Showing papers in "International Security in 2020"
TL;DR: In 2017, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) changed its domestic security strategy in Xinjiang, escalating the use of mass detention, ideological re-education, and pressure on Uyghur diaspora net as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In 2017–18, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) changed its domestic security strategy in Xinjiang, escalating the use of mass detention, ideological re-education, and pressure on Uyghur diaspora net...
51 citations
TL;DR: For example, the authors argues that China's grand strategy under Xi Jinping is clearly distinctive from the grand strategy that China has embraced since the early 1990s, and that it does not fundamentally break with the Grand Strategy of China since 1990s.
Abstract: China's grand strategy under Xi Jinping is clearly distinctive. It does not, however, fundamentally break with the grand strategy that China has embraced since the early 1990s—one that aims to real...
40 citations
TL;DR: The U.S. military's prevailing norms of professionalism exhibit three paradoxes that render the organization poorly suited to meet contemporary challenges to its nonpartisan ethic as discussed by the authors, and that undermi...
Abstract: The U.S. military's prevailing norms of professionalism exhibit three paradoxes that render the organization poorly suited to meet contemporary challenges to its nonpartisan ethic, and that undermi...
36 citations
TL;DR: Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the balance of power in the int...
Abstract: Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the balance of power in the int...
34 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a survey of attitudes toward the laws of war published in the summer 2017 issue of the New York Times Magazine, "Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Non-combatants".
Abstract: In “Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants,” a pathbreaking survey of attitudes toward the laws of war published in the summer 2017 iss...
32 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a case study of three case studies of nonstate actors that differ in terms of ideology and capacity (al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the People's Protection Units in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon) suggests that the ability and desire to control proxies varies with the sponsor's capacity.
Abstract: Studies of conflicts involving the use of surrogates focus largely on states, viewing the relationship between sponsors and proxies primarily as one in which states utilize nonstate actors as proxies. They have devoted far less attention to sponsor-proxy arrangements in which nonstate actors play super-ordinate roles as sponsors in their own right. Why and how do nonstate actors sponsor proxies? Unlike state sponsors, which value proxies primarily for their military utility, nonstate sponsors select and utilize proxies mainly for their perceived political value. Simply put, states tend to sponsor military surrogates, whereas nonstate actors sponsor political ancillaries. Both endogenous actor-based traits and exogenous structural constraints account for these different approaches. An analysis of three case studies of nonstate sponsors that differ in terms of ideology and capacity—al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the People's Protection Units in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon—confirms this argument, but also suggests that the ability and desire to control proxies varies with the sponsor's capacity. High-capacity nonstate sponsors such as Hezbollah behave similarly to state sponsors, but remain exceptional. Most nonstate sponsors are less dominant, rendering the relationships to their proxies more transactional and pragmatic, and ultimately less enduring than those of state sponsors and their clients.
20 citations
TL;DR: The so-called hub-and-spokes alliance system emerged in East Asia after World War II instead of a multilateral alliance as discussed by the authors, and realists and constructivists offer various explanations, pointing to...
Abstract: Why did the so-called hub-and-spokes alliance system emerge in East Asia after World War II instead of a multilateral alliance? Realists and constructivists offer various explanations, pointing to ...
19 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that to deter a nuclear attack, states must be certain of their ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike, and that China's nuclear posture of uncertain retaliation suggests a...
Abstract: Many strategists argue that to deter a nuclear attack, states must be certain of their ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike. China's nuclear posture of uncertain retaliation suggests a...
12 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that international political outcomes are deeply shaped by the balance of power, but some military capabilities rely on secrecy to be effective, and that these capabilities pose problems for conver...
Abstract: International political outcomes are deeply shaped by the balance of power, but some military capabilities rely on secrecy to be effective. These “clandestine capabilities” pose problems for conver...
12 citations
TL;DR: In this article, how electoral politics affect presidential decision-making in war is examined, and the authors conclude that "as both commander in chief and elected officeholder, presidents must inevitably balance competing objectives of the national int...
Abstract: How do electoral politics affect presidential decisionmaking in war? As both commander in chief and elected officeholder, presidents must inevitably balance competing objectives of the national int...
11 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a single instance of disloyalty can damage the reputation of a state during a crisis, and the state's other allies will expect similar disloyalness in the future.
Abstract: Leaders believe that if their state abandons one ally during a crisis, then their state's other allies will expect similar disloyalty in the future. Thus, a single instance of disloyalty can damage...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that more than twenty-five years after the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs), there is no evidence that such tribunals can deter combatant atrocities against civilians.
Abstract: Advocates of wartime international criminal tribunals (ICTs) hope that such tribunals can deter combatant atrocities against civilians. Yet, more than twenty-five years after the establishment of t...
TL;DR: In practice, however, relatively rising states can also cooperate with declining great powers as mentioned in this paper, however, they may also cooperate w.r.t. the other great powers in practice.
Abstract: International relations scholarship overwhelmingly expects that relatively rising states will threaten and challenge declining great powers. In practice, however, rising states can also cooperate w...
TL;DR: In the years between the 1991 Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi regime faced a cheater's dilemma: how much should it reveal of Iraq's WMD capabilities when each...
Abstract: Between the 1991 Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi regime faced a cheater's dilemma: how much should it reveal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities when each...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the U.S.-Soviet detente during the 1970s and emphasize the Soviet Union's inability to put aside its communist ideology for the sake of a more cooperative relations with the United States.
Abstract: Standard explanations for the demise of U.S.-Soviet detente during the 1970s emphasize the Soviet Union's inability to put aside its communist ideology for the sake of a more cooperative relationsh...
