Showing papers in "Politics, Philosophy & Economics in 2017"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined whether the voting age should be lowered to 16 in the UK and found that 16-year-olds in the United Kingdom are not politically mature enough to vote.
Abstract: This article examines whether the voting age should be lowered to 16. The dominant view in the literature is that 16-year-olds in the United Kingdom are not politically mature enough to vote since ...
24 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss two normative questions raised by cases of colonial settlement: is it sometimes wrong to migrate and settle in a previously inhabited land? If so, under what condition...
Abstract: This article discusses two normative questions raised by cases of colonial settlement. First, is it sometimes wrong to migrate and settle in a previously inhabited land? If so, under what condition...
23 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that parents have a special, shared duty to organize for collective action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, but not for the reason one might assume The apparently "odd" behavior of some parents.
Abstract: This article argues that parents have a special, shared duty to organize for collective action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, but not for the reason one might assume The apparently o
22 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present estimates of the global cost of collective and interpersonal violence for the period of one year, including war, terrorism, homicides, assaults and domestic violence against women and children.
Abstract: This article presents estimates of the global cost of collective and interpersonal violence for the period of one year. This includes war, terrorism, homicides, assaults and domestic violence against women and children. The cost of conventionally defined interpersonal violence, that is, homicides and assault, are about 7.5 times higher than the cost due to war and terrorism. I also estimate the costs of non-fatal domestic violence against children and women and suggest that these costs are much higher than the combined costs of homicide, assault, terrorism and war. The main reason is that the prevalence of these types of violence is very high: possibly as many as 16 per cent of all children are punished using violent methods and about 12 per cent of all women experience intimate partner violence. Richer societies have lower levels of violence, and there is evidence that prevalence rates have been declining over time. However, it is often unclear why this is the case. Much of the evidence from violence red...
22 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that fairness preferences fundamentally affect individual behavior and play an important role in shaping social and political institutions, and that people differ both with respect to what they view as fair and unfair.
Abstract: Fairness preferences fundamentally affect individual behavior and play an important role in shaping social and political institutions. However, people differ both with respect to what they view as ...
21 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on a specific instance of individual corrupt behaviour on the part of public officials entrusted with the power to implement public rules in a liberal democracy, and distinguish this form of corruption as surreptitious action from such unlawful but publicly justifiable kinds of political misbehaviour as civil disobedience.
Abstract: Is the corrupt behaviour of public officials a politically relevant kind of wrong only when it causes the malfunctioning of institutions? We challenge recent institutionalist approaches to political corruption by showing a sense in which the individual corrupt behaviour of certain public officials is wrong not only as a breach of personal morality but in inherently politically salient terms. To show this sense, we focus on a specific instance of individual corrupt behaviour on the part of public officials entrusted with the power to implement public rules in a liberal democracy. Although not necessarily unlawful, their behaviour is politically wrong qua corrupt when it contradicts surreptitiously the requirement of public justification that undergirds the public order. Then, we distinguish this form of corruption as surreptitious action from such unlawful but publicly justifiable kinds of political misbehaviour as civil disobedience.
16 citations
TL;DR: The authors traces John Rawls's debt to Frank Knight's critique of the 'just deserts' rationale for laissez-faire in order to defend justice as fairness against some prominent contemporary critici...
Abstract: This article traces John Rawls’s debt to Frank Knight’s critique of the ‘just deserts’ rationale for laissez-faire in order to defend justice as fairness against some prominent contemporary critici...
15 citations
TL;DR: According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for as mentioned in this paper, which implies that those who are discriminated by choices that prevent disadvantaging others are not the ones who should be discriminated.
Abstract: According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvant...
14 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that individuals can be asked to surrender their personal data as a requirement of reciprocity in a cooperative system in which they gain security from others doing likewise.
Abstract: Governments around the world collect huge amounts of personal data from their citizens (as well as foreigners) for counterterrorist purposes. While mining this data has arguably increased the security of populations, the practices through which these data are currently collected in many countries have been criticised for violating individuals’ rights to privacy. Yet it is not clear what a permissible data collection regime (if one is possible) would look like and thus also how we could reform existing regimes to make them morally acceptable. This article explores a number of ways in which we might justify a data collection regime to those affected in spite of the setbacks to their privacy. In contrast to existing justifications, I argue that individuals can be asked to surrender their personal data as a requirement of reciprocity in a cooperative system in which they gain security from others doing likewise. Relying on this justification, though, has significant implications for how we should reform exist...
14 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that even if some version of the first claim is true, which I believe is quite likely, the second does not follow and should chasten the most overzealous advocates of Darwinian social science, as well as softening the instinctive resistance of many social scientists and historians to the genuine insights enabled by a Darwinian approach.
