Showing papers in "Journal of Political Philosophy in 2000"

The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism

Abstract: In both ancient and modern worlds cosmopolitan ideas have developed alongside, if not directly in response to, the posited social, political, economic and ethical imperatives of a divided world. Consequently, the salience of such ideas may be measured more by the level of contestation than of acceptance. Despite its long history, an uncontentious account of the implications of a cosmopolitan ethical perspective still eludes political and moral theorists. Part of the difficulty of understanding the precise nature of cosmopolitanism, as well as its relationship with other perspectives, lies in the myriad ways it has been understood or, perhaps more accurately, misunderstood. A plethora of images, many inconsistent if not altogether contradictory, confront students of cosmopolitanism. Critics target its various alleged manifestations — as political visions,3 ethical commitments4 and economic agendas5 — without being entirely clear about how these disparate expressions of cosmopolitanism cohere under a single paradigm.

Feminism and Republicanism: Is This a Plausible Alliance?

Abstract: LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.

Repentance Rituals and Restorative Justice

Abstract: For most of this century, debate over how criminal justice should be transacted has alternated between an emphasis on retribution versus rehabilitation. Restoration has emerged in the 1990s as a credible third alternative. The most influential definition of restorative justice is by Tony Marshall in the context of a Delphi process conducted by Paul McCold: ‘Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future’. Restorative justice means restoring victims, restoring offenders and restoring communities. Among the losses victims, offenders or communities might want restored are property loss, injury, a sense of security, dignity, a sense of empowerment, voice, harmony based on a feeling that justice has been done, and social support.

Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the Algeria Question

Abstract: In the closing years of the eighteenth century, a great intellectual and moral challenge to European empire was launched by many of the most innovative thinkers of the day, including Kant, Adam Smith, Bentham, Burke, Diderot, and Condorcet. They drew on a strikingly wide range of ideas to argue against empire: among others, the rights of man and the imperative of popular self-determination, the economic wisdom of free trade and foolishness of conquest, the corruption of natural man by a degenerate civilization, the hypocrisy required for self-governing republics to rule despotically over powerless subjects, and the impossibility of sustaining freedom at home while practicing despotism abroad.

“Two Concepts of Liberty” Through African Eyes

Abstract: In “Two Concepts of Liberty” Berlin notes the protean nature of the word “freedom” and then systematically proceeds to narrow its range of meanings. In the process, Berlin eliminates much of what most people, in everyday communication, regard as freedom, believing that this is in the best interest of intellectual clarity. As he puts it: [N]othing is gained by a confusion of terms. To avoid glaring inequality or widespread misery I am ready to sacrifice some, or all, of my freedom: I may do so willingly and freely: but it is freedom that I am giving up for the sake of justice or equality or the love of my fellow men. I should be guilt-stricken, and rightly so, if I were not, in some circumstances, ready to make this sacrifice. But a sacrifice is not an increase in what is being sacrificed, namely freedom, however great the moral need or the compensation for it. Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience. (Emphasis added). Berlin's other, perhaps overarching, aim is to show how inattention to the specificity of the meanings of concepts might have potentially dangerous political repercussions. He implicitly argues that the intellectuals who promoted the idea of positive freedom as opposed to that of negative freedom contributed to the emergence of totalitarianism and fascism in Europe.

Two Models of Deliberation: Oratory and Conversation in Ratifying the Constitution

Abstract: In recent years, “deliberation” has become the byword of many political theorists, most of whom identify deliberation with reasoned conversation. Among the most forceful advocates of deliberation as conversation are Jurgen Habermas and, to a greater or lesser extent, his successors who style themselves “deliberative democrats.” For them, the more political decision-making approximates the ideal of a reasoned public conversation among free and equal individuals, the more legitimate and rational it will be. “Outcomes,” they say are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals. Their deliberative model produces more rational decision-making, they say, because it conveys information, impels individuals to order their preferences coherently, and by making persons articulate good reasons in public leads them “to think from the standpoint of all involved.”

Moral Desert, Fairness and Legitimate Expectations in the Market

Abstract: Do people morally deserve what they earn in the market? More specifically, can people legitimately claim to deserve what they earn in the market in a way that counts against redistributing those earnings? As most liberal political philosophers do, I argue that the answer is no. Unlike many of these philosophers, however, I do not focus on whether or not people can be deserving. Instead, I focus on the relationship between social institutions and moral desert, and advance two claims. First, in the market, desert claims are undermined by the very nature of the market even if people can be deserving in general. Second, part of the intuition that motivates accounts of moral desert may be explained instead with reference to a principle of fairness that demands the fulfillment of people's legitimate expectations as to what they will receive, and this principle places much weaker restrictions on redistributive policies than do claims of moral desert.

