Showing papers on "Value (ethics) published in 1977"

Values of games with a priori unions

Abstract: Let us suppose that, for sane reason, players 1 and 2 have a strong tendency to act together. (Perhaps they have fonned a union or signed sane agreerrent to this effect.) In that case, the "natural" outcane would seem to be a coalition between 1 and 2, with the profit of one unit to be divided arrong them sonehow. This division is not fixed, but, for value purposes, we might present the (0.5, 0.5) division as a reasonable expectation (Le., this is not a guarantee but an expected value). Thus the vector y' (0.5, 0.5, 0) would seem a reasonable candidate for "rrodified value" of the game.

The theory of morality

Abstract: "Let us . . . nominate this the most important theoretical work on ethical or moral theory since John Rawls's "Theory of Justice." If you have philosophical inclinations and want a good workout, this conscientious scrutiny of moral assumptions and expressions will be most rewarding. Donagan explores ways of acting in the Hebrew-Christian context, examines them in the light of natural law and rational theories, and proposes that formal patterns for conduct can emerge. All this is tightly reasoned, the argument is packed, but the language is clear." "Christian Century" "The man value of this book seems to me to be that it shows the force of the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition in the hands of a creative philosopher. Throughout the book, one cannot but feel that a serious philosopher is trying to come to terms with his religious-moral background and to defend it against the prevailing secular utilitarian position which seems to dominate academic philosophy." Bernard Gert, "Journal of Medicine and Philosophy""

Quality of Group Judgment

Abstract: The quality of group judgment is examined in situations in which groups have to express an opinion in quantitative form. To provide a yardstick for evaluating the quality of group performance (which is itself defined as the absolute value of the discrepancy between the judgment and the true value), four baseline models are considered. These models provide a standard for evaluating how well groups perform. The four models are: (a) randomly picking a single individual; (b) weighting the judgments of the individual group members equally (the group mean); (c) weighting the "best" group member (i.e., the one closest to the true value) totally where the best is known, a priori, with certainty; (d) weighting the best member totally where there is a given probability of misidentifyin g the best and getting the second, third, etc., best member. These four models are examined under varying conditions of group size and "bias." Bias is denned as the degree to which the expectation of the population of individual judgments does not equal the true value (i.e., there is systematic bias in individual judgments). A method is then developed to evaluate the accuracy of group judgment in terms of the four models. The method uses a Bayesian approach by estimating the probability that the accuracy of actual group judgment could have come from distributions generated by the four models. Implications for the study of group processes and improving group judgment are discussed. Consider a group of size N that has to arrive at some quantitative judgment, for example, a sales forecast, a prediction of next year's gross national product, the number of bushels of wheat expected in the next quarter, and the like. Given the prevalence of such predictive activity in the real world, it is clearly important to consider how well groups can and do perform such tasks, as well as to consider strategies that may be used to improve performance. In this paper we address the issue of defining the quality of group judgment and assess the effects and limitations on judgmental quality of different strategies for combining opinions under a variety of circumstances .

Interpersonal Influence on Consumer Behavior: An Attribution Theory Approach

Abstract: Attribution theory is used to develop a new approach to interpersonal influence. As a first step in investigating this approach, an experiment explores how people infer personal dispositions from observing a consumer's behavior. The results illustrate the value of the attribution approach but suggest the need for extending existing attribution theory.

Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence

Abstract: but only in specific situations; thus knowledge of the law can never be precise since legal rights are always at the mercy of events. Despite the problem of measurement, it is worth noting that each of the major surveys indicates that knowledge of the law is substantially greater with respect to criminal than civil matters (Sarat, 1975; Michigan Law Review, 1973; Williams and Hall, 1972; Albrecht, 1974; Cortese, 1966). Citizens typically know more about what they are entitled to expect of and demand from public authority and less about what the law sanctions in their relations with other private individuals. This is to some extent a function of the emphasis on crime and criminal law in mass culture, but it also marks a significant element in the legal culture, the dominant view that the proper scope and value of law is to regulate the exercise of government authority. In spite of the rather widespread ignorance of the law there is some evidence of an equally widespread belief in the appropriateness of using law and legal processes as problem-solving devices. This is not to say, however, that law is a preferred means for dealing with problems. We know that relatively few of society's disputes are handled by the legal system. To some extent this reflects an awareness of the costs of mobilizing the law (Friedman, 1967). But it is still true that "the reluctance of citizens to mobilize the law is so widespread . . . that it may be appropriate to view legal inaction as the dominant pattern of empirical legal life" (Black, 1973:133). Yet resort to law is not considered to be deviant behavior. The American Bar Foundation's recent national survey of legal needs asked, for example, whether "a person should not call upon a lawyer until he has exhausted every other possible way of solving his problem." Forty-two percent of those interviewed agreed, 55 percent disagreed (Curran and Spalding, 1974:94). Furthermore, Jacob's four-city study in Wisconsin reports that slightly less than half of those without experience in court displayed a high level of "judicial efficacy," that is, they believed that courts are appropriate mechanisms for dealing with their personal problems (1969:119). Because most people do not know the full range of their legal rights and because of the high cost of using the law, participation in its administration or enforcement is not widespread. Such participation is generally concentrated among those social groups who are regularly able to avail themselves of expert help, afford the costs of mobilizing the law, and aggressively use the law to further their interests and goals (Galanter, 1974). Most individual This content downloaded from 207.46.13.176 on Mon, 20 Jun 2016 05:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 452 11 LAW & SOCIETY / WINTER 1977 citizens possess neither the expertise nor the resources necessary to do so (Wanner, 1974; Galanter, 1975).19 Yet citizens are not wholly incompetent or unable to participate. Aggrieved individuals generally first seek less costly nonlegal remedies (Sarat, 1976), but feel no "moral" inhibitions about using the law. The pattern of participation is typically sporadic and somewhat reluctant, but the legal system is, nonetheless, open. Americans seem to possess enough knowledge, a sufficiently well developed sense of their rights and sufficient confidence in the law to participate in a defensive manner, to use the law to remedy past grievances if not to create new opportunities. In this sense, our legal culture reflects and shapes our legal institutions; it is reactive but not quiescent. What about the problem of obedience to law? If Americans do not turn to law readily and actively to solve problems, how do they respond to its directions? Are they more enthusiastic as subjects than they are as participants? Like attitudes toward the police, the disposition to obey law and to recognize the law's obligatory character develops early in childhood (Koeppen, 1972; Torney, 1971). Research on the development of those ideas has frequently taken the form of a general inquiry into the development of legal reasoning, the processes through which individuals interpret, define, and make decisions about the roles, rules, rights and responsibilities offered or imposed by the legal system (Tapp and Levine, 1974:19). Furthermore, many studies of legal thought accept the assumptions of developmental psychology that there are distinctive, organized structures of reasoning which are stable across situations and across cultures, that these develop in an invariant sequence of age-related stages, and that the process of development is self-regulated but not immune to environmental influences (Tapp and Levine, 1974:15; Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969). Whether or not one accepts the extravagant claims of developmental psychology, the research that it has inspired provides a significant basis for understanding the emergence of attitudes toward law and law abidingness. For the young child, law is first associated with rules not rights. Rules and laws are viewed as essential to the maintenance of social order and as a vital defense against social chaos (Tapp and Kohlberg, 1971:73-79). They are perceived to be immutable, imperative and fair (Adelson et al., 1969; Torney, 1971). Young children associate law with obedience by reason of their fear of 19. Galanter (1975) reviews studies of the characteristics of litigants in trial courts and finds that individuals acting outside of a business or professional capacity are more often involved as defendants than as plaintiffs. Organizations and government agencies comprise the largest group of plaintiffs. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.176 on Mon, 20 Jun 2016 05:35:13 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory

Abstract: The author examines the sources and premises of the idea that free expression has value in part because of the function it performs in checking the abuse of official power (the “checking value”) and explores how this checking value difyers from those values that have dominated First Amendment analysis since 1919. In addition, the author traces in some detail the uneven influence the checking value has had recently in three areas of First Amendment adjudication: civil actions f o r defamution; disputes arising from efforts by journalists to protect or establish relationships with news sources; and claims b y nonjournalists to a constitutional or statutory right to communicate directly to the public over major print or broadcast outlets. The author argues that the checking value must receive open, systematic consideration if it is to play a consistent part in adjudication and speculates on how such consideration of the checking value might help one think about a wide range of additional First Amendment questions.

