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A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods - experimental evidence

TLDR
In this paper, a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods is presented. But the results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising.
Abstract
The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in different economic environments. Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising. Section I of the paper introduces the mechanism to be examined. Section II discusses the experimental design. Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results followed by a summary.

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University of Zurich
Zurich Open Repository and Archive
Winterthurerstr. 190
CH-8057 Zurich
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Year: 2000
A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods:
experimental evidence
Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf
Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf. A simple mechanism for the efficient
provision of public goods: experimental evidence. American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Originally published at:
American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264
Falkinger, Josef; Fehr, Ernst; Gächter, Simon; Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf. A simple mechanism for the efficient
provision of public goods: experimental evidence. American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264.
Postprint available at:
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich.
http://www.zora.unizh.ch
Originally published at:
American Economic Review 2000, 90(1):247-264

A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods:
experimental evidence
Abstract
The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms
in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so
that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the
author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in
different economic environments. Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very
promising. Section I of the paper introduces the mechanism to be examined. Section II discusses the
experimental design. Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results
followed by a summary.




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References
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Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans

TL;DR: A large number of studies suggest that reciprocity constitutes a basic motivational drive and that it can explain why wages are downwardly rigid, giving rise to noncompensating wage differentials and to a positive correlation between profits and wages as mentioned in this paper.
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Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study

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Voluntary contribution games: efficient private provision of public goods

Mark Bagnoli, +1 more
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Sequential contributions to public goods

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