Showing papers on "Value (ethics) published in 1981"

Forms of talk

Abstract: Forms of Talk extends Erving Goffman's interactional analyses of face-to-face communication to ordinary conversations and vebal exchanges. In this, his most sociolinguistic work, Goffman relates to certain forms of talk some of the issues that concerned him in his work on frame analysis. This book brings together five of Goffman's essays: "Replies and Responses," "Response Cries," "Footing," "The Lecture," and "Radio Talk." Of lasting value in Goffman's work is his insistence that behavior-verbal or nonverbal-be examined along with the context of that behavior. In all of these classic essays, there is a "topic" at hand for discussion and analysis. In addition, as those familiar with Goffman's work have come to expect, there is the wider context in which the topic can be viewed and related to other topics-a characteristic move of Goffman's that has made his work so necessary for students of interaction in many disciplines.

The power to tax : analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution

Abstract: Commenting on his collaboration with Geoffrey Brennan on "The Power to Tax", James M. Buchanan says that the book is "demonstrable proof of the value of genuine research collaboration across national-cultural boundaries." Buchanan goes on to say that "The Power to Tax" is informed by a single idea - the implications of a revenue-maximizing government." Originally published in 1980, "The Power to Tax" was a much-needed answer to the tax revolts sweeping across the United States. It was a much-needed answer as well in the academic circles of tax theory, where orthodox public finance models were clearly inadequate to the needs at hand. The public-choice approach to taxation which Buchanan had earlier elaborated stood in direct opposition to public-finance orthodoxy.What Buchanan and Brennan constructed in "The Power to Tax" was a middle ground between the two. As Brennan writes in the foreword, "The underlying motivating question was simple: Why not borrow the motivational assumptions standard in public-choice theory and put them together with assumptions about policy-maker discretion taken from public-finance orthodoxy?" The result was a controversial book - and a much misunderstood one as well. Looking back twenty years later, Brennan feels confirmed in the rightness of the theories he and Buchanan espoused, particularly in their unity with the public-choice tradition: "The insistence on motivational symmetry is a characteristic feature of the public choice approach, and it is in this dimension that "The Power to Tax" and the orthodox public-finance approach diverge."

Black and white styles in conflict

Abstract: "Goes a long way toward showing a lay audience the value, integrity, and aesthetic sensibility of black culture, and moreover the conflicts which arise when its values are treated as deviant version of majority ones."--Marjorie Harness Goodwin, "American Ethnologist"

The Ethics of Organizational Politics

Abstract: Political uses of power demand explicit consideration of ethical restraints, in part because current management theory focuses on the value of outcomes rather than on the value of the means chosen. We have developed a normative model of ethical analysis that can be helpful in determining what these restraints are. The model integrates three kinds of ethical theories: utilitarianism, theories of moral rights, and theories of justice.

Philosophy and Democracy

Abstract: The prestige of political philosophy is very high these days. It commands the attention of economists and lawyers, the two groups of academics most closely connected to the shaping of public policy, as it has not done in a long time. And it claims the attention of political leaders, bureaucrats, and judges, most especially judges, with a new and radical forcefulness. The command and the claim follow not so much from the fact that philosophers are doing creative work, but from the fact that they are doing creative work of a special sort-which raises again, after a long hiatus, the possibility of finding objective truths, "true meaning," "right answers," "the philosopher's stone," and so on. I want to accept this possibility (without saying very much about it) and then ask what it means for democratic politics. What is the standing of the philosopher in a democratic society? This is an old question; there are old tensions at work here: between truth and opinion, reason and will, value and preference, the one and the many. These antipodal pairs differ from one another, and none of them quite matches the pair "philosophy and democracy." But they do hang together; they point to a central problem. Philosophers claim a certain sort of authority for their conclusions; the people claim a different sort of authority for their decisions. What is the relation between the two? I shall begin with a quotation from Wittgenstein that might seem to resolve the problem immediately. "The philosopher," Wittgenstein wrote, "is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher."' This is more than an assertion of detachment in its usual sense, for citizens are surely capable, sometimes, of detached judgments even of their own ideologies, practices, and institutions. Wittgenstein is asserting a more radical detachment. The philosopher is and must be an outsider; standing apart, not occasionally (in judgment) but systematically (in thought). I do not know whether the philosopher

