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Games with permission structures : The conjunctive approach
TLDR
In this paper, it is shown that the Shapley value of these projected games can be interpreted as an index that measures the power of the players in the permission structure, and that the collection of these games forms a subspace of the vector space of all games with side payments on a specified player set.Abstract:
This paper is devoted to the game theoretic analysis of decision situations, in which the players have veto power over the actions undertaken by certain other players. We give a full characterization of the dividends in these games with a permission structure. We find that the collection of these games forms a subspace of the vector space of all games with side payments on a specified player set. Two applications of these results are provided. The first one deals with the projection of additive games on a permission structure. It is shown that the Shapley value of these projected games can be interpreted as an index that measures the power of the players in the permission structure. The second application applies the derived results on games, where the organization structure can be analysed separately from the production capacities of the participating players.read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition
TL;DR: In this article, three licensing policies, the auction, the fee, and the royalty, are studied in a Bertrand-type duopoly with differentiated goods and the analysis is conducted in terms of a multistage non-cooperative game involving an external patentee and two firms each producing a differentiated good in Bertrand competition.
Journal Article
The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
Ulrich Faigle,Walter Kern +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the Shapley value is defined as the expected marginal contribution of a player to a feasible random coalition in a cooperative game, which is a generalization of the permission value of Gilles and van den Brink.
Journal ArticleDOI
Measuring Domination in Directed Networks
TL;DR: Two relational power measures, the β - measure and the score-measure, are axiomatically characterized and applied to weighted directed networks that can be interpreted as dominance structures which dominance relations are assigned weights representