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Showing papers in "Population and Development Review in 2001"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that women in South Asia are largely gender stratified, characterized by patrilineal descent, patrilocal residence, inheritance and succession practices that exclude women, and hierarchical relations in which the patriarch or his relatives have authority over family members.
Abstract: THE CULTURES OF South Asia are largely gender stratified, characterized by patrilineal descent, patrilocal residence, inheritance and succession practices that exclude women, and hierarchical relations in which the patriarch or his relatives have authority over family members. Levels and patterns of female autonomy vary considerably within the region, however, and the question is why. Two arguments have been advanced in the literature to support the hypothesis that women in Pakistan have less autonomy and control over their own lives than do women in India. The first argues that in Pakistan as in other Islamic settings, women occupy a separate and distinctive position that effectively denies them education and autonomy. Women’s lack of control over their own lives has been cited as the central factor underlying the poorer mortality outcomes experienced by Islamic societies (Caldwell 1986: 175). The second argument draws on research conducted in India that demonstrates the dominant influence of behavior and norms imprinted by regionally prescribed social systems, and points out that the social systems that characterize the southern region provide women more exposure to the outside world, more voice in family life, and more freedom of movement than do the social systems of the north (Dyson and Moore 1983; Basu 1992; Jejeebhoy 2000). In this view, to which we subscribe, region plays the major conditioning role, and once region is controlled, Muslim women exert about as much autonomy in their lives as do Hindu women, wherever they reside. The argument in favor of regional social systems as opposed to religion as the driving force is strengthened by evidence suggesting wide variations in the ways in which gender and behavioral norms are manifested across a range of Islamic countries (see for example, Obermeyer 1992).

714 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors assesses the efficacy of the strategy of immigration control implemented by the US government since 1993 in reducing illegal entry attempts, and documents some of the unintended consequences of this strategy, especially a sharp increase in mortality among unauthorized migrants along certain segments of the Mexico-US border.
Abstract: This article assesses the efficacy of the strategy of immigration control implemented by the US government since 1993 in reducing illegal entry attempts, and documents some of the unintended consequences of this strategy, especially a sharp increase in mortality among unauthorized migrants along certain segments of the Mexico–US border. The available data suggest that the current strategy of border enforcement has resulted in rechanneling flows of unauthorized migrants to more hazardous areas, raising fees charged by people-smugglers, and discouraging unauthorized migrants already in the US from returning to their places of origin. However, there is no evidence that the strategy is deterring or preventing significant numbers of new illegal entries, particularly given the absence of a serious effort to curtail employment of unauthorized migrants through worksite enforcement. An expanded temporary worker program, selective legalization of unauthorized Mexican workers residing in the United States, and other proposals under consideration by the US and Mexican governments are unlikely to reduce migrant deaths resulting from the current strategy of border enforcement.

501 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined the determinants of fertility in India in a multivariate framework using district-level panel data linking two censuses 1981 and 1991 and found that women education and child mortality were the most important factors explaining fertility differences across the country and over time.
Abstract: A large body of Indian and international evidence points to the role of increasing female education in lowering fertility. Questions have been raised however about the nature and interpretation of this evidence. Several studies have found little evidence of a positive link between womens education and "female autonomy" while other studies report no significant correlation between female education and fertility. This article attempts to address these issues by examining the determinants of fertility in India in a multivariate framework using district-level panel data linking two censuses 1981 and 1991. The panel aspect of the data permits controlling for district-specific effects that might otherwise produce a spurious correlation between fertility and various explanatory variables. Even after controlling for district effects womens education and child mortality emerge as the most important factors explaining fertility differences across the country and over time. Moreover low levels of son preference also contribute to lower fertility. By contrast general indicators of modernization and development such as urbanization poverty reduction and male literacy bear no significant association with fertility decline.

355 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Chu Junhong1
TL;DR: Prenatal sex determination by ultrasound scanning and subsequent sex-selective abortion was a widespread practice, especially for second and higher-order pregnancies and order of pregnancy, sex of fetus, and sex of previous children were major determinants of the practice.
Abstract: This study analyzes the practice of prenatal sex selection in rural central China. It examines the prevalence and determinants of prenatal sex determination by ultrasound scanning and subsequent sex-selective abortion. The data are derived from a survey of 820 married women aged 20–44 and from in-depth interviews with rural women and men, village leaders, family planning managers, and health providers, conducted by the author in one county in central China in 2000. Prenatal sex determination was a widespread practice, especially for second and higher-order pregnancies. Sex-selective abortion was prevalent and order of pregnancy, sex of fetus, and sex of previous children were major determinants of the practice. A female fetus representing a high-order pregnancy in a family with one or more daughters was the most likely to be aborted. Awareness among rural families that in the population at large a future marriage squeeze was likely did not diminish the demand for sex-selective abortion.