Reaffirming The Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions

Abstract: It is a pity that David Ricardo is not alive to tell us whether he would agree with Pierro Sraffa's 1960 proposed 'standard commodity" as a good approach to Richardo's desired "standard measure of value". Fortunately, Abram Bergson and I are alive and kicking and available to record our reactions to the recent axioms proposed by Kemp and Ng (1976) (who refer to a similar unpublished 1973 Washington University paper by R. R. Parks) as "reasonable" for an ethical system of the individualistic BergsonSamuelson type to satisfy. Let me record at the beginning, after careful reflection and consultation with various authorities, the following reactions. (a) I must regard Axiom 3 of Kemp-Ng as anything but "reasonable" to impose on a Bergson-Samuelson Individualistic Social Welfare Function (B-S ISWF). As Oscar Wilde might put it, "For any ethical observer to understand Axiom 3 is to reject it". I believe that Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes would be interested in Arrow's "Impossibility Theorem" on ideal democracy. I doubt that such ethical philosophers as Bentham, Kant, Sidgwick or Rawls would be jarred by the Kemp-Ng "impossibility theorem", once they perceive how it transparently follows from the gratuitous Axiom 3. (b) Granted that I or any writer in the Bergson tradition would not wish to adopt the proferred Axiom 3 and that the jury would approve of this considered decision, what about the semantic question of whether post-1938 writers in that tradition have seemed to use the words, "individual tastes are to count or to be respected" and the words "the B-S ISWF is to be purely 'ordinal' and not at all 'cardinal' ", in such a way as to imply that the Kemp-Ng Axiom 3 does validly obtain? If this semantic indictment could be sustained-and some research in the relevant writings leads me to believe that it cannot be-the charge would not be a serious one: in almost forty years, it seems to have occurred to only three sophisticated people to be led astray! As Pareto used to say, who would ever let substantive matters be determined by philology? In any case, since the question of word usage has been raised, the Kemp and Ng article provides an appropriate occasion to clarify the record on the sense in which the B-S ISWF is to be understood to "ordinally" "depend on" the "ordinal" preferences of individuals. My later discussion deals with this matter. (c) Granted that ethical systems will not wish to be restricted by Axiom 3 and that their wording is clear (or made clear) on that, there is no reason why those economists engrossed in social choice theory may not wish to explore other "social choice" functions than those of proposed ethical

On value maximization and alternative objectives of the firm

Abstract: THE RECENT LITERATURE on firm behavior has been characterized by two contrasting strands of analysis: on the one hand, there is the literature attempting to extend the conventional maxims of profit maximization of competitive firms from the familiar static models to dynamic contexts and into situations of uncertainty. These analyses argue that firms should maximize their stock market value and explore the implications of this for firm behavior. On the other hand, there is the vast and growing "managerial" literature, in which other objectives, such as "satisficing," "sales maximizing," and "maximization of the manager's utility functions" are postulated. The second group of analyses criticize the first as being unrealistic, while the first argues that it provides the best "first approximation" to firm behavior: if firms did not maximize their stock market value, or deviated far from value maximization, someone would attempt to take them over, change the course of action of the firm, and make a pure capital gain. This paper presents a unified framework for analyzing firm behavior which can be used to reconcile these divergent views. We begin our analysis by taking seriously several aspects of modern corporations which are usually ignored: there exist shareholders' meetings, the right to vote at these shareholders' meetings often has market value (market prices for voting and non-voting shares often differ); disagreements occasionally arise at these meetings; takeover bids are not uncommon; and takeovers are often disputed. The modern corporation is an economic institution in which there is always a potential political (i.e. voting) aspect. Thus, we model the firm as if the action it takes were determined by a majority vote of its shareholders. In deciding what action to vote for, shareholders must have some expectations of the consequences of alternative actions; in particular, we consider a small firm, so that it is not unreasonable for the individual to assume that the actions and values of all other firms will be unaffected. Thus we take the conventional Nash-non-cooperative view of market equilibrium. On the other hand, the action of the firm may have an effect on the market value of the firm in question, and it may lead individuals to decide to reallocate their portfolios.' We postpone until later a more detailed discussion of what a market equilibrium would look like in this context; but the simplest case to analyze is that where all individuals agree on what action the firm ought to take. In some sense, when that is the case, the shareholders' meeting is redundant. Section 1 of this paper gives an introduction to our result that in many cases

