Showing papers in "Harvard Business Review in 2003"

The one number you need to grow.

Abstract: Companies spend lots of time and money on complex tools to assess customer satisfaction. But they're measuring the wrong thing. The best predictor of top-line growth can usually be captured in a single survey question: Would you recommend this company to a friend? This finding is based on two years of research in which a variety of survey questions were tested by linking the responses with actual customer behavior--purchasing patterns and referrals--and ultimately with company growth. Surprisingly, the most effective question wasn't about customer satisfaction or even loyalty per se. In most of the industries studied, the percentage of customers enthusiastic enough about a company to refer it to a friend or colleague directly correlated with growth rates among competitors. Willingness to talk up a company or product to friends, family, and colleagues is one of the best indicators of loyalty because of the customer's sacrifice in making the recommendation. When customers act as references, they do more than indicate they've received good economic value from a company; they put their own reputations on the line. And they will risk their reputations only if they feel intense loyalty. The findings point to a new, simpler approach to customer research, one directly linked to a company's results. By substituting a single question--blunt tool though it may appear to be--for the complex black box of the customer satisfaction survey, companies can actually put consumer survey results to use and focus employees on the task of stimulating growth.

The quest for resilience.

Abstract: In less turbulent times, executives had the luxury of assuming that business models were more or less immortal. Companies always had to work to get better, but they seldom had to get different--not at their core, not in their essence. Today, getting different is the imperative. It's the challenge facing Coca-Cola as it struggles to raise its "share of throat" in noncarbonated beverages. It's the task that bedevils McDonald's as it tries to restart its growth in a burger-weary world. It's the hurdle for Sun Microsystems as it searches for ways to protect its high-margin server business from the Linux onslaught. Continued success no longer hinges on momentum. Rather, it rides on resilience-on the ability to dynamically reinvent business models and strategies as circumstances change. Strategic resilience is not about responding to a onetime crisis or rebounding from a setback. It's about continually anticipating and adjusting to deep, secular trends that can permanently impair the earning power of a core business. It's about having the capacity to change even before the case for change becomes obvious. To thrive in turbulent times, companies must become as efficient at renewal as they are at producing today's products and services. To achieve strategic resilience, companies will have to overcome the cognitive challenge of eliminating denial, nostalgia, and arrogance; the strategic challenge of learning how to create a wealth of small tactical experiments; the political challenge of reallocating financial and human resources to where they can earn the best returns; and the ideological challenge of learning that strategic renewal is as important as optimization.

Coming up short on nonfinancial performance measurement.

Abstract: Companies in increasing numbers are measuring customer loyalty, employee satisfaction, and other nonfinancial areas of performance that they believe affect profitability. But they've failed to relate these measures to their strategic goals or establish a connection between activities undertaken and financial outcomes achieved. Failure to make such connections has led many companies to misdirect their investments and reward ineffective managers. Extensive field research now shows that businesses make some common mistakes when choosing, analyzing, and acting on their nonfinancial measures. Among these mistakes: They set the wrong performance targets because they focus too much on short-term financial results, and they use metrics that lack strong statistical validity and reliability. As a result, the companies can't demonstrate that improvements in nonfinancial measures actually affect their financial results. The authors lay out a series of steps that will allow companies to realize the genuine promise of nonfinancial performance measures. First, develop a model that proposes a causal relationship between the chosen nonfinancial drivers of strategic success and specific outcomes. Next, take careful inventory of all the data within your company. Then use established statistical methods for validating the assumed relationships and continue to test the model as market conditions evolve. Finally, base action plans on analysis of your findings, and determine whether those plans and their investments actually produce the desired results. Nonfinancial measures will offer little guidance unless you use a process for choosing and analyzing them that relies on sophisticated quantitative and qualitative inquiries into the factors actually contributing to economic results.

Delusions of success. How optimism undermines executives' decisions.

Abstract: The evidence is disturbingly clear: Most major business initiatives--mergers and acquisitions, capital investments, market entries--fail to ever pay off. Economists would argue that the low success rate reflects a rational assessment of risk, with the returns from a few successes outweighing the losses of many failures. But two distinguished scholars of decision making, Dan Lovallo of the University of New South Wales and Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman of Princeton University, provide a very different explanation. They show that a combination of cognitive biases (including anchoring and competitor neglect) and organizational pressures lead managers to make overly optimistic forecasts in analyzing proposals for major investments. By exaggerating the likely benefits of a project and ignoring the potential pitfalls, they lead their organizations into initiatives that are doomed to fall well short of expectations. The biases and pressures cannot be escaped, the authors argue, but they can be tempered by applying a very different method of forecasting--one that takes a much more objective "outside view" of an initiative's likely outcome. This outside view, also known as reference-class forecasting, completely ignores the details of the project at hand; instead, it encourages managers to examine the experiences of a class of similar projects, to lay out a rough distribution of outcomes for this reference class, and then to position the current project in that distribution. The outside view is more likely than the inside view to produce accurate forecasts--and much less likely to deliver highly unrealistic ones, the authors say.

