Showing papers in "The Philosophical Quarterly in 2007"
TL;DR: In this paper, an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down.
Abstract: I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley's regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intuition, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, and discussing the ramifications of giving the justification I think best.
130 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that during the 1790s Kant restricted the role of the concept of race, and dropped his hierarchical account of the races in favour of a more genuinely egalitarian and cosmopolitan view.
Abstract: During the 1780s, as Kant was developing his universalistic moral theory, he published texts in which he defended the superiority of whites over non-whites. Whether commentators see this as evidence of inconsistent universalism or of consistent inegalitarianism, they generally assume that Kant's position on race remained stable during the 1780s and 1790s. Against this standard view, I argue on the basis of his texts that Kant radically changed his mind. I examine his 1780s race theory and his hierarchical conception of the races, and subsequently address the question of the significance of these views, especially in the light of Kant's own ethical theory. I then show that during the 1790s Kant restricts the role of the concept of race, and drops his hierarchical account of the races in favour of a more genuinely egalitarian and cosmopolitan view.
126 citations
TL;DR: The Critic of Nature and Genius as discussed by the authors is a classic example of such an approach, where the Critic is a critic of nature and genius, and the critic is a prophet.
Abstract: 1. Wide Screen 2. Lost Chords 3. Classical Glue 4. Theory Facades 5. The Practical Go of It 6. The Virtues of Cracked Reasoning 7. Linguistic Wayfaring 8. Song of the Master Idea 9. Semantic Mimicry 10. The Critic of Nature and Genius
87 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that the theory of dispositional monism fails to make the identities of powers determinate, and it does not put certain constraints on what the structure of fundamental properties is like.
Abstract: Dispositional monism is the view that natural properties and relations are ‘pure powers’. It is often objected that dispositional monism involves some kind of vicious or otherwise unpalatable regress or circularity. I examine ways of making this objection precise. The most pressing interpretation is that the theory fails to make the identities of powers determinate. I demonstrate that this objection is in error. It does, however, put certain constraints on what the structure of fundamental properties is like. I show what a satisfactory structure would be.
66 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the author argues that the commitment to attitudes that presuppose moral responsibility can soften and fade, often without our noticing it, and argues that aspects of certain attitudes commonly thought to be opposed to the objective attitude are in fact compatible with it.
Abstract: I aim to alleviate the pessimism with which some philosophers regard the ‘objective attitude’, thereby removing a particular obstacle which P.F. Strawson and others have placed in the way of more widespread scepticism about moral responsibility. First, I describe what I consider the objective attitude to be, and then address concerns about this raised by Susan Wolf. Next, I argue that aspects of certain attitudes commonly thought to be opposed to the objective attitude are in fact compatible with it. Finally, I examine the prospects of someone who wishes to adopt the objective attitude permanently. In response to philosophers who claim that this would be psychologically impossible, I argue that our commitment to attitudes that presuppose moral responsibility can soften and fade, often without our noticing it.
65 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend a compromise view concerning the dependence relations between mathematical objects, according to which the structuralists are right about some mathematical objects but wrong about others, and they end with some remarks about the crucial notion of dependence.
Abstract: The notion of dependence figures prominently in recent discussions of non-eliminative mathematical structuralism. Structuralists often argue that mathematical objects from one and the same structure depend on one another and on the structure to which they belong. Their opponents often argue that there cannot be any such dependence. I first show that the structuralists' claims about dependence are more important to their view than is generally recognized. Then I defend a compromise view concerning the dependence relations between mathematical objects, according to which the structuralists are right about some mathematical objects but wrong about others. I end with some remarks about the crucial notion of dependence.
63 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a framework for describing ontic vagueness in general in terms of multiple actualities has been developed for defending ontically vague identity, which is immune from Evansian worries.
Abstract: Gareth Evans's argument against ontically vague identity has been picked over on many occasions. But extant proposals for blocking the argument do not meet well-motivated general constraints on a successful solution. Moreover, the pivotal position that defending ontically vague identity occupies vis a vis ontic vagueness more generally has not yet been fully appreciated. This paper advocates a way of resisting the Evans argument meeting all the mentioned constraints: if we can find referential indeterminacy in virtue of ontic vagueness, we can get out of the Evans argument while still preserving genuinely ontically vague identity. To show how this approach can vindicate particular cases of ontically vague identity, I develop a framework for describing ontic vagueness in general in terms of multiple actualities. The effect, overall, is to provide a principled and attractive approach to ontically vague identity that is immune from Evansian worries.
