A
Andrei Shleifer
Researcher at Harvard University
Publications - 519
Citations - 286543
Andrei Shleifer is an academic researcher from Harvard University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Government & Shareholder. The author has an hindex of 171, co-authored 514 publications receiving 271880 citations. Previous affiliations of Andrei Shleifer include National Bureau of Economic Research & University of Chicago.
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The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing the cost of providing a service in order to improve the quality or reduce the cost.
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State versus Private Ownership
TL;DR: The case for private provision only becomes stronger when competition between suppliers, reputational mechanisms, the possibility of provision by private not-for-profit firms, as well as political patronage and corruption are brought into play.
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Legal Determinants of External Finance
Rafael La Porta,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny,Robert W. Vishny +7 more
TL;DR: The authors showed that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets than those with stronger investor protections.
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The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost, and applied it to understand the costs and benefits of prison privatization, and found that if contracts are incomplete, the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee.
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The Strategic Bequest Motive
TL;DR: The authors developed a simple model of strategic bequests in which a testator influences the decisions of his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of bequesques on the beneficiaries' actions.