Open AccessDissertation
Decision-making in complex and uncertain environments - Experimental studies in behavioral economics
TLDR
In this article, a large body of empirical evidence that people do not always behave according to game theoretic predictions in many economic or social environments is presented, and the authors address issues related to such forms of boundedly rational behavior and non-standard utility maximization.Abstract:
There is a large body of empirical evidence that people do not always behave according to game theoretic predictions in many economic or social environments. Possible deviations from standard-economic behavior can occur when individuals have either (i) non-standard beliefs, which are systematically biased, (ii) non-standard preferences, such as preferences for fairness, or (iii) when they engage in imperfect utility maximization, for example, because of limited attention and only consider salient alternatives in their choice sets (Rabin, 2002). This thesis addresses issues related to such forms of boundedly rational behavior and non-standard utility maximization.read more
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Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
TL;DR: In this paper, a variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs about others' contributions were used to evaluate the hypothesis of conditional cooperation with a selfish bias in repeated public good games.
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Correlation misperception in choice
Andrew Ellis,Michele Piccione +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a decision-theoretic analysis of an agent's understanding of the interdependencies in her choices, and provide the foundations for a simple and flexible model that allows the misperception of correlated risks.
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Belief Formation Under Signal Correlation
Tanjim Hossain,Ryo Okui +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the importance of simultaneously considering two behavioral biases, correlation neglect and overprecision, in characterizing belief formation was demonstrated, showing that subjects overvalue moderately or strongly correlated signals, but undervalue weakly correlated signals.
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Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: Media Power via Correlation of News Content
TL;DR: In this article, the power of media owners to bias readers' opinions has been studied and it is shown that when readers have correlation neglect, diversity in the interests of owners might lower the informativeness of news content.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
TL;DR: Z-Tree as mentioned in this paper is a toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, which allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time and is stable and easy to use.
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An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments
TL;DR: The Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE) is introduced, which is a free, convenient and very powerful tool to organize their experiments and sessions in a standardized way.
Posted ContentDOI
Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined image motivation as a driver in prosocial behavior and asked whether extrinsic monetary incentives (do well) have a detrimental effect on prosocial behaviour due to crowding out of image motivation.
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Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II
TL;DR: This article investigated the mechanisms through which leaders affect growth and found that autocrats affect growth directly, through fiscal and monetary policy, and also influence political institutions that, in turn, appear to affect growth.
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Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Claudia Keser,Frans van Winden +1 more
TL;DR: The authors compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects play a repeated publi c good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations and interpret subjects' behavior in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both futureoriented and reactive behavior.