世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

Co-Planar Stereotaxic Atlas of the Human Brain—3-Dimensional Proportional System: An Approach to Cerebral Imaging, J. Talairach, P. Tournoux. Georg Thieme Verlag, New York (1988), 122 pp., 130 figs. DM 268

计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

In 1974 an article appeared in Science magazine with the dry-sounding title “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” by a pair of psychologists who were not well known outside their discipline of decision theory. In it Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the world to Prospect Theory, which mapped out how humans actually behave when faced with decisions about gains and losses, in contrast to how economists assumed that people behave. Prospect Theory turned Economics on its head by demonstrating through a series of ingenious experiments that people are much more concerned with losses than they are with gains, and that framing a choice from one perspective or the other will result in decisions that are exactly the opposite of each other, even if the outcomes are monetarily the same. Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of our brain’s wiring.

Thinking fast and slow.

The author systematically examines one of the important issues of information — establishing the market price. He introduces the concept of «search» — where a buyer wanting to get a better price, is forced to question sellers. The article deals with various aspects of finding the necessary information.

Economics of Information

Accurately estimating consumer demand for new products is an arduous task made even more difficult by the fact that individuals tend to overstate the amount they are willing to pay for new goods when asked hypothetical questions. Despite their appeal in eliminating hypothetical bias, marketers have been slow to adopt experimental auctions as a standard tool in pre-test market research. One issue that has slowed adoption of the methodology is the proliferation of auction mechanisms and the lack of clear guidance in choosing between mechanisms. In this paper, we provide insight into the theoretical properties of two incentive compatible value elicitation mechanisms, the BDM and Vickrey 2nd price auction, such that practitioners can make more informed decisions in designing experimental auctions to determine consumer willingness-to-pay. In particular, we draw attention to the shapes of the payoff functions and show in a simulation that the two mechanisms differ with respect to the expected cost of deviating from truthful bidding. We show that incentives for truthful bidding depend on the distribution of competing bidders' values and/or prices and individuals' true values for a good. The simulation indicates the 2nd price auction punishes deviations from truthful bidding more severely for high value individuals than the BDM mechanism. These results are confirmed by an experimental study, where we find more accurate bidding for high-value individuals in the 2nd price auction as compared to the BDM. Our results also indicate that when implementing the BDM mechanism, the greatest incentives for truthful value revelation are created when the random price generator is based on a normal distribution centered on an individual's expected true value.

Designing Experimental Auctions For Marketing Research: Effect Of Values, Distributions, And Mechanisms On Incentives For Truthful Bidding

Consumers have shown an increasing interest in not only how their food is produced, but also who benefits from their food purchase. In some cases, such as organics, food is marketed as being produced in an 'equitable' food system. But are consumers willing to pay for a fair food system? Using a model of inequality aversion and a set of real-money experiments, we find that about 15 per cent of consumers' willingness-to-pay a premium for organic foods is attributable to altruism and inequality aversion. The fairness premium is significantly influenced by who receives this premium, how much the consumer earns, and how the experiment is framed. Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2010; all rights reserved. For permissions, please email journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Preferences for fairness and equity in the food system

The present article discusses general issues associated with experimental auctions and their relative advantages and disadvantages over other marketing research techniques. Experimental auctions create an active market environment with feedback where subjects exchange real goods and real money, which is not generally the case with other methods. The article also discusses four experimental design issues associated with experimental auctions: auction mechanism, market feedback and bidder affiliation, demand reduction and wealth effects, and multiple attribute valuation. Each of these experimental design issues, if not properly controlled, have the potential to create serious flaws in marketing recommendations.

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Using Experimental Auctions for Marketing Applications: A Discussion

AJAE appendix for “Food Values”

There has been considerable debate regarding which probability distribution best represents crop yields. This study ranks six yield densities based on their out-of-sample forecasting performance. The forecasting ability for each density was ranked according to its likelihood function value when observed at out-of-sample observations. Results show that a semiparametric model offered by Goodwin and Ker best forecasts county average yields.

Jayson L. Lusk

Papers

Designing Experimental Auctions For Marketing Research: Effect Of Values, Distributions, And Mechanisms On Incentives For Truthful Bidding

Preferences for fairness and equity in the food system

Using Experimental Auctions for Marketing Applications: A Discussion

AJAE appendix for “Food Values”

Ranking Crop Yield Models Using Out-of-Sample Likelihood Functions