302 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The extent to which these changes have led to the convergence of demographic patterns around the world is assessed, not just the levels of fertility and mortality in each country at different points in time, but also the size of each population.
Abstract: This research article discusses the various global changes in levels of fertility and mortality and in population size that led to the convergence of demographic patterns around the world. China and India were disaggregated into their constituent provinces and states in order to provide estimates for units more typical of the size of the populations of other countries. One result of taking this approach is that no individual entity constitutes a particularly large fraction of the worlds total population. Results indicate that mortality levels have shown even more remarkable convergence than fertility with the change being especially marked between 1950-55 and 1975-80. Despite the lasting gap between rich and poor countries many aspects of the social agenda of development particularly education have greatly narrowed the gap. By contrast literacy and urbanization have shown slower rates of convergence than mortality and fertility.

233 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a data analysis of the 1987 and 1995 China One Percent Population Sample Surveys to describe patterns of migration during 1982-95, showing that the increasing importance of temporary migration has been attributed to the countrys transition to a marketoriented economy and the continuing legacy of the household migration system.
Abstract: This paper presents a data analysis of the 1987 and 1995 China One Percent Population Sample Surveys to describe patterns of migration during 1982-95. Overall the findings demonstrated the increasing importance of temporary migration since the late 1980s. Such increase in temporary migration is attributed to the countrys transition to a market-oriented economy and the continuing legacy of the household migration system. In this regard increasing migration patterns that involve long distances and the crossing of province boundaries are noted. It is noted that the volume of migration in the country has contributed in the transformation of the agrarian society into a modern industrialized society. In addition it has created social mobility and has challenged the traditional hierarchy of social and economic stratification. Furthermore migration becomes a part of the strategy for survival among rural households. As such the policy implications of the governments policy known as "urbanization from below" that promotes development in rural areas are assessed according to the emerging migration patterns.

225 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Ogawa and Retherford as discussed by the authors described these changes and assessed their effects on age at marriage and the proportion who will never marry in Japan and found that fertility is now well below replacement level and still falling.
Abstract: FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II, the mean age at marriage in Japan (as measured by the singulate mean age at marriage) remained fairly stable until 1975, when it suddenly began to increase Between 1975 and 1995, singulate mean age at marriage increased from 245 to 277 years for women and from 276 to 307 years for men, making Japan one of the latest-marrying populations in the world Over the same period, the proportion who will never marry, calculated from age-specific first-marriage probabilities pertaining to a particular calendar year, increased from 5 to 15 percent for women and from 6 to 22 percent for men-a far cry from the universal-marriage society of earlier years While of great interest in their own right, these marriage trends have gained attention also because they account for more than half of Japan's resumed fertility decline since 1973 (Ogawa and Retherford 1993b) This fertility decline has been substantial Between 1975 and 1999 the total fertility rate fell from 19 to 13 children per woman That fertility is now well below replacement level and still falling has caused much public concern in Japan The trend toward late marriage and less marriage has come about because of a confluence of interrelated economic, social, and cultural changes, including remarkable educational gains by women, massive increases in the proportion of women who work for pay outside the home, major changes in the structure and functioning of the marriage market, extraordinary increases in the prevalence of premarital sex, and far-reaching changes in values relating to marriage and family life In this article we describe these changes and assess their effects on age at marriage and the proportion never marrying in Japan

210 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a comprehensive picture of levels and trends of contemporary fertility in low-fertility countries of Europe North America Oceania and East Asia and apply the cohort fertility approach to study the changes in womens childbearing patterns.
Abstract: This paper presents a comprehensive picture of levels and trends of contemporary fertility in low-fertility countries of Europe North America Oceania and East Asia. Cohort fertility approach was applied to study the changes in womens childbearing patterns. Among the various findings it is noted that the levels trends and age patterns of cohort fertility for women born between 1930 and 1960 in Western countries differed from those in the formerly socialist countries. In most Western countries the decline of completed cohort fertility has been in progress starting with women born in the 1930s and women born around 1960 are likely to complete their fertility with values decidedly below the replacement level. While in the formerly socialist countries completed cohort fertility remained within narrow bands and was relatively steady starting with the cohorts born in the 1930s until the cohorts of the late 1950s; thereafter completed cohort fertility declined from one cohort to the next for women born during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In almost all industrialized and postindustrial societies women born during the 1960s and early 1970s are experiencing lower fertility at comparable ages than women born earlier.

177 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the US, the proportion of persons surviving to age 15 who ever marry remained fairly steady at about five-sixths of all men and seven-eighths of women as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Marital status life tables were calculated using 1995 US rates of marriage, divorce, and mortality. Compared to figures for 1988, the proportion of persons surviving to age 15 who ever marry remained fairly steady at about five-sixths of all men and seven-eighths of all women. The average age at first marriage rose substantially: to 28.6 years for men and 26.6 years for women. The probability of a marriage ending in divorce changed little and was .437 for men and .425 for women. It is likely that no US period or cohort will ever have half of all marriages end in legal divorce, though the highest cohort may reach 47 percent. Patterns of marriage and divorce observed since 1970 show the effect that cohabitation continues to have on the American family, where it is delaying, but not replacing, marriage.

144 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors reassess mortality-fertility links in the context of less developed countries and assemble these building blocks in support of the conclusion that demographer Kingsley Davis who states that large mortality declines will stimulate corresponding adjustments in fertility was essentially correct.
Abstract: The purpose of this chapter is to reassesses mortality-fertility links in the context of less developed countries. In the first section the author examines the nature of pretransitional reproductive regimes. He then describes the massive disruption to these regimes caused by the mortality declines in the early half of the 20th century and follows this account by distilling explanatory lessons from the evidence about fertility transitions in the second half of that century. He then assembles these building blocks in support of the conclusion that demographer Kingsley Davis who states that large mortality declines will stimulate corresponding adjustments in fertility was essentially correct. Mortality decline is indeed the common underlying cause – both necessary and sufficient – of the fertility declines that have swept across most of the developing world in the past 40 years. (excerpt modified)

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present the results of a new estimation procedure to reconstruct the Indian fertility transition and describe some of its spatial and statistical properties, and suggest that preoccupation with the effect on fertility of factors that are poorly correlated with spatial location may have concealed the progression of fertility change through diffusion processes at the micro-level.
Abstract: Within the context of demographic heterogeneity this article seeks to update knowledge on fertility levels in India and to extend understanding of the mechanisms behind regional variations. The authors present the results of a new estimation procedure to reconstruct the Indian fertility transition and describe some of its spatial and statistical properties. Rather than test hypotheses on fertility-economy-society linkages through an econometric model the authors focus on the spatial structuring of reproductive behavior in India: fertility is examined as a regionalized variable that is a variable that is assumed to be spatially continuous. As their maps suggest and the geostatistical analysis demonstrates spatial variations of fertility in India are far from random a fact that has potentially significant implications for the interpretation of fertility decline. Specifically the authors suggest that preoccupation with the effect on fertility of factors that are poorly correlated with spatial location such as family planning campaigns or structural transformations of the economy may have concealed the progression of fertility change through diffusion processes at the microlevel. (excerpt modified)

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined the labor supply prospects of 16 developed countries for the period 2000-2050, drawing attention to the ways in which countries may be able to influence the future levels of their labor supply.
Abstract: Over the past 20 years, policy attention has been focused upon the implications of below-replacement fertility for the aging of populations. This article argues that another potential consequence, a decline in the absolute size of the labor force, may prove to be an equally compelling issue because of its impact on rates of economic growth. Because the United States will experience both increasing labor productivity and an increase in its labor supply, the growth orientation of the global economy is likely to persist. In this circumstance, given relatively comparable changes in the productivity of labor across countries, countries that face major declines in their labor supply will fare less well than countries that are able to maintain their labor supply at least constant. The article examines the labor supply prospects of 16 developed countries for the period 2000–2050, drawing attention to the ways in which countries may be able to influence the future levels of their labor supply.

Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the pace of fertility decline in Asia Africa and Latin America and discuss the factors likely to accelerate or hamper fertility decline, based on empirical data collected since 1950.
Abstract: This chapter examines the pace of fertility decline. The pace of transition is a relatively unexplored topic despite its short- and mid-term demographic consequences and despite the deep impression that the apparent rapidity of transition has left on many scholars (e.g. Watkins 1986; Cleland and Wilson 1987). The classic statements about the determinants of fertility decline are addressed much more to the question of why fertility declines than to how rapidly it declines (Notestein 1953; Davis 1965; Coale 1973; Freedman 1979; Caldwell 1982) although hypotheses about pace can be readily derived from these statements. As Bongaarts and Watkins (1996) note at present there is little agreement about why some fertility declines are precipitous while others occur at a leisurely pace. The chapter is motivated by prospective concerns – will decline proceed rapidly or slowly during the next few decades? – hence the empirical analysis is confined to Asia Africa and Latin America. I begin with an examination of empirical data on fertility transitions that have commenced since 1950 documenting the variation in pace of decline at the national level. I then shift to a conceptual framework for understanding variation in the pace of fertility transition followed by an extended discussion of those factors likely to accelerate or hamper fertility decline. (excerpt)

Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors reviewed the evidence on the role of gender and family systems in fertility transition and traces the implications for future trends in fertility and discussed how prevailing family and gender systems in pretransitional societies affect the "readiness" of the population to begin fertility transition.
Abstract: This paper reviews the evidence on the role of gender and family systems in fertility transition and traces the implications for future trends in fertility. It discusses how prevailing family and gender systems in pretransitional societies affect the "readiness" of the population to begin the fertility transition. Three intermediate factors that influence such readiness include: the number of surviving children that family systems can accommodate; the onset and speed of mortality decline; and the availability and costs of postnatal forms of family-size control. Following this the relationship between changes in traditional family and gender systems and the onset and speed of the transition is analyzed. The intermediate variables considered are the demand for children the supply of them and the costs of using fertility limitation. Finally the paper examines the influence of family and gender systems on post- transitional changes or variations in fertility. It is noted that neither family nor gender systems can be considered master determinants of fertility transitions but in interaction with other factors they appear to play important roles.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: On the basis of population projections model and other indirect sources of evidence it is estimated that famine-related deaths in the country most likely numbered between 600000 and 1 million in the period from 1995 to 2000.
Abstract: Although the worst effects of the North Korean famine in the mid-1990s have apparently subsided the actual demographic toll of the famine remains uncertain owing to a lack of reliable data. Several reports based on officially released crude death rates for 1995 and 1998 inferred about 220000 excess deaths while figures based on other evidence are far higher (2.6 million between 1995 and 2000). This paper aims to narrow the range of uncertainty regarding the demographic impact of the famine. Using demographic models it shows how these two direct sources of information on mortality produce contradictory estimates at the more extreme ends of the range. On the basis of population projections model and other indirect sources of evidence it is estimated that famine-related deaths in the country most likely numbered between 600000 and 1 million in the period from 1995 to 2000. These indirect sources of evidence include Chinas mortality experience during its Great Leap Forward and several surveys of child malnutrition in North Korea.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors presented the first global population projections by educational attainment using methods of multi-state population projection and estimated the educational composition of the population by age and sex and educational fertility differentials.
Abstract: This research note presents the first global population projections by educational attainment using methods of multi-state population projection. The educational composition of the population by age and sex and educational fertility differentials are estimated for 13 world regions, and alternative scenarios are presented to the year 2030. One of these scenarios assumes constant educational transition rates and the other assumes that all regions reach Northern American levels of enrollment rates by 2030. The strong momentum or, as the case may be, inertia in the transformation of the educational composition of a population, seen in the results, arises because education is mostly acquired at a young age. The sex bias in the educational composition, especially evident in some developing countries, is unlikely to disappear soon. China has made remarkable progress in improving educational enrollment and as a consequence by 2030 is expected to have more educated people of working age than Europe and Northern America together.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The article describes the foundational principles and the main phases of a model for the evolution of longevity mediated through social organization, and applies the concept specifically to human populations.
