Showing papers in "Theory and Society in 1975"

Toward a political economy of crime

Abstract: As Gouldner and Fredrichs have recently pointed out, social science generally, and sociology in particular is in the throes of a “paradigm revolution.” Predictably, criminology is both a reflection of and a force behind this revolution. The energing paradigm in criminology is one which emphasizes social conflict-particularly conflicts of social class interests and values. The paradigm which is being replaced is one where the primary emphasis was on consensus, and within which “deviance” or “crime” was viewed as an aberration shared by some minority. This group had failed to be properly socialized or adequately integrated into society or, more generally, had suffered from “social disorganization.” The shift in paradigm means more than simply a shift from explaining the same facts with new causal models. It means that we stretch our conceptual framework and look to different facets of social experience. Specifically, instead of resorting inevitably to the “normative system,” to “culture” or to socio-psychological experiences of individuals, we look instead to the social relations created by the political and economic structure. Rather than treating “society” as a full-blown reality (reifying it into an entity with its own life), we seek to understand the present as a reflection of the economic and political history that has created the social relations which dominate the moment we have selected to study. The shift means that crime becomes a rational response of some social classes to the realities of their lives. The state becomes an instrument of the ruling class enforcing laws here but not there, according to the realities of political power and economic conditions. There is much to be gained from this re-focusing of criminological and sociological inquiry. However, if the paradigmatic revolution is to be more than a mere fad, we must be able to show that the new paradigm is in fact superior to its predecessor. In this paper I have tried to develop the theoretical implications of a Marxian model of crime and criminal law, and to assess the merits of this paradigm by looking at some empirical data. The general conclusion is that the Marian paradigm provides a long neglected but fruitful approach to the study of crime and criminal law.

Towards a reconstruction of historical materialism

Abstract: In the present paper I will analyze the merits and limitations of historical materialism to the extent that it can be considered a theoretical explanation of social evolution. I would like to begin by introducing and critically scrutinizing the fundamental concepts and main hypotheses of historical materialism. Moreover, after indicating some of the problems, I shall also propose and illustrate a possible solution. First, I will deal with the concepts of "social labor" and "history of the species,"

Survival in the field: Implications of personal experience in field work

Abstract: I have argued that insofar as sociological research seeks to elicit information from individuals directly (rather than by the use of documents, etc.), it necessarily involves the formation of a social relationship between investigator and subject(s) which may in time modify either party. I have concentrated on the effects of the research relationship on the investigator, effects which I claim are denied and systematically eliminated by being processed through a methodology which attempts to create a formal hiatus between the researcher and his facts, and to present the facts in such a way as to be readily communicable and verifiable by the professional community. One important area of investigation is thus that of how the research results are achieved or constructed, and in particular, an investigation of the variety of ways in which research situations can affect investigators. This area is beginning to be explored, but is frequently obscured by the methodological orthodoxy which denies its existence.

Communes and communitarianism

Abstract: The social ills of our time are compounded of many things: they defy simple analysis and invite polemic There are classic contradictions in the record: the increasing size of our organizations and the impersonality and irresponsibility of authority, clashes with our traditions of individual liberty leading to escalating assertions on both sides-and strong feelings of alienation and loss of identity In the 1960's self-assertion had a brave and nostalgic quality, as people moved by the thousands into little groups, seeking autonomy and identity in their occupations, sex, books, drugs, crafts, religion, and recreation By the 1970's the increasingly strident demands of their members for the right to do what they want made it seem that American society (and certainly British and to an increasing extent every industrial society) consisted entirely of people presenting nonnegotiable demands with no regard for the scarcity principle or the rights of others Vine deLoria Jr exemplifies the moods: his assertion of group autonomy for the Amerinds in the 1960's was an act of forthright liberalism; by the 1970's his proposals for a new federated America with absolute guarantees for minority group autonomy had an anarchic, anti-social sound (Is there any such thing as American society?)

Paradigms and Incommensurability

Abstract: One of the consequences of the new image of science has been an emphasis on the ‘incommensurability’ of paradigms. As we have seen, advocates of the new image challenge the view that statements, including scientific theories, have some atomic, fixed meanings; they argue that statements have meanings only by virtue of their relations to other statements in the system to which they belong. Further, Kuhn and Feyerabend stress the very impossibility of comparing, contrasting and discussing different observational languages, theories and standards when different scientific paradigms are involved. Scientists work within these paradigms, and the paradigms determine the scientists’ views of the world. A scientist working within a given paradigm simply cannot, on Kuhn’s account, transcend his own particular situation. In his words: ‘Though most of the same signs are used before and after a [scientific] revolution e.g. force, mass, element, compound, cell the ways in which some of them attach to nature have changed. Successive theories are thus, we say, incommensurable.’1 Feyerabend is in general agreement with Kuhn, acknowledging that ‘succeeding paradigms can be evaluated only with difficulty and that they may be altogether incomparable’.2 He goes on to speak of incommensurable theories whose ‘content cannot be compared’.

