Showing papers in "Analysis in 2021"
41 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that the conflict between the two norms constitutes a puzzle and that the puzzle is genuine, drawing on the felicity conditions of confirmation requests and the biased interrogatives used to perform them.
Abstract:
Like other epistemic activities, inquiry seems to be governed by norms. Some have argued that one such norm forbids us from believing the answer to a question and inquiring into it at the same time. But another, hither-to neglected norm seems to permit just this sort of cognitive arrangement when we seek to confirm what we currently believe. In this paper, I suggest that both norms are plausible and that the conflict between them constitutes a puzzle. Drawing on the felicity conditions of confirmation requests and the biased interrogatives used to perform them, I argue that the puzzle is genuine. I conclude by considering a response to the puzzle that has implications for the debate regarding the relationship between credences and beliefs.
13 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show why we must reject the moral equality account of the hypocrite's lack of standing to blame, and compare non-hypocritical and hypocritical blamers subscribing to hierarchical moral norms.
Abstract:
It is commonly believed that blamees can dismiss hypocritical blame on the ground that the hypocrite has no standing to blame their target. Many believe that the feature of hypocritical blame that undermines standing to blame is that it involves an implicit denial of the moral equality of persons. After all, the hypocrite treats herself better than her blamee for no good reason. In the light of the complement to hypocrites and a comparison of hypocritical and non-hypocritical blamers subscribing to hierarchical moral norms, I show why we must reject the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame.
11 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the main argument for strict propriety only supports weak propriety, which is non-negotiable given strict truth-directedness and additivity, and therefore no further argument is necessary.
Abstract: Considerations of accuracy—the epistemic good of having credences close to truth-values—have led to the justification of a host of epistemic norms. These arguments rely on particular ways of measuring accuracy. In particular, the accuracy measure should be strictly proper. However, the main argument for strict propriety only supports weak propriety. But, strict propriety follows from weak propriety given strict truth-directedness (which is non-negotiable) and additivity (which is both very common and plausible). So no further argument is necessary.
10 citations
TL;DR: A critical survey of recent work in epistemology on higher-order evidence can be found in this article, where the authors discuss the nature of higherorder evidence, some puzzles it raises, responses to those puzzles, and problems facing them.
Abstract:
A critical survey of recent work in epistemology on higher-order evidence. It discusses the nature of higher-order evidence, some puzzles it raises, responses to those puzzles, and problems facing them. It concludes by indicating connections between debates concerning higher-order evidence in epistemology and parallel debates in ethics and aesthetics.
9 citations
9 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a novel account of the grounds of necessity is presented, the core of which states that necessary truths are necessary because they stand in specific grounding connections, and that such truths are always necessary.
Abstract:
Drawing from extensions of existing ideas in the logic of ground, a novel account of the grounds of necessity is presented, the core of which states that necessary truths are necessary because they stand in specific grounding connections.
8 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the Guaranteed Principle is formulated as a principle of preference, and it is shown that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the guaranteed principle, whereas the preference of agents who embody causal decision theory do not.
Abstract: This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that standard grounding conditions contradict standard conditions for the identities of propositions, and that standard ground conditions for propositions can also contradict standard identities for propositions for the identity of propositions.
Abstract:
I show that standard grounding conditions contradict standard conditions for the identities of propositions.
6 citations
TL;DR: The credibility-thesis has a long way to go if it is to account for the epistemic merits of toy models, and is raised on a familiar problem for imagination-based modal epistemologies.
Abstract:
Several philosophers of science claim that scientific toy models afford knowledge of possibility, but answers to the question of why toy models can be expected to competently play this role are scarce. The main line of reply is that toy models support possibility claims insofar as they are credible. I raise a challenge for this credibility-thesis, drawing on a familiar problem for imagination-based modal epistemologies, and argue that it remains unanswered in the current literature. The credibility-thesis has a long way to go if it is to account for the epistemic merits of toy models.