Friendship and the good in Aristotle

Abstract: If the number of published discussions is a fair measure, the two books of the Nicomachean Ethics devoted to friendship (PtXita) have not much engaged the attention of philosophers and philosophical scholars. Yet such neglect is not easily justifiable. For both in his account of what friendship is and in the various considerations he brings to bear to show what is good about friendship, Aristotle displays psychological subtlety and analytical ingenuity of an unusually high order, even for him. In this paper I hope to show this for Aristotle's views on the value of friendship, by discussing his principal arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere bearing on this topic.'

On Understanding a Sociological Classic

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the conditions requisite to an understanding of "classic" works in sociological theory, using Durkheim's Elementary Forms of the Religious Life as the example. Included are (1) a discussion of "presentist" and "historicist" approaches to the history of sociological thought; (2) a criticism of presentist "statements of contribution" in the secondary literature on the Elementary Forms; (3) an assessment of Merton's distinction between the "history" and the "systematics" of sociological theory; (4) a reconsideration of "contextual" approaches to classical social theory; (5) the proposal of a new approach to the history of sociological theory, illustrated by a very tentative reinterpretation of Durkheim's theory of sacrifice; and (6) a concluding section on the value for sociology itself of an authentic history of sociological thought.

Measurement in Social Stratification

Abstract: Valid measurement involves a process of theoretical conceptualization and opera­ tional definition based on rules of correspondence between the theory and the scaling techniques selected. The requirement of prior conceptual clarity is a major obstacle in the measurement of social stratification: theories in this field are complex, contra­ dictory, diverse, and "as difficult to express operationally as they are grand" (Jack­ son & Curtis 1968: 112). It is not the purpose of this paper to review the theoretical issues; that has been well done by others in recent years (Svalastoga 1964, 1965; Bottomore 1966; Lenski 1966; Tumin 1967; Allardt 1968; Runciman 1968; Parsons 1970; Eisenstadt 1971). Rather, the major objective is to present and critically review some of the measurement devices that have been developed by US, Canadian, and British researchers. Fortunately, there are some core concepts in social stratifi­ cation that have permitted these attempts at measurement, even in the absence of an agreed-upon theoretical base, or as Bottomore suggests (1966:10), "some general features of social stratification which are not in dispute." In the first place, social stratification is virtually synonymous with social inequal­ ity.1 Strata are not simply nominal categories, but hierarchically arranged sets with distinctions by ordinal rank. These distinctions indicate a second general feature, namely that stratification is social, the ranks based on societal definitions or attribu­ tions of differential value. The arenas and grounds for these value judgments, however, are subject to some controversy. There is little disagreement concerning the existence of at least two types of characteristics generating such judgments: biological distinctions, such as age, sex, or race, and acquired distinctions, such as power, wealth, or prestige. But there is no theoretical consensus as to which of these

Class and conformity: A study in values, with a reassessment, 1977

Abstract: First published in 1969 and augmented by the author with a new essay in 1977, "Class and Conformity" remains a model of sociological craftsmanship. Kohn's work marshals evidence from three studies to show a decided connection between social class and values. He emphasizes that occupation fosters either self-direction or conformity in people, depending upon the amount of freedom from supervision, the complexity of the task, and the variety of work that the job entails. The extent of parents' self-direction on the job further determines the value placed on self-direction for their children; thus, Kohn finds, is the most critical and pervasive factor distinguishing children raised in different socioeconomic classes.

Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs

Abstract: IN recent years, one of the areas singled out as having the potential for wasteful behavior is that of information. It is claimed that expenditures on certain kinds of information will yield negative social value. In their maximizing behavior, people seek and use discovered opportunities, whether or not they are "socially desirable." For instance, stealing is practiced. Not surprisingly, great moral pressure and resources are used to restrain thieves. One cannot expect individuals, however, to refrain from all socially undesirable behavior since, even if they wanted to, they cannot always be certain which activities are undesirable. Two types of wasteful behavior with respect to information have been identified. One is associated with speculative activities,2 and the other with signaling or sorting.3 Great ingenuity has gone into the construction of models describing them. Common to both sets of models is the notion that some kinds of knowledge neither affect allocation nor increase social product. Nevertheless, they will be procured by those who benefit from them, though their benefit is entirely at the expense of others. In some fundamental sense, "waste" doubtless does occur in that situation. Even the most casual observation reveals numerous actual instances

A crisis of identity: the case of medical sociology.