60 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that rape is both properly defined as NCS and properly evaluated as a serious wrong, but they do not see all instances of NCS as seriously wrongful.
Abstract: If rape is evaluated as a serious wrong, can it also be defined as non-consensual sex (NCS)? Many do not see all instances of NCS as seriously wrongful. I argue that rape is both properly defined as NCS and properly evaluated as a serious wrong. First, I distinguish the hurtfulness of rape from its wrongfulness; secondly, I classify its harms and characterize its essential wrongfulness; thirdly, I criticize a view of rape as merely ‘sex minus consent’; fourthly, I criticize mistaken attempts to discount the wrongfulness of rape for those who do not value sex; fifthly, I contrast two models for weighing interests, according to one of which rape is not seriously wrongful; finally, I sketch a defence of the view that our sexual integrity ought to be a central interest of ours.
59 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that the ideal of political equality, under its most plausible characterizations, lacks independent justificatory force and provided indirect support for the claim that democratic government is only instrumentally justified.
Abstract: Many writers claim that democratic government rests on a principled commitment to the ideal of political equality. The ideal of political equality holds that political institutions ought to be arranged so that they distribute political standing equally to all citizens. I reject this common view. I argue that the ideal of political equality, under its most plausible characterizations, lacks independent justificatory force. By casting doubt on the ideal of political equality, I provide indirect support for the claim that democratic government is only instrumentally justified.
56 citations
TL;DR: This paper proposed a fix for this problem which has the added benefit of avoiding the familiar problems of finks and masks, which has been shown to be useful in the context of the relationship between dispositions and conditional.
Abstract: Previous theories of the relationship between dispositions and conditional.! are unable to account for the fact that dispositions come in degrees. We propose a fix for this problem which has the added benefit of avoiding the familiar problems of finks and masks.
53 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Scott Sehon argues that CSP explanations are not causal but teleological, that they cite the purpose or goal of the behavior in question rather than an antecedent state that caused the behavior.
Abstract: Using the language of common-sense psychology (CSP), we explain human behavior by citing its reason or purpose, and this is central to our understanding of human beings as agents. On the other hand, since human beings are physical objects, human behavior should also be explicable in the language of physical science, in which causal accounts cast human beings as collections of physical particles. CSP talk of mind and agency, however, does not seem to mesh well with the language of physical science.In Teleological Realism, Scott Sehon argues that CSP explanations are not causal but teleological -- that they cite the purpose or goal of the behavior in question rather than an antecedent state that caused the behavior. CSP explanations of behavior, Sehon claims, are answering a question different from that answered by physical science explanations, and, accordingly, CSP explanations and physical science explanations are independent of one another. Common-sense facts about mind and agency can thus be independent of the physical facts about human beings, and, contrary to the views of most philosophers of mind in recent decades, common-sense psychology will not be subsumed by physical science.Sehon defends his non-reductionist account of mind and agency in clear and nontechnical language. He carefully distinguishes his view from forms of "strong naturalism" that would seem to preclude it. And he evaluates key objections to teleological realism, including those posed by Donald Davidson's influential article "Actions, Reasons and Causes" and some put forth by more recent proponents of causal theories of action. CSP, Sehon argues, has a different realm than does physical science; the normative notions that are central to CSP are not reducible to physical facts and laws.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend the use of possible-worlds talk when discussing haecceitism, arguing that the term will mean different things to parties who depend on different presuppositions about possible worlds.
Abstract: Possible-worlds talk obscures the debate about haecceitism, rather than clarifying it. I distinguish haecceitism and anti-haecceitismfrom other doctrines which sometimes go under those names. Then I defend the claim that any definition of 'haecceitism' using possible-worlds talk depends for its correctness on a substantive theory of the nature of possible worlds. This explains why using possible-worlds talk when discussing haecceitism causes confusion: the term will mean different things to parties who depend on different presuppositions about possible worlds.
TL;DR: From Locke to Dugald Stewart as mentioned in this paper, the notion of the bare authority of feeling has been studied extensively in the nineteenth century and later in the twenty-first century, with a focus on science and freedom.
Abstract: Introduction: From Locke to Dugald Stewart 1. Locke's chapter 'Of Power' and its eighteenth-century reciprocation 2. King, Clarke, Collins 3. Hume's reconciling project 4. Kames's hypothesis 5. Jonathan Edwards against Arminianism 6. The bare authority of feeling: James Beattie in context 7. Hartley, Tucker, Priestley 8. Science and freedom in Thomas Reid 9. Liberty and necessity after Reid Postscript: The nineteenth century and afterwards
TL;DR: Hume's "Natural History of Religion" as discussed by the authors offers a naturalized account of the causes of religious thought, an investigation into its "origins" rather than its "foundation in reason".
Abstract: Hume's ‘Natural History of Religion’ offers a naturalized account of the causes of religious thought, an investigation into its ‘origins’ rather than its ‘foundation in reason’. Hume thinks that if we consider only the causes of religious belief, we are provided with a reason to suspend the belief. I seek to explain why this is so, and what role the argument plays in Hume's wider campaign against the rational acceptability of religious belief. In particular, I argue that the work threatens a form of fideism which maintains that it is rationally permissible to maintain religious belief in the absence of evidence or of arguments in its favour. I also discuss the ‘argument from common consent’, and the relative superiority of Hume's account of the origins of religious belief.
TL;DR: The anti-zombie argument can be defeated only at the cost of rendering the zombie argument itself redundant as mentioned in this paper, and the moral of the paper is that dualists should not be zombists.
Abstract: The zombie argument has come to occupy a central role in the case for a non-physicalist view of consciousness. This paper seeks to turn the tables on defenders of the argument ('zombists') by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism. The argument invokes what I call anti-zombies – purely physical creatures that are nonetheless conscious. I show that, using the same resources as those employed by zombists, it is possible to construct an argument from the conceivability of anti-zombies to the truth of physicalism. l go on to defend the claim that anti-zombies are conceivable and to argue that the anti-zombie argument can be defeated only at the cost of rendering the zombie argument itself redundant. The moral of the paper is that dualists should not be zombists.
TL;DR: The authors examined a recent anti-Fregean line with respect to hybrid talk of numbers and ordinary things, such as ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’.
Abstract: With the aid of some results from current linguistic theory, I examine a recent anti-Fregean line with respect to hybrid talk of numbers and ordinary things, such as ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’. I conclude that the anti-Fregean line with respect to these sentences is indefensible.
TL;DR: According to Davidson, triangulation is necessary both to fix the meanings of one's thoughts and utterances and to have the concept of objectivity, both of which are necessary for thinking and talking at all.
Abstract: According to Davidson, 'triangulation' is necessary both to fix the meanings of one's thoughts and utterances and to have the concept of objectivity, both of which are necessary for thinking and talking at all. Against these claims, it has been objected that neither meaning-determination nor possession of the concept of objectivity requires triangulation; nor does the ability to think and talk require possession of the concept of objectivity. But this overlooks the important connection between the tasks that triangulation is meant to perform. One cannot fix concepts or meanings, which one must do for there to be any concepts or meanings at all, without having the concept of objectivity. I. Over twenty years ago, Donald Davidson introduced the term 'triangulation' to refer to a process through which, according to him, people have to go in order to be thinkers and speakers.' This process consists of 'the mutual and simultaneous responses of two or more creatures to common distal stimuli and to one another's responses' (Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, p. xv). Triangulation is necessary, Davidson maintains, both to fix the meanings of one's thoughts and utterances and to have the concept of objectivity, that is, the 'awareness, no matter how inarticulately held, of the fact that what is thought [or said] may be true or false'.2 Both these ingredients, he also maintains, are necessary in order to think and talk at all. The importance of the triangulation argument in Davidson's philosophy cannot be overstated. Though its primary purpose is to establish the essentially social character of language and thought, it is also the basis of Davidson's own brand of realism and semantic externalism, as well as of his anti-foundationalism and anti-scepticism. It is no wonder, then, that the argument occupies an increasingly central place in his later philosophy. And given the extensive work it is meant to do, it is perhaps no wonder that it remains highly controversial. In fact, whenever it is discussed, it is almost invariably rejected.
