A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.

http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/Personal/stengel/TEXTE/agt-stengel.pdf

Algorithmic Game Theory

The paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier (1) has superior information about the cost of the project and (2) invests in cost reduction. The main result states that, under risk neutrality, the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns. This (optimal) contract moves toward a fixed-price contract as the announced cost decreases. An investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate-of-return regulation is studied.

/pdf/using-cost-observation-to-regulate-firms-z4nu7nlg6z.pdf

Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms

In the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs. This article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms. In equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction. The mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences. Medicare's prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here.

A Theory of Yardstick Competition

This paper begins with a sketch of the New Institutional Economics, with special emphasis on the ‘institutional environment’ (North and others) and the ‘institutions of governance’ (Coase and others) Thereafter the paper mainly emphasizes the applications of transaction cost economics to the study of governance, the object being to effect an economizing alignment between transactions, which differ in their attributes, and governance structures (firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus), which differ in their cost and competence I raise a series of issues – phenomena of interest, describing human agents, describing firms, purposes served, scaling up – to which any would-be theory of the firm should be expected to speak and indicate how transaction cost economics responds to each I thereafter describe the mechanisms through which transaction cost economics is implemented and develop some of the core conceptual supports out of which it works Applications to public bureaus, strategic management, and intractable transactions are sketched

Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed

Modelling and forecasting the diffusion of innovation – A 25-year review

Infrastrukturwettbewerb und Netzneutralität

Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.

/pdf/fiber-investment-and-access-under-uncertainty-long-term-2ipu68l12p.pdf

Fiber investment and access under uncertainty: long-term contracts, risk premia, and access options

The need for more efficient public funding of new communications infrastructure in EU member states

Im Koalitionsvertrag kundigen CDU, CSU und SPD an, dass sie den flachendeckenden Ausbau mit Gigabit-Netzen bis 2025 anstreben. Jochen Homann, Bundesnetzagentur, hinterfragt, ob der bestehende Ordnungsrahmen, der ursprunglich auf die Uberfuhrung eines Monopols in den Wettbewerb ausgerichtet war, heute noch der richtige ist, wenn es darum geht, neue gigabitfahige Infrastrukturen entstehen zu lassen. Torsten J. Gerpott, Universitat Duisburg-Essen, sieht den Ausbau von Glasfasernetzen fur stationare Kunden als wichtigen Schritt zur Verbesserung der digitalen Infrastrukturen in Deutschland an. Er konzentriert sich auf die Frage, inwiefern eine Veranderung der Vergabepraxis fur Frequenzlizenzen fur den mobilen drahtlosen Netzzugang geeignet sein konnte, Investitionen in Mobilfunknetze der funften Generation zu stimulieren. Er kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein Verzicht auf Auktionen zur Vergabe von Frequenzen fur mobiles Breitband Deutschland auf dem Weg in die Gigabit-Gesellschaft eher zuruckwerfen wurde. Nach Ansicht von Wolfgang Briglauer, Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim, und Ingo Vogelsang, Boston University, sollten, um die Ziele der Gigabit-Gesellschaft zu verfolgen, Marktprozesse und -ergebnisse nicht verzerrt werden, indem einzelne Zugangstechnologien bevorzugt werden. Es sollte vielmehr der Grundsatz der Technologieneutralitat berucksichtigt werden. Fur Jan Kramer, Universitat Passau, ist das Wichtigste, eine verlassliche regulatorisch-politische Basis fur die nachsten 20 Jahre zu schaffen. Iris Henseler-Unger, WIK GmbH, sieht als Voraussetzung fur die Verwirklichung des »Gigabit-Ziels« vor allem das privatwirtschaftliche Engagement im Ausbau eines hochleistungsfahigen Breitbandnetzes. Lukas Wiewiorra, Universitat Frankfurt am Main, ist der Ansicht, dass verstarkt ein Augenmerk auf Investitionsanreize und Regulierungsansatze gelegt sowie Planungssicherheit bei der Investition in eine Glasfaserinfrastruktur geschaffen werden sollten.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/181085/1/ifosd-v71-2018-i07-p03-21.pdf

Ausbau der digitalen Infrastruktur bis 2025: Welche Wege führen in die ›Gigabit-Gesellschaft‹?

Regulation and consumer class actions can complement, duplicate, or oppose each other, depending, among others, on the leanings of regulatory objective functions towards the industry or consumers. In particular, pro-consumer regulators would like to see consumers benefit from class actions while pro-industry regulators would like to prevent regulated firms from being harmed by them. However, because pro-consumer regulators are already doing their best for consumers and pro-industry regulators their best for firms, they are both usually constrained in their policies. The result is that class actions tend to be less efficient under pro-consumer regulators and more efficient under pro-industry regulators.

Ingo Vogelsang

Papers

Infrastrukturwettbewerb und Netzneutralität

Fiber investment and access under uncertainty: long-term contracts, risk premia, and access options

The need for more efficient public funding of new communications infrastructure in EU member states

Ausbau der digitalen Infrastruktur bis 2025: Welche Wege führen in die ›Gigabit-Gesellschaft‹?

An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries