Showing papers in "International Security in 2003"

Is China a Status Quo Power

Abstract: of China (PRC) is more integrated into, and more cooperative within, regional and global political and economic systems than ever in its history. Yet there is growing uneasiness in the United States and the Asia-Paciac region about the implications of China’s increasing economic and military power. Characterizations of Chinese diplomacy in the policy and scholarly worlds are, if anything, less optimistic of late about China’s adherence to regional and international norms. In the 1980s there was little discussion in the United States and elsewhere about whether China was or was not part of something called “the international community.” Since the early 1990s, however, scholars and practitioners alike have argued increasingly that China has not demonstrated sufaciently that it will play by so-called international rules and that somehow it must be brought into this community. The subtext is a fairly sharp othering of China that includes a civilizing discourse (China is not yet a civilized state) or perhaps a sports discourse (China is a cheater). Many of the most vigorous policy debates in the United States in recent years have been over whether it is even possible to socialize a dictatorial, nationalistic, and dissatisaed China within this putative international community. Engagers argue that China is becoming socialized, though mainly in the sphere of economic norms (e.g., free trade and domestic marketization). Skeptics either conclude that this is not the case, due to the nature of the regime (for some, China is still Red China; for more sophisticated skeptics, China is oirting with fascism), or that it could not possibly happen because China as a rising power, by deanition, is dissatisaed with the U.S.-dominated global order (a power-transition realpolitik argument). A logical conclusion is that both groups view the problem of China’s rising power as the primary Is China a Status Quo Power?

Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks

Abstract: lations theory is inductively derived from the European experience of the past four centuries, during which Europe was the locus and generator of war, innovation, and wealth. According to Kenneth Waltz, “The theory of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era. It would be . . . ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica. . . . A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers.”1 If international relations theorists paid attention to other regions of the globe, it was to study subjects considered peripheral such as third world security or the behavior of small states.2 Accordingly, international relations scholarship has focused on explaining the European experience, including, for example, the causes of World Wars I and II, as well as the Cold War and U.S.-Soviet relations.3 Although this is still true, other parts of the world have become increasingly signiacant. Accordingly, knowledge of European Getting Asia Wrong

Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony

Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, scholars, commentators, and practitioners of foreign policy have debated what structure of world power would follow the bipolar U.S.-Soviet competition, and what U.S. foreign policy would replace containment. Those who hypothesized a long “unipolar moment” of extraordinary U.S. relative power have proven more prescient than those who expected the relatively quick emergence of a multipolar world.1 Those who recommended a policy of “primacy”—essentially hegemony—to consolidate, exploit, and expand the U.S. relative advantage have carried the day against those who argued for a more restrained U.S. foreign policy.2 One can argue that the jury is still out, the Command of the Commons

Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-first Century

Abstract: effort to restrict territorial access-has long been a core state activity.' As territorially demarcated institutions, states have always imposed entry barriers, whether to deter armies, tax trade and protect domestic producers, or keep out perceived "undesirables." All states monopolize the right to determine who and what is granted legitimate territorial access.2 But there is significant historical variation in border control priorities. Although military defense and economic regulation have traditionally been central border concerns, in many places states are retooling and reconfiguring their border regulatory apparatus to prioritize policing. Thus, rather than simply eroding, as is often assumed, the importance of territoriality is persisting-but with a shift in emphasis.3 In many cases, more intensive border law enforcement is accompanying the demilitarization and economic liberalization of borders.

Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism

Abstract: tween the evolving changes of globalization, the inherent weaknesses of the Arab region, and the inadequate American response to both ensures that terrorism will continue to be the most serious threat to U.S. and Western interests in the twenty-arst century. There has been little creative thinking, however, about how to confront the growing terrorist backlash that has been unleashed. Terrorism is a complicated, eclectic phenomenon, requiring a sophisticated strategy oriented toward inouencing its means and ends over the long term. Few members of the U.S. policymaking and academic communities, however, have the political capital, intellectual background, or inclination to work together to forge an effective, sustained response. Instead, the tendency has been to fall back on established bureaucratic mind-sets and prevailing theoretical paradigms that have little relevance for the changes in international security that became obvious after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. The current wave of international terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented threats from nonstate actors, not only is a reaction to globalization but is facilitated by it; the U.S. response to this reality has been reactive and anachronistic. The combined focus of the United States on statecentric threats and its attempt to cast twenty-arst-century terrorism into familiar strategic terms avoids and often undermines effective responses to this nonstate phenomenon. The increasing threat of globalized terrorism must be met with oexible, multifaceted responses that deliberately and effectively exploit avenues of globalization in return; this, however, is not happening. Behind the Curve

Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force by the United States, 1990-2003

Abstract: In their study of gender differences in public reactions to the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis and war, Virginia Sapiro and Pamela Conover analyzed a number of American survey items dealing with hypothetical security policies as well as concrete questions involving the use of military force and its consequences. The results were clear: Although a gender difference on the more abstract, hypothetical questions was weak or nonexistent, when the analysis turned to the speciac questions of using force against Iraq and the civilian and military casualties that could result, the differences became large indeed. Sapiro and Conover concluded that “when we moved from the abstract to the concrete—from hypothetical wars to the Gulf War—the distance separating women and men grew, and on every measure, women reacted more negatively. These gender differences are some of the largest and most consistent in the study of political psychology and are clearly of a magnitude that can have real political signiacance under the right circumstances.”1 Less than ten years later, as NATO warplanes continued their attacks against Serbia, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the gender difference in public opinion concerning the war over Kosovo was far smaller than it had been in previous wars: “As debate persists in America over how much to use force, Gender Differences and the Use of Force

Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited

Abstract: A serious gap exists in scholarly understanding of nuclear proliferation. The gap derives from inadequate attention to the phenomena of nuclear reversal and nuclear restraint as well as insufŽcient awareness of the biases and limitations inherent in the empirical data employed to study proliferation. This article identiŽes “nuclear hedging” as a national strategy lying between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback. An understanding of this strategy can help scholars to explain the nuclear behavior of many states; it can also help to explain why the nightmare proliferation scenarios of the 1960s have not materialized. These insights, in turn, cast new light on several prominent proliferation case studies and the unique role of the United States in combating global proliferation. They have profound implications for engaging current or latent nuclear proliferants, underscoring the centrality of buying time as the key component of a nonproliferation strategy. The article begins with a brief review of contemporary nuclear proliferation concerns. It then takes stock of the surprisingly large documented universe of nuclear reversal cases and the relevant literature.1 It proceeds to examine the empirical challenges that bedeviled many of the earlier studies, possibly skewing their theoretical findings. Next, it discusses the features of the nuclear reversal and restraint phenomena and the forces that inuence them. In this context, it introduces and illustrates an alternative explanation for the nuclear behavior of many states based on the notion of nuclear hedging. It draws on this notion and other inputs to reassess the role that the United States Never Say Never Again

Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror

Abstract: that war is politics by other means is a reminder that the primary goal of the war against terror is not to defeat and eliminate those who aim to attack the United States and its allies. Rather it is to enhance the security of the American people and their allies. These goals are the same only if terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda are isolated groups of criminals that need only be found and dealt with swiftly. But if al-Qaeda and its associated groups represent the values and beliefs of substantial numbers of people, and all signs indicate that this is the case, then defeating these groups will not end the struggle against terror. Only by changing the values and beliefs of supporters of terrorist groups can the United States and its allies expect to achieve this objective. To win the war against terror, the United States and its allies must have both a military strategy and a political strategy. Achieving political victory requires an understanding of the social basis of terror—that is, the values and beliefs that legitimate the use of extreme and indiscriminate violence against the civilian populations of out-groups. Such understanding will not reveal much about terror groups that seem to lack social support, such as the Basque terrorists in Spain, but it will help to reduce the inouence of those groups that appear to enjoy widespread support, such as al-Qaeda. Seeking to understand the motivations of terrorists, however, should not be confused with empathizing with them or acquiescing on issues that terrorists and their supporters claim motivate them. Some scholars have sought to link poverty with terror. Poverty, they argue, fosters terror because it creates a sense of hopelessness, restricts educational opportunity, and produces frustration over inequality.1 The direct causal linkages between poverty and terror are more elusive than scholars suggest, howMarket Civilization and Its Clash with Terror

Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?

Abstract: alysts have inaccurately portrayed the Israeli-Palestinian-U.S. summit at Camp David in July 2000 and subsequent negotiations. Based on this inaccurate portrayal, a number of observers have argued that a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conoict is not possible at this time. This article addresses the inaccuracies of this dominant narrative and offers a different understanding of Israeli-Palestinian relations in 2000 (and January 2001) that, in turn, suggests that the door to Israeli-Palestinian political talks is open. After the Camp David summit, Israel and some U.S. ofacials told a story about what happened that was widely accepted in Israel and the United States. According to this dominant version of the events at Camp David, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak made a generous offer to the Palestinian negotiators who rejected it without even putting forth a counterproposal. At Camp David, Barak offered a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and more than 90 percent of the West Bank, a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, shared control of the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary in Jerusalem’s Old City, and a commitment to withdraw many Israeli settlements from the West Bank. The Israeli version continues that Palestinian leaders rejected Barak’s offer and the diplomatic route to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conoict. Instead, they tried to destroy Israel by pressing throughout the Israeli-Palestinian talks for the return of millions of Palestinian refugees to Israel and by launching the second intifada, or uprising, in September 2000.1 Visions in Collision

Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense

Abstract: On December 17, 2002, President George W. Bush ordered the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD). Proponents of missile defenses, both inside and outside the Bush administration, argue that, absent NMD, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the greater U.S. vulnerability that this entails will signiŽcantly limit the United States ability to secure it foreign policy goals. “A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argues, “could give rogue states the power to hold our people hostage to nuclear blackmail—in an effort to prevent us from projecting force to stop aggression.”1 Similarly, Walter Slocombe as undersecretary of defense in the Clinton administration asserted, “Without defenses, potential aggressors might think that the threat of strikes against U.S. cities could coerce the United States into failing to meet its commitments.”2 To what extent do the spread of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them threaten U.S. interests and impede the United States ability to pursue its Nuclear Deterrence Theory

Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities

Abstract: States and its allies have toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, the knotty question of Iraq’s future government is rising to the fore. Although the Bush administration, nongovernmental organization ofacials, and exiled Iraqis disagree on interim measures for governing Iraq, there is a surprising consensus on the eventual nature of Iraq’s government: Almost all parties believe that Iraq must have a democratic, and highly federal, government.1 President George W. Bush declared that “all Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected.”2 Zalmay Khalilzad, who was the special presidential envoy and ambassador at large for Free Iraqis, called for “a broad-based representative and democratic government” in a post-Saddam Iraq.3 Indeed the Bush administration’s vision for democracy extends beyond Iraq. Richard Perle, an inouential strategist with close ties to the administration, Constructing a Democratic Iraq

Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons

Abstract: September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to the ofaces of NBC News, the New York Post, and the publisher of the National Enquirer. Contaminated letters were subsequently sent to, among others, then Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.). By the end of the year, anthraxcontaminated letters had infected eighteen people, ave of whom died.1 Although the anthrax attacks resulted in relatively few casualties, at least one poll suggested that public concern about biological terrorism had increased.2 Some 10,000 people, actually or potentially exposed to virulent anthrax spores, were prescribed prophylactic antibiotics with unknown longterm effects on their health or the health of the public at large.3 In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and anthrax mailings, U.S. policymakers scrambled to enact new legislation to address the terrorist threat. The urgency of the effort precluded careful balancing of competing interests, with potential adverse effects on civil liberties, public health, and national security. The U.S.A. Patriot Act, passed by both Houses of Congress in the space of weeks, was signed by President George W. Bush on October 26. Among its provisions, the act overrides laws in forty-eight states that made library reDreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons

The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969

Abstract: On the evening of October 10, 1969, Gen. Earle Wheeler, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), sent a top secret message to major U.S. military commanders around the world informing them that the JCS had been directed “by higher authority” to increase U.S. military readiness “to respond to possible confrontation by the Soviet Union.” The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was ordered to stand down all aircraft combat training missions and to increase the number of nucleararmed B-52 bombers on ground alert. These readiness measures were implemented on October 13. Even more dramatic, on October 27 SAC launched a series of B-52 bombers, armed with thermonuclear weapons, on a “show of force” airborne alert, code-named Giant Lance. During this alert operation, eighteen B-52s took off from bases in California and Washington State. The bombers crossed Alaska, were refueled in midair by KC-135 tanker aircraft, and then oew in oval patterns toward the Soviet Union and back, on eighteenhour “vigils” over the northern polar ice cap. Why did the U.S. military go on a nuclear alert in October 1969? The alert was a loud but secret military signal ordered by President Richard Nixon. Nixon sought to convince Soviet and North Vietnamese leaders that he might do anything to end the war in Vietnam, in accordance with his “madman theory” of coercive diplomacy. The nuclear alert measures were therefore speciacally chosen to be loud enough to be picked up quickly by the Soviet Union’s intelligence agencies. The military operation was also, however, deliberately designed to remain secret from the American public and U.S. allies. InThe Madman Nuclear Alert

A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo

Abstract: President Slobodan Milosevi ae surrender control of Kosovo to NATO on June 9, 1999? Two reasons are most commonly cited: (1) the likelihood of continued and intensiŽed NATO air strikes, and (2) the alliance s threat to launch a ground war. The distinction between the two is an important one. If NATO s ground threat did not play a role in Milosevi ae s decision to surrender, then Operation Allied Force, launched on March 24, 1999, demonstrates the ability of coercive air power—and air power alone—to achieve a major political goal. If, however, the ground threat factored into Milosevi ae s decisionmaking, then the Kosovo conict serves as an example of the inherent difŽculty of relying on air power alone to achieve political goals, even under favorable conditions. The conventional view of the war in Kosovo holds that the threat of ground invasion was an essential element of NATO s success. According to Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, this threat “probably played the largest role in motivating Milosevi ae s concessions.”1 Ivo Daalder and Michael O Hanlon argue that the turning point occurred when U.S. ofŽcials began to threaten a decisive invasion.2 Benjamin Lambeth contends that “there [was] no question that by the end of May, NATO had yielded to the inevitable and embraced in principle the need for a ground invasion. . . . There is also every reason to believe that awareness of that change in NATO s position . . . Žgured importantly in [Milosevi ae s] decision to capitulate.”3 In his memoirs, NATO s former Su-

Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed?: A Review Essay

Abstract: Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, Democracies at War. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. Throughout history, states have exhibited a puzzling degree of variation in their capacities to create military power. Some consistently excel at warfare. Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, has long been singled out for its military's exceptional tactical proficiency, especially in the battles of both world wars. Others-such as Italy in those same conflicts-often perform poorly, demonstrating endemic weaknesses in their abilities to generate military force.' Yet a third category of states exhibits curious variation in military effectiveness over time. Most analysts, for example, count Egypt's performance in the 1967 Six Day War against Israel among the most dismal of contemporary military history. They also tend to agree, however, that in the 1973 October War Egypt was able to dramatically improve its effectiveness, manifest most vividly in the military's textbook crossing of the Suez Canal. Why are some states, at some times, better able to translate their basic material and human strengths into military power? Sociologists and military historians have long been interested in this question, often focusing on the human relations among soldiers and quality of leaders that make some militaries exceptional. More recently, political scientists have evinced growing interest in

Understanding Victory: Why Political Institutions Matter

Abstract: In our book, Democracies at War, we asked the question: Why do democracies tend to win the wars they aght? We conarmed this pattern, arst noted by David Lake in his “Powerful Paciasts” article, using statistical tests and numerous historical cases.1 Notably, this phenomenon confounds the traditional realpolitik fear that democratic liberalism is a luxury that states may be unable to afford. Our basic answer to the question is that democracies tend to win because they put themselves in a position to do so. The constraints that oow from democratic political structures lead the executives of liberal democracies to hesitate before starting wars, particularly wars where victory on the battleaeld appears to be less than clear-cut. Democracies’ willingness to start wars only against relatively weaker states says nothing about the actual military efaciency or capacity of democratic states. Rather, it says that when they do start a aght, they are more likely to pick on relatively weaker target states. We also and, however, that in addition to this “selection effects” explanation of democratic success, democratic armies enjoy a small advantage on the battleaeld. Michael Desch, a prominent realist scholar, reviews these claims in his article “Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters.”2 His assertion that regime type is irrelevant to the probability of military victory is consistent with the broader realist agenda, which argues that domestic politics matters little in the formation of foreign policy or the interactions between states. Desch makes a valuable contribution in advancing the debate over this question. There are many points about which Desch and we agree. Democracies do Understanding Victory

