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Do Managers Withhold Bad News

TLDR
In this article, the authors examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news and find that the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures is greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price response to positive news disclosures.
Abstract
In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors.

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The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent Literature

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References
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a framework for analyzing managers' reporting and disclosure decisions in a capital markets setting, and identify key research questions and key researchquestions, concluding that current research has generated a number of useful insights.
Journal ArticleDOI

Outside directors and CEO turnover

TL;DR: This article examined the relation between the monitoring of CEOs by inside and outside directors and CEO resignations using stock returns and earnings changes as measures of prior performance, and found that there is a stronger association between prior performance and the probability of a resignation.
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The economic implications of corporate financial reporting

TL;DR: This paper found that the majority of managers would avoid initiating a positive NPV project if it meant falling short of the current quarter's consensus earnings, and more than three-fourths of the surveyed executives would give up economic value in exchange for smooth earnings.
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Trending Questions (1)
Do mangers withhold bad news?

Yes, managers tend to delay the release of bad news to investors.