Abstract: In recent years, some have claimed that a Darwinian perspective will revolutionize the study of human society and culture. This project is viewed with disdain and suspicion, on the other hand, by many practicing social scientists. This article seeks to clear the air in this heated debate by dissociating two claims that are too often assumed to be inseparable. The first is the ‘ontological’ claim that Darwinian principles apply, at some level of abstraction, to human society and culture. The second is the more ‘pragmatic’ claim that this observation necessitates substantial changes in the practices of social scientists. Even if some version of the first claim is true, I argue – which I believe is quite likely – the second does not follow. This observation ought to chasten the most overzealous advocates of Darwinian social science, as well as softening the instinctive resistance of many social scientists and historians to the genuine insights enabled by a Darwinian approach. The conclusion discusses these i...
14 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the idea of self-organizing moral systems, in which each individual, acting on her own views of justice (including the importance of reconciliation), responds to the decisions of others, forming systems of shared justice.
Abstract: This essay examines two different modes of reasoning about justice: an individual mode in which each individual judges what we all ought to do and a social mode in which we seek to reconcile our judgments of justice so that we can share common rules of justice. Social contract theory has traditionally emphasized the second, reconciliation mode, devising a central plan (the contract) to do so. However, I argue that because we disagree not only in our judgments of justice but also about the degree of reconciliation justice calls for, the social contract presupposes a single, controversial, answer to the proper degree of reconciliation. In place of the social contract’s ‘top-down’ approach, this article explores the idea of self-organizing moral systems, in which each individual, acting on her own views of justice (including the importance of reconciliation), responds to the decisions of others, forming systems of shared justice. Several basic agent-based models are explored to begin to understand the dynami...
TL;DR: It is argued that, within Rawlsian liberalism, care should be considered a primary good and proposed a third principle of justice requiring access to the social and legal supports of caring relationships, which could address two other injustices related to care.
Abstract: Caring relationships and material caregiving are politically significant goods that should be distributed according to principles of justice. I argue that, within Rawlsian liberalism, care should b...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend the right that Palestinians have to return to the territory governed by Israel, but they do not defend the duty on Israel to permit return, whether there is such a duty depends on whether the economic, social and security costs override that right.
Abstract: This article defends the right that Palestinians have to return to the territory governed by Israel. However, it does not defend the duty on Israel to permit return. Whether there is such a duty depends on whether the economic, social and security costs override that right. In order to defend the right of return, it is shown both that the current generation of Palestinians retain a significant interest in return, and that insofar as their interests are diminished, their rights are not diminished proportionally. The interests of Jewish Israelis in excluding the Palestinians are then considered. Their rights of self-determination, it is argued, do not powerfully favour excluding the Palestinians. The economic, social and security costs may do so. Overall, I conclude that either the Israel should grant return to the Palestinians or it should properly acknowledge the right of return and respond appropriately through a powerful effort to compensate and resettle them.
TL;DR: The authors argue that under certain circumstances, citizens would insist on the enactment of political interventions to protect this option, and this insistence renders these interventions not only legitimate but positively mandatory. But do these interventions constitute legitimate uses of political power?
Abstract: Despite women’s increased labor force participation, household divisions of labor remain highly unequal. Properly implemented, gender egalitarian political interventions such as work time regulation, dependent care provisions, and family leave initiatives can induce families to share work more equally than they currently do. But do these interventions constitute legitimate uses of political power? In this article, I defend the political legitimacy of these interventions. Using the conception of citizenship at the heart of political liberalism, I argue that citizens would accept political interventions aimed at protecting the ‘genuinely available option’ to enact gender egalitarian lifestyles. More strongly still, I argue that under certain circumstances, citizens would insist on the enactment of political interventions to protect this option. According to political liberalism’s constraints on legitimacy, this insistence renders these interventions not only legitimate but positively mandatory. It is legiti...
TL;DR: This paper argued that it makes a moral difference whether an individual is worse off than she could have been, and argued that the moral difference between the individual and the situation she is in makes no difference.
Abstract: In this article, I argue that it makes a moral difference whether an individual is worse off than she could have been. Here, I part company with consequentialists such as Parfit and side with contr...
TL;DR: The authors argue that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring compromises or compromising can assume a more significant part of what makes a position all things considered best, and in this way disagreement can ground moral compromise.
Abstract: In an influential article, Simon C. May forcefully argued that, properly understood, there can never be principled reasons for moral compromise (May, 2005). While there may be pragmatic reasons for compromising that involve, for instance, concern for political expediency or for stability, there are properly speaking no principled reasons to compromise. My aim in the article is to show how principled moral compromise in the context of moral disagreements over policy options is possible. I argue that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring compromises or compromising can assume a more significant part of what makes a position all things considered best, and in this way disagreement can ground moral compromise.
TL;DR: The authors discusses the adequacy of Rawls' theory of justice as a tool for racial justice and argues that critics like Charles W Mills fail to appreciate both the insights and limits of the R...
Abstract: This article discusses the adequacy of Rawls’ theory of justice as a tool for racial justice. It is argued that critics like Charles W Mills fail to appreciate both the insights and limits of the R...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that there are three key arguments that can explain why boundary precedents are associated with subsequent disputes: ease of justification, perpetual conflict over territories of particular value, and persistent coordination around old borders.
Abstract: Recent evidence suggests that historical boundary precedents play a central role in the outbreak, character, and long-term consequences of territorial disputes. The institutional theory of borders holds promise in explaining why leaders find old borders to be attractive as new borders. However, the mechanisms that link historical precedents to territorial claims and their consequences are not fully specified in the extant literature. I argue that there are three key arguments that can explain why boundary precedents are associated with subsequent disputes: ease of justification, perpetual conflict over territories of particular value, and persistent coordination around old borders. I argue that the coordination mechanism is essential to understanding the connections between historical boundary precedents and territorial disputes.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend a mixed answer to these questions: on the one hand, we should not underestimate the extent to which Rawls's theory already addresses the concerns that motivate Cohen's appeal to the socialist ideal.
Abstract: Does the kind of socialist ideal articulated by G. A. Cohen in Why Not Socialism? add anything substantial to the Rawlsian conception of justice? Is it an ideal that Rawlsians should want to take on board, or is it ultimately foreign to their outlook? I defend a mixed answer to these questions. On the one hand, we shouldn’t underestimate the extent to which Rawls's theory already addresses the concerns that motivate Cohen’s appeal to the socialist ideal. Within the bounds of a society living up to Rawls’s two principles of justice, I maintain, there would be little room left for an ideal of social relations to do any independent work. On the other hand, Cohen’s ideal may still have an important role to play within Rawlsian theory – not within the confines of a given society but on the international stage, beyond the liberal state as we know it. This asymmetry between the domestic and the international case stems from the fact that Rawls's principles of justice apply in full strength only at the domestic l...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that if self-defense against military aggression is just, then, ceteris paribus, so are defensive wars against the imposition of economic injustice.
Abstract: According to Thomas Pogge, rich people do not simply violate a positive duty of assistance to help the global poor; rather, they violate a negative duty not to harm them. They do so by imposing an unjust global economic structure on poor people. Assuming that these claims are correct, it follows that, ceteris paribus, wars waged by the poor against the rich to resist this imposition are morally equivalent to wars waged in self-defense against military aggression. Hence, if self-defense against military aggression is just, then, ceteris paribus, so are defensive wars against the imposition of economic injustice. While I do not think Pogge’s analysis of the causes of global poverty is correct, I defend these inferences against various challenges.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors challenge the argument that there is no freedom without law, and present an alternative approach to untangling the relationship of law and liberty in political theory, which they call "unwinding the relationship between law and freedom".
Abstract: Untangling the relationship of law and liberty is among the core problems of political theory. One prominent position is that there is no freedom without law. This article challenges the argument t...
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that division methods from apportionment theory can be used to provide fair division for indivisible goods without weighted lotteries and without fairness paradoxes.
Abstract: Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do without weighted lotteries fall prey to three fairness paradoxes. We demonstrate that division methods from apportionment theory, which has hitherto been ignored by philosophical theories of fairness, can be used to provide fair division for indivisible goods without weighted lotteries and without fairness paradoxes.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider two types of cases: (1) those in which V is not harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is, and (2) those where V is harmed, but she is not, and argue that we should defer to her beliefs in both cases.
Abstract: If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we respond if V has false beliefs about whether she is harmed by D’s wrong? There are two types of cases we must consider: (1) those in which V is not harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is (2) those in which V is harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is not. I canvass three views: The Objective View, The Subjective View and The Mixed View. The Objective View holds that V’s claim depends on the correct account of harm, rather than her false beliefs, and so D has a duty to offer damages to V in (2) but not in (1) in order to compensate her. The Subjective View holds that, for broadly anti-perfectionist reasons, V’s claim depends on her sincere beliefs, even if they are mistaken, and so D has a duty to compensate V in (1) but not in (2). The Mixed View holds that we should defer to her beliefs in (1) but not in (2), so D has a duty to compensate her in both cases. In this article, I argue that we should a...
TL;DR: Many proposed moral principles are such that it would be difficult or impossible to always correctly identify which act is required by that principle in a given situation; attempts to resolve this apparent paradox are surveyed.