In praise of boundaries. A conversation with Miss Manners. Interview by Diane L. Coutu.

Abstract: The past three decades have been a time of increasing informality in the American workplace. It's easy to characterize this growing comfort with the casual as a positive step for workplace culture, an outgrowth of the American democratic belief in workers' equality. Informal environments are said to be more trusting and open, and workers who are free to express their personalities are more comfortable and thus more creative--right? According to etiquette guru Judith Martin--known far and wide as Miss Manners--informality in the workplace may do more harm than good. Without some formality in social intercourse, Miss Manners argues, human interactions end up being governed by laws, which are too heavy-handed to serve as a guide through the nuances of personal--or professional--behavior. Since our earliest beginnings, we have developed formal rules to accompany shared human experiences, such as eating and mourning. Yet, says Miss Manners, something in us rebels against form and etiquette, and every so often, an anti-manners movement takes hold, and people come to believe that following etiquette is unnatural. One recent such movement has led to the belief that a distinction between our work life and our professional life is unnecessary. If we hope to reassure our customers that we are indeed professional, however, we need to be aware of the boundaries of professional behavior. On the whole, Miss Manners argues, informality in the workplace leads to a host of problems, from making employees feel pressured to "socialize" with coworkers during weekends and evenings to sexual harassment. Despite the shortcomings of informality in the American workplace, though, Miss Manners believes that we have the best code of manners the world has ever seen-in theory. In practice, American etiquette is undoubtedly still a work in progress.

What is a global manager

Abstract: Riven by ideology, religion, and mistrust, the world seems more fragmented than at any time since, arguably, World War II. But however deep the political divisions, business operations continue to span the globe, and executives still have to figure out how to run them efficiently and well. In "What Is a Global Manager?" (first published in September-October 1992), business professors Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal lay out a model for a management structure that balances the local, regional, and global demands placed on companies operating across the world's many borders. In the volatile world of transnational corporations, there is no such thing as a "universal" global manager, the authors say. Rather, there are three groups of specialists: business managers, country managers, and functional managers. And there are the top executives at corporate headquarters who manage the complex interactions between the three--and can identify and develop the talented executives a successful transnational requires. This kind of organizational structure characterizes a transnational rather than an old-line multinational, international, or global company. Transnationals integrate assets, resources, and diverse people in operating units around the world. Through a flexible management process, in which business, country, and functional managers form a triad of different perspectives that balance one another, transnational companies can build three strategic capabilities: global-scale efficiency and competitiveness; national-level responsiveness and flexibility; and cross-market capacity to leverage learning on a worldwide basis. Through a close look at the successful careers of Leif Johansson of Electrolux, Howard Gottlieb of NEC, and Wahib Zaki of Procter & Gamble, the authors illustrate the skills that each managerial specialist requires.

Luxury for the masses.

Abstract: Increasingly wide income disparities, higher levels of education, and greater awareness of other cultures' ideas of the good life have given rise to a new class of American consumer. And a new category of products and services, including automobiles, apparel, food, wine, and spirits, has sprung into being to cater to it. That category is called new luxury. America's middle-market consumers are trading up to higher levels of quality and taste than ever before. Members of the middle market (those earning $50,000 and above annually) collectively have around $1 trillion of disposable income. And they will pay premiums of 20% to 200% for well-designed, well-engineered, and well-crafted goods that can't be found in the mass middle market and that have the artisanal touches of traditional luxury items. Most important, even when they address basic necessities, such goods evoke and engage consumers' emotions while feeding their aspirations for a better life. Supply-side forces are essential to the rise of new luxury. Like the consumers of their goods, entrepreneurs are better educated and more sophisticated about their customers than ever before. In addition, global sourcing, falling trade barriers and transportation costs, and rising offshore manufacturing standards are making possible the economical production of alluring products of high quality. Unlike old-luxury goods, new-luxury products can generate high sales volumes despite their relatively high prices. As a result, new-luxury companies are achieving levels of profitability and growth beyond the reach of their conventional competitors. Whether the item in question is a $6 Panera sandwich or a $30,000 Mercedes, new luxury is a formula that middle-market companies, facing erosion of their market share by high-end and low-end producers, can ill afford to ignore.

Delusions of Success

Abstract: IN 1992, OXFORD HEALTH PLANS started to build a complex new computer system for processing claims and payments. From the start, the project was hampered by unforeseen problems and delays. As the company fell further behind schedule and budget, it struggled, vainly, to stem an ever rising flood of paperwork. When, on October 27, 1997, Oxford disclosed that its system and its accounts were in disarray, the company's stock price dropped 63%, destroying more than $3 billion in shareholder value in a single day.