Abstract: This paper addresses current contentions that medical sociology is handicapped as both a scholarly and a policy science by its subordinate relationship to the more powerful field of medicine. An analysis of all research articles published in the JOURNAL OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR which focus upon patients reveals the following: (I) the presence, in the majority, of implicit and explicit medical value assumptions influencing all stages of the research process, from the definition of problems and variables through the application of findings to health policy; (2) a tendency for cases of "medical bias" to be associated with collaborative research in which the sociologist is wholly or partly dependent upon medical sponsorship and definition of the research situation. Consequences of this situation for the human subjects of research as well as for the field are discussed. A conclusion is that both our subjects' interests and the theoretic and political integrity of the field are best served by maximizing professional autonomy vis-i-vis medicine. A proposal for studying the structure of working arrangements concludes the paper.

The Perception of Man and the Conception of Government

Abstract: The long-run tendency toward expansion of government that has dominated social developments in the Western democracies for many years is attracting increasing attention from an array of social science scholars in search of a systematic explanation. This paper is an attempt to contribute a small fragment to that discussion. It addresses the rationale underlying conflicting views about the role, range and function of government. Alternative intellectual approaches to the "limits of government" appear to us to be critically influenced by the models of man employed by the various discussants.1 The set of characteristics with which man is endowed in the development of social science theory inevitably controls the body of theory that is forthcoming. What is less frequently recognized is the impact that views about the nature of man have on the evaluation of political and market institutions.2 *The paper has been influenced by many discussions with Allan H. Meltzer and Michael Jensen. We also gratefully acknowledge valuable comments offered by William Dewald on a first draft. lNormative views about the role of government are also conditioned by the conception of justice employed. An enquiry into the impact of alternative views of justice on political and social ideas is postponed to another occasion. 2Professional articulators usually explain the dispute between advocates of severely limited government and the proponents of large and not clearly limited government in terms of different ideological commitments. This is a rather shallow and unrevealing answer. It is easily understandable, however, in terms of the characteristics of the "market for words" conditioning the intelligentsia's behavior. Of course, ideological dimensions enter all our intellectual endeavors. The occurrence of these ideological components does not justify per se the rejection of any hypothesis or theory. Whatever the ideological influences at work, the informative value of a hypothesis can only be judged by appropriate cognitive procedure.s.

The Control of Inflation: Lessons from East European Experience

Abstract: Economics is difficult enough, even if one manages to avoid comparative studies in applied economics. Such efforts are inherently unreliable and incoinclusive. It is much simpler to model any single set of economic institutions and functional relations, using the data they generate to test hypotheses derived from the model, than to compare two different economic environments with each other in any useful way. With a model, one has an essential extra degree of freedom-one constructs it oneself. In comparative applied economics, however, everything is given, and we are reduced to counterfactual hypotheses analogous to those of economic history; e.g., how would a policy directed towards narrowing wage differentials as in the USSR work in some other country?-supposing we do know, more or 1Pss, what has actually happened in the USSR. It is therefore easier to apply the analytical tools of Western economics to the socialist centrally planned economics (CPEs), whatever the data problems and the need to adapt our models, than to seek any comparative lessons. One is especially reluctant to hypothesize the introduction of some CPE institutional pattern into a capitalist mixed economy. In our present circumstances, however, this is perhaps academic self-indulgence. Whether or not we are yet moving towards any "new international economic order", the old one surely has broken down; whether or not we can discern the future outlines of our own domestic economic system, the existing one isn't working very well. To proclaim a "crisis of capitalism"-or of orthodox economics-may be rhetorical excess, but in fact both are being seriously challenged, so far more by events than by new ideas. So it may be useful to put unfamiliar alternatives before a wider public, with a view to evaluating them and drawing implications, both positive and negative, for our own institutions and policies. At least this form of comparative applied economics has some potential value, in contrast with "comparative economic systems", which typically juxtaposes idealized models bearing little relation to actual economies; and it may not be so open to misinterpretation as East-West comparisons of growth rates and efficiency (see the critique in Hanson, 1971). I shall deal with the CPEs of Eastern Europe as a group. There are some significant differences between them in economic institutions and levels of development, but all allocate resources centrally in physical terms, and all have similar monetary systems. The USSR stands out for its size, Hungary for its market-oriented "economic reforms" of 1968, which took it partly outside the CPE category. Yugoslavia deliberately rejected central planning over two decades ago, but it is a socialist economy, and its workers' control and inflation justify a brief discussion (Section VIII).

