C
Chen Lin
Researcher at University of Hong Kong
Publications - 201
Citations - 13021
Chen Lin is an academic researcher from University of Hong Kong. The author has contributed to research in topics: Shareholder & Competition (economics). The author has an hindex of 48, co-authored 199 publications receiving 9882 citations. Previous affiliations of Chen Lin include The Chinese University of Hong Kong & City University of Hong Kong.
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Creditor rights, information sharing, and bank risk taking
TL;DR: This paper found that stronger creditor rights tend to promote greater bank risk-taking and increase the likelihood of financial crisis, while the benefits of information sharing among creditors appear to be universally positive.
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Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world
TL;DR: In this article, the authors combine and explore two new data sources, an original cross-national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms' concrete experiences with bribery.
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Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify an important channel through which excess control rights affect firm value and find that the cost of debt financing is significantly higher for companies with a wider divergence between the largest ultimate owner's control rights and cash-flow rights.
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Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic
TL;DR: The pandemic-induced drop in stock returns was milder among firms with stronger pre-2020 finances, and firms controlled by families, large corporations, and governments performed better, and those with greater ownership by hedge funds and other asset management companies performed worse.
Journal ArticleDOI
Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify an important channel through which excess control rights affect firm value and find that the cost of debt financing is significantly higher for companies with a wider divergence between the largest ultimate owner's control rights and cash-flow rights.