The five minds of a manager.

Abstract: Managers are told: Be global and be local. Collaborate and compete. Change, perpetually, and maintain order. Make the numbers while nurturing your people. To be effective, managers need to consider the juxtapositions in order to arrive at a deep integration of these seemingly contradictory concerns. That means they must focus not only on what they have to accomplish but also on how they have to think. When the authors, respectively the director of the Centre for Leadership Studies at the University of Exeter in the U.K. and the Cleghorn Professor of Management Studies at McGill University in Montreal, set out to develop a masters program for practicing managers, they saw that they could not rely on the usual MBA educational structure, which divides the management world into discrete business functions such as marketing and accounting. They needed an educational structure that would encourage synthesis rather than separation. Managing, they determined, involves five tasks, each with its own mind-set: managing the self (the reflective mind-set); managing organizations (the analytic mind-set); managing context (the worldly mind-set); managing relationships (the collaborative mind-set); and managing change (the action mind-set). The program is built on the exploration and integration of those five aspects of the managerial mind. The authors say it has proved powerful in the classroom and insightful in practice. Imagine the mind-sets as threads and the manager as weaver. Effective performance means weaving each mind-set over and under the others to create a fine, sturdy cloth.

Developing your leadership pipeline.

Abstract: Why do so many newly minted leaders fail so spectacularly? Part of the problem is that in many companies, succession planning is little more than creating a list of high-potential employees and the slots they might fill. It's a mechanical process that's too narrow and hidebound to uncover and correct skill gaps that can derail promising young executives. And it's completely divorced from organizational efforts to transform managers into leaders. Some companies, however, do succeed in building a steady, reliable pipeline of leadership talent by marrying succession planning with leadership development. Eli Lilly, Dow Chemical, Bank of America, and Sonoco Products have created long-term processes for managing the talent roster throughout their organizations--a process Conger and Fulmer call succession management. Drawing on the experiences of these best-practice organizations, the authors outline five rules for establishing a healthy succession management system: Focus on opportunities for development, identify linchpin positions, make the system transparent, measure progress regularly, and be flexible. In Eli Lilly's "action-learning" program, high-potential employees are given a strategic problem to solve so they can learn something of what it takes to be a general manager. The company--and most other best-practice organizations--also relies on Web-based succession management tools to demystify the succession process, and it makes employees themselves responsible for updating the information in their personnel files. Best-practice organizations also track various metrics that reveal whether the right people are moving into the right jobs at the right time, and they assess the strengths and weaknesses not only of individuals but of the entire group. These companies also expect to be tweaking their systems continually, making them easier to use and more responsive to the needs of the organization.

Preparing for evil

Abstract: How can you plan for every crisis that might occur, even for ones you can't imagine? The task seems so daunting and so limitless that many firms don't even start. In fact, as the authors' 20 years of research shows, three out of four Fortune 500 companies are prepared to handle only the types of calamities they've already suffered, and not even all of those. That's unfortunate because the research also shows that crisis-prepared companies fare better financially, have stronger reputations, and ultimately stay in business longer than their crisis prone counterparts. Crisis-prepared companies use a systematic approach to focus their efforts. In addition to planning for natural disasters, they divide man-made calamities into two sorts--accidental or "normal" ones, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and deliberate or "abnormal" ones, like product tampering. Then they take steps to broaden their thinking about such potential crises. They consider threats that would be common in other industries, for instance. And they seek input from outsiders such as investigative journalists and even reformed criminals. But if these companies think broadly about possible threats, they think narrowly about implementation. Each year, smart companies focus their resources and attention on a few facilities picked at random, just as airlines conduct detailed security checks on just a few passengers for each flight. That reduces the probability of an attack on the entire organization even as it allows the business to migrate steadily to a higher level of crisis readiness. Crisis-prepared companies know that disasters cannot be managed through cost-benefit analyses. It is precisely because the effects of a disaster cannot be predicted or controlled that smart companies focus their efforts on preventing crises rather than containing them after the fact.

The great transition.