Morality and expediency : the folklore of academic politics

Abstract: This book is about micro-politics: that kind of manoevre to control or avoid being controlled, to claim friendship or proclaim enmity, which takes place between people who know one another, and who must temper and adjust their actions towards one another because they share other activities They are members of the one community and of the same organization, and this not only moderates their actions but also provides them with themes for use in the political arenaThese justificatory themes and the irresolvable contradictions between them, and what is to be done when decisions cannot be made through rational procedures, is one subject of the book The setting is the university world of committees and dons and administrators, but the inquiry is into general questions about organizational life How are value contradictions resolved? Why are some matters discussed openly and others only before restricted audiences? Could we dispense with confidentiality and secrecy? What masks are used to make a person or a point of view persuasive?It is impossible and therefore wholly unwise to try to attempt to run such organizations in a wholly open and wholly rational fashion: without an appropriate measure of pretence and secrecy, even of hypocrisy, they cannot be made to work At a basic level organizations require secrecy and confidentiality to run effectively

Cognition In Cartography

Abstract: A considerable amount of perceptual research within the general framework of behavioral psychology has been conducted by cartographers during the last ten or fifteen years. However, as one reviews the findings of this research in connection with problems encountered during the normal process of making maps, it doesn't seem to add up to much. No whole theory or set of principles, greater than the sum of the small component parts, has emerged. Similarly, analytical attempts to deal with the notion of map reading have not led to any theoretical structures from which principles that would assist in the details of map design can be deduced. Clearly, map reading is more than just the cumulation of a number of simple perceptual com parisons of symbol size or value. Perhaps it is time, in recognition of this fact, to shift our thinking from the details of empirical research, from psychophysical studies, etc., to a concern with the broader assumptions that underlie the conduct of such research, and to the possibility that certain shifts in those basic assump tions might be of some value to cartography. Whitehead has characterized science as, "the union of passionate interest in the detailed facts with equal devotion to abstract generalization." We need to be concerned always with both levels of research activity.

A Medieval View of Human Dignity

Abstract: On the views of human dignity held by a society, whether consciously or unconsciously, depend many other matters of basic importance. Such matters include not only the more obvious questions of how a man behaves, or should behave, toward members of his own and other groups but also his relationship to his material environment. the value he places on different types of human activity (whether he should seek or scorn wealth and fame, be a warrior or man of peace, prize the active or contemplative life), and the kinds of responsibilities he assumes. As far back as written records give us any knowledge, man seems to have considered himself a special kind of being. One of his more worthy and interesting intellectual activities has been his attempt to investigate the nature and moral basis of human worth. The western

Fundamental Research and Education

Abstract: stereotypic view of the connection between research and education generally assumes that the knowledge of greatest value to educators specifies, at least ideally, a set of pedagogical "dos" and "don'ts," and that the prime consumer of that knowledge is the classroom teacher These assumptions have been widely held since the development of psychology as a science; they were a force in the creation of many schools of education and guided early educational research Their popularity is understandable, for given the subject matter of psychology, it seems reasonable to expect it to be of direct benefit to persons whose occupational concerns are interpersonal And yet, they are unwise assumptions, for they tend to act as a set of blinders, closing off a fuller view of what educationa can gain from research

Experimentation in Psychology of Religion: An Impossible Dream

Abstract: Experimentation, a research method that has proven extremely useful in other areas of psychology, has been used only rarely in psychology of religion. The value of experimentation lies in its effectiveness in testing scientific theories. Lack of experimentation may be one reason there has been so little progress in developing and testing scientific theories in psychology of religion. But ethical and practical restrictions make it unlikely that experimentation will ever be widely used in research on religion. Quasi-experimental methods do, however, seem possible. Several quasi-experimental designs particulary relevant to psychological research on religion are discussed, and greater use of quasi-experimental methods is encouraged.

