Showing papers in "Perspectives on Politics in 2012"
TL;DR: In political theory, argument about "democracy" is usually qualified by one of an array of adjectives, which include cosmopolitan, agonistic, republican, and monitory as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Over the past two decades we have heard an historically unprecedented volume of talk about and praise of democracy, and many governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations have been engaged in democracy promotion. Democracy is a subject that crosses the boundaries in political science, and within my own field of political theory there has been a major revival of democratic theory. In political theory, argument about “democracy” is usually now qualified by one of an array of adjectives, which include cosmopolitan, agonistic, republican, and monitory. But the new form that has been by far the most successful is deliberative democracy. By 2007 John Dryzek could write that “deliberative democracy now constitutes the most active area of political theory in its entirety (not just democratic theory).” Not only is there an extremely large and rapidly growing literature, both theoretical and empirical, on deliberative democracy, but its influence has spread far outside universities.
507 citations
TL;DR: The authors propose a theory of political parties in which interest groups and activists are the key actors, and coalitions of groups develop common agendas and screen candidates for party nominations based on loyalty to their agendas.
Abstract: We propose a theory of political parties in which interest groups and activists are the key actors, and coalitions of groups develop common agendas and screen candidates for party nominations based on loyalty to their agendas. This theoretical stance contrasts with currently dominant theories, which view parties as controlled by election-minded politicians. The difference is normatively important because parties dominated by interest groups and activists are less responsive to voter preferences, even to the point of taking advantage of lapses in voter attention to politics. Our view is consistent with evidence from the formation of national parties in the 1790s, party position change on civil rights and abortion, patterns of polarization in Congress, policy design and nominations for state legislatures, Congress, and the presidency.
488 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a conceptual typology of political orders for civil war is proposed. But the typology is limited to the distribution of territorial control and the level of cooperation between states and insurgents.
Abstract: Bargains, deals, and tacit understandings between states and insurgents are common in civil wars. This fascinating mix of conflict and cooperation shapes patterns of politics, governance, and violence. Building on recent findings about state formation, I offer a conceptual typology of political orders amidst civil war. Wartime political orders vary according to the distribution of territorial control and the level of cooperation between states and insurgents. Orders range from collusion and shared sovereignty to spheres of influence and tacit coexistence to clashing monopolies and guerrilla disorder. Examples from contemporary South Asian conflicts illustrate these concepts, which are scalable and portable across contexts. Scholars need to think more creatively about the political-military arrangements that emerge and evolve during war. A key policy implication is that there are many ways of forging stability without creating a counterinsurgent Leviathan.
297 citations
TL;DR: The authors show that multiculturalism in no case hinders immigrants' socio-political engagement with society and government, and in many cases seems to foster it, thus, the claim that immigration undermines immigrants' social integration appears largely without foundation.
Abstract: Across immigrant-receiving democracies on both sides of the Atlantic, policies of “cultural recognition” (e.g., “multiculturalism”) have become a convenient punching-bag for political elites. Among academics, heated theoretical debates exist over whether such policies foster or hinder immigrants' engagement with their adoptive nation. We provide a novel empirical assessment of this debate from the immigrant perspective. We ask how multicultural and citizenship policies influence immigrants' socio-political engagement with their adoptive nation in three realms: social inclusion, political inclusion, and political engagement. Using a variety of cross-national and single-country surveys, we show that multiculturalism in no case hinders engagement with society and government, and in many cases seems to foster it. Thus, the claim that multiculturalism undermines immigrants' socio-political integration appears largely without foundation.
220 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the sources of durability of party-based authoritarian regimes in the face of crisis and argue that the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion and durability.
Abstract: We explore the sources of durability of party-based authoritarian regimes in the face of crisis. Recent scholarship on authoritarianism suggests that ruling parties enhance elite cohesion—and consequently, regime durability—by providing institutionalized access the spoils of power. We argue, by contrast, that while elite access to power and spoils may ensure elite cooperation during normal times, it often fails to do so during crises. Instead, the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion—and durability—in party-based authoritarian regimes. Origins in violent conflict raise the cost of defection and provide leaders with additional (non-material) resources that can be critical to maintaining unity and discipline, even when a crisis threatens the party's hold on power. Hence, where ruling parties combine mechanisms of patronage distribution with the strong identities, solidarity ties, and discipline generated by violent origins, regimes should be most durable.We apply this argument to four party-based competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In each of these cases, an established single- or dominant-party regime faced heightened international pressure, economic crisis, and a strong opposition challenge after 1990. Yet whereas ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were organized almost exclusively around patronage, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were liberation parties that came to power via violent struggle. This difference is critical to explaining diverging post-Cold War regime outcomes: whereas ruling parties in Zambia and Kenya imploded and eventually lost power in these face of crises, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe remained intact and regimes survived.