Abstract: As China's economy grows and opens further, the opportunity it presents to multinationals is changing. Foreign companies are moving to country development and new strategic choices. Now, foreign firms can actually go after the Chinese domestic market, and it's worth going after. Improvements in China's infrastructure, workforce, and regulatory environment are making it possible for companies to lower their costs to reap new competitive advantages. Multifaceted and often-shifting risks accompany this shifting opportunity. The reforms required for admission into the WTO will be politically difficult for China to implement, and its progress will be slowed by the scarcity of resources for the country's shaky banking system, the inadequacy of the social safety net, environmental problems, and local governments' cash shortage. China's breathtaking 9% average annual GDP growth rests on an unsteady foundation of overcapitalized state-owned enterprises, which have oversupplied many markets, and fiercely protectionist regional government officials pursuing growth-at-almost-all-costs policies. Frequent changes in regulations, bureaucracies, and reporting relationships will continue to make planning difficult, and, as the SARS epidemic demonstrated, there is always the potential for serious disruptions. But for at least the next ten years, multinationals should be the biggest winners in China. To reap the benefits, a multinational must properly nest its effort into its overall organization, show "one face to China" at the national level but also tailor local strategies, be wary of joint ventures, and mitigate risk, in particular the theft of intellectual property. China is a major opportunity for companies that forthrightly face its complexities. It will remain largely inscrutable--and unprofitable--for the rest.

The Chinese negotiation.

Abstract: Most Westerners preparing for a business trip to China like to arm themselves with a list of etiquette how-tos. "Carry a boatload of business cards," tipsters say. "Bring your own interpreter." "Speak in short sentences." "Wear a conservative suit." Such advice can help get companies in the door and even through the first series of business transactions. But it won't sustain the prolonged, year-in, year-out associations Chinese and Western businesses can now achieve. The authors' work with dozens of companies and thousands of American and Chinese executives over the past 20 years has demonstrated that a superficial adherence to etiquette rules gets executives only so far. They have witnessed communication breakdowns between American and Chinese businesspeople time and time again. The root cause: the American side's failure to understand the much broader context of Chinese culture and values, a problem that too often leaves Western negotiators flummoxed and flailing. American and Chinese approaches often appear incompatible. Americans see Chinese negotiators as inefficient, indirect, and even dishonest, while the Chinese see American negotiators as aggressive, impersonal, and excitable. Such perceptions have deep cultural origins. Yet those who know how to navigate these differences can develop thriving, mutually profitable, and satisfying business relationships. Four cultural threads have bound the Chinese people together for some 5,000 years, and these show through in Chinese business negotiations. They are agrarianism, morality, the Chinese pictographic language, and wariness of strangers. Most Western businesspeople often find those elements mysterious and confusing. But ignore them at any time during the negotiation process, and the deal can easily fall apart.

The lean service machine.

Abstract: Jefferson Pilot Financial, a life insurance and annuities firm, like many U.S. service companies at the end of the 1990s was looking for new ways to grow. Its top managers recognized that JPF needed to differentiate itself in the eyes of its customers, the independent life-insurance advisers who sell and service policies. To establish itself as these advisers' preferred partner, it set out to reduce the turnaround time on policy applications, simplify the submission process, and reduce errors. JPF's managers looked to the "lean production" practices that U.S. manufacturers adopted in response to competition from Japanese companies. Lean production is built around the concept of continuous-flow processing--a departure from traditional production systems, in which large batches are processed at each step. JPF appointed a "lean team" to reengineer its New Business unit's operations, beginning with the creation of a "model cell"--a fully functioning microcosm of JPF's entire process. This approach allowed managers to experiment and smooth out the kinks while working toward an optimal design. The team applied lean-manufacturing practices, including placing linked processes near one another, balancing employees' workloads, posting performance results, and measuring performance and productivity from the customer's perspective. Customer-focused metrics helped erode the employees' "My work is all that matters" mind-set. The results were so impressive that JPF is rolling out similar systems across many of its operations. To convince employees of the value of lean production, the lean team introduced a simulation in which teams compete to build the best paper airplane based on invented customer specifications. This game drives home lean production's basic principles, establishing a foundation for deep and far-reaching changes in the production system.

Predictable surprises: the disasters you should have seen coming.

Abstract: Think hard about the problems in your organization or about potential upheavals in the markets in which you operate. Could some of those problems--ones no one is attending to--turn into disasters? If you're like most executives, you'll sheepishly answer yes. As Harvard Business School professors Michael Watkins and Max Bazerman illustrate in this timely article, most of the "unexpected" events that buffet companies should have been anticipated--they're "predictable surprises." Such disasters take many forms, from financial scandals to disruptions in operations, from organizational upheavals to product failures. Some result in short-term losses or distractions, while others cause damage that takes years to repair. Some are truly catastrophic--the events of September 11, 2001, are a tragic example of a predictable surprise. The bad news is that all companies, including your own, are vulnerable to predictable surprises. The good news is that recent research helps explain why that's so and what companies can do to minimize their risk. The authors contend that organizations' inability to prepare for predictable surprises can be traced to three sets of vulnerabilities: psychological, organizational, and political. To address these vulnerabilities, the authors recommend the RPM approach. More than just the usual environmental scanning and contingency planning, RPM requires a chain of actions--recognizing, prioritizing, and mobilizing--that companies must meticulously adhere to. Failure to apply any one of these steps, the authors say, can leave an organization vulnerable. Given the extraordinarily high stakes involved, it should be every business leader's core responsibility to apply the RPM approach, the authors conclude.