Abstract: This article proposes that longevity is not merely the result of an absence of mortality but a self-reinforcing and positively selected life-history trait in social species. It argues that a small increase in longevity is amplified as (1) reductions in mortality at young ages increase natural selection for mechanisms of maintenance and repair at all older ages as well as increasing the potential for intergenerational transfers; (2) intergenera-tional transfers of resources from old to young increase fitness (e.g., through improved health, skill, and competitive ability) of the young and thus favor the presence of older individuals in a population; and (3) the division of labor increases both efficiency and innovation at all levels, resulting in increased resources that can be reinvested. This theory is framed around the longevity-oriented question posed two decades ago by the ger-ontologist George Sacher, “Why do we live as long as we do?,” rather than the more prevalent question today, “Why do we grow old?” The article describes the foundational principles and the main phases of a model for the evolution of longevity mediated through social organization, and applies the concept specifically to human populations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This analysis presents estimates of adult mortality in Zimbabwe based on multiple sources, including registered deaths adjusted for incomplete reporting, which leave no doubt that adult mortality risks in Zimbabwe more than doubled between 1982 and 1997.
Abstract: This report analyzes national data on the level and trend of adult mortality in Zimbabwe over the past two decades. It assesses data quality and presents estimates on the rise in adult mortality risks. Four sources of data are available for the estimation of adult mortality in the country: vital registration estimates from household deaths data estimates from parental survival data and estimates from sibling survival data. Overall it is noted that estimated completeness of death registration rises rapidly between 1986 and 1992. This increase reflects the assumption that death rates for the 10-14 year age group were constant. Such increase in death rates indicates that completeness of death registration in the later years is overestimated and death rates are underestimated. Moreover a massive rise in adult mortality risks was also experienced during the period from 1982-97 with the conditional probability of death by age 60 given survival to age 15 rises from 0.20 in 1982 to 0.50 in 1997 for females and from 0.31-0.65 for males. The increase accelerates throughout this period suggesting that probabilities of death will rise further before leveling off and declining. There is essentially no doubt that these increases in adult mortality risks are due to HIV/AIDS.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The 2000 census of China sketches the highlights of preliminary tabulations and discusses issues related to data quality as discussed by the authors, which is notable for its design and expanded content reflecting Chinas increasing complexity and the rising demand for social data to inform policy.
Abstract: This report briefly describes the 2000 census of China sketches the highlights of preliminary tabulations and discusses issues related to data quality. The author states that the census is notable for its design and expanded content reflecting Chinas increasing complexity and the rising demand for social data to inform policy. Several innovations distinguish this fifth census from the four previous ones: a confidentiality statement appears on the census form; the forms are designed for optical character scanning; and census documents can be accessed from an official census Web site. The census questionnaire was also changed to provide a collection of standard items for every person in every household and an unprecedented scope for data collection on issues of concern to Chinas policymakers. The data released provide the basis for only very general and tentative conclusions on national trends and regional trends. Although there is as yet no basis on which to evaluate the survey the potential for error in this census is considerable. Thus users should proceed with caution until the data have been carefully evaluated.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine population and economic growth, eating, and tilling to answer the question: How much will growing crops to feed more and wealthier people encroach on forests between now and 2050?
Abstract: IN RECENT DECADES some 50 countries have reported increases in the volume or area of their forests (UN ECE/FAO 2000). These increases, mainly in industrial countries, encourage the vision of a great restoration of nature in the form of a spreading forest canopy. The reforestation supports such a vision even while population continues to grow, albeit at a slowing rate, and the human condition improves. Geographers have dated the onset of reforestation in some areas as early as the nineteenth century and have called it the forest transition (Mather, Fairbairn, and Needle 1999). The realization of the vision of course depends upon many factors, including how people prosper and eat, how farmers till, and how each change of cropland encroaches on forests. Here we examine population and economic growth, eating, and tilling to answer the question: How much will growing crops to feed more and wealthier people encroach on forests between now and 2050? To many, the prospect is dire and the proscription of farming is clear. For example, Ayres (1999) wrote in a millennial issue of Time magazine, “Agriculture is the world’s biggest cause of deforestation, and increasing demand for meat is the biggest force in the expansion of agriculture.” A bird’seye view of the landscape confirms that farming has historically transformed the most acreage, and so we shall concentrate on it, while recognizing that climate change, urban sprawl, and other forces can also change land use and land cover. As for meat, although grazing to produce beef will affect forests, we shall concentrate on the more distinct impact of crops. Crops encompass corn to feed cows, pigs, and chickens as well as wheat, rice, and vegetables for people to eat directly. Poultry and swine depend almost entirely on feed. Cattle, too, have moved toward feedlots. In the United States, for example,

Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, the plausibility of causal linkages between population policies and fertility trends in developing countries is discussed and a cross-national trend analysis that attempts to link social programmatic and fertility change is presented.
Abstract: Currently two-thirds of developing countries have national population policies or programs. In addition fertility levels have declined in developing countries. The question is what role if any do those programs have on the fertility transitions? This paper reviews the plausibility of causal linkages between population policies and fertility trends in developing countries. It is divided into seven sections with the first section being an introduction to the discussion. The second section reviews the evolution of population policy since 1960 while the third addresses the design content and effort levels of population programs. The fourth section presents the behavioral trends accompanying the fertility transitions over the years. The fifth section details a cross-national trend analysis that attempts to link social programmatic and fertility change. In the sixth section the author proposes considering other disciplinary perspectives and methods to examine organizational systems and processes of population programs. Finally the seventh section discusses implications of existing social trends for future family planning programs.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is shown that though they did not want as many children as possible, most Chinese couples did want to raise as many sons as possible.
Abstract: Several demographers who have studied Chinese historical demography claim that the people of imperial China deliberately controlled their fertility. Wang Feng James Lee and Cameron Campbell claim to have found in the genealogies of the Qing imperial lineage evidence that Qing nobles reduced their fertility through a combination of late starting early stopping and long spacing. They further claim that the fertility rates of Han bannermen in Liaoning could not have been so low without reduced sexual activity or methods of family planning. Some revisionist demographers claim that modern Chinas population policy was unnecessary and that it could not have been so successful if the people had not already been very accustomed to fertility control. The author of this article argues against these claims. He agrees that compared to premodern Europe Chinese birth intervals were longer especially the interval from marriage to first birth and marital fertility was higher among the wealthy than among the poor. He also acknowledges that the Chinese regulated family size through marriage age breast-feeding adoption and sex-selective infanticide. The author claims however that Chinese regulation of fertility was primarily directed at the goal of increasing the number of sons. He supports his theory by re-examining the revisionist studies and with data from a survey he conducted during 1980-1981 of 580 women.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A concise update of the breadth of questions and hypotheses of likely interest to demographers and others that evolutionary theorists address using a variety of traditional and historical datasets is provided.
Abstract: An ecological evolutionary viewpoint offers new perspectives on contemporary demographic problems in general and on population–environment issues in particular. In turn, rich and detailed human demographic data can help solve problems of interest in evolutionary theory. Such data have been analyzed in greatest detail in studies of traditional and historical societies. Evolutionary approaches using historical data go beyond small-sample anthropological studies to the application of the evolutionary approach to large datasets, and illuminate important similarities between small-scale traditional societies and large modern populations living in evolutionarily novel environments. This article provides a concise update of the breadth of questions and hypotheses of likely interest to demographers and others that evolutionary theorists address using a variety of traditional and historical datasets. It suggests opportunities for additional collaborative work between evolutionary theorists and historical demographers and highlights topics relevant to modern demography.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The provision of measles vaccination markedly reduces mortality risks for poorer children-from over three times higher to just over 1.5 times higher relative to vaccinated children from wealthier families.
Abstract: This paper explores the potential direct role of health interventions in contributing to greater health equity. Longitudinal data from a study in rural Bangladesh is used to examine the impact of a measles vaccination program on gender and socioeconomic differentials in childhood mortality. Data analysis revealed that provision of measles vaccination alone has the potential to reduce child mortality risks markedly ranging from over three times higher to just over 1.5 times higher. The impact of measles vaccination is most pronounced among the poorest group and average economic status groups of children. The importance of gender itself is also evident with female children experiencing substantially higher mortality risks relative to male children and greater absolute reductions in mortality risks with vaccination. This mortality differential persists among children born to mothers with limited education (1-5 years). These findings reinforce and extend previously reported results on the effect of measles vaccination on childhood mortality in the study area. These results also underscore the need for developing special strategies and targeted approaches for reaching the most disadvantaged children.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors reviewed the 2001 Indian census results and drew several provisional conclusions as to what they imply and concluded that the true population is believed to be even larger than expected.
Abstract: This paper reviews key features of the 2001 Indian census results and draws several provisional conclusions as to what they imply. Overall the provisional results of the 2001 census present a mixed picture. The population count of 1027 million as of March 1 2001 was larger than expected and the true population is believed to be even larger. Previously May 11 2000 was designated as the day of the birth of Indias billionth citizen but the census results imply that the population had actually reached 1 billion in late 1999. However allowing for a plausible underenumeration the date could well have been in 1998. Indias rate of population growth is falling obviously because the birth rate is falling faster than the death rate; the true growth rate of the population during the 1991-2001 intercensal decade was probably somewhere between 1.93% and 1.84%. This implies that during 1981-91 the population grew by a few million more than 163 million while during 1991-2001 it probably grew by a few million less than 180 million. Finally very little can be read into the indicated decline in population masculinity although there are signs of increased masculinity in four major states.

Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, a new perspective on the relevance to fertility behavior of gender and family systems in post-industrial societies is proposed, which relates to the greater ability of some women to control the timing of events and the resulting sense of entitlement to leisure time this generates.
Abstract: This paper proposes a new perspective on the relevance to fertility behavior of gender and family systems in postindustrial societies. This perspective says the author pertains to the greater ability of some women to control the timing of events and the resulting sense of entitlement to leisure time this generates and how both aspects of time relate to the timing and number of births women have. Several familiar issues on demography are addressed: changing control technology the timing of first births and the marital or nonmarital context in which children are born and reared. Overall it is noted that demographic theories need to consider the concept of time as well as timing be more middle- range in theoretical perspective and be more gender oriented. Measures relating to entitlement to leisure time for both women and men should be included in future fertility studies of postindustrialized countries. Class differences within societies should also be examined. This provides a better understanding of how gender and family systems relate to the process of fertility behavior and why fertility in such societies may fall below existing levels in the near future.

Journal Article
TL;DR: The divergence between desired family size (DFS) and total fertility rate (TFR) in Europe is discussed in this article, where the authors argue that the failure of the analysis to consider factors affecting fertility trends is attributed to "negative fertility drift" induced by existing welfare systems and womens employment.
Abstract: This paper comments on demographer John Bongaarts analysis which is included in the same book on the divergence between desired family size (DFS) and total fertility rate (TFR) in Europe The causes of TFR exceeding DFS is associated with unwanted fertility coupled with the drive to replace unexpected deaths of children and dissatisfaction over the sex balance In Bongaarts analysis both DFS and TFR are intended as period measures consequently removing the "tempo" effect that is a crucial step in determining the discrepancy between the two measures in low fertility contexts In this respect the author argues the failure of the analysis to consider factors affecting fertility trends As such low fertility in Europe is attributed to "negative fertility drift" induced by existing welfare systems and womens employment

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed an alternative explanatory model and tested it empirically with reference to Kenya and found that access to political power and, through power, access to a state's resources, including resources devoted to clinics, schools, labor opportunities, and other determinants of demographic behavior, are the key factors underlying ethnic differences.
Abstract: Ethnic differences in demographic behavior tend to be disguised behind analytically opaque labels like “district” or “region,” or else subjected to simplistic cultural explanations. Drawing on new political economy, sociological theory and the political science literature on sub-Saharan Africa, this article proposes an alternative explanatory model and tests it empirically with reference to Kenya. Access to political power and, through power, access to a state's resources—including resources devoted to clinics, schools, labor opportunities, and other determinants of demographic behavior—are advanced as the key factors underlying ethnic differences. District-level estimates of “political capital” are introduced and merged with two waves of Demographic and Health Survey data. The effects on models of contraceptive use are explored. Results confirm that measures of political capital explain residual ethnic differences in use, providing strong support for a political approach to the analysis of demographic behavior.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The United States and Australia converged by the mid-1980s on receptive and expan sive immigration policies reflecting client politics as mentioned in this paper, and Australia has since pursued a more restrictive and selective course while the United States has resisted pressures toward such a stance.
Abstract: The United States and Australia converged by the mid-1980s on receptive and expan sive immigration policies reflecting “client” politics. Australia has since pursued a more restrictive and selective course while the United States has resisted pressures toward such a stance. The authors account for these differences by assessing the theoretical perspectives of interests, rights, and states. Conflicts among groups with direct interests in policy outcomes are the principal source of immigration politics, but a comparison of the roles of rights and state institutions helps explain peculiarities of the two cases. The distinctive Australian policy trajectory is shaped by greater volatility of public opinion about immigration and multiculturalism, and by political institutions that are more responsive to popular sentiment.