202 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that contention spread so quickly because many people in a wide range of countries drew rash inferences from the downfall of Tunisia's dictator, and overrated the significance of the Tunisian success, overestimated the similarities with the political situation in their own country, and jumped to the conclusion that they could successfully challenge their own autocrats.
Abstract: Prominent scholars have highlighted important similarities between the Arab Spring of 2011 and the “revolutions” of 1848: Both waves of contention swept with dramatic speed across whole regions, but ended up yielding rather limited advances toward political liberalism and democracy. I seek to uncover the causal mechanisms that help account for these striking parallels. Drawing on my recent analysis of 1848, I argue that contention spread so quickly because many people in a wide range of countries drew rash inferences from the downfall of Tunisia's dictator. Applying cognitive heuristics that psychologists have documented, they overrated the significance of the Tunisian success, overestimated the similarities with the political situation in their own country, and jumped to the conclusion that they could successfully challenge their own autocrats. This precipitation prompted protests in many settings that actually were much less propitious; therefore problems abounded. Cognitive shortcuts held such sway because Arab societies were weakly organized and repressed and thus lacked leaders from whom common people could take authoritative cues. The decision whether to engage in emulative contention fell to ordinary citizens, who—due to limited information access and scarce experience—were especially susceptible to the simple inferences suggested by cognitive heuristics.
171 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the extent to which terrorism and civil war overlap and then unpack various temporal and spatial patterns, showing that a substantial amount of terrorism occurs prior to civil wars in Latin America but yet follows civil war in other regions of the world.
Abstract: What is the relationship between civil war and terrorism? Most current research on these topics either explicitly or implicitly separates the two, in spite of compelling reasons to consider them together. In this paper, we examine the extent to which terrorism and civil war overlap and then unpack various temporal and spatial patterns. To accomplish this, we use newly geo-referenced terror event data to offer a global overview of where and when terrorist events happen and whether they occur inside or outside of civil war zones. Furthermore, we conduct an exploratory analysis of six separate cases that have elements of comparability but also occur in unique contexts, which illustrate some of the patterns in terrorism and civil war. The data show a high degree of overlap between terrorism and ongoing civil war and, further, indicate that a substantial amount of terrorism occurs prior to civil wars in Latin America, but yet follows civil war in other regions of the world. While the study of terrorism and of civil war mostly occurs in separate scholarly communities, we argue for more work that incorporates insights from each research program and we offer a possibility for future research by considering how geo-referenced terror and civil war data may be utilized together. More generally, we expect these results to apply to a wide variety of attitudes and behaviors in contentious politics.
151 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors conceptualize fragmentation along three constitutive dimensions: the number of organizations in the movement; the degree of institutionalization across these organizations; and the distribution of power among them.
Abstract: How do we conceptualize the fragmentation of internally divided movements? And how does variation in fragmentation affect the probability and patterns of infighting? The internal politics of non-state groups have received increasing attention, with recent research demonstrating the importance of cohesion and fragmentation for understanding conflict dynamics. Yet there is little consensusonhowtoconceptualizefragmentation,theconceptatthecenterofthisagenda,withauthorsusingdifferentdefinitionsand measures. In this paper we conceptualize fragmentation along three constitutive dimensions: the number of organizations in the movement; the degree of institutionalization across these organizations; and the distribution of power among them.We then show how variation across these dimensions can explain variation in important conflict processes, focusing on infighting. When I came to Spain, and for some time afterwards, I was not only uninterested in the political situation but unaware of it. I knew there was a war on, but I had no notion what kind of a war . . . As for the kaleidoscope of political parties and trade unions, with their tiresome names—PSUC, POUM, FAI, CNT, UGT, JCI, JSWU, AIT—they merely exasperated me. It looked at first sight as though Spain were suffering from a plague of initials . . .
135 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make a case for greater attention to informal political institutions in established democracies, and introduce a theoretical framework to support such analysis, and illustrate its theoretical framework with case studies from American politics, the subfield in which formal-institutional analysis has flourished most.
Abstract: Scholars of the developing world have driven a surge of interest in unwritten or informal institutions as determinants of political outcomes. In advanced industrial democracies, by contrast, informal institutions often remain consigned to the analytic margins. This article makes a case for greater attention to informal political institutions in established democracies, and it introduces a theoretical framework to support such analysis. Informal institutions, understood as the unwritten rules of political life, are seen to perform three functions: they complete or fill gaps in formal institutions, coordinate the operation of overlapping (and perhaps clashing) institutions, and operate parallel to formal institutions in regulating political behavior. These three roles of informal institutions are associated with different characteristic patterns of institutional stability and change. The article illustrates its theoretical framework with case studies from American politics, the subfield in which formal-institutional analysis has flourished most. These cases are the historical norm of a two-term presidency (a completing institution), the unwritten rules of the presidential nomination process (coordinating institutions), the informal practice of obstruction in the Senate (a parallel institution), and the normative expectation that presidents should address the public directly (which performs all three functions).