The Power of Democratic Cooperation

Abstract: In examining ave causal mechanisms offered by "democratic triumphalists" to support the military effectiveness of democracy, Desch argues that "none of them is logically compelling or has much empirical support" (p. 25). In this ar- ticle I do not attempt to respond to all the points Desch raises. Instead I focus on one of his critiques—namely, whether democratic allies can be more effec- tive than nondemocratic allies in wartime and whether they are more likely to achieve victory. My goal is twofold: arst, to offer an alternative theoretical ex- planation for the relationship between alliance behavior, the role of domestic political institutions, and their effect on war performance to explanations that Desch attributes to democratic triumphalists; and second, to provide quantita-

The Political Economy of Alignment: Great Britain's Commitments to Europe, 1905–39

Abstract: deeply to the core of international relations theory as the origins of diplomatic alignments. If only one of the great powers had chosen a different alliance strategy at any of several critical junctures over the past century, the course of world history might have been radically altered. Germany might have succeeded in the conquest of Europe, or it might have been deterred from hostilities altogether. Much depended on Great Britain, which avoided entangling itself in continental crises until each world war had already become inevitable. By making a stronger commitment to France in the early 1910s, or by forging a close partnership with the Soviet Union in the late 1930s, Britain might have been able to persuade German leaders that military conoict would not have been worth the risk. Given the enormous stakes of great power politics, it is of vital importance for the aeld of international relations to provide a compelling account of how states choose their allies and adversaries. The academic debate over alignment has centered on two schools of thought within the realist paradigm. One view posits that states tend to balance against the most powerful actor in the system; the other asserts that states concern themselves only with speciac threats to their national security. Using these theories as a point of departure, many scholars have also explored secondorder factors that affect great power alignments, including offense-defense balance, revisionist motives, domestic regime characteristics, and intra-alliance bargaining dynamics. Such works have not directly challenged the core asThe Political Economy of Alignment

The Mixed Blessing of Israel's Nuclear Policy

Abstract: M ost observers seem to agree on three issues regarding Israel's nuclear policy. First, Israel's acquisition of a significant nuclear capability occurred over a relatively long period of time. Second, its policy of nuclear ambiguity has been balanced and sound, enabling Israel to develop a nuclear arsenal while maintaining close relations with the United States and other countries committed to nuclear non-

Fair Fights?: Evaluating Theories of Democracy and Victory

Abstract: Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters,” Michael Desch criticizes the methods and results of several studies, mine included, that and that democracies tend to win the wars they aght.1 After raising a number of empirical and research design issues, Desch concludes that “on balance, democracies share no particular advantages or disadvantages in selecting and waging wars. In other words, regime type hardly matters for explaining who wins and loses wars” (p. 8). Desch does the discipline a service by challenging extant andings— skepticism is, after all, the most important trait of a social scientist. A careful review of theory and method, however, conarms the anding that democracies tend to be victorious in war. In his article, Desch separates research design from theory and thus does not provide the fair test that he claims. Scholars cannot evaluate empirical relationships outside of their theoretical context. Similarly, the concept of causality cannot be understood apart from a prior theory. Correlation may or may not exist, but causation can only be inferred. Even as the historical record highlights the distinctive nature of democracies, researchers conclude that democracy causes (at least in part) victory in war only because theory implies that it should. The literature on the democratic peace in general, and the theory and andings on democracy and victory in particular, have contributed to a new generation of research on war as a process. With fresh attention to how war outcomes affect strategic bargaining before and during crises, scholars are moving in the direction of more synthetic and productive theories of conoict that show how attributes of states, such as democracy, interact with their choices to explain war and peace. This is one of the most promising avenues of research in contemporary security studies—and one that reinforces the need to bind empirical Fair Fights?

