Showing papers on "Rainbow table published in 2000"

Forwarding table incorporating hash table and content addressable memory

Abstract: A forwarding table comprising a combination of a hash table and a content addressable memory (CAM). The forwarding table combines a one way hash table and a small CAM to perform the forwarding information retrieval function. The CAM is used when an address cannot be found in the hash table. When MAC addresses are being added to the forwarding table, they are first tried in the hash table. The address is applied to the hash function and a resulting index input to the hash table. If a hit occurs, it indicates that an entry at that index already exists and a location in the CAM is then allocated for that address. As long as the CAM does not become full, a 100% hit rate is guaranteed. During retrieval, the hash table or the CAM forms the forwarding information output to the next processing stage. If an entry is not found in the hash table, it will typically be found in the CAM. If no entry is found in either, the received frame is flooded to all the ports of the network device.

Method for securely using a single password for multiple purposes

Abstract: A method is presented that includes receiving input data. The method also includes determining if a salt value exists and generating a salt value and storing the salt value in a table entry if the salt value does not exist. The method further provides for retrieving the salt value from the table entry if the salt value exists and generating a hash from the salt value and the input data. The method also provides for generating a password from the hash and returning the password to an application to gain entry to the application. Also presented is a program storage device readable by a machine including instructions that cause the machine to perform similar to the method above.

System and method for password authentication for non-LDAP regions

Abstract: A system and method for allowing roaming of a subscriber and password authentication a non-LDAP region. A user signs onto a network access server which in turn connects to the regional LDAP RADIUS server. Password authentication occurs by hashing a transmitted password and comparing it to a clear text password from an LDAP database that has been hashed in the same manner as the transmitted password. When the subscriber is in a non-LDAP region, The password proceeds trough a proxy server to a regional RADIUS server which connects to a non-LDAP server. The non-LDAP server connects to and SMS database and retrieve the clear text password associated with the non-LDFSAP user, hashes it according the same method as the transmitted hashed password and formats the password for comparison in the regional RADIUS server. If the hashed passwords compare, the access is permitted.

The memory-hard Argon2 password hash and proof-of-work function

Abstract: This document describes the Argon2 memory-hard function for password hashing and proof-of-work applications. We provide an implementer- oriented description with test vectors. The purpose is to simplify adoption of Argon2 for Internet protocols. This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF.

One-time password generator, authentication method and recording medium with one-time password generating program recorded therein

Abstract: PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a one-time password generator that can make retrieval of an encryption key and a count on the basis of generating a one-time password much more difficult in the case of employing the one-time password by a counter synchronous system SOLUTION: A random number generating section 38 in the one-time password generator generates a random number that is kept within a range smaller than a count M being a permissible count range when an authentication server 4 authenticates a password A counter 33 advances its count according to the random number generated by the random number generating section 38 A one-time password generating section 34 uses an encryption key from an encryption key storage section 32 and the count from the counter 33 for parameters to conduct encryption processing and to generate a one-time password Then the continuity of counts on the basis of the one-time password is lost and the interval of counts is made at random

Dynamic password control system

Abstract: PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide a dynamic password control system conducting an authentication process for a user by using a password having a dynamically changed value time-wise and not known to third persons easily. SOLUTION: This dynamic password control system is provided with a stationary user terminal, an authentication server connected via a communication network, and a portable password calculating device. The stationary user terminal transmits a card ID, and the authentication server receiving the card ID calculates the dynamic password dynamically changed according to the elapsed time based on the password parameter inherent to the card ID and the elapsed time to determine the present password corresponding to the card ID. The portable password calculating device calculates the dynamic password by the same calculation logic as the authentication server to determine the present password when the elapsed time is inputted.

Authentication system and its method

Abstract: PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide an authentication system of high security capable of detecting and excluding an illegal access due to the illegal use of a transmitting and address or a password. SOLUTION: Plural passwords (or plural password generation algorithm elements) and set information are stored in a connection device 1 and a terminal 2. The time of the device 1 is synchronized with that of the terminal 2 and a password (or password generation algorithm) is changed with the lapse of time on the basis of the set information. The terminal 2 adds the password to a frame to be transmitted and transmits the frame and the device 1 compares the password of the received frame with the password of the device 1. When both the passwords coincide with each other, the device 1 permits the communication of the terminal 2, and when the passwords are different from each other, inhibits the communication and cancels the frame.