133 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a review of the structural, strategic, and social approaches to explaining regime change in the world since 1972, and the volume on dynamics of democratization edited by Nathan J. Brown.
Abstract: “Predictions are risky, particularly if they look into the future.” That deep philosophical insight goes back to a Bavarian comedian of the last century. We can assume that neither Talcott Parsons nor Francis Fukuyama has ever come across the Bavarian comedian Carl Valentin; otherwise they would not have so easily dared to predict the long-term victory of capitalist-democratic modernization or the end of history. Any look into the future is difficult for social and political scientists. But even looking back and finding ex post explanations for past developments is not uncontroversial in political science. This is true in particular for the “big questions” (Barbara Geddes), such as which determinants, causes, and drivers enable, promote, or prevent the democratization of political regimes. Since Seymour M. Lipset’s seminal essay “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Legitimacy” (American Political Science Review 53 [1959]: 69–105) triggered the democratization debate, no commonly agreed-upon answer has been found. Structuralists compete with agency theorists, modernization theory has been challenged by dependency theory, and lean monistic explanations are confronted with complex eclectic and contextual approaches, large-n with small-n studies, and long-term with short-term analyses. The prolific production of disputed studies on regime changes has suggested that there might be several answers, quite to the dismay of those who claim to have found one single answer to the big regime question, which is universally valid across time and space. Recently two books have been published that address those same old, but not yet uncontroversially answered, questions: Jan Teorell’s monograph on explaining regime change in the world since 1972, and the volume on “the dynamics of democratization” edited by Nathan J. Brown. The Swedish political scientist Teorell poses his questions right at the beginning of his thorough empirical analyses: “Why do some countries become democracies and others not? . . . Are social, economic or international forces the key determinants of these processes? Are some types of authoritarian regimes more prone to democratize than others? Do actors influence democratization, or is that a structurally determined outcome?” (Determinants of Democratization, p. 1). And finally: “What lessons can be learned for international efforts at promoting democracy from comparative democratization studies?” (ibid.). The questions posed to the authors of the edited volume mirror those which underlie Teorell’s study: “What causes a democracy to emerge and then maintains it? . . . Does democracy make things better? . . . Can democracy be promoted?” (The Dynamics of Democratization, pp. 1–2). Although the questions are the same, the applied theories and methods differ. Teorell developed his own theoretical approach, which he then adopted to his empirical analysis. He first critically reviews the virtues, pitfalls, and shortcomings of four prominent approaches: the structuralist (e.g., Lipset), the strategic (e.g., Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 1986), the economic (e.g., Carles Boix), and the social (e.g., Dietrich Rueschemeyer). The author convincingly argues that none of these approaches can explain regime changes as a whole, but they all have their analytical merits, which he intends to preserve in an “eclectic” combination of the structural, strategic, and social approaches. However, he excludes the new economic approaches of Boix (Democracy and Redistribution, 2003) and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 2006). Their somewhat orthodox rational choice–inspired economic approach “appears too occupied with conflicts over income distribution” (p. 12). Moreover, Teorell claims that their key explanation that democratization is triggered by decreasing income inequality “is not borne out in my data” (ibid.). By combining the strategic (agency) and structural (modernization theory) approach and not neglecting the force of social classes, he presents an eclectic but sound inclusive theoretical approach that promises to overcome the self-imposed limitations of the single theories. Brown’s volume, which grew out of a series of conferences, also does not follow one single theoretical approach. On the contrary, the editor deliberately allows for different theories and methods. Large-n analyses, such as the one by Jose Antonio Cheibub and James Raymond Vreeland on “Economic Development and Democratization,” and regional studies on the “Unexpected Resilience of Latin American Democracy” (Kathleen Bruhn) and “Present Authoritarianism and the Future of Democracy in Africa” (Staffan I. Lindberg and Sara Meerow) are assembled in the volume. So are case studies (“Sustaining Party Rule in China,” by Bruce J. Dickson); analyses of single institutions, such as Steven Fish’s “Strong Legislatures as the Key to Bolstering Democracy”; and specific determinants of democratization, such as “Legacy Effects” ( John Gerring), “Elections” (Susan D. Hyde), or “International Diffusion and Democratic Change” (Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik). Each of these studies can | |
123 citations
TL;DR: This article proposed an alternative framework for how to conceptualize the process of political violence and review the literature to identify key restraint mechanisms at micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis.