6 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a new extension of Srivastava's triple hypergeometric functions by using Pochhammer's symbol was proposed, which has certain basic properties such as integral representations, derivative formulas, and recurrence relations.
Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we define a new extension of Srivastava’s triple hypergeometric functions by using a new extension of Pochhammer’s symbol that was recently proposed by Srivastava, Rahman and Nisar [H. M. Srivastava, G. Rahman and K. S. Nisar, Some extensions of the Pochhammer symbol and the associated hypergeometric functions, Iran. J. Sci. Technol. Trans. A Sci. 43 2019, 5, 2601–2606]. We present their certain basic properties such as integral representations, derivative formulas, and recurrence relations. Also, certain new special cases have been identified and some known results are recovered from main results.
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that even if a schematic principle of existential grounds for propositional quantifiers has to be restricted, this does not immediately apply to a corresponding non-schematic principle in higher-order logic.
Abstract: Existential claims are widely held to be grounded in their true instances However, this principle is shown to be problematic by arguments due to Kit Fine Stephan Kramer has given an especially simple form of such an argument using propositional quantifiers This note shows that even if a schematic principle of existential grounds for propositional quantifiers has to be restricted, this does not immediately apply to a corresponding non-schematic principle in higher-order logic
TL;DR: In this paper, an array of new cases of lies is presented in support of the idea that lying does not require an intention to be deceptive, and the crucial feature of these cases is that the agents who lie have some sort of motivation to lie alternative to an intention-to-be deceptive.
Abstract:
An array of new cases of lies is presented in support of the idea that lying does not require an intention to be deceptive. The crucial feature of these cases is that the agents who lie have some sort of motivation to lie alternative to an intention to be deceptive. Such alternative motivation comes in multiple varieties, such that we should think that the possibility of lying without an intention to be deceptive is common.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that perfectionism is best understood as explaining why certain properties are prudentially good-making, which is compatible with each of the Big Three theories of well-being.
Abstract: The ‘Big 3’ theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfactionism, and objective list theory—attempt to explain why certain things are good for people by appealing to prudentially good-making properties. But they don’t attempt to explain why the properties they advert to make something good for a person. Perfectionism, the view that well-being consists in nature-fulfilment, is often considered a competitor to these views (or else a version of the objective list theory). However, I argue that perfectionism is best understood as explaining why certain properties are prudentially good-making. This version of perfectionism is compatible with each of the Big 3, and, I argue, quite attractive.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an analysis of the relationship between the number of neurons and the amount of noise in a neural network and the mean square root of the noise in the network.
Abstract: © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. This is the accepted manuscript version of an article which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa073
TL;DR: The authors argue that social norms can require attitudes as well as behaviour, and that the existence of such attitudinal social norms speaks in favour of the preference-based view and against the normative attitudes-based one.
Abstract: On Bicchieri's view, social norms most centrally involve a pattern of preferences among the members of a relevant population; according to Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin, and Southwood, social norms most centrally involve patterns of normative attitudes among the members of a given group. This paper argues, first, that social norms can require attitudes as well as behaviour, and, second, that the existence of such attitudinal social norms speaks in favour of the preference-based view and against the normative attitudes-based view.
TL;DR: The authors argue that credences perform this simplifying function at least as well as beliefs do, and that the Bayesian challenge fails to explain why we need beliefs if we have credences already.
Abstract:
Doxastic dualists acknowledge both outright beliefs and credences, and they maintain that neither state is reducible to the other. This gives rise to the ‘Bayesian Challenge’, which is to explain why we need beliefs if we have credences already. On a popular dualist response to the Bayesian Challenge, we need beliefs to simplify our reasoning. I argue that this response fails because credences perform this simplifying function at least as well as beliefs do.
TL;DR: This paper showed that hypercrisy is a problem for the moral equality account, which is also the problem for Lippert-Rasmussen's own account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame.