On the value of acting from the motive of duty

Abstract: t has quite reasonably been a source of frustration to sympaI thetic readers that Kant seems to claim that a dutiful action can have moral worth only if it is done from the motive of duty alone. The apparent consequence of this view-that an action cannot have moral worth if there is supporting inclination or desire-is, at the least, troubling as it judges a grudging or resentfully performed dutiful act morally preferable to a similar act done from affection or with pleasure. In a recent article, 1 Richard Henson attempts to take the sting out of this view of Kant on moral worth by arguing (i) that attending to the phenomenon of the overdetermination of actions leads one to see that Kant might have had two distinct views of moral worth, only one of which requires the absence of cooperating inclinations, and (ii) that when Kant insists that there is moral worth only when an action is done from the motive of duty alone, he need not also hold that such a state of affairs is morally better, all things considered, than one where supporting inclination is present. Henson's proposals seem to me both serious and plausible. I do not think that either of his models, in the end, can take on the role Kant assigns to moral worth in the argument of the Groundwork. But seeing the ways Henson's account diverges from Kant's makes clearer what Kant intended in his discussion of those actions he credits with moral worth. Most of the traditional difficulties with Kant's views on moral worth come from not seeing the point of that discussion.

Ex-ante and Ex-post Welfare Optimality under Uncertainty

Abstract: It is widely believed by economic theorists that, if there were no transactions costs, and if all information about the economy were perfectly shared by all, then Arrow-Debreu contingent commodity markets should bring about an ideal allocation The basis for this belief seems clear We have the two efficiency theorems of welfare economics which assure us that, in the absence of external effects, any competitive allocation is Pareto-efficient, and that any Pareto-efficient allocation is competitive, provided that appropriate lump-sum transfers are made Of course, there are some reservations that need to be made: local satiation and non-convexities are well known to cause problems But these are not the problems I wish to discuss here To return to the usual argument, the next step involves noticing how, with contingent commodity markets, the efficiency theorems of welfare economics carry over to an economy with uncertainty, as explained, for instance, in Chapter 7 of Debreu's Theorpj of Value The fundamental value judgment that gives these efficiency theorems their normative interest is what may be called "consumer sovereignty" It is an assumption that the social welfare ordering should respect the preferences that govern consumers' market behaviour It is a serious value judgment-more serious than most economists have been prepared to concede But its seriousness increases when there is uncertainty We know full well that individuals misperceive the probabilities of certain events, assuming that they even perceive any probabilities at all (see, for example, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) Nor are we always willing to accept as appropriate the attitudes to risk of individuals who seem either extremely reckless or extremely cautious Societies are often willing to make some gestures towards property owners who have not insured themselves adequately against damage from fire, flood or tempest, and not just because of imperfect insurance markets or even misperceptions of probabilities In addition, the inequalities of income that arise when some individuals take more risks than others are not necessarily seen to be desirable, particularly if an individual has undertaken a useful but risky activity and has a very low income as a result of failure Such gestures are examples of "contingent lump-sum transfers" It seems clear that, if such transfers occur to a sufficient extent, they could supplant completely the securities markets which are usually sufficient to bring about Pareto efficiency They may even be able to go further, and correct the imperfections of an Arrow-Debreu market allocation when individuals do misperceive probabilities or else have wrong attitudes to risk This is the main question I wish to consider here The idea that consumer sovereignty should not always extend to economies with uncertainty is not new: it can be found in work by Diamond (1967), Dr6ze

Faith and Reason

Abstract: Introduction 1. The Nature of Belief 2. Rational Belief 3. The Value of Rational Religious Belief 4. The Nature of Faith 5. The Purpose of Religion 6. The Role of Creeds 7. The Comparison of Creeds Epilogue: Faith is Voluntary

From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for Rationality in Ethics

Abstract: In the interest of securing a rational foundation for morality, contemporary ethical theory has ignored or rejected the significance of narrative for ethical reflection It is our contention that this has been a profound mistake, resulting in a distorted account of moral experience Furthermore, the attempt to portray practical reason as independent of narrative contexts has made it difficult to assess the value which convictions characteristic of Christians or Jews might have for moral existence As a result, we have lost sight of the ways these traditions might help us deal with the moral issues raised by modern science and medicine1