Abstract: The research problem driving this paper is the absence of a strong theory that accounts for variation among cases that have similar probabilities of escalating to genocide and similar forms of organized (usually state-led) mass violence against civilians. Much of the existing theory on genocide focuses on explaining under what conditions and by what processes regimes commit large-scale violence against civilians. I argue that a critical missing dimension to studies of genocide, but also more generally to the study of political violence, is a methodological recognition of negative cases and a theoretical recognition of the dynamics of restraint that helps to explain such negative cases. That is, in addition to asking what causes leaders to choose to escalate violence, I argue that scholars should emphasize conditions that prompt moderation, de-escalation, or non-escalation. I propose an alternative framework for how to conceptualize the process of political violence and review the literature to identify key restraint mechanisms at micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis. I further articulate a provisional theory of genocide using this new analytical framework. I illustrate my argument with an empirical analysis of mass violence cases in Sub-Saharan Africa since independence, and with a more in-depth analysis of comparable crises in Rwanda and Cote d’Ivoire, where the trajectories of violence differed significantly. While this paper draws on extensive empirical research, my primary purpose is not to advance a developed new theory or to test particular hypotheses, but rather to outline a research agenda that promises to draw from and contribute to recent work on the comparative politics of violence.
TL;DR: The study of Latin American politics has always generated great new research questions, and within Latin America, no country's experience has generated more interesting questions than Venezuela since the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998 as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The study of Latin American politics has always generated great new research questions, and within Latin America, no country's experience has generated more interesting questions than Venezuela since the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998. Contemporary Venezuela raises fascinating questions about the collapse of a highly institutionalized party system and the erosion or breakdown of what had been the third-oldest democracy outside of the advanced industrial democracies. What accounts for these stunning developments? What can we learn from them? These issues go to the core of important developments in Latin American politics, and they are major issues for comparative political scientists beyond Latin America.
TL;DR: This volume is Zeev Maoz’s order of battle, detailing what he means by networks, what the important characteristics of networks are, how these facets of networks can be observed, and the implications of different kinds of network structures.
Abstract: Zeev Maoz was one of the first international relations scholars to take up the network banner and carry it into the fray of international relations. This volume is his order of battle, detailing what he means by networks, what the important characteristics of networks are, how these facets of networks can be observed, and the implications of different kinds of network structures. From this, he describes the network structure of the international system and develops and evaluates a theory of network(ed) international politics. For Maoz, network analysis has the potential to provide a framework for the systematic study of indirect relations among states, whereby the fate of China–U.S. relations affects, for example, the future of Japan. At the same time, network analysis provides, for Maoz, a bridge across the levels-of-analysis chasm that has plagued international relations scholarship since the early 1950s. Moreover, by using the bridge of network analysis, one can putatively observe new levels of analysis, ignored by past paradigms. Herein, for Maoz, networks come close to being a Morton Kaplan type of self-reinforcing international system, which largely determines the putatively sovereign behavior of individual nation-states (see Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, 1957). And finally, network analysis can provide a whole new array of concepts, such as structural holes, to the study of many problems that have perplexed international relations analysts for decades. Thus, networks provide a lens on how states behave strategically toward one another (classic realism), how their actions have externalities that may be beneficial at a distance (liberalism), and how ideas that are nurtured in the network collectivity also have purchase on world politics (constructivism). The major building blocks of the network structure are developed mostly from the sociological literature known as social network analysis (SNA). Maoz starts with the basic mathematical representation in SNA and other network perspectives: an n n matrix connecting n nodes to each other, with entries reflecting the existence or strength of connections between each pair of actors. This is known as an adjacency matrix or (weighted) graph in some contexts, but in SNA it is called the sociomatrix. This matrix is interpreted as a mathematical representation of the network, focused on the strength of ties among nodes or, for Maoz, countries. These network structures have a number of characteristics, but most importantly those that inure to the node (e.g., how many links flow toward a given country) and others that exist at the network level (e.g., how dense is the network; i.e., how many links are non-zero out of all possible links). Centrality is the most important concept in SNA. How central to the network is a given node? How many connections are necessary to link a given node to all others? How central is a node in the secondary or indirect ties (e.g., neighbors of neighbors) that exist in the network, compared to the direct ties? Beyond these kinds of measures, one finds network characteristics of nodes to be broadly important. For example, how similar are the network roles (of, say, brokerage) of two different actors? The idea of structural equivalence is an important concept that has considerable purchase in the international relations context. Clique overlap, block portioning, network polarization, and other concepts from SNA get adapted and customized to serve Maoz’s theory of network relations in international relations. The description of the toolbox is done quite well, and can serve as a very brief primer to some of the basic concepts in network science for those interested in international relations. Maoz describes the structure of the international system using the basic tools of SNA, as well as some he develops specifically. He shows that things change, but not necessarily in immediately obvious ways. Density of the international network generally goes down over time in trade, for example, while international organization membership of network density grows substantially. Transitivities are another important network characteristic that evolves over time. High transitivity implies consistent cooperation patterns throughout the network, but dips in these measures signal potential trouble in the international system. Finally, polarization is also assessed and shown in these analyses not to be supportive of the general informal impressions about the link between rising polarization and political conflict. The theory of network formation and evolution perhaps comprises the most unique contribution of Maoz’s book. Herein, he tackles the issues of why (or how) states choose to cooperate, whether there is spillover in cooperation across domains, and what structural consequences are bound to this cooperation via the network evolution. This theory is developed against a backdrop of realism based on suspicion of others and common interests. The liberal lighting given the realist backdrop suggests that states are not the only actors and that different structures can affect outcomes, including the emergence of institutions. Finally, security is not the main driving force, but may actually be subsidiary to other interests. To this stage, Maoz adds a constructivist score that is similar in many respects to the ideas of Kaplan; namely, | |
TL;DR: The authors argue that judgment is a critical intersubjective ingredient of political measurement that needs to be acknowledged and rationalized, rather than exorcised, and argue that it produces opaque, biased, and unreliable data.