Democracy and Victory: Fair Fights or Food Fights?

Abstract: Ajin Choi, David Lake, and Dan Reiter and Allan Stam have each provided useful rejoinders to the critique of democratic triumphalism in my recent article “Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters.”1 In response, I begin by summarizing our arguments and pointing out several issues where we have little or no disagreement. I then examine our two major areas of contention: how best to test whether democracy matters much in explaining military outcomes, and whether the democratic triumphalists’ proposed mechanisms convincingly explain why democracies frequently appear to win their wars.

Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officer Attitudes toward Transformation

Abstract: a growing number of defense analysts, government ofacials, and military ofacers have argued that the growth and diffusion of stealth, precision, and information technology will drastically alter the character and conduct of future wars, yielding a revolution in military affairs (RMA).1 George W. Bush and his administration came to oface promising to transform the U.S. armed forces by skipping a generation of technology. In a speech at the Norfolk Navy Base on February 13, 2001, President Bush pledged to “move beyond marginal improvements to harness new technologies that will support a new strategy.” He called for the development of ground forces that are lighter, more mobile, and more lethal, as well as manned and unmanned air forces capable of striking across the globe with precision.2 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld issued the administration’s formal strategy for transforming the U.S. military in June 2003. The Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) document deanes “transformation” as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”3 The fundamental assumption of the TPG is that existing U.S. forces—and evolutionary improvements to those forces—will not be

Beyond the MTCR: Building a Comprehensive Regime to Contain Ballistic Missile Proliferation

Abstract: ballistic missiles has been a major international security concern for many years.1 Efforts to address this concern, centered on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), have had a mixed record.2 The MTCR seeks to curb missile proliferation by denying regional powers the technology to build missiles. In the MTCR’s arst decade, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, Syria, and Taiwan were thwarted from advancing their missile ambitions. In light of these positive developments, MTCR members expressed satisfaction with the regime at its tenth anniversary in 1997. Yet in subsequent years, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan launched medium-range missiles, and several other states have expanded their missile programs, demonstrating the MTCR’s limitations. To augment the regime, MTCR members drafted the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.3 In November 2002 ninety-three countries signed the code, which calls on states to make their missile policies more transparent. In this article I seek to answer two central questions: First, can the MTCR’s technology barriers, along with the Code of Conduct’s transparency initiatives, curb the spread of ballistic missiles? Second, if the MTCR and the code are inadequate, what additional measures are necessary to contain missile proliferBeyond the MTCR

Two Dismal Sciences Are Better Than One—Economics and the Study of National Security: A Review Essay

Abstract: Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conoict Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. War is economics by other means. States may increase their wealth by developing their own resources and through the promotion of foreign trade, or instead by seizing the economies of other nations. As Jack Hirshleifer puts it in The Dark Side of the Force, “There are two main methods of making a living . . . the way of production and exchange versus the way of predation and conoict.”1 Why do states choose one strategy over another? Under what conditions will they threaten other governments, and when will they seek to appease them? Economic theory has played a key role in shaping the way that scholars grapple with these and many other questions in the aeld of security studies. Have economic methods and models proved useful in advancing scholarly understanding of strategic interactions among nations? That question provokes a surprising amount of controversy within the academic community.2 The publication of Hirshleifer’s collected papers on conoict theory provides a fresh opportunity to assess the inouence of economics on the study of national security since World War II.3 TwoDismal Sciences Are Better Than One— Economics and the Study of National Security Ethan B. Kapstein

The Sources of Terrorism

Abstract: In his article "Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror," Michael Mousseau frames a hypothesis about the contemporary "social origins of terror". According to Mousseau, "As a result of globalization, [the values and beliefs of liberal democracies and those of collectivist-autocratic clientalist states] are increasingly clashing in the mixed market– clientalist economies of the developing world, triggering intense antimarket resentment directed primarily against the epitome of market civilization: the United States."