Max Weber: Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory

Abstract: AX WEBER IS widely regarded as one of the founders of twentieth-century social science and probably its greatest practitioner. Modern and ancient theorists commonly believed that founding-or giving a form or constitution to collective life-was reckoned to be the most notable action of which political man is capable. It is superior to other types of political acts because it aims to shape the lives of citizens by designing the structure or "dwelling" which they and their posterity will inhabit. In describing this extraordinary action, political theorists often had recourse to architectural metaphors: the founder "lays foundations." No such images were invoked to explain the routine acts that occur in the daily life of a polity. Ordinary action is commonly described as "doing," "effecting," or "bringing something about." If political actors are to bring something about, they presuppose conditions that make possible the action in questicn and the means for doing it. They also presuppose a context that permits the action to be understood and interpreted. The founder is quintessentially an author of political presuppositions. By analogy, to found a form of social science entails an act of demarcation that indicates the subject-matter peculiar to the science, the kind of activities that are appropriate (e.g., empirical inquiry), and the norms that are to be invoked injudging the value of the results produced by the activities. These demarcations beconme presuppositions of subsequent practice. Weber was engaged in founding when he wrote the following:

Pathology and probabilities: a new approach to interpreting and reporting biopsies.

Abstract: Pathologists typically analyze biopsy specimens and report their opinions in a qualitative fashion. Clinical information, often fragmentary in character, is implicitly linked with the histologic findings, and interpretations are couched in ambiguous language: "consistent with," "highly suggestive of," "may represent," or "cannot exclude." Only pathognomonic or normal findings are reported in an unequivocal fashion. In this paper we compare the analysis of biopsy material by a conventional method and by a numerical, probabilistic technique. We suggest that applying a probabilistic technique can considerably improve the precision of tissue diagnosis and can greatly facilitate the communication of pathologists with clinicians and with each other. Probabilistic analysis is also likely to be of substantial value in improving the interpretation and reporting of x-ray and nuclear-medicine studies. (N Engl J Med. 1981; 305:917–23.)

The Value controversy

Abstract: One of the fruits of the revival of socialist economic theory over the past decade has been a wide-ranging debate about the validity of Marx's labour theory of value. At the heart of the discussion stands the theoretical work of Piero Sraffa and the conclusions drawn from it by such economists as Ian Steedman. Initially confined to a relatively narrow circle of specialists, the controversy about value theory has since spread to wider circles of the left. But although general awareness that the stakes of the dispute are of concern to all socialists is now extensive, understanding of the issues involved has remained more restricted than need be. This volume presents, for the first time, a comprehensive yet accessible overview of the discussion. The essays discuss not only the value debate itself, but also its relevance to such issues as capitalist crisis, the theory of exploitation, and historical materialism. Comprehensible to the non-specialist, but without sacrificing rigour or oversimplifying the issues, the articles assembled here offer a definitive summary of the current state of one of the crucial aspects of Marxist thought.

Intuitive Data Processing as a Potential Source of Bias in Naturalistic Evaluations

Abstract: in the 17th century, for example, rebelled against the influence of Aristotelian thinking and the methods of acquiring knowledge (especially about the physical universe) current in his own day. In particular, he warned against a number of sources of distortion which he called Idols. Those associated with sensory perception and intuitive methods of analysis he called the "Idols of the Tribe," since he believed them to be "inherent in human nature, and the very tribe or race of man" (Bacon 41). Recent research in human perception and cognition has given substance and specificity to many of Bacon's concerns. In addition, there has been growing interest in the implications of this type of research in various social settings, in particular, to courtroom testimony (Yarmey, 1979) and to decision making in business (Wright, 1980). Because bias threatens an evaluation, it is not surprising that there is considerable literature on the topic. It is possible to group various forms of bias under three broad headings. First, there are ethical compromises, actions for which the evaluator is personally culpable. Second are what may be called value inertias, unwanted distorting influences which reflect the evaluator's background experience. The first part of this paper is a brief survey of these two categories, mainly to indicate the scope of each and so distinguish them from the third category, cognitive limitations in dealing with data. The major purpose of the paper is to elaborate the third category. This takes the form of a survey of faulty intuitions which have been identified in empirical research. Only those aspects which appear to have direct relevance to evaluation (in particular, naturalistic evaluation) are included. This is not to suggest that current naturalistic approaches to research and evaluation are undisciplined and merely impressionistic. They are not, of course. But such a catalog of commonly-found intuitive biases is justified even if it is not accompanied by concrete proposals as to how each may be eliminated or reduced. To be sure, the presentation may appear to be somewhat negative (after all, it is a list of defects) but if it helps sensitize naturalistic inquirers to potential problem areas, its contribution will be positive.