Abstract: Standard methodological advice in political science warns against the distortion of measurement decisions by judgmental elements. Judgment is subjective, common wisdom asserts, it produces opaque, biased, and unreliable data. This article, by contrast, argues that judgment is a critical intersubjective ingredient of political measurement that needs to be acknowledged and rationalized, rather than exorcised.
TL;DR: Focusing on MMR that combines some type of qualitative analysis with statistical or formal approaches, it is demonstrated that error-reduction and cross-validation are not feasible where methods are not sufficiently similar in their basic ontologies and their conceptions of causality.
Abstract: While acknowledging the many forms and contributions of multi-method research (MMR), we examine the costs of treating it as best practice on the grounds that it reduces method-specific weaknesses and increases external validity for findings. Focusing on MMR that combines some type of qualitative analysis with statistical or formal approaches, we demonstrate that error-reduction and cross-validation are not feasible where methods are not sufficiently similar in their basic ontologies and their conceptions of causality. In such cases, MMR may still yield important benefits—such as uncovering related insights or improving the coding of variables—but these can be readily obtained through collaboration among scholars specializing in single-method research (SMR). Such scholars often set the standards for the application of particular methods and produce distinctive insights that can elude researchers concerned about competently deploying different methods and producing coherent findings. Thus, the unchecked proliferation of multi-method skill sets risks forefeiting the benefits of SMR and marginalizing idiographically-oriented qualitative research that fits less well with formal or quantitative approaches. This would effectively subvert the pluralism that once gave impetus to MMR unless disciplinary expectations and professional rewards are predicated on a more balanced and nuanced understanding of what various forms of SMR and MMR bring to the table.
TL;DR: The authors argued that the fundamental democratic deficiency of the US political system goes much deeper than its disproportionate responsiveness to wealthy interests; it is a matter of system biases that foster the formation and expression of those interests, while mitigating against mobilization by those Americans who want inequality to be reduced.
Abstract: That acts of democratic representation participate in creating the interests for which legislators and other officials purport merely to stand gives rise to the “constituency paradox.” I elucidate this paradox through a critical reading of Hanna Pitkin's The Concept of Representation, together with her classic study of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein and Justice. Pitkin's core insight into democratic representation is that democratic representation is “quasi-performative”: an activity that mobilizes constituencies by the interests it claims in their name. I develop this insight together with its implications for contemporary scholarship on the political effects of economic equality. I conclude by arguing that the fundamental democratic deficiency of the US political system goes much deeper than its disproportionate responsiveness to wealthy interests; it is a matter of system biases that foster the formation and expression of those interests, while mitigating against mobilization by those Americans who want inequality to be reduced.
TL;DR: This article reviewed new trends in history-writing and highlighted opportunities for social-scientific oriented research centered on the interaction of state power, local communities, and violent mobilization in five areas: military occupation, repertoires of violence, alliance politics, genocidal policymaking, and resistance.
Abstract: The substantial literature on mass violence, from ethnic cleansing to civil wars, has paid surprisingly little attention to the largest instance of mass violence in human history: the Holocaust. When political scientists have approached the subject, the trend has been to treat the Holocaust as a single case, comparing it—sometimes controversially—with other instances of genocide such as Rwanda or Cambodia. But historically grounded work on the destruction of European Jewry can help illuminate the microfoundations of violent politics, unpack the relationship between a ubiquitous violence-inducing ideology (antisemitism) and highly variable murder, and recast old questions about the origins and evolution of the Holocaust itself. After reviewing new trends in history-writing, I highlight opportunities for social-scientifically oriented research centered on the interaction of state power, local communities, and violent mobilization in five areas: military occupation, repertoires of violence, alliance politics, genocidal policymaking, and resistance. My conclusion addresses thorny issues of comparison, morality, and memory.