What really works.

Abstract: When it comes to improving business performance, managers have no shortage of tools and techniques to choose from. But what really works? What's critical, and what's optional? Two business professors and a former McKinsey consultant set out to answer those questions. In a ground-breaking, five-year study that involved more than 50 academics and consultants, the authors analyzed 200 management techniques as they were employed by 160 companies over ten years. Their findings at a high level? Business basics really matter. In this article, the authors outline the management practices that are imperative for sustained superior financial performance--their "4+2 formula" for business success. They provide examples of companies that achieved varying degrees of success depending on whether they applied the formula, and they suggest ways that other companies can achieve excellence. The 160 companies in their study--called the Evergreen Project--were divided into 40 quads, each comprising four companies in a narrowly defined industry. Based on its performance between 1986 and 1996, each company in each quad was classified as either a winner (for instance, Dollar General), a loser (Kmart), a climber (Target), or a tumbler (the Limited). Without exception, the companies that outperformed their industry peers excelled in what the authors call the four primary management practices: strategy, execution, culture, and structure. And they supplemented their great skill in those areas with a mastery of any two of four secondary management practices: talent, leadership, innovation, and mergers and partnerships. A company that consistently follows this 4+2 formula has a better than 90% chance of sustaining superior performance, according to the authors.

Why hard-nosed executives should care about management theory.

Abstract: Theory often gets a bum rap among managers because it's associated with the word "theoretical," which connotes "impractical." But it shouldn't. Because experience is solely about the past, solid theories are the only way managers can plan future actions with any degree of confidence. The key word here is "solid." Gravity is a solid theory. As such, it lets us predict that if we step off a cliff we will fall, without actually having to do so. But business literature is replete with theories that don't seem to work in practice or actually contradict each other. How can a manager tell a good business theory from a bad one? The first step is understanding how good theories are built. They develop in three stages: gathering data, organizing it into categories highlighting significant differences, then making generalizations explaining what causes what, under which circumstances. For instance, professor Ananth Raman and his colleagues collected data showing that bar code-scanning systems generated notoriously inaccurate inventory records. These observations led them to classify the types of errors the scanning systems produced and the types of shops in which those errors most often occurred. Recently, some of Raman's doctoral students have worked as clerks to see exactly what kinds of behavior cause the errors. From this foundation, a solid theory predicting under which circumstances bar code systems work, and don't work, is beginning to emerge. Once we forgo one-size-fits-all explanations and insist that a theory describes the circumstances under which it does and doesn't work, we can bring predictable success to the world of management.

What becomes an icon most

Abstract: Some brands become icons. Think of Nike, Apple, Harley-Davidson: They're the brands every marketer regards with awe. But they are not built according to the principles of conventional marketing, says Harvard Business School marketing professor Douglas Holt. Iconic brands beat the competition not just by delivering innovative benefits, services, or technologies but by forging a deep connection with the culture. A brand becomes an icon when it offers a compelling myth, a story that can help people resolve tensions in their lives. The deepest source of tension in modern society is the disparity between national ideology and the average citizen's reality. When ideologies shift, myths become even more important, and in America, the most potent myths are depictions of rebels. Mountain Dew has long offered a rebel myth in ads showing exciting, vital men who are far from the ideological model of success. Loyal customers drink the beverage to consume the myth. But Mountain Dew's greatest achievement is that it has retained its iconic power by creating fresh rebel myths to suit the tensions of each era: first the hillbilly, who stood in stark contrast to the organization man of the 1950s and 1960s; then the redneck, who rebelled against the investment bankers and consultants of the 1970s and 1980s; and most recently the slacker, who rejects the values and behaviors that, for the past decade, have marked the successful executive. Holt says marketers can learn from Mountain Dew and other iconic brands if they are willing to move beyond conventional brand management and acquire knowledge and skills they may not have. They must learn to target national contradictions instead of just consumer segments, create myths that make sense of confusing societal changes, and speak with a rebel's voice.