Following Christ in a Consumer Society: The Spirituality of Cultural Resistance

Abstract: In an era of fraud, corruption, and the relentless celebration of image over substance, the message of this perennial best-seller is more timely than ever. Following Christ in a Consumer Society offers a penetrating critique of the culture of consumerism, contrasted with the personalism of the Gospel. Addressing a soul-destroying culture in which ""having more"" has become the only measure of value, Kavanaugh reminds us of the values that truly make us human. Through the counter-cultural message of the Gospel, his book presents a diagnosis of our social ills while at the same time providing a guide back to wholeness, sanity, and spiritual health.

Organization Development: A Political Perspective

Abstract: It is now accepted that organizational politics exist in every organization and are involved in almost every facet of organizational life. Organizational politics are certainly involved in intervention programs. Despite these facts, organization development (OD) has been characterized as lacking any political sophistication whatsoever. In order to increase their success rate, OD consultants have been asked to become more politically involved in their intervention programs [Bennis, 1969; Pettigrew, 1975]. We argue here that OD has developed an unrecognized political orientation that aids OD consultants in the political arena and supports their intervention programs, and we explore the practical and ethical/value considerations of greater political involvement.

The social rate of discount for nuclear waste storage: economics or ethics?

Abstract: The traditional economic approach for evaluating alternative policies has been the use of benefit-cost analysis Application of this tool, however, to broad social questions, such as the choice to store nuclear wastes, has been unsuccessful because of several philosophical and ethical problems raised, first, by the need to value risks to human life and, second, with valuing in present terms events which may occur thousands of years hence This paper is an attempt to look beyond traditional ethical and economic perspective Formal economic models of alternative decision criteria for nuclear waste storage are developed which are based on alternative ethical positionsIn particlular, three ethical positions are developed for comparison to benefit-cost analysis First, the utilitarian ethic is used to explore the notion that the proper goal for society is to pursue the greatest good for the greatest number Secondly, a simplified libertarian viewpoint is explored where the protection of individual rights is more important than the good of the whole The final ethical position is based upon the democratic ethic (JMT)

Philosophy of medicine as the source for medical ethics.

Abstract: The article offers an approach to inquiry about, the foundation of medical ethics by addressing three areas of conceptual presupposition basic to medical ethical theory. First, medical ethics must presuppose a view about the nature of medicine. it is argued that the view required by a cogent medical morality entails that medicine be seen both as a healing relationship and as a practical art. Three ways in which medicine inherently involves values and valuation are presented as important, i.e., in being aimed at the good of health, in being a cognitive art evaluating towards that good, and as a manifestation of a virtuous disposition concerning that good. Finally, a value ontology drawn from these considerations is seen as necessarily underlying medical ethics. A set of three such basic values are promoted as crucial: the value of health; the value of the individual patient; and the value of altruism that mediates the class of potential patients.

Mental health as rational autonomy.

Abstract: Rather than eliminate the terms "mental health and illness" because of the grave moral consequences of psychiatric labeling, conservative definitions are proposed and defended. Mental health is rational autonomy, and mental illness is the sustained loss of such. Key terms are explained, advantages are explored, and alternative concepts are criticized. The value and descriptive components of all such definitions are consciously acknowledged. Where rational autonomy is intact, mental hospitals and psychotherapists should not think of themselves as treating an illness. Instead, they are functioning as applied axiologists, moral educators, spiritual mentors, etc. They deal with what Szasz has called "personal, social, and ethical problems in living." But mental illness is real.

It pays to do good, but not to do more good than it pays: A note on the survival of altruism

Abstract: Recently Becker and Hirshleifer have attempted to explain the survival of altruism. Altruism ‘pays’ in their framework because it permits mutual cooperation or exchange to take place. This paper shows that these arguments are invalid. This case is that in any environment where altruism pays there is always an egoistic strategy called cooperation egoism — which yields an even higher return. In equilibrium, this will be anticipated so that, while altruism may pay off in a disequilibrium situation, in equilibrium egoism and not altruism has survival value.

Humanistic Education: Too Tender for a Tough World?.

Abstract: any people regard the humanist movement in education as a fad perpetrated by fuzzy-minded, soft-headed people sadly out of touch with the real values of education. Others believe that humanistic education is usurping the prerogatives of home and church. A few even refer to it as "secular humanism" and so regard it as ungodly or antireli gious. Still others believe that humanism is a nice idea but much too soft to prepare youth for the tough world of reality. All of these misconceptions only confuse the issues and delay what is an absolute neces sity for American education. What is humanistic education? The Working Group on Humanistic Educa tion of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD) de fined it as follows: Humanistic education is a commitment to educational practice in which all facets of the teaching/learning process give major emphasis to the free dom, value, worth, dignity, and integrity of persons. * More specifically, humanistic education: 1. accepts the learner's needs and pur poses and develops experiences and pro grams around the unique potential of the learner; 2. facilitates self-actualization and strives to develop in all persons a sense of personal adequacy; 3. fosters acquisition of basic skills necessary for living in a multicultured society, including academic, personal, interpersonal, communicative, and eco nomic proficiency; 4. personalizes educational decisions and practices (to this end it includes stu dents in the processes of their own educa tion via democratic involvement at all levels of implementation); 5. recognizes the primacy of human feelings and uses personal values and perceptions as integral factors in educa tional processes; 6. develops a learning climate that nurtures learning environments perceived by involved individuals as challenging, understanding, supportive, exciting, and free from threat; and 7. develops in learners genuine con cern and respect for the worth of others and skill in conflict resolution. The humanist movement is no fad, destined to come into being for a short time and quickly fade away. Quite the contrary, it is part of a worldwide move ment in human thinking. It does not exist only in education. There are humanist movements in psychology, sociology, an thropology, political science, theology, philosophy, and medicine. The humanist movement in education is simply another expression of these larger events. If it did not exist, we would have to invent it. There are three major reasons why this is so.

The Place of Network Analysis in the Study of Supportive Social Associations

Abstract: Network analysis is a set of constructs used to identify and to describe social units according to the transactions that take place among individuals. This analytic framework can prove particularly useful for the study of supportive 'interpersonal exchanges during conditions of rapid social change. Despite demonstrated importance of social support to health and well-being, earlier concepts used in the study of social support have not provided a framework needed to differentiate supportive exchanges, to describe the supportive associations available to a single individual, and to uncover the often concealed structures that underlie repeated patterns of supportive exchanges within a community. A review of both the earlier concepts and of network analysis is followed by an examination of four studies, each illustrating a particular value in the use of network analysis for the study of social support.

Morality and the Development of Conceptions of Justice

Abstract: Social philosophers from Aristotle to Rawls have argued that justice is the primary value underlying all morality. Nevertheless, our understanding of how the concern with justice guides human behavior is far from complete. The explication of this relationship is made especially difficult because it is not easy to define justice. In fact, it often appears that justice is only definable in contrast with injustice. When we speak of a just act, we generally mean that the act has remedied or prevented an unjustice. From this perspective, the pursuit of justice can best be defined as the active process of remedying or preventing what would arouse the sense of injustice (Cahn, 1949). In this chapter, we attempt to describe how the sense of injustice is aroused and how the pursuit of justice becomes a moral value.