Land, Culture and Justice: A Framework for Group Rights and Recognition*

Abstract: Meet the Sorbs. They are a Slavic people in Germany who number around sixty thousand. They are not mistreated or oppressed by the German government. They live in two German states, but they are interspersed with other Germans. Do the Sorbs deserve special, group rights to help maintain their culture? The recent arguments of many theorists suggest that they do. Iris Marion Young has recently argued that all marginalized groups should have group rights. Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal maintain that all cultural groups have certain rights. Will Kymlicka suggests that all ‘societal cultures’ have group rights, which might include the Sorbs.

Dealing with Extremists in Public Discussion: Front national and 'Republican Front' in France

Abstract: In this article we investigate the way modern democracies can deal with extremists in public discussion. The first part of the article conceptualizes political discussion insofar as it makes a contribution to the democratic process. We focus upon the democratic process as a way of dealing with conflicts between citizens that stem from differences in moral outlook. We reflect upon this process mainly in relation to its capacity to overcome possible political deadlocks, in the perspective of collective decision making. In the second part we concentrate on the question of how public discussion in a modern democracy should look. Here, then, we take a similar perspective as Gutmann and Thompson (1996) in saying that we should try and define some central ‘rules of the game’ for public discussion. We make a distinction between entrance rules that are proscriptive and performative rules that are suggestive.

In Defence of Pure Pluralism: Two Readings of Walzer's Spheres of Justice

Abstract: In this article I will argue that there are two theories of distributive justice hidden in Walzer's Spheres of Justice. The first one emphasises the separation of distributive spheres. It tries to formulate distributive criteria by sticking faithfully to sphere-specificity. I shall refer to this theory as ‘pure pluralism’. The second theory downplays the separation of spheres and emphasises ‘across spheres’ or ‘between spheres’ criteria instead. I shall call this theory ‘mitigated pluralism’. Mitigated pluralism has become popular among Walzer's friendly critics who apparently do not want to charge him with a distributive theory as clear and rigid as pure pluralism. Although I consider myself another friendly critic, I shall argue in favour of pure pluralism.

Epistemological Restraint—Revisited

Abstract: THOMAS NAGEL has argued that ‘true liberalism’ excludes appeals to conceptions of the good in political argument. According to Nagel, liberalism's impartiality is grounded not in skepticism but, rather, in its commitment to ‘epistemological restraint.’ As he puts it, ‘We accept a kind of epistemological division between the private and the public domains: in certain contexts I am constrained to consider my beliefs merely as beliefs rather than as truths, however convinced I may be that they are true, and that I know it.’ Nagel's notion of epistemological restraint has been roundly criticized by perfectionist liberals and advocates of liberal neutrality alike. In fact, even Nagel has come to reject the epistemological argument—in part, because of the epistemological asymmetry that it presupposes. In this paper, I offer an answer to Nagel's critics, one that makes the notion of epistemological asymmetry coherent. In so doing, I show how to defend liberal neutrality without embracing skepticism. I structure the paper in the following way: Section II lays out the critique of epistemological restraint; Section III defends the coherence of this notion; and Section IV considers an objection to the analysis developed in Section III.

Legislation and Non-neutral Principles: A Lockean Approach

Abstract: When citizens and legislators attempt to justify coercive acts, such as fines or imprisonment, they often do so on the basis of controversial justificatory principles. There are at least two ways a principle can be controversial: one may claim that the principle in question is false; or one may claim that the principle, correctly applied, does not actually justify the specific act in question. Thus, suppose the state invokes the principle ‘false beliefs should be censored’ to justify silencing a dissident. The dissident might disagree because she thinks the state should not be in the business of censoring false beliefs, or she might agree with the principle but object to the action because she is quite convinced that her beliefs are not false.

Liberalism and Collective Investments in Repertoires

Abstract: The true end of Man . . . is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole. Freedom is the first and indispensable condition which the possibility of such a development presupposes; but there is besides another essential—intimately connected with freedom, it is true—a variety of situations. Even the most free and self-reliant of men is hindered in his development, when set in a monotonous situation.—Wilhelm von Humboldt