Andrei Shleifer

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of the firms are widely held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern corporation.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used new data on the holdings of 769 tax-exempt (predominantly pension) funds, to evaluate the potential effect of their trading on stock prices.

TL;DR: This paper found that countries with a higher proportion of engineering college majors grow faster than countries with lower proportion of law concentrators, whereas countries with high proportion of business concentrators grow more slowly.

TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the strongest, and french civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German and Scandinavian countries located in the middle.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors present evidence that some types of bidders systematically overpay in acquisitions, thereby reducing the wealth of their shareholders as opposed to just revealing bad news about their firm.