Differential Fault Analysis on Tiaoxin and AEGIS Family of Ciphers

TLDR: In this article, the authors proposed differential fault analysis of Tiaoxin and AEGIS family of ciphers in a nonce reuse setting and showed that the secret key can be recovered with 384 single bit faults.

Abstract: Tiaoxin and AEGIS are two second round candidates of the ongoing CAESAR competition for authenticated encryption. In 2014, Brice Minaud proposed a distinguisher for AEGIS-256 that can be used to recover bits of a partially known message, encrypted \(2^{188}\) times, regardless of the keys used. Also he reported a correlation between AEGIS-128 ciphertexts at rounds i and \(i + 2\), although the biases would require \(2^{140}\) data to be detected. Apart from that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no known cryptanalysis of AEGIS or Tiaoxin. In this paper we propose differential fault analyses of Tiaoxin and AEGIS family of ciphers in a nonce reuse setting. Analysis shows that the secret key of Tiaoxin can be recovered with 384 single bit faults and the states of AEGIS-128, AEGIS-256 and AEGIS-128L can be recovered respectively with 384, 512 and 512 single bit faults. Considering multi byte fault, the number of required faults and re-keying reduces 128 times.