Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 1997"

TL;DR: In this article, the authors use the model of games with a system of unions and the Owen value to analyze the determination of aircraft landing fees and illustrate the situation at Labacolla airport in Santiago de Compostela, Spain.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied the potential functions associated with the Shapley value for cooperative TU games and the relationship of the potential with non-cooperative potential games, introduced by Monderer and Shapley, for the multilinear case in the continuum finite type setting.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the supplier-firm-buyer game of Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) always has a non-empty core and that local additivity is a sufficient condition for nonemptiness of the core in m-sided assignment games.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that stability of monotone selection dynamics at an interior rest point is completely determined by that of the replicator dynamic unless there is a trivial linearization.

TL;DR: In this article, a framework is presented in which to analyze the power of players in a cooperative game in which only certain coalitions are allowed, characterized by a closure operator that combinatorially abstracts the notion of convexity.

TL;DR: In this article, a simple measure of the difference between the Borda rule and any given social choice function is proposed, which is given by the ratio of the best Borda score achieved by the social choice functions under scrutiny over the score of a Borda winner.

TL;DR: In this article, the probability that the Condorcet winner is bottom ranked under the point-total rule that assigns 1, (s + 1)/2, and 0 points, respectively, to each voter's first, second and third preference, conditional on the fact that a Condorcets winner exists.

TL;DR: In this article, the issue of how income should be redistributed when people endowed with different levels of talent exert varying levels of effort is reconsidered, and two new schemes, called balanced egalitarian equivalence and balanced conditional egalitarianism, are proposed and characterized.

TL;DR: In this article, an axiomatization of preference relations over these streams that includes preferences which do not satisfy temporal monotonicity, and which leads to a simple functional representation of these preferences is examined.

TL;DR: This article examined the associative model for joint receipt of alternatives together with preference order and the status quo as an identity and found that the joint receipt with a preference order forms an Archimedean ordered group.

TL;DR: In this paper, a definition of uncertainty aversion for nonprobabilistic decision models based on set comparisons is proposed and dual results are obtained for uncertainty appeal, and it is shown that imposing an uncertainty-neutrality condition leads to an impossibility result.

TL;DR: In this article, the core of a game is defined as the set of outcomes acceptable for all coalitions from a fixed family of coalitions, and the core can be empty because there are too many coalitions.

TL;DR: A weaker than usual continuity condition for acyclic preferences is introduced in this paper, which turns out to be equivalent to lower continuity, but in general this is not true.

TL;DR: In this article, a generalization of this last model is proposed, where the set of choices is defined as a set of all probability distributions of finite support, i.e. the probability distribution of all the probabilities of a choice.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine exclusion from the benefits of a collective action as a tool to reduce the incentive to understate value in collective action negotiations and identify conditions for which an auction-like mechanism approaches classical ex post efficiency for the allocation of an excludable public good.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors combine and extend three recent developments: probabilistic choice models of approval voting, general random utility representations for a variety of order relations, and stochastic theories of persuasion.

TL;DR: In this article, the mean and variance of the number of PE points in the game and the probability of at least k PE points approaches one as pure strategy sets increase in size.

TL;DR: In this article, four types of invariance for solutions of finite normal form games are considered and for several solutions appearing in the literature, the invariance is investigated and the results are shown.

TL;DR: In this paper, Taylor and Zwicker introduced the notion of the dispersal interval to measure the influence of a player in a simple game and extended it to non-weighted games via the assumption that every simple game is an intersection of weighted games.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the minimal provision mechanism is the unique mechanism that satisfies strategy-proofness, voluntary participation and the full-range property when a given cost share rule has the convex property.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider game-theoretic situations with an additional power structure on coalitions and formulate axioms for such a solution concept, inspired by their assumption concerning the nature of the power structure, on the other hand by the following consideration of consistency.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors derive from these suppositions, under quite weak technical conditions, that the scale values are aggregated by products of powers, in particular by weighted geometric means, and both the individual and overall selection probabilities are relatively simple functions of scale values of the options.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors employ the symmetric uncertain dichotomous choice model to establish the marginal contribution of an individual's decisional skill to the collective decisional quality, and show that this marginal contribution increases with the individual's relative ranking by decisional skills.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce new normative conditions under which impossibility results are derived, which are not dependent upon rationality conditions and extend the Impossibility Theorem to general sets of voters and alternatives.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed how the statistical properties of a risk affect the attitude of individuals towards accepting another independent risk and found sufficient conditions for an additional background risk to either reduce or increase the index of absolute risk aversion.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce the perfectly almost strict equilibrium concept for finite games in strategic form, which is a strict refinement of the perfect equilibrium which rejects completely mixed Nash equilibria which are not self-enforcing.

TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that if the individual endowment space of each agent does not include all the commodities, then Debreu's conclusion need not hold, and the set of endowment assignments which result in a finite number of price equilibria is large in the sense that it has null closed complement.

TL;DR: This paper proposes a Stretchable model for multidimensional scaling and proves that, in two dimensions, some instances (called here omnipotent ) might lead to the induction of all possible preference orders.

TL;DR: Decomposable effectivity functions are introduced as an extension of additive effectivity function as discussed by the authors and are generated by pairs of balanced TU-utility games that need not be additive.

TL;DR: The authors analyzes voting by veto procedures in the context of a pure sharing problem and shows that the direct intuition about these voting mechanisms fails: the veto power of the players does not by itself make players act in an equitable manner.