How (un) ethical are you

Abstract: Answer true or false: "I am an ethical manager." If you answered "true," here's an Uncomfortable fact: You're probably wrong. Most of us believe we can objectively size up a job candidate or a venture deal and reach a fair and rational conclusion that's in our, and our organization's, best interests. But more than two decades of psychological research indicates that most of us harbor unconscious biases that are often at odds with our consciously held beliefs. The flawed judgments arising from these biases are ethically problematic and undermine managers' fundamental work--to recruit and retain superior talent, boost individual and team performance, and collaborate effectively with partners. This article explores four related sources of unintentional unethical decision making. If you're surprised that a female colleague has poor people skills, you are displaying implicit bias--judging according to unconscious stereotypes rather than merit. Companies that give bonuses to employees who recommend their friends for open positions are encouraging ingroup bias--favoring people in their own circles. If you think you're better than the average worker in your company (and who doesn't?), you may be displaying the common tendency to overclaim credit. And although many conflicts of interest are overt, many more are subtle. Who knows, for instance, whether the promise of quick and certain payment figures into an attorney's recommendation to settle a winnable case rather than go to trial? How can you counter these biases if they're unconscious? Traditional ethics training is not enough. But by gathering better data, ridding the work environment of stereotypical cues, and broadening your mind-set when you make decisions, you can go a long way toward bringing your unconscious biases to light and submitting them to your conscious will.

Causes and effects.

Abstract: Most companies make charitable donations, but few approach their contributions with an eye toward enhancing their brands. Those that do take such an approach commit talent and know-how, not just dollars, to a pressing but carefully chosen social need and then tell the world about the cause and their service to it. Through the association, both the business and the cause benefit in ways they could not otherwise. Organizations such as Avon, ConAgra Foods, and Chevrolet have recognized that a sustained cause-branding program can improve their reputations, boost their employees' morale, strengthen relations with business partners, and drive sales. And the targeted causes receive far more money than they could have from direct corporate gifts alone. The authors examine these best practices and offer four principles for building successful cause-branding programs. First, they say, a company should select a cause that advances its corporate goals. That is, unless the competitive logic for supporting the cause is clear, a company shouldn't even consider putting its finite resources behind it. Second, a business should commit to a cause before picking its charitable partners. Otherwise, a cause-branding program may become too dependent on its partners. Third, a company should put all its assets to work, especially its employees. It should leverage the professional skills of its workers as well as its other assets such as distribution networks. And fourth, a company should promote its philanthropic initiatives through every possible channel. In addition to using the media, it should communicate its efforts through the Web, annual reports, direct mail, and so on. Cause branding is a way to turn the obligations of corporate citizenship into a valuable asset. When the cause is well chosen, the commitment genuine, and the program well executed, the cause helps the company, and the company helps the cause.

Storytelling that moves people. A conversation with screenwriting coach Robert McKee.

Abstract: When executives need to persuade an audience, most try to build a case with facts, statistics, and some quotes from authorities. In other words, they resort to "companyspeak," the tools of rhetoric they have been trained to use. In this conversation with HBR, Robert McKee, the world's best-known screenwriting lecturer, argues that executives can engage people in a much deeper--and ultimately more convincing--way if they toss out their Power-Point slides and memos and learn to tell good stories. As human beings, we make sense of our experiences through stories. But becoming a good storyteller is hard. It requires imagination and an understanding of what makes a story worth telling. All great stories deal with the conflict between subjective expectations and an uncooperative objective reality. They show a protagonist wrestling with antagonizing forces, not a rosy picture of results meeting expectations--which no one ends up believing. Consider the CEO of a biotech start-up that has discovered a chemical compound to prevent heart attacks. He could make a pitch to investors by offering up market projections, the business plan, and upbeat, hypothetical scenarios. Or he could captivate them by telling the story of his father, who died of a heart attack, and of the CEO's subsequent struggle against various antagonists--nature, the FDA, potential rivals--to bring to market the effective, low-cost test that might have prevented his father's death. Good storytellers are not necessarily good leaders, but they do share certain traits. Both are self-aware, and both are skeptics who realize that all people--and institutions--wear masks. Compelling stories can be found behind those masks.

Supply chain challenges. building relationships.

Abstract: Supply chain management is all about software and systems, right? Put in the best technology, sit back, and watch as your processes run smoothly and the savings roll in? Apparently not. When HBR convened a panel of leading thinkers in the field of supply chain management, technology was not top of mind. People and relationships were the dominant issues of the day. The opportunities and problems created by globalization, for example, are requiring companies to establish relationships with new types of suppliers. The ever-present pressure for speed and cost containment is making it even more important to break down stubbornly high internal barriers and establish more effective cross-functional relationships. The costs of failure have never been higher. The leading supply chain performers are applying new technology, new innovations, and process thinking to far greater advantage than the laggards, reaping tremendous gains in all the variables that affect shareholder value: cost, customer service, asset productivity, and revenue generation. And the gap between the leaders and the losers is growing in almost every industry. This roundtable gathered many of the leading thinkers and doers in the field of supply chain management, including practitioners Scott Beth of Intuit, Sandra Morris of Intel, and Chris Gopal of Unisys. David Burt of the University of San Diego and Stanford's Hau Lee bring the latest research from academia. Accenture's William Copacino and the Warren Company's Robert Porter Lynch offer the consultant's perspectives. Together, they take a wide-ranging view of such topics as developing talent, the role of the chief executive, and the latest technologies, exploring both the tactical and the strategic in the current state of supply chain management.