TL;DR: In this paper, the similarities between contemporary externalist theories of knowledge and classical Indian and Tibetan theory of knowledge are pointed out, and it is shown that correct analysis of these issues requires externalist theory of mind and knowledge.
Abstract: The similarities between contemporary externalist theories of knowledge and classical Indian and Tibetan theories of knowledge are striking. Drawing on comparisons with Timothy Williamson's recent work, I address related topics in Indo-Tibetan epistemology and show that correct analysis of these issues requires externalist theories of mind and knowledge. The topics addressed range from a discussion of possible Gettier cases in the Tibetan philosophical tradition to an assessment of arguments for and against the existence of factive mental states/events that fail to be knowledge states/events. I conclude by explaining how these matters in Indian and Tibetan epistemology can inform us about the viability of externalist epistemologies of the sort articulated by Williamson.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare two kinds of holism about values: G.E. Moore's "organic unities" and Jonathan Dancy's "value holism" and argue that Moore's view is more plausible.
Abstract: I compare two kinds of holism about values: G.E. Moore's ‘organic unities’, and Jonathan Dancy's ‘value holism’. I propose a simple formal model for representing evaluations of parts and wholes. I then define two conditions, additivism and invariabilism, which together imply a third, atomism. Since atomism is absurd, we must reject one of the former two conditions. This is where Moore and Dancy part company: whereas Moore rejects additivism, Dancy rejects invariabilism. I argue that Moore's view is more plausible. Invariabilism ought to be retained because (a) it eliminates the needless multiplication of values inherent in variable evaluations, and (b) it preserves a certain necessary connection between values and reasons, which Dancy himself endorses.
TL;DR: In this paper, Williamson's epistemology leads to a fairly radical version of scepticism, where all knowledge is evidence, and it follows that if S knows p, the evidential probability for S that p is 1.
Abstract: Timothy Williamson's epistemology leads to a fairly radical version of scepticism. According to him, all knowledge is evidence. It follows that if S knows p, the evidential probability for S that p is 1. I explain Williamson's infallibilist account of perceptual knowledge, contrasting it with Peter Klein's, and argue that Klein's account leads to a certain problem which Williamson's can avoid. Williamson can allow that perceptual knowledge is possible and that all knowledge is evidence, while at the same time avoiding Klein's problem. But while Williamson can allow that we know some things through experience, there are very many things he must say we cannot know. Given just how very many these are, he should be considered a sceptic.
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that even relative backwards causation is impossible in Dummett's and Tooley's scenarios of parallel processes in which causes apparently act in opposite temporal directions.
Abstract: Dummett and others have failed to show that an effect can precede its cause. Dummett claimed that ‘backwards causation’ is unproblematic in agentless worlds, and tried to show under what conditions it is rational to believe that even backwards agent-causation occurs. Relying on considerations originating in philosophical discussions of special relativity, I show that the latter conditions actually support the view that backwards agent-causation is impossible. I next show that even in Dummett's agentless worlds explanation does not necessitate it. I then show why even relative backwards causation is impossible in his and Tooley's scenarios of parallel processes in which causes apparently act in opposite temporal directions. We thus have good reasons for thinking that backwards causation is impossible.
TL;DR: The authors argue that physicalism is consistent with Mary's acquisition of new information, even if she has perfect powers of deduction, and higher-level physical facts are a priori deducible from lower-level ones, yet she may still lack concepts which are required in order to deduce from the lower level physical facts what it is like to see red.
Abstract: Mary knows all there is to know about physics, chemistry and neurophysiology, yet has never experienced colour. Most philosophers think that if Mary learns something genuinely new upon seeing colour for the first time, then physicalism is false. I argue, however, that physicalism is consistent with Mary's acquisition of new information. Indeed, even if she has perfect powers of deduction, and higher-level physical facts are a priori deducible from lower-level ones, Mary may still lack concepts which are required in order to deduce from the lower-level physical facts what it is like to see red.
TL;DR: In this article, a contrast between Kant's and Leibniz's conceptions of empirical knowledge, specifically with respect to the irreducibility of spatio-temporal determinations, is explored.