TL;DR: The authors examines the problems and limitations of the privatization of federal and local disaster recovery policies and services following the Hurricane Katrina disaster and discusses the significance of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in accelerating efforts to devolve and privatize emergency management functions; reorganization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a service purchaser and arranger; and the efforts by the New Orleans city government to contract out disaster recovery activities to private firms.
Abstract: This paper examines the problems and limitations of the privatization of federal and local disaster recovery policies and services following the Hurricane Katrina disaster. The paper discusses the significance of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 in accelerating efforts to devolve and privatize emergency management functions; the reorganization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a service purchaser and arranger; and the efforts by the New Orleans city government to contract out disaster recovery activities to private firms. I situate and explain these three developments in the context of recent trends toward the neoliberalization of state activities, including the privatization and devolution of policy implementation to private firms and non-governmental organizations. On both the federal and local levels, inadequate contract oversight and lack of cost controls provided opportunities for private contractors to siphon public resources and exploit government agencies to further their profiteering interests and accumulation agendas. This article demonstrates how the privatization of emergency management services and policy constitutes a new regulatory project in which the state's role has shifted away from providing aid to disaster victims and toward the management and coordination of services delivered by private contractors.
TL;DR: In this article, the conditions under which genocide is likely to occur, the multilevel processes of violent escalation and de-escalation, and the ways in which these processes are shaped by, connect to, reinforce, accelerate and impede one another.
Abstract: Over the past two decades, scholars have generated a large and sophisticated literature on genocide. Nevertheless, there are still several research areas that require further work. This article outlines a research agenda that analyzes the conditions under which genocide is likely to occur, the multilevel processes of violent escalation and de-escalation, and the ways in which these processes are shaped by, connect to, reinforce, accelerate and impede one another. I argue that scholars should 1) model elite and follower radicalization processes by disaggregating genocidal “intent” over time and space, and exploring how intent emerges rather than taking it as pre-given. Doing so will permit researchers to 2) situate genocide research within a broader context of political violence in order to understand how they are related temporally and spatially, and to decenter analytical domains beyond the standard country level and single victim group in order to gain insight into the dynamics of genocide, including how perpetrator policies vary by group; 3) draw on recent advances in microanalyses of civil war to theorize about subnational patterns of violence diffusion; 4) move beyond problematic contrasts between ideology and rationality to analyze how ideologies frame the strategic choices “available” to genocidal elites.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the circular and voluntaristic view of leadership behavior inherent in such an approach, and argue that to be more useful for the analysis of development outcomes, as well as for policy design, the discourse on political will should be firmly integrated into a more systematic framework of analysis.
Abstract: Policy makers and policy-oriented scholars concerned with development and reform commonly appeal to “political will” as a cornerstone of development. We question the circular and voluntaristic view of leadership behavior inherent in such an approach, and argue that—to be more useful for the analysis of development outcomes, as well as for policy design—the discourse on political will should be firmly integrated into a more systematic framework of analysis. In particular, we suggest that it should engage in more active dialogue with the combined insights offered by principal-agent theory and what we refer to as state theory. More specifically, in the framework we develop, the principal-agent framework offers the analytical tools for analyzing leadership behavior at the micro level, while state theory provides crucial insights regarding the macro-level factors shaping leadership behavior. In the end, these two perspectives in tandem have the potential to significantly increase our understanding of empirically observed leadership behavior as well as our theoretical understanding of how the context—and especially the character of underlying social contracts—shapes and constrains “political will.”
TL;DR: Barack Obama as mentioned in this paper examined the responsibilities he faced in assuming the received tasks of modern presidential leadership amid a polarized political system, and argued that presidential partisanship threatens to relegate collective responsibility to executive aggrandizement.
Abstract: Ascending to the presidency in the midst of a severe economic crisis and an ongoing war on terrorism, Barack Obama faced numerous political and policy challenges. We examine the responsibilities he faced in assuming the received tasks of modern presidential leadership amid a polarized political system. To a point, Obama has embraced partisan leadership, indeed, even further articulating developments in the relationship between the president and parties that Ronald Reagan had first initiated, and George W. Bush built upon. Thus Obama has advanced an executive-centered party system that relies on presidential candidates and presidents to pronounce party doctrine, raise campaign funds, mobilize grassroots support, and campaign on behalf of their partisan brethren. Just as Reagan and Bush used their powers in ways that bolstered their parties, so Obama's exertions have strengthened the Democratic Party's capacity to mobilize voters and to advance programmatic objectives. At the same time, presidential partisanship threatens to relegate collective responsibility to executive aggrandizement. Seeking to avoid the pitfalls that undermined the Bush presidency, Obama has been more ambivalent about uniting partisanship and executive power. Only time will tell whether this ambiguity proves to be effective statecraft—enshrining his charisma in an enduring record of achievement and a new Democratic majority—or whether it marks a new stage in the development of executive dominion that subordinates party building to the cult of personality.
