developments, particularly with reference to the British and the Americans. Little noticed, and rarely understood in their proper military context, PSYOPS has a poor public reputation, being associated with the ‘black arts’ of deception and disinformation. In fact, in their overt form, PSYOPS are closely related to branding and marketing — but in a battlefield or combat or other military mission's context. Whether the military are best equipped to undertake such work has come into question largely as a result of the conflict in Iraq. There have, however, been some notable successes as well as some serious failures. The latter are usually more to do with the political rather than the military context.

Nation-Building: A Joint Enterprise

Abstract: "Battles are won by the infantry, the armor, the artillery and air teams, by soldiers living in the rains and huddling in the snow. But wars are won by the great strength of the nation--the soldier and the civilian working together." --General Omar N. Bradley (1) Consider the following questions. The Army is at war, but is the nation at war? Has the nation sufficiently mobilized the elements of national power in support of a global war effort? Have average Americans changed their lives because of the war? Is popular support for the war in Iraq high enough to mobilize the nation? Public opinion polls in January 2007 showed that support for President Bush's handling of the war was at an all-time low of 26 percent. (2) Similar polls suggested that 54 percent of the American public believed that the United States was losing the war in Iraq. (3) Then-Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, began his remarks to the House Armed Services Committee on 27 June 2006 with these words. America's Army remains at war. And we will be fighting this war for the foreseeable future. This is not just the Army's war. Yet in light of the scale of our commitment we bear the majority of the burden, serving side by side with Marines and our other sister services and coalition partners. (4) General Schoomaker identified the crux of the issue; America relies upon the Army, and from a joint perspective, the Department of Defense, to fight and win the nation's wars. The American people have every expectation that the military will succeed when committed. They hold the military accountable for achieving victory. Yet the military does not command or control the elements of national power (diplomatic, information, and economic) essential for achieving victory. Intellectuals argue that wars are won or lost by nations and not by militaries. The military does, however, make a significant contribution to any eventual outcome of a conflict. Many observers believe the military is responsible for the final outcome of any conflict despite a multitude of related factors. (5) For example, there are those who contend that America lost the war in Vietnam even though, from a tactical standpoint, the Army did not lose a battle. Many blamed this loss on the lack of a coordinated national strategy, but continue to hold the military accountable for failing to develop a winning strategy. (6) Similarly, in Iraq, many claim the war is being lost and blame the leadership of the Department of Defense for any number of strategic errors. (7) This harkens back to the issue that the military is accountable to fight and win America's wars. Others question why the military needs to support such missions as nation-building. The fact of the matter is the military as an element of national power is employed to protect the United States' national interests. The military is exercising that role in Iraq because national leaders believe that critical interests are at stake. (8) The United States performs nation- building activities to establish conditions that further our national interests. There are a number of countries needing assistance with nation-building, but the military is not capable of providing direct assistance to all in need. The nation's leaders apparently do not consider national interests sufficient to warrant military deployments to all of these regions. (9) Africa has a predominance of the poorest nations in the world. Genocide, famine, disease, and failed governments are often cited as sufficient justification for the US military's nation-building assistance. (10) Yet, because vital national security interests are not at stake, the military is not substantially engaged throughout Africa. It goes without saying that the world has more needs than the United States has the capacity to provide solutions. National interests serve to prioritize the employment of America's military. …

On the Commander-In-Chief Power

Abstract: Since September 11, the Bush administration has asserted broad, exclusive presidential war powers under the Commander in Chief Clause However, the minimalist language of the Clause never specifies what powers a commander in chief possesses This paper argues, based on military history, original understanding, and the contemporary theory of civilian-military relations, that the commander-in-chief power is narrow rather than broad In ancient and feudal societies, like contemporary military dictatorships, civilian and military dominion are fused to consolidate power in the hands of a single leader - a warrior-king or fighting executive, whose military prowess validates the claim to civilian rule In a democratic republic, however, the purpose of fused dominion is entirely different It is to ensure civilian control of the military - to safeguard against coups, usurpations, and adventurism For purposes of civilian control of the military, there is no assumption that the civilian commander in chief possesses any military competence or exercises real military command There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that the commander-in-chief power incorporates a broad, uncircumscribed set of war powers Examination of military history shows that at the time of the constitutional framing, the functional roles of rulers and military commanders were already separated; and founding-era debates demonstrate lively concern about the dangers of usurpation and adventurism The contemporary theory of civilian-military relations reveals the continued importance of maintaining separation of civilian and military functions In short, the political theory behind the civilian commander in chief centers on the need to restrain power, not to enhance it; and it is this theory that provides the interpretive key to the Commander in Chief Clause

The Secret of Future Defeat: The Evolution of US Joint and Army Doctrine 1993-2006 and the Flawed Conception of Stability Operations

Abstract: : Throughout the past 15 years, both the Western allies and the Russians have entered into a series of military engagements that have in one way or another spectacularly failed to achieve the results intended, namely a decisive military victory which would in turn deliver a solution to the original political problem. The nature of US military operations in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has achieved dramatic military victories but has failed to deliver the political aims of the conflicts. Many analysts attempt to explain the phenomenon by describing changes in the strategic environment that have rendered conventional interstate warfare ineffective or even irrelevant or obsolete. Many even claim that the age of conventional warfare is over, and that the world has transitioned to a new irregular paradigm of conflict. Other analysts point to organizational and cultural preferences for conventional warfare or for material-based or technological solutions that are inappropriate to the situation. However, these concepts are merely symptoms, or at best precipitating causes and not the proximate cause of this seeming lack of military effectiveness in securing national policy objectives. Instead, the principal cause of the lack of efficacy in the modern military art is a flawed conceptual approach and design to current joint and Army doctrine. This monograph will explore the development of doctrinal concepts and models since 1993, focusing on Joint and Army doctrine's treatment of combat and stability operations. It will then analyze these models in relation to history and theory of stability operations, isolating flaws in conceptual models such as the Range of Military Operations, the Deliberate Phasing Model, Full Spectrum Operations, and the Army tenet of versatility. These flaws will be linked to conceptual errors endemic to the Joint and Army organizatio

The modern military and the environment : the laws of peace and war

Abstract: The battle is an old one: man versus nature. And in modern society, man includes the military. Machines. Chemicals. Who wins the battle and at what cost? This practical analysis of the conflict between national security requirements and environmental responsibility looks at just that. William Wilcox examines the most common environmental issues that the military faces during wartime and peacetime and provides an introduction to the legal authorities, including statutes, regulations, and executive orders, governing the application of environmental law to military activities.