Who needs budgets

Abstract: Budgeting, as most corporations practice it, should be abolished. That may sound radical, but doing so would further companies' long-running efforts to transform themselves into developed networks that can nimbly adjust to market conditions. Most other building blocks are in place, but companies continue to restrict themselves by relying on inflexible budget processes and the command-and-control culture that budgeting entails. A number of companies have rejected the foregone conclusions embedded in budgets, and they've given up the self-interested wrangling over what the data indicate. In the absence of budgets, alternative goals and measures--some financial, such as cost-to-income ratios, and some nonfinancial, such as time to market-move to the foreground. Companies that have rejected budgets require employees to measure themselves against the performance of competitors and against internal peer groups. Because employees don't know whether they've succeeded until they can look back on the results of a given period, they must use every ounce of energy to ensure that they beat the competition. A key feature of many companies that have rejected budgets is the use of rolling forecasts, which are created every few months and typically cover five to eight quarters. Because the forecasts are regularly revised, they allow companies to continuously adapt to market conditions. The forecasting practices of two such companies, both based in Sweden, are examined in detail: the bank Svenska Handelsbanken and the wholesaler Ahlsell. Though the first companies to reject budgets were located in Northern Europe, organizations that have gone beyond budgeting can be found in a range of countries and industries. Their practices allow them to unleash the power of today's management tools and realize the potential of a fully decentralized organization.

The hidden dragons.

Abstract: Most multinational corporations are fascinated with China. Carried away by the number of potential customers and the relatively cheap labor, firms seeking a presence in China have traditionally focused on selling products, setting up manufacturing facilities, or both. But they've ignored an important development: the emergence of Chinese firms as powerful rivals--in China and also in the global market. In this article, Ming Zeng and Peter Williamson describe how Chinese companies like Haier, Legend, and Pearl River Piano have quietly managed to grab market share from older, bigger, and financially stronger rivals in Asia, Europe, and the United States. Global managers tend to offer the usual explanations for why Chinese companies don't pose a threat: They aren't big enough or profitable enough to compete overseas, the managers say, and these primarily state-owned companies are ill-financed and ill-equipped for global competition. As the government's policies about the private ownership of companies changed from forbidding the practice to encouraging it, a new breed of Chinese companies evolved. The authors outline the four types of hybrid Chinese companies that are simultaneously tackling the global market. China's national champions are using their advantages as domestic leaders to build global brands. The dedicated exporters are entering foreign markets on the strength of their economies of scale. The competitive networks have taken on world markets by bringing together small, specialized companies that operate in close proximity. And the technology upstarts are using innovations developed by China's government-owned research institutes to enter emerging sectors such as biotechnology. Zeng and Williamson identify these budding multinationals, analyze their strategies, and evaluate their weaknesses.

The customer has escaped.

Abstract: Every company makes choices about the channels it will use to go to market. Traditionally, the decision to sell through a discount superstore or a pricey boutique, for instance, was guided by customer demographics. A company would identify a target segment of buyers and go with the channel that could deliver them. It was a fair assumption that certain customer types were held captive by certain channels--if not from cradle to grave, then at least from initial consideration to purchase. The problem, the authors say, is that today's customers have become unfettered. As their channel options have proliferated, they've come to recognize that different channels serve their needs better at different points in the buying process. The result is "value poaching." For example, certain channels hope to use higher margin sales to cover the cost of providing expensive high-touch services. Potential customers use these channels to do research, then leap to a cheaper channel when it's time to buy. Customers now hunt for bargains more aggressively; they've become more sophisticated about how companies market to them; and they are better equipped with information and technology to make advantageous decisions. What does this mean for your go-to-market strategy? The authors urge companies to make a fundamental shift in mind-set toward designing for buyer behaviors, not customer segments. A company should design pathways across channels to help its customers get what they need at each stage of the buying process--through one channel or another. Customers are not mindful of channel boundaries--and you shouldn't be either. Instead, they are mindful of the value of individual components in your channels--and you should be, too.

Why good projects fail anyway.