The dialectical uses of ideal-types

Abstract: 1. For a number o1 years now, dating at least from the social upheaval and turmoil of the 1960's, American sociology has been experiencing a revival of sorts in the increasingly widespread recognition of the need for rigorous and critically-informed evaluations of prevailing social arrangements. The rapid growth of the sociology of sociology and the renewal and expansion of the muckraking tradition in the guise of radical sociology are clear reflections of this revived concern with analyzing and eradicating social injustices. While both of these developments have done much to undermine the value-free presumptions of conventional sociology, they have contributed little to indeed, it may be argued that they have impeded - the formation of a critical sociology. The sociology of sociology, by demonstrating the inevitable connection between values and sociological research, justifies the explicit valueladen posture assumed by radical sociologists, but the justification it provides does not go far enough. Except for a vague commitment to the idea of moral culpability and a better society, this justification neglects to specify which values should be used in conjunction with empirical investigation. The relativism embedded in value-free sociology is sustained in the "paradigms" and "domain assumptions" of radical sociology. In the absence of a generally acceptable set of evaluative principles, what currently passes for critical sociology is in fact a loose connection of critical sociologies. Both the liberating tendencies contained in society and the most adeauate means for actualizing these tendencies are assessed in terms of a variety of normative prescriptions - some based on the position of the working class, old and new, others on the interests of women or blacks, and still others derived from the tenets of philosophical humanism or natural law doctrine. Personal preference appears to be the major factor determining which of these somewhat incongruent sets of normative standards ultimately informs a particular analysis.

A preface to critical theory

Abstract: George Lichtheim once characterized sociology as a discipline with "one foot firmly planted on the grave of metaphysics, the other tentatively poised on the elevator leading to the summit of political power"1 Over the past few years, Lichtheim's witticism has turned into an uncomfortable truth; within the social sciences generally, and sociology in particular, there has emerged a growing concern about the relationship between social knowledge and political power More particularly, the concern is focussed on positivist social science and its linkage to power, and disciplines once firmly in the grip of positivism are now beginning to explore alternative paradigms to serve as programmatic guides to research2

Changes in the social definition of early childhood and the new forms of symbolic violence

Abstract: The nursery school may be considered an institution and a market where the habits produced by the family are moulded, developed and standardized; thus, it is confronted with an objective definition of early childhood embedded in pedagogical practices. The proper objective of a sociology of nursery-school practice is the analysis of the lag between the functions delegated to the school by the different social classes and the functions which it objectively tends to fulfill. Here we have the best test of the lag between the pedagogic demands of the different classes and what the schools supply-which is very abstract, with results that are only visible at a later stage in the school career. It is not so much a question of learning to read or of preparing to do so (the acquisition of certain logical operations or a developed sensitivity, of acquiring a few I.Q. points). This learning takes place through many varied activities which apppear to be far from the learning function.

The barrington moore thesis and its critics

Abstract: The critical response to Moore's Social Origins may reveal as much about the present state of social science as it does about the book itself. While the critics accused Moore of an excessive emphasis on economic factors, the economists and economic historians virtually ignored the book; while Moore's case studies were all historical, national historians have tended to overlook them. The academic group which showed the greatest interest was the new field of “comparative modernization,” which consists mostly of sociologists and sociologically-oriented historians. Critics of this school were enthusiastic about the interdisciplinary and comparative aspect of the book, but tended not to discuss the theoretical issues presented by Moore, except for a vigorous defense of non-Marxist and anti-Marxist positions. In general the critics did not defend value neutrality, which Moore attacked, and were impressed by Moore's case for progressive violence, but eager to move on to other topics, instead of considering the implications of these issues. There were only a few committed cold warriors; Stanley Rothman described Moore as a former fellow traveller, and Gabriel Almond indicated that Moore was soft on communism, but these arguments were the exception rather than the rule.

Reading the Grundrisse: Beyond “orthodox” Marxism

Abstract: ing the problem into a framework which fails to examine the quality of contemporary development, this account also ends up by reifying present social injustices and inequalities; by freezing the present socio-economic situation within its present determinations, it rules out any possible vindication of existing "wrongs," while implicitly legitimating existing power relations. Again, what does not come under scrutiny is the quality of development. Therefore, existing productive practices embodying specific modes of social domination are automatically accepted. On the international level, what this analysis prescribes is continued world domination by advanced industrial societies and continued dependence and backwardness for all other underdeveloped or developing societies. Clearly, this proposal cannot be accepted by most of today's societies confronted daily with misery, suffering and hunger, and it has been rightly attacked on these grounds.49 The critical account, mainly associated with Commoner's work, is unlike the other two in that it approaches the ecological crisis as a consequence of previous social decisions, and sees specific types of social action as capable of providing a remedy. It calls neither for an abrupt halt in development, nor for a rigid program of population control-both of which implicitly accept and validate the present system-but for a new set of socio-economic choices no longer subject to maximization of profits and retention of existing power relations as determining criteria. In examining the nature of the main technological developments of the post-World War II period, Commoner has found that 1) the much publicized and glorified technological developments have not qualitatively or quantitatively improved our life-style; 2) new products of modern technology, such as plastics, aluminium, etc., are not better than those they replace (wood, steel, etc.); and 3) far from having much to do with improvements in everyday life, the main motives for the introduction of both new products and new technologies were a function of the structural requirements of late capitalism. The principal thrust of post-World War II capitalism has been to shift from labor-intensive technologies to capital-intensive ones, thus resulting in the This content downloaded from 157.55.39.162 on Thu, 11 Aug 2016 05:37:54 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Charismatic de-legitimation: A case study

