Ecological changes in the phenology and distribution of plants and animals are occurring in all well-studied marine, freshwater, and terrestrial groups These observed changes are heavily biased in the directions predicted from global warming and have been linked to local or regional climate change through correlations between climate and biological variation, field and laboratory experiments, and physiological research Range-restricted species, particularly polar and mountaintop species, show severe range contractions and have been the first groups in which entire species have gone extinct due to recent climate change Tropical coral reefs and amphibians have been most negatively affected Predator-prey and plant-insect interactions have been disrupted when interacting species have responded differently to warming Evolutionary adaptations to warmer conditions have occurred in the interiors of species’ ranges, and resource use and dispersal have evolved rapidly at expanding range margins Observed genetic shifts modulate local effects of climate change, but there is little evidence that they will mitigate negative effects at the species level

https://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/documents/R2ES/LitCited/LPC_2012/Parmesan_2006.pdf

Ecological and Evolutionary Responses to Recent Climate Change

Climate change over the past approximately 30 years has produced numerous shifts in the distributions and abundances of species and has been implicated in one species-level extinction. Using projections of species' distributions for future climate scenarios, we assess extinction risks for sample regions that cover some 20% of the Earth's terrestrial surface. Exploring three approaches in which the estimated probability of extinction shows a power-law relationship with geographical range size, we predict, on the basis of mid-range climate-warming scenarios for 2050, that 15-37% of species in our sample of regions and taxa will be 'committed to extinction'. When the average of the three methods and two dispersal scenarios is taken, minimal climate-warming scenarios produce lower projections of species committed to extinction ( approximately 18%) than mid-range ( approximately 24%) and maximum-change ( approximately 35%) scenarios. These estimates show the importance of rapid implementation of technologies to decrease greenhouse gas emissions and strategies for carbon sequestration.

/pdf/extinction-risk-from-climate-change-3pqx1sctsd.pdf

Extinction risk from climate change

Advances in the science and observation of climate change are providing a clearer understanding of the inherent variability of Earth's climate system and its likely response to human and natural influences. The implications of climate change for the environment and society will depend not only on the response of the Earth system to changes in radiative forcings, but also on how humankind responds through changes in technology, economies, lifestyle and policy. Extensive uncertainties exist in future forcings of and responses to climate change, necessitating the use of scenarios of the future to explore the potential consequences of different response options. To date, such scenarios have not adequately examined crucial possibilities, such as climate change mitigation and adaptation, and have relied on research processes that slowed the exchange of information among physical, biological and social scientists. Here we describe a new process for creating plausible scenarios to investigate some of the most challenging and important questions about climate change confronting the global community.

/pdf/the-next-generation-of-scenarios-for-climate-change-research-4brdc09r2l.pdf

The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment

This paper reviews the concept of adaptation of human communities to global changes, especially climate change, in the context of adaptive capacity and vulnerability. It focuses on scholarship that contributes to practical implementation of adaptations at the community scale. In numerous social science fields, adaptations are considered as responses to risks associated with the interaction of environmental hazards and human vulnerability or adaptive capacity. In the climate change field, adaptation analyses have been undertaken for several distinct purposes. Impact assessments assume adaptations to estimate damages to longer term climate scenarios with and without adjustments. Evaluations of specified adaptation options aim to identify preferred measures. Vulnerability indices seek to provide relative vulnerability scores for countries, regions or communities. The main purpose of participatory vulnerability assessments is to identify adaptation strategies that are feasible and practical in communities. The distinctive features of adaptation analyses with this purpose are outlined, and common elements of this approach are described. Practical adaptation initiatives tend to focus on risks that are already problematic, climate is considered together with other environmental and social stresses, and adaptations are mostly integrated or mainstreamed into other resource management, disaster preparedness and sustainable development programs. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

/pdf/adaptation-adaptive-capacity-and-vulnerability-3txg5bpzf9.pdf

Adaptation, adaptive capacity and vulnerability

The distributions of many terrestrial organisms are currently shifting in latitude or elevation in response to changing climate Using a meta-analysis, we estimated that the distributions of species have recently shifted to higher elevations at a median rate of 110 meters per decade, and to higher latitudes at a median rate of 169 kilometers per decade These rates are approximately two and three times faster than previously reported The distances moved by species are greatest in studies showing the highest levels of warming, with average latitudinal shifts being generally sufficient to track temperature changes However, individual species vary greatly in their rates of change, suggesting that the range shift of each species depends on multiple internal species traits and external drivers of change Rapid average shifts derive from a wide diversity of responses by individual species

/pdf/rapid-range-shifts-of-species-associated-with-high-levels-of-249w1ca3i9.pdf

Rapid Range Shifts of Species Associated with High Levels of Climate Warming

Ch. 12: Indigenous Peoples, Lands, and Resources. Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment

This paper draws ten lessons from analyses of adaptation to climate change under conditions of risk and uncertainty: (1) Socio-economic systems will likely respond most to extreme realizations of climate change. (2) Systems have been responding to variations in climate for centuries. (3) Future change will effect future citizens and their institutions. (4) Human systems can be the sources of surprise. (5) Perceptions of risk depend upon welfare valuations that depend upon expectations. (6) Adaptive decisions will be made in response to climate change and climate change policy. (7) Analysis of adaptive decisions should recognize the second-best context of those decisions. (8) Climate change offers opportunity as well as risk. (9) All plausible futures should be explored. (10) Multiple methodological approaches should be accommodated. These lessons support two pieces of advice for the Third Assessment Report: (1) Work toward consensus, but not at the expense of thorough examination and reporting of the "tails" of the distributions of the future. (2) Integrated assessment is only one unifying methodology; others that can better accommodate those tails should be encouraged and embraced.