Abstract: Big projects fail at an astonishing rate--more than half the time, by some estimates. It's not hard to understand why. Complicated long-term projects are customarily developed by a series of teams working along parallel tracks. If managers fail to anticipate everything that might fall through the cracks, those tracks will not converge successfully at the end to reach the goal. Take a companywide CRM project. Traditionally, one team might analyze customers, another select the software, a third develop training programs, and so forth. When the project's finally complete, though, it may turn out that the salespeople won't enter in the requisite data because they don't understand why they need to. This very problem has, in fact, derailed many CRM programs at major organizations. There is a way to uncover unanticipated problems while the project is still in development. The key is to inject into the overall plan a series of miniprojects, or "rapid-results initiatives," which each have as their goal a miniature version of the overall goal. In the CRM project, a single team might be charged with increasing the revenues of one sales group in one region by 25% within four months. To reach that goal, team members would have to draw on the work of all the parallel teams. But in just four months, they would discover the salespeople's resistance and probably other unforeseen issues, such as, perhaps, the need to divvy up commissions for joint-selling efforts. The World Bank has used rapid-results initiatives to great effect to keep a sweeping 16-year project on track and deliver visible results years ahead of schedule. In taking an in-depth look at this project, and others, the authors show why this approach is so effective and how the initiatives are managed in conjunction with more traditional project activities.

R&D comes to services. Bank of America's pathbreaking experiments.

Abstract: At the heart of business today lies a dilemma: Our economy is increasingly dependent on services, yet our innovation processes remain oriented toward products. Indeed, we have well-tested, scientific methods for developing and refining manufactured goods, but many of them don't seem applicable to the world of services. In this article, Harvard Business School professor Stefan Thomke points out the challenges of applying the discipline of formal RD an experiment that doesn't work may harm customer relationships and even the brand. Given such challenges, it's no surprise that most service companies have not established rigorous, ongoing R&D processes, Thomke says. Here the author provides an in-depth look at a five-step process that Bank of America has used to create new service concepts for retail banking. The company has turned a set of its branches into, in effect, a laboratory where a corporate research team conducts service experiments with actual customers during regular business hours, compares results with those of control branches, and pinpoints attractive innovations for broader rollout. The author describes the program's workings, its successes, and the obstacles the bank faced. The effort reveals what a true R&D operation might look like inside a service business, he concludes.

Clueing in customers.

Abstract: Leonard L Berry and Neeli Bendapudi When customers lack the expertise to judge a company's offerings, they naturally turn detective, scrutinizing people, facilities, and processes for evidence of quality The Mayo Clinic understands this and carefully manages that evidence to convey a simple, consistent message: The needs of the patient come first From the way it hires and trains employees to the way it designs its facilities and approaches its care, the Mayo Clinic provides patients and their families concrete evidence of its strengths and values, an approach that has allowed it to build what is arguably the most powerful brand in health care Marketing professors Leonard Berry and Neeli Bendapudi conducted a five-month study of evidence management at the Mayo Clinic They interviewed more than 1,000 patients and employees, observed hundreds of doctor visits, traveled in the Mayo helicopter, and stayed in the organization's many hospitals Their experiences led them to identify best practices applicable to just about any company, in particular those that sell intangible or technically complex products Essentially, the authors say, companies need to determine what story they want to tell, then ensure that their employees and facilities consistently show customers evidence of that story At Mayo, the evidence falls into three categories: people, collaboration, and tangibles The clinic systematically hires people who espouse its values, and its incentive and reward systems promote collaborative care focused on the patient's needs The physical environment is explicitly designed for its intended effect on the patient experience In almost every interaction, an organization's message comes through "Patients first," the Mayo Clinic's message, is not the only story a medical organization could tell, but the way in which Mayo manages evidence to communicate this message is an example to be followed

Tipping Point Leadership

Abstract: When William Bratton was appointed police commissioner of New York City in 1994, turf wars over jurisdiction and funding were rife and crime was out of control. Yet in less than two years, and without an increase in his budget, Bratton turned New York into the safest large city in the nation. And the NYPD was only the latest of five law-enforcement agencies Bratton had turned around. In each case, he succeeded in record time despite limited resources, a demotivated staff, opposition from powerful vested interests, and an organization wedded to the status quo. Bratton's turnarounds demonstrate what the authors call tipping point leadership. The theory of tipping points hinges on the insight that in any organization, fundamental changes can occur quickly when the beliefs and energies of a critical mass of people create an epidemic movement toward an idea. Bratton begins by overcoming the cognitive hurdles that block organizations from recognizing the need for change. He does this by putting managers face-to-face with operational problems. Next, he manages around limitations on funds, staff, or equipment by concentrating resources on the areas that are most in need of change and that have the biggest payoffs. He meanwhile solves the motivation problem by singling out key influencers--people with disproportionate power due to their connections or persuasive abilities. Finally, he closes off resistance from powerful opponents. Not every CEO has the personality to be a Bill Bratton, but his successes are due to much more than his personality. He relies on a remarkably consistent method that any manager looking to turn around an organization can use to overcome the forces of inertia and reach the tipping point.