Abstract: In the philosophy of science, identity over time emerges as a central concern both as an ontological category in the interpretation of physical theories, and as an epistemological problem concerning the conditions of possibility of knowledge. In Reichenbach and subsequent writers on the problem of indistinguishable quantum particles we see the return of a contrast between Leibniz and Aquinas on the subject of individuation. The possibility of rejecting the principle of the identity of indiscernibles has certain logical difficulties, leading us inexorably from ontology into epistemology. For the epistemological problem we attend to the differences that emerged between the (neo-)Kantian and logical empiricist traditions, also saliently displayed in Reichenbach's writings. After examining the contrast between Kant's and Leibniz's conceptions of empirical knowledge, specifically with respect to the irreducibility of spatiotemporal determinations, we explore an application of a neo-Kantian view to the same problem of indistinguishable quantum particles.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that Graham Priest's story "Sylvan's Box" has an attractive consistent reading and that this story can be used as an example of a non-trivial "essentially inconsistent" story.
Abstract: I argue that Graham Priest's story 'Sylvan's Box' has an attractive consistent reading. Priest's hope that this story can be used as an example of a non-trivial 'essentially inconsistent' story is thus threatened. I then make some observations about the role 'Sylvan's Box' might play in a theory of unreliable narrators.
TL;DR: The authors define "skim semantics" to be a Davidson-style truth-conditional semantics combined with a variety of deflationism about truth, and show that truth's expressive role in truth-conditioned semantics precludes at least some kinds of skim semantics; thus they reject the idea that the challenge to skim semantics derives solely from Davidson's explanatory ambitions.
Abstract: I define ‘skim semantics’ to be a Davidson-style truth-conditional semantics combined with a variety of deflationism about truth. The expressive role of truth in truth-conditional semantics precludes at least some kinds of skim semantics; thus I reject the idea that the challenge to skim semantics derives solely from Davidson's explanatory ambitions, and in particular from the ‘truth doctrine’, the view that the concept of truth plays a central explanatory role in Davidsonian theories of meaning for a language. The fate of skim semantics is not determined by the fate of the truth doctrine, so rejecting the truth doctrine does not in itself open the way to skim semantics. I establish my thesis by showing that some recently proposed versions of skim semantics fail because of truth's expressive role. I also discuss the conditions that might permit skim semantics.
TL;DR: The authors argue that the role of the counterfactual intervener in such examples can only be filled by a rational agent, and they examine a problem with their account of responsibility in cases where we fail to act.
Abstract: Frankfurt-type examples seem to show that agents can be morally responsible for their actions and omissions even if they could not have done otherwise. Fischer and Ravizza's influential account of moral responsibility is largely based on such examples. I examine a problem with their account of responsibility in cases where we fail to act. The solution to this problem has a surprising and far reaching implication concerning the construction of successful Frankfurt-type examples. 1 argue that the role of the counterfactual intervener in such examples can only be filled by a rational agent.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that real purism is much closer to pacifism than its proponents would like it to be, and they conclude that the best explanation of the common view that unjust combatants may be defensively killed relies on a rights-based conception of self-defence.
Abstract: According to the purist war ethic, the killings committed by soldiers fighting in just wars are permissible, but those committed by unjust combatants are nothing but murders. Jeff McMahan asserts that purism is a direct consequence of the justice-based account of self-defence. I argue that this is incorrect: the justice-based conception entails that in many typical cases, killing unjust combatants is morally unjustified. So real purism is much closer to pacifism than its proponents would like it to be. I conclude that the best explanation of the common view that unjust combatants may be defensively killed relies on a rights-based conception of self-defence.
TL;DR: To the familiar idea of an undetectable spectrum inversion some have added the idea of inverted earth as mentioned in this paper, which is even harder to make coherent, particularly as it applies to a supposed inversion of black and white counteracted by an environmental switch of these.
Abstract: To the familiar idea of an undetectable spectrum inversion some have added the idea of inverted earth. This new combination of ideas is even harder to make coherent, particularly as it applies to a supposed inversion of black and white counteracted by an environmental switch of these. Black and white exhibit asymmetries in their connections with illumination, shadow and visibility, which rule out their being reversed. And since the most saturated yellow is light and the most saturated blue dark, yellow and blue could not be reversed unless light and dark could be. The difficulties suggest some more general morals for how to think of the role of “qualia” in colour perception.