King Lear and the Decline of Feudalism

Abstract: M ODERN CRITICISM of King Lear has emphasized that it is the most metaphysical of Shakespeare's tragedies. The main characters each have their own theory about their place in the world, the meaning of their experience, and the relation between man and the higher powers; the play's action is thus subjected to continuous philosophical scrutiny by those who take part in it. Critics have been much concerned with this intricate debate about human destiny, which is carried on through the play both explicitly and by the implications of dramatic action. Ultimately, it is argued, the play makes a "statement" about life, though there has been scant agreement on what the statement is. At one pole, Bradley and the neo-Christians have claimed that the play asserts the redemptive value of suffering; at the other, Jan Kott makes of it an absurdist drama about the loss of value that anticipates the modern apotheosis of the mode in the grotesque farces of Samuel Beckett.1 It would be obtuse to deny the importance of this metaphysical preoccupation in King Lear; obviously the play does explore the universal significance of individual experiences of pain or loss. But critical discussion will remain unproductive and unresolvable so long as it limits the play's metaphysics to a separate and selfcontained mode of discourse. We need to remember that the first quarto of King Lear (1608) calls it a "True Chronicle Historie" (i.e., a play based on matter from Holinshed or other early chronicles) and that it has much in common with Shakespeare's earlier works in the genre, especially the tetralogy that begins with Richard II. Its "philosophy" becomes clearer when approached by way of the contemporary meaning, for Shakespeare and his audience, of the political struggle that it dramatizes. My aim in this paper will be to present a reading of King Lear grounded on the premises of dialectical materialism and to suggest some implications for a general assessment of Shakespeare's political outlook. In a single article I can only sketch the salient features of a complex historical situation; the close examination of the various divisions and crosscurrents within the class structure of Tudor England must be left to studies of wider scope.2 The analysis will take as its point of departure Marx's view of the English Renaissance as a transitional stage between the dominance of the feudal aristocracy and that of the commercial bourgeoisie, which consolidated its power over England's destiny in 1688. My concern will be with the effects of this transition on social and personal relations: that is, with shifts in consciousness that pertain to the cultural "superstructure" rather than to the direct results of changes in the mode of production. Since economic relations are readily quantifiable their evolution can be charted with some precision, even in earlier periods of history; but social relations, always more mixed and indefinite, adapt neither smoothly nor rapidly to economic change. It does not lie in our power to change our personalities overnight, except in rare instances of conversion; psychological conflict must therefore be endemic in a dynamic society. Traditional styles of relationship will be continuously undermined by the forces of change, but the personality structure appropriate for new kinds of social organization can evolve only gradually. By the time it has become "second nature," it will have been outmoded by further change. The resultant instability and uncertainty will be perceived differently by various social groups according to the effect of economic change on their fortunes: what are symptoms of decline for one class may be portents of liberation and fresh opportunity for another. Shakespeare lived at a time when an uncertain balance had been struck in the transition from the feudal-aristocratic society of medieval England to the emergent bourgeois state. The aristocracy and the bourgeoisie were a rough

The normal range: a concept in transition.

Abstract: One of the most frequent and perhaps frustrating questions the pathologist is called on to answer regarding laboratory tests is, "What is normal?" In recent years the term "normal range" has been replaced by "reference range." "Upper limit of normal" has been replaced by "referent value," "critical value," or "cut-off point." Our literature now reflects increasing contributions from biostatistics, decision theory, and systems analysis. Yet, for most of us, although the names have changed, the problem has not. Understanding Bayes' Theorum will not help the busy internist when he complains about false-positive elevations in alkaline phosphatase activity on hospital admission profiles. The laboratory director must be able to integrate reference range data and predictive value theory in his own environment if he wishes to provide meaningful information to clinicians. It is the objective of this review to focus on the definition and integration of these areas of emerging concern for the laboratorian.

Critical Theory and Film: Adorno and "The Culture Industry" Revisited

Abstract: What the statements above have in common is the use of a photographic or cinematic metaphor to assign a negative value to certain literary texts, particularly those of the "naturalist" or "socialist realist" schools. What interests me here is not the attitude toward those particular texts,4 but the metaphor itself and what it reveals about the assumptions and attitudes of these critics toward the film medium.