Abstract: Many proposed moral principles are such that it would be difficult or impossible to always correctly identify which act is required by that principle in a given situation. To deal with this problem, theorists typically offer various methods of determining what to do in the face of epistemic limitations, and we are then told that the right thing to do – given these limitations – is to perform the act identified by the given method. But since the method and the underlying principle can diverge, it would seem that in such cases we are being given contradictory advice: some particular act will be both right (since it is so identified by the favored method) and not right (since it does not conform to the underlying principle). Various attempts to resolve this apparent paradox are surveyed, but none are completely satisfactory.
TL;DR: The first principle of Rawls's conception of justice secures a set of "basic liberties" equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society, however, the "worth" of citizens' liberties may vary depending upon their wealth as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The first principle of Rawls’s conception of justice secures a set of ‘basic liberties’ equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The ‘worth’ of citizens’ liberties, however, may vary depending upon their wealth. Against Rawls, Cohen contends that an absence of money often can directly constrain citizens’ freedom and not simply its worth. This is because money often can remove legally enforced constraints on what citizens can do. Cohen’s argument – if modified to apply to citizens’ ‘moral powers’ rather than ‘negative liberty’ – threatens a core feature of Rawls’s conception of justice, as it is unclear why the parties within the ‘original position’ would endorse the lexical priority of the first principle over the ‘difference principle’ (which concerns the distribution of wealth) if both principles similarly shape citizens’ freedom. I concede Cohen’s point regarding the relation between freedom and money but argue that it is not fatal to Rawls’s conception of justice if the...
TL;DR: This paper argued that prioritarianism and egalitarianism coincide in their implicatio... and argued that the reason to equalize is not due to the benefits for the worse off, but to the benefit for the better off.
Abstract: Prioritarianism doesn’t value equality as such – any reason to equalize is due to the benefits for the worse off. But some argue that prioritarianism and egalitarianism coincide in their implicatio...
TL;DR: The authors examine and reject Gaus's defence of public justification and show that those attitudes need not be grounded in a commitment to public justification, and the availability of alternative grounds for these attitudes shows, contra Gaus, that we can rationally reject public justification while maintaining a wholehearted commitment to the reacti...
Abstract: A distinctive position in contemporary political philosophy is occupied by those who defend the principle of public justification. This principle states that the moral or political rules that govern our common life must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. In this article, I evaluate Gerald Gaus’s defence of this principle, which holds that it is presupposed by our moral reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. He argues, echoing P.F. Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, that these attitudes are so deep a part of us that we are unable to rationally reject them. I examine and reject this defence of the principle. Considering the nature of our commitment to the moral reactive attitudes, I argue that those attitudes need not be grounded in a commitment to public justification. The availability of alternative grounds for these attitudes shows, contra Gaus, that we can rationally reject the principle of public justification while maintaining a wholehearted commitment to the reacti...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the regulation of offensive conduct can inadvertently increase the incidence of offensive behavior by nurturing offensive-taking sensibilities, and explain why concerns about the inadvertent nurturing of offense are now more pressing, given the identity-political character of contemporary offense-based social conflicts.
Abstract: Joel Feinberg’s Offense to Others is the most comprehensive contemporary work on the
significance of offense in a liberal legal system. Feinberg argues that being offended can
impair a person’s liberty, much like a nuisance, and that it is therefore legitimate in
principle to regulate conduct because of its offensiveness. In this article, I discuss some
overlooked considerations that give us reason to resist Feinberg’s conclusion, even while
granting this premise. My key claim is that the regulation of offense can inadvertently
increase the incidence of offense, by nurturing offense-taking sensibilities. In the course
of defending this claim and spelling out its implications, I explain why concerns about the
inadvertent nurturing of offense are now more pressing, given the identity–political
character of contemporary offense-based social conflicts, and I discuss why a reluctance
to legally regulate offensive conduct need not be insensitive to the identity–political
issues that animate those conflicts.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider when, if ever, it is morally permissible to pay minorities to leave the UK and argue that such payments are impermissible if at least one of two conditions are met: the payments demean or harm other members of society, or the payments are provided to recipients who have failed to consent to the payments.
Abstract: In April 1962, white segregationists paid money to African Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans. In 2010, the British National Party proposed paying non-white migrants money to leave the UK. Five years later, a landlord in New York paid African American tenants to vacate their apartments. This article considers when, if ever, it is morally permissible to pay minorities to leave. I argue that paying minorities to leave is demeaning towards recipients and so wrong. Although the payments are wrong, it is not clear if they are impermissible, given the benefits for the recipients. I argue that payments are impermissible if at least one of two conditions are met: The payments demean or harm other members of society, or the payments are provided to recipients who have failed to consent to the payments.
TL;DR: Egalitarian theories assume, without defending it, the view that the costs of children should be shared between non-parents and parents This standard position is called into question by the Parent.
Abstract: Egalitarian theories assume, without defending it, the view that the costs of children should be shared between non-parents and parents This standard position is called into question by the Parent