Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 2008"

TL;DR: An axiomatic characterization of the Hirsch-index in terms of three natural axioms is presented, which is a well-known index for measuring and comparing the output of scientific researchers.

TL;DR: This paper employs both statistical and axiomatic arguments to derive weights from pairwise comparison matrices and obtained geometric mean-type solutions with Saaty's eigenvector method.

TL;DR: The first polynomial-time algorithm for computing the minimal covering set of a (weak) tournament is presented and it is shown that no efficient algorithm exists for two variants of the minimalCovering set-the minimal upward covering set and the minimal downward covering set-unless P equals NP.

TL;DR: It is shown that if the market is covered then irrespective of the magnitude of the innovation both firms acquire the new technology and pay positive royalty and zero up-front fee and the increase in social welfare due to the innovation is totally extracted by the innovator.

TL;DR: It is proved that a random utility representation exists in the particular case when IIA holds for choice among lotteries and when probabilistic versions of the Archimedean and the Independence Axioms are combined with Dimensional Invariance axioms explicit functional forms of the utility function follow.

TL;DR: A simple axiom is employed to provide three characterizations of the Owen value without efficiency which are related to Owen's, Hart and Kurz's and Peleg's values.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors expose a general theory of measurable systems (an example of which is an individual characterized by her preferences) allowing for incompatible (non-commuting) measurements.

TL;DR: Here, Diffo Lambo and Moulen's result to all the preorderings induced by regular semivalues in a larger class of games that are weakly linear simple games are extended and a characterization of weaklylinear games is provided.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a similarity-weighted averaging approach to assess a real-valued variable y by combining past observations of x and y with the current values of x to generate an assessment of y, where the weighted average of all previously observed values y i is the similarity between the vector x n +1 1,…, x n+1 m associated with y n + 1, and the previously observed vector, x i 1,.., x m.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set and that the farsighted core of a TU game is either empty or is equal to the set of imputations of the game.

TL;DR: This work presents a new characterization of divisor methods, via primal and dual optimization problems, that embraces pervious and impervious diviser methods, and vector and matrix problems.

TL;DR: Abalo and Kostreva as mentioned in this paper proved existence theorems of Berge and Berge-Nash equilibria for S -equi-well-posed games, namely, Theorems 3.2 and 3.3.

TL;DR: An allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent is investigated, demonstrating that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

TL;DR: It is shown that, for a suitably chosen probability function, the maximum likelihood rule for vote aggregation coincides with the Borda rule, thus, partially reconciling the BordA and the Condorcet methods.

TL;DR: This paper proposes three axiomatic characterizations of the Owen point and uses eight axioms for these characterizations, among those, inessentiality and additivity of players' demands are used for the first time.

TL;DR: The main focus of this paper is on the restricted Shapley value for multi-choice games introduced by Derks and Peters and it is shown that this solution can be formulated as the vector of marginal contributions of a potential function.

TL;DR: A generalized pricing formula and sensitivity analysis for sequential compound options (SCOs) that can enhance and broaden the use of compound option theory in the study of real options and financial derivatives is proposed.

TL;DR: An infinite extension of acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the choice function to have nonempty values provided the underlying relation is an interval order.

TL;DR: It will be shown that there exists no probability measure that would obey Benford's law for any base, but if the set of possible bases does not exceed a given upper limit, most real-life distributions obey, or can be transformed to obey Ben Ford's law.

TL;DR: It is shown that binary preferences over multiple dimensions are surprisingly complex, in that their interdependence structures defy the most natural attempts at characterization.

TL;DR: This work characterize balanced, totally balanced, and exact capacities by properties concerning the probability transformation function, f. v=foP to obtain simple new characterizations of a large pattern of risk aversions relevant to Yaari's dual theory of choice under risk.

TL;DR: This paper focuses on deterministic contracts and shows how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold when finite games with generic payoffs are considered.

TL;DR: It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection, and a suggestion by Savage to reveal indifferent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is formalized and generalized to a purely topological framework.

TL;DR: The Generalized Conjectural Equilibrium (GCE) concept for social networks is introduced and the set of GCE networks when players observe only local parts of the network is completely characterized.

TL;DR: This notes examines Basu and Foster's framework and offers an alternative benchmark for the effective literacy rate, which is strictly greater than or equal to R.

TL;DR: This work provides a characterization of WAMS processes that among other things leads to link rational beliefs and overconfidence: Rational beliefs exhibit rational confidence and, since different agents may hold different rational beliefs, the resulting diversity gives rise to rational overconfidence at the social level.

TL;DR: This paper studies a non-cooperative mechanism implementing a cooperative solution for a situation in which members of a society are subdivided into groups and/or coalitions and there is asymmetry among the individuals of the society.

TL;DR: This note provides a sufficient condition for generating the Nash bargaining solution payoff configuration and the equal split solution as the limit of the stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs of Hart and Mas-Colell's bargaining game when the probabilities of the breakdown of negotiations converge to zero.

TL;DR: This work shows three impossibility results on restricted domains: there is no strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanism satisfying either equal compensation, normal compensation, or individual rationality, and it shows that the sequential mechanisms satisfy strategy- proofness, weak symmetry, budget balance, and the other three axioms on much more restricted domains.

TL;DR: This work considers the problem of representing an incomplete preference relation by means of a vector-valued utility function and obtains representation results under the lower separability assumption, extending the main representation theorems by Ok in terms of the separability axioms.