Risk and uncertainties, analysis and evaluation: lessons for adaptation and integration

The global-change research community is beginning to turn its attention to assessing the vulnerability of social, economic, political and/or ecological systems to climate change and climate variability in ways that systematically incorporate their ability to adapt. The Workshop on Adaptation to Climate Variability and Change hosted in Costa Rica (March 29}April 1, 1998) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stands as evidence of this increased interest. Indeed, the `Scoping Meetinga hosted by the IPCC in late June con"rmed that vulnerability and adaptation will be unifying themes in the work of Working Groups II and III as they prepare the Third Assessment Report (TAR). It is reasonable, therefore, to expect a #urry of activity in this area over the next several years. As the process begins, though, it must be emphasized that the proceedings of the IPCC Costa Rica Adaptation Workshop reiterated the long held belief that long-term uncertainty and near-term variability are ubiquitous. Participants there agreed that

Spanning not-implausible futures to assess relative vulnerability to climate change and climate variability1

The Stern Review reported a social cost of carbon of over $300/tC, calling for ambitious climate policy. We here conduct a systematic sensitivity analysis of this result on two crucial parameters: the rate of pure time preference, and the rate of risk aversion. We show that the social cost of carbon lies anywhere in between 0 and $120,000/tC. However, if we restrict these two parameters to match observed behavior, an expected social cost of carbon of $60/tC results. If we correct this estimate for income differences across the world, the social cost of carbon rises to over $200/tC.

Risk Aversion, Time Preference, and the Social Cost of Carbon. ESRI WP252. September 2008

According to broad international agreement, a global warming increase beyond 2°C is unacceptable ([ 1 ][1]). Because of the physics of the climate system, we must ensure that global emissions of greenhouse gases peak and start to decline rapidly within a decade in order to have a reasonable chance of meeting the 2°C goal ([ 2 ][2]). Humankind has waffled and delayed for decades; further delay risks serious consequences for people and the ecosystems on which we rely.

Because the potential consequences of climate change are so high, the science community has an obligation to help people, organizations, and governments make informed decisions. Yet existing institutions are not well suited to this task. Therefore, we call for the science community to develop, implement, and sustain an independent initiative with a singular mandate: to actively and effectively share information about climate change risks and potential solutions with the public, particularly decision-makers in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Moreover, we call on philanthropic funding institutions to endorse and provide sustained support for the initiative.

![Figure][3] 

CREDIT: ANDREW PARFENOV/ISTOCKPHOTO.COM

The initiative must make concerted efforts to provide people, organizations, and governments with critical information, to address misperceptions, and to counter misinformation and deception. In doing so, it will have to overcome psychological and cultural barriers to learning and engagement ([ 3 ][4]–[ 5 ][5]).

The initiative should be judged against two critical outcomes: (i) improved understanding of risks and potential solutions by people, organizations, and governments, and (ii) more informed decision-making—and less avoidance of decision-making—about how to manage those risks. The initiative should be an embodiment of what Fischhoff calls “non-persuasive communication.” It should not advocate specific policy decisions; good decision-making involves weighing the best available information with the values of the decision-makers and those affected by the decisions.

The initiative should recruit a full range of climate scientists, decision scientists, and communication professionals into the effort ([ 6 ][6], [ 7 ][7]) to ensure both sound scientific information and effective communication. In addition, it should build bridges to other communities of experts—such as clergy, financial managers, business managers, and insurers—who help people, organizations, and governments assess and express their values. Scientists and nonscientists alike inevitably interpret climate science information in the context of other information and values; the initiative should mobilize experts who can facilitate appropriate and useful interpretations.

Despite the politically contentious nature of climate change policy, the initiative must be strictly nonpartisan. In the face of efforts to undermine public confidence in science, it must become a trusted broker of un biased information for people on all sides of the issue.

At this potentially critical moment for human civilization, it is imperative that people, organizations, and governments be given the resources they need to participate in constructive civic, commercial, and personal decision-making about climate change risks and solutions.

1. [↵][8] Group of 8, “Responsible leadership for a sustainable future” (G8 Summit, L'Aquila, Italy, 2009).
 

2. [↵][9] 1. M. Meinshausen 2. et al
 ., Nature 458, 1158 (2009).
 [OpenUrl][10][CrossRef][11][PubMed][12][Web of Science][13]

3. [↵][14] National Research Council, Evaluating Progress of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program: Methods and Preliminary Results (National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2007).
 

4. National Research Council, Informing Decisions in a Changing Climate (National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2009).
 

5. [↵][15] National Research Council, Informing an Effective Response to Climate Change (National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2010).
 

6. [↵][16] 1. B. Fischhoff
 , Environ. Sci. Technol. Online 41, 7207 (2007).
 [OpenUrl][17]

7. [↵][18] 1. T. E. Bowman, 2. E. Maibach, 3. M. E. Mann, 4. S. C. Moser, 5. R. C. J. Somerville
 , Science 324, 36-b (2009).
 [OpenUrl][19]

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Gary W. Yohe

Papers

Ch. 12: Indigenous Peoples, Lands, and Resources. Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment

Risk and uncertainties, analysis and evaluation: lessons for adaptation and integration

Spanning not-implausible futures to assess relative vulnerability to climate change and climate variability1

Risk Aversion, Time Preference, and the Social Cost of Carbon. ESRI WP252. September 2008

Time to take action on climate communication.