Abstract: In 1484, a young friar sat in the monastery of San Giorgio, planning a sermon in his mind and waiting for a friend. He suddenly had a vision. He thought of "about seven reasons" why the Church would soon take a terrible punishment from God, and then build itself anew.1 1484 was a year in which astrological prophecies were frequent and taken seriously; Jupiter and Saturn were conjunct; it was therefore possible to see into the future. Not only this young friar, Girolamo Savonarola, had visions of apocalypse; the great scholar Landino had them, as did the court astrologer to Frederick III, and friends of the philosopher Ficino.2 But Savonarola's vision was to form the basis of a unique career.

Sociological and lay accounts as versions of reality: Choosing between reports of the “charismatic renewal movement” amongst Roman catholics

Abstract: The fact that the above theories of truth somewhat deny what we sociologists take for granted as “watchers of behaviour” has not prevented us from either implicitly invoking such theories as legitimation for our exercises (although usually correspondence is the firm favourite), nor does it excuse us from not validating our statements. In everyday life a formal study of truth is not needed to accomplish practical affairs. The problem of correspondence is the routine necessity of satisfying hearers that we have established a relationship between words and things that make sense. Sociology also faces all these difficulties as an ongoing practical accomplishment, and in this respect must vie with other accounting procedures as just one other. The inherent weakness of truth theories (in which we are surely interested as honourable men?) makes our claims to scientific status an embarrassment.

Hedonism, incest and the problem of difference

Abstract: This paper attempts to offer, through a reading of hedonism, an Analytic conception' of the Difference which one author has referred to as the dialectic of speech and silence.2 In addressing the form of life of hedonism as one version of otherness and difference, I seek not only to display an alternative conception of life and inquiry than that of hedonism, but also to show the authority or grounds of this paper's possibility even if such a showing inevitably and necessarily remains incomplete. This is to say that a formulation of the project of hedonism in and of itself is not the end or limit of the present inquiry, except insofar as this formulation makes available an encounter with its ground (conception of difference and otherness). In this respect, it is not so much that I seek a dialogue with hedonism as that a conception of dialogue is made reference to in my speech about hedonism.3

Using contradictions to explore the conventions of theorizing

Abstract: Featherman is using an error in reasoning to appraise Kelley's model; but errors in reasoning can be put to a second purpose. They provide us with an opportunity to discover the actual conventions required by theoriesmore generally they provide us with an opportunity to discover the conventions actually required by reasoning. In order to pursue this second purpose we must, instead of questioning the value of contradictions, ask a different question: how is it possible to make the charge that something is an error in reasoning? More precisely, what conventions are required in order to charge that a text contains a contradiction? I will be guided here by the second question; contradictions in the exchange on occupational careers will be used to explore the conventions required by actual reasoning.

Claude Lévi-Strauss: Fieldwork, explanation and experience

Abstract: ions which must become more and more removed from the concrete realities, or, without detracting from its distinctiveness from history, the idea of structure might itself be transformed and used in a way quite distinct

Theodor W. Adorno: Theoretician through negations

Abstract: Among academic writers, arrogance encompasses a continuum spanned at one end by meticulous footnoting, which takes the reader for a fool, and marked at the other end by the vaguest allusions to a panopoly of academic ideas, which also takes the reader for a fool, albeit a highly erudite fool whose major activity consists in reading other erudites. The burdens of the publishing marketplace currently exert considerable pressure against the former arrogance. Cost effectiveness demands that footnotes be cut and placed at the end of books, at worst, or the end of chapters at best. Despite writers' insistence that footnotes are only of value if available with their immediate text, this economic determinism gives a new value to footnotes, which can now more easily be measured, if not as to their quality, then for their quantity. Aspiring academics can now boast, "the book was at least a third footnotes." Writers like Christopher Jencks have the additional benefits with such a system of footnoting of being able to take back in the footnotes, what they assert in the text; thus, Jencks' popularly-oriented text on Inequality2 echoes radical sympathies with this tiptoeing around the genetics and intelligence issues, while his footnotes place him more squarely on the liberal fence.