Abstract:
In a 2020 article in Analysis, Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame fails. To object to this account, Lippert-Rasmussen considers the contrary of hypocrisy: hypercrisy. In this article, I show that if hypercrisy is a problem for the moral equality account, it is also a problem for Lippert-Rasmussen’s own account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame. I then reflect on the hypocrite’s and hypercrite’s standing to self-blame, which reveals that the challenge hypercrisy poses for accounts of standing is different from the challenge Lippert-Rasmussen articulates.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors cast doubt on whether the most natural generalisations of imaging are able to provide a plausible account of the norms of partial subjunctive supposition in the context of partial indicative supposition.
Abstract: According to orthodoxy, there are two basic moods of supposition: indicative and subjunctive. The most popular formalisations of the corresponding norms of suppositional judgement are given by Bayesian conditionalisation and Lewisian imaging, respectively. It is well known that Bayesian conditionalisation can be generalised (via Jeffrey conditionalisation) to provide a model for the norms of partial indicative supposition. This raises the question of whether imaging can likewise be generalised to model the norms of `partial subjunctive supposition'. The present article casts doubt on whether the most natural generalisations of imaging are able to provide a plausible account of the norms of partial subjunctive supposition.
TL;DR: In this article, a lecture exploratoire et psychodynamique des effets intrapsychiques and collectifs that la crise environnementale produit and revele de l’Homme.
Abstract: Resume Contexte Les sciences humaines psychologiques et psychanalytiques sont balbutiantes sur la question de la crise environnementale alors qu’une importante psychologisation du sujet emerge sur le scene sociale et mediatique avec l’usage notamment des expressions « eco-anxiete » et « solastalgie ». Cette question pose un probleme difficile car elle cherche a traiter d’un objet hypercomplexe : la Nature. Nous proposons ici une lecture exploratoire et psychodynamique des effets intrapsychiques et collectifs que la crise environnementale produit et revele de l’Homme. Methode A partir de l’etude des discours scientifiques, d’une part, et des reactions face a ces discours, d’autres part, nous presenterons une analyse des variables psychologiques mobilisees et des secteurs de pensee potentiellement impactes. Il nous sera necessaire de prendre en compte la difficile mise en representation et le caractere incertain des differentes menaces regroupees sous l’expression crise environnementale et risque d’effondrement. Resultats La realite exterieure revet aujourd’hui un caractere menacant a bien des egards : au niveau economique, par les limites a la satisfaction pulsionnelle et les vecus de perte, et plus fondamentalement, sur l’autoconservation. La question de l’angoisse est a differencier selon la nature de celle-ci : symbolique ou reelle. Revenir a une definition freudienne de l’angoisse-signal permet de resituer la place de l’excitation face a la crise environnementale, que nous proposons d’entendre sous le prisme des situations extremes de la subjectivite. Enfin, nous verrons que l’angoisse de notre nevrose actuelle est liee avant tout a la transformation des metacadres. Conclusion Nous ouvrirons notre propos sur la necessite de poursuivre l’etude approfondie de differents themes de recherches : les facteurs inconscients impliques dans les conduites destructrices, a l’aune de la pulsion de mort et l’emergence d’une meta-culture vis-a-vis de laquelle les cliniciens ont un role important a jouer.
TL;DR: The authors argue that there is another way to explain the intuition that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to justify. But explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the significance of the intent to harm.
Abstract:
Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to justify. But explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s another way to explain the intuition.
TL;DR: The authors show how Pluralists who appeal to the relative naturalness of quantifiers can respond to these arguments, and show how to counter the arguments against Pluralism with quantifiers.
Abstract:
Monism about being says that there is one way to be. Pluralism about being says that there are many ways to be. Recently, Trenton Merricks and David Builes have offered arguments against Pluralism. In this paper, I show how Pluralists who appeal to the relative naturalness of quantifiers can respond to these arguments.