Pragmatic Naturalism: An Introduction

Abstract: It is said that America came of age in-tellectually with the appearance of the pragmatic movement in philosophy. "Pragmatic Naturalism "presents a selec-tive and interpretative overview of this philosophy as developed in the writings of its intellectual founders and chief exponents--Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, George Herbert Mead, and John Dewey. Mr. Eames groups the leading ideas of these pragmatic natu-ralists around the general fields of "Na-ture and Human Life," "Knowledge," "Value," and "Education," treating the primary concerns and special emphasis of each philosopher to these issues. Philosophy students, teachers of phi-losophy, and general readers will find this book a comprehensive overview of American philosophy.

Teachers in Role Conflict: The Hidden Dilemma.

Abstract: expectable among my friends in educa tion who choose, inadvertently or self consciously, to prefer value orientations that are predominantly past-centered, present-centered, or quite probably just eclectic-centered. Not all of my friends, however, are of like mind. Some are future-centered. With that galaxy of powerful and ac tivist Utopians ranging all the way from Plato to Francis Bacon to Edward Bella my to Buckminster Fuller to Lewis Mumford ? these and other friends would maintain (as the secular peren nialist educator Robert M. Hutchins once maintained while commenting on the confusions besetting education) that nothing less than a Utopian choice will any longer do. I am reminded here, too, of a wonderful quotation from Arnold Toynbee: "It is a paradoxical but pro foundly true and important principle of life," he said, "that the most likely way to reach a goal is to be aiming not at that goal itself but at some other more ambitious goal behind it." As I interpret this great global his torian, he was speaking to us from a value orientation that is neither merely pastnor present-centered but is, above all, a new value orientation that should now govern our educational and cultural agenda. For, as Toynbee indicated, we need to set our target toward "the more ambitious goal" of today and tomorrow that only a future-oriented philosophy of education can any longer provide. D

Across the Nuclear Divide—Strategic Studies, Past and Present

Abstract: A combination of accident and design has produced a transnational strategic studies community which has only the most casual acquaintance with strategic thought and action prior to 1945. In this article it is argued both that the continuities in international politics and strategy, preand post-1945, are far more important than are the discontinuities, and that therefore the disciplined study of pre-nuclear ideas and events could and should much improve our understanding of the structure of current and anticipated security problems. The identity of the political players changes, as do the characteristics of particular weapons, but such policy problem categories as the utility of force for the support of foreign policy, alliance management, the conduct of an arms race, the prosecution of limited war, arms control negotiations, and the accomodation of new weapon technologies, all have long pre-nuclear histories. Nuclear-age strategic theory has suffered severely from shallowness of its empirical base. Relatively few strategists today deny, in principle, the salience of pre-1945 thought and practice. But, historical consciousness of more than a very cosmetic variety continues to be the rare exception in contemporary strategic and arms control analysis. It is , of course, somewhat contrary to the American "style" which continues overwhelmingly to be pragmatic and optimistic in character, to suggest that the practice of bad old "power politics" may be traced back as far as human literary and archaeological records extend-the past and the present essentially are one in terms of statecraft. An historical memory that stops at a postulated great divide in 1945 encourages aspirations for "new eras" and the like. Since the past provides the only evidence upon which theories may be constructed, the time is long overdue for strategists and arms controllers (if these be separate categories) to seek out the relevant past in a systematic fashion for the purposes of policy-science today. (This is not to deny the value of historical enquiry pursued for its own sake; the trouble tends to be that historical research for its own sake requires a massive effort of translation before its findings are organized in ways at all useful for those facing contemporary policy problems.)

On psychological space.

Abstract: Western psychology, with a few exceptions (James, 1890; Lewin, 1936; Matte Blanco, 1975), has on the whole ignored any relationship between mind 'and space, no doubt because of the lingering influence of Descartes, who separated the world into the thinking substance of mind as over against the spatially-extended substance of matter. This paper will examine the relationship between mind and space in an experientialphenomenological framework and show that the notion of psychological space can potentially be of great value in helping us to understand the nature of consciousness and the ways in which we create our world,