Le discours de Jean-Jacques Rousseau sur les femmes, et sa réception critique

Abstract: Jean-Jacques Rousseau's discussion of women and its reception. ; In the twentieth century the analysis of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's discussion of women remains very ambiguous. Was Rousseau anti-feminist ? By rejecting masculine authority, paternal or conjugal, by criticising the education of women, and marriages of convenience, he exculpates women ; thanks to him a higher value is attached to their moral force. In those revolutionary times the majority of illiterate women claim social rather than political rights and like Rousseau blame the women of the corrupt upper classes. Though Rousseau refuses women any political role, they see him nonetheless as their spokesman not their enemy.

Clarence Ayres and the Instrumental Theory of Value

Abstract: Having rejected the individualism usually associated with orthodox economics, institutionalists have always faced a problem in finding some alternative criterion of value, and one consistent with their reformist leanings. A variety of value theories can be found in the institutionalist literature, but the one of most interest involves the use of an instrumentalist philosophy, based on the work of John Dewey, combined with a study of the nature of the evolutionary process. Examples of this approach can be found in the work of W. H. Hamilton [1953] and John R. Commons [1932], but it is in the writings of C. E. Ayres that it is most fully developed. Ayres, however, was not simply a Deweyan but significantly extended and modified Dewey's ideas [Breit and Culbertson 1976, p. 14]. Ayres's version of instrumentalism has had a considerable influence on the current generation of institutionalist writers and appears to have become closely associated with the term "neo-institutionalism" [Junker 1968; Tool 1977]. The purpose of this article is to outline the Ayresian approach to questions of social value and evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. In addition, it will be argued that the least satisfactory aspects of Ayres's views are to be found in precisely those areas where he departed from Dewey's lead.

Patterns in the use of information: The right to be different

Abstract: Axioms or priorities in the value of information are a dynamic function for each user which changes with the intended use. The viewpoints of users can frequently be grouped into related “dimensions of value”: what is chosen as most important in STI is quite different from the viewpoints of science, of technology, and the information itself. There are many such sets of interacting viewpoints. Values differ for use for information operations, for planning, or for research. Preferred information may be qualitative or judgmental and not quantitative, or subjective/intuitive and not rational. Other differences may depend on the environment of use, in government/industry/academia, in business/economics/statistics, or in the argument between public versus private versus the basic urge to know. Two dimensions in any of these sets is not enough and each has to some extent its own language, with characteristic shifts in the meanings of words. The recognition of patterns in value has a direct bearing on the conservation of the energy put into evaluation. Information analysis and evaluation can be envisioned as a pyramid of work where progressively smaller parts of the original are pointed at a desired target, by being pumped up through successively higher energy levels of selection and rejection. It is possible to convert part of this work into potential energy for future reference, but information systems designed to handle facts alone have a chronic problem: they try to convert all input on values into the quantitative dimension, and they make no provision for sending the user's opinion along with the product. Intractable conflicts in information policy can be expected whenever such a reduction in values is imposed upon a multidimensional pattern, if this allows one protagonist to deny to another the right to be different. Help can come from the user's learning to recognize his own changes in identity, and where his friends are.

The case for a moral sex education in the schools.

Abstract: The potential benefits of sex education cannot be realistically discussed without initially rooting out the fears and myths which prevent the active promotion of good programs. The truth of the situation is that knowledgeable and informed adolescents are more likely to postpone sexual relations until they feel emotionally ready and are able to take the necessary precautions against pregnancy and venereal disease. It is essential that sexuality programs be taught with values. When teaching contraception the instructor needs to convey some basic guidelines. Sex education should be taught from the perspective that it is wrong to take advantage of another individual. The function of a "moral" education is to encourage people to strive toward the universally accepted ideals of this democratic and pluralistic society and to offer facts which facilitate responsible decision making. The value of equality of the sexes dignity and respect for all human being must be taught. A great difference exists between being moral and being moralistic. In moralistic presentations the attempt is made a impose a personal point of view in a dogmatic way. Sex education programs are best taught from a moral perspective which encourages the accepted aspirations of this society while preserving individual liberty. Given these guidelines even the most controversial subjects may be discussed in school within a moral framework. A quality sex education program must include the following principles: enhancing the self-concept; preparation for marriage and parenthood; understanding love; preparation for making responsible decisions; helping people understand the need for equal opportunities for males and for females; and contributing to knowledge and understanding of the sexual dimension of life.