TL;DR: This article found a strong link between privatization and political pluralism in the post-Soviet political economy and demonstrated that the political promise of economic liberalization and the logic of modernization that underlies it hold true, drawing on existing and original data on privatization, pluralism, and opposition movements throughout the region from early independence to the present.
Abstract: Reflecting a chiefly economic approach to understanding political outcomes, a burgeoning literature on post-Soviet political economy finds a strong link between privatization and political pluralism in the region. To test whether the political promise of economic liberalization and the logic of modernization that underlies it hold true, I draw on existing and original data on privatization, pluralism, and opposition movements throughout the region from early independence to the present. The data reveal a fundamentally different formulation of the relationship between economics and politics than that found in the standard causal account. Contrary to approaches that stress the “the primacy of economics” in determining political outcomes, numerous cases of post-Soviet capitalist defection to the political opposition clearly point to “the primacy of politics”: the tangible ways that formal and informal institutions structure economic opportunities and ultimately impinge on individual calculations to comply with, oppose, or seek refuge from the regime.
TL;DR: Hoffmann et al. as discussed by the authors argue that no amount of experimentation among a small transnational climate elite helps solve the global warming problem unless these experiments somehow influence the behavior of outsiders.
Abstract: ever. I found two aspects of Global Warming Gridlock problematic. First, Victor’s explanation for the failure of multilateral climate diplomacy is not particularly convincing. He claims that multilateral diplomacy has gone awry because diplomats “thought global warming was just another environmental problem, but the standard tools of environmental diplomacy don’t work well on problems, such as global warming, that require truly independent coordination” (p. 203). In contrast to Victor’s realistic analysis of the nature of the global warming problem, this explanation seems quite naive. What about the political power of interest groups that stand to lose from climate policy, such as coal producers? What about the role of the Senate filibuster in killing countless climate policies in the United States? What about the deep distributional conflict between industrialized and emerging countries? What about fundamental disagreements concerning burden sharing? To this reviewer, these factors seem much more fundamental to an understanding of the global warming gridlock than the nostalgia of environmental diplomats. Second, given Victor’s emphasis on credibility, it is ironic that his policy proposals are themselves somewhat vague. What exactly are countries such as China and the United States supposed to promise? For example, it seems difficult to believe that the domestic politics of the United States would allow a large income transfer to China in exchange for reduced use of coal. Similarly, it seems hard to believe that the European Union’s promise to reduce emissions or deploy renewable energy would fundamentally change China’s political-economic calculus or reduce opposition to climate policy among conservatives in the United States. I may well be wrong here, but Victor’s book does little to convince me. Climate Governance at the Crossroads also suffers from two problems worth mentioning here. First, Hoffmann does not measure the extent to which policymakers are actually learning from climate experiments. Although these climate experiments seem to produce information and the author’s interviews confirm this expectation, for a social scientist this is not enough. Hoffmann’s book falls short of a rigorous demonstration that climate experiments are actually causing meaningful learning. Second, while Hoffmann’s analysis is strong on the descriptive side, it does not even attempt to develop a theoretical account to explain climate experiments. He never reaches beyond the rather obvious claim that if multilateral negotiations are failing, then interested actors have incentives to act. This is unfortunate because the causes of climate experimentation are central to an evaluation of their effectiveness. If climate experiments are implemented by actors who are fundamentally different from the rest of the world, then it is not at all clear that climate experiments produce useful information for the rest of the world. No amount of experimentation among a small transnational climate elite helps solve the problem unless these experiments somehow influence the behavior of outsiders. While both books suffer from weaknesses, this is not altogether surprising given the monstrous complexity of the climate change problem. Overall, both books are impressive and should be read by anyone interested in the future of planet Earth.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the everyday politics behind scientific inquiry and how they affect what we come to know about the world, in the context of their own fieldwork on the human rights response to children born of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Abstract: How does the everyday politics behind scientific inquiry impact what we come to know about the world? Here I consider this question in the context of my own fieldwork on the human rights response to children born of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, I reflect on how the academy functions to direct researchers' attention and skill sets to certain types of human rights problems in certain ways, inevitably affecting what we can know about our subject matter. Second, I consider the practical politics by which human rights scholars interface with policy-makers, the media, and the public, and the extent to which members of the human rights scholarly community constitute nodes in the wider networks we are studying.
TL;DR: The Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) as mentioned in this paper is a super-statute of the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and it has been used to restrict the FDA's authority.