TL;DR: This paper found that the majority of Americans do not consider the first use of nuclear weapons a taboo and their commitment to non-combatant immunity is shallow, and that when provoked, and in conditions where saving U.S. soldiers is at stake, majority of respondents preferred the nuclear strike.
Abstract: Our 2015 survey experiment—reported in the 2017 International Security article “Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran”—asked a representative sample of Americans to choose between continuing a ground invasion of Iran that would kill an estimated 20,000 U.S. soldiers or launching a nuclear attack on an Iranian city that would kill an estimated 100,000 civilians.1 Fifty-six percent of the respondents preferred the nuclear strike. When a different set of subjects instead read that the air strike would use conventional weapons, but still kill 100,000 Iranians, 67 percent preferred it over the ground invasion. These andings led us to conclude that “when provoked, and in conditions where saving U.S. soldiers is at stake, the majority of Americans do not consider the arst use of nuclear weapons a taboo and their commitment to noncombatant immunity is shallow.”2 By 2015, we had been researching American public opinion on the use of nuclear weapons and the ethics of war for several years. Many of our previous andings about the U.S. public’s hawkish attitudes had been unsettling. Nevertheless, the levels of public support we found in this study for a strike that so clearly violated ethical and legal principles on the use of force were deeply troubling. We proposed, therefore, that future research on the nuclear taboo and the noncombatant immunity norm focus on interventions that might blunt
TL;DR: On November 19, 1977, the world watched in disbelief as Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat visited Jerusalem and met with Israel's leaders, promised "no more war,” and off...
Abstract: On November 19, 1977, the world watched in disbelief as Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat visited Jerusalem. In one dramatic stroke, Sadat met with Israel's leaders, promised “no more war,” and off...
TL;DR: When a mass movement broke out in 2013 against the corrupt government of Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine, the United States and its West European allies mobilized to support it as mentioned in this paper, and the policy was justifi...
Abstract: When a mass movement broke out in 2013 against the corrupt government of Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine, the United States and its West European allies mobilized to support it. The policy was justifi...
TL;DR: Since September 11, 2001, most expert commentary on radiological weapons has focused on nonstate actors, to the neglect of state-level programs as mentioned in this paper, and numerous countries in the past have express...
Abstract: Since September 11, 2001, most expert commentary on radiological weapons has focused on nonstate actors, to the neglect of state-level programs. In fact, numerous countries in the past have express...
TL;DR: Zhang as mentioned in this paper argues that China has not used brute force in any of its territorial disputes in the South China Sea, but I disagree with her use of the term "brute force" (p. 134).
Abstract: Ketian Zhang’s article is an important contribution to the literature on Chinese foreign policy and coercive diplomacy. Her research design, however, is not best suited to demonstrate the key andings of her study: China is a cautious bully; it employs coercion only infrequently; and as it grows stronger, it uses military coercion less often.1 For reasons discussed below, it is premature to conclude that China’s “decisions about when to pursue coercion and which tools to use cannot be explained by focusing on material capabilities” (p. 119). First, Zhang’s decision to develop “a theory of coercion . . . in response to national security threats” means that every instance of coercion discussed in the article is a result of China’s failed deterrence against a challenge from another state (p. 119). Zhang mentions but does not analyze cases of proactive coercion; therefore, her andings about Chinese coercion apply only to China’s reactions to what Beijing considers to be provocations. A bully can get what it wants by using brute force or proactive coercion, but Zhang chooses to exclude these aspects from her analysis—for example, China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea (pp. 133–134). If, without provocation, China were to occupy disputed maritime features or to threaten a military attack to expel other disputants, Zhang’s operationalization would exclude this action from her analysis because it would be considered brute force or proactive coercion. Second, Zhang argues that “China has not used brute force in any of its territorial disputes in the South China Sea” since the 1990s, but I disagree with her use of the term “brute force” (p. 134). Indeed, China has refrained from using military violence since the 1990s in the South China Sea, whereas it fought against South Vietnam in 1974 and against Vietnam in 1988. Nevertheless, I argue that China has continued to use brute force, because scholars who study the use of coercion should distinguish brute force
TL;DR: The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with t...
Abstract: The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with t...
TL;DR: Green and Long as mentioned in this paper argue that if the risk of countermeasures is low or if replacement capabilities exist, signaling becomes attractive for improved general deterrence, adversary resource diversion, and diplomatic concessions or strategic adjustments.
Abstract: Brendan Green and Austin Long make a signiacant contribution with their theoretical framework for peacetime signaling of clandestine military capabilities.1 Examining U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) during the Cold War, they argue that choices to disclose capabilities depend on uniqueness (replaceability) and anticipated countermeasures (pp. 59–60). Green and Long cannot fully account for many historical cases, however, because they overlook decisionmaker concerns about the spread of technology. A modiaed framework combining their theory with fears of technological diffusion offers greater predictive power by explaining the broader dilemma of revealing military innovations during both war and peace. States conceal military capabilities to avoid two threats: nulliacation and duplication.2 Green and Long’s variables of uniqueness and countermeasures focus on the former while failing to address the latter. Green and Long argue that if the risk of countermeasures is low or if replacement capabilities exist, signaling becomes attractive for “improved general deterrence, adversary resource diversion, and diplomatic concessions or strategic adjustments” (p. 56). Duplication is a fundamentally different concern. Disclosures may provide an adversary with insights to improve their own capabilities. The fear of nulliacation identiaed by Green and Long does not preclude concerns about technological diffusion (pp. 51–52). Correspondence: Clandestine Capabilities