Abstract: We appreciate Dan Carpenter's thoughtful assessment of our book and are eager to respond to his reflections about the political theory of the republic of statutes. He is right that we did not discuss some highly entrenched statutory schemes that might well deserve small-c constitutional status as superstatutes. Although we do treat the Defense of Marriage Act as a superstatute in our chapter on the antihomosexual constitution and its disentrenchment, we might have included a chapter on the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (along with the many subsequent amendments that helped shape the drug enforcement regime we have today) if we had as many original things to say about the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) administrative constitutionalism as Carpenter did in his book. It would have been a big chapter, too.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors search for patterns in several different surveys taken of a wide variety of businesses spread across the country and find that there is wide variation in environmental performance over time across the nation's industrial facilities and across the fifty states.
Abstract: toxic chemicals and their risks to communities across the nation” (p. xii). In this case, the goal of adding to general understanding about means and methods to control risk is primarily that of requiring businesses to provide and disclose information about their operations. Whether these disclosures reduce the total pollutant burden and what the effects, including economic ones, might be are also of interest. The study searches for patterns in several different surveys taken of a wide variety of businesses spread across the country. If information disclosure does what many proponents imagine it will and should, then improvements counted as reductions in toxic releases should be observed. Several chapters are devoted to the practical and theoretical hopes for information disclosure (Chaps. 1–2), and another focuses on the realities as the TRI developed between 1988 and 2007 (Chap. 3). The search for general patterns and confirmation of the initial hopes for the TRI produced mixed results. Yes, there was evidence that the total toxic load was decreasing, but there was also evidence that some firms in different parts of the country were actually not improving or were even getting worse (Chaps. 5–6). “Variation” is the catchall explanation offered up to characterize the effectiveness of the TRI program: [V]ariation is both a hallmark of environmental performance at the facilities and a key signpost of the differing opinions about the TRI program, the nature of toxic chemical management, and the extent of communication between facilities and others . . . [T]here is wide variation in environmental performance over time across the nation’s industrial facilities (and across the fifty states)” (p. 153). Understanding how efficient and equitable the TRI program has been also proved to be elusive, despite the constant complaints from many business people and from some economists that the costs of measuring, collecting, and reporting the required data are excessive. Try as I might, I could not discover in the book any estimates of what complying with the TRI requirements cost—in total, for industry classes, or for different parts of the country. Likewise, there were at best only very general statements of the benefits attributable to the TRI (e.g, lives saved, costs avoided, or any other number of risk-based assessment measures). Nor is there compelling evidence presented that the TRI is even used or discussed very much, especially by many in the public or, for that matter, by facilities managers in “interaction with the media, with legislators, with local emergency planning committees, or with community or environmental groups” (pp. 184–85). What we end up with (pp. 201–2, “Final Observations”) are an equivocation: “[T]he current mix of public policies does not live up to expectations”; a hunch: “We also think that information disclosure probably works best in combination with the mix of incentives and disincentives provided by other regulatory and nonregulatory programs”; and a request: “We have suggested . . . continuing research needs and the kinds of questions that students of environmental policy need to address in the future.” If understanding is the key ingredient to managing risk, these “Observations” provide scant help. But both books at least point our attention to a problem of continuing importance.
TL;DR: The New Orleans Katrina Memorial is located at the upper end of Canal Street, an inexpensive and relatively short trolley car ride from the city's tourist hub in the French Quarter.
Abstract: The New Orleans Katrina Memorial is located at the upper end of Canal Street, an inexpensive and relatively short trolley car ride from the city's tourist hub in the French Quarter. Despite its ease of access, and close proximity to the more famous cemeteries to which tourists regularly make pilgrimage, the memorial is little visited and largely unknown, even to many of the city's own residents. In this it stands in stark contrast to the National September 11 Memorial in Lower Manhattan, which drew its millionth visitor less than four months after its opening on September 12, 2011. Recent work in political theory on memory, mourning, and memorialization—as well as Ancient Greek concerns about the same—point to the ways in which the manner of remembrance, grieving, and commemoration employed by a democratic polity help to shape political outcomes. In what follows, I trace the history and design of the New York City and New Orleans memorials to suggest the ways in which they embody and perpetuate national strategies of remembrance and forgetting, in which injustices perpetrated against the polity are prioritized over injustices perpetrated within it. Drawing on John Bodnar's distinction between national and vernacular commemoration, I nevertheless conclude with a counter-intuitive suggestion: that while on a national level the public's relative ignorance of the Katrina Memorial is indeed indicative of a polity more concerned with injustices perpetrated against it than within it; on a local level the erection and subsequent forgetting of the Katrina Memorial is a manifestation of a mode of vernacular memory, mourning and commemoration with far more democratically-productive potential than its counterpart in New York City. In particular, I argue that it cultivates, and historically has cultivated, a more forward-looking, progressive, and polyphonic response to loss than the type of dominant national narratives embodied by the 9/11 Memorial. Whereas the latter continually replays the loss in ways that rob the polity of its capacity to move beyond its initial response, the former acknowledges and incorporates the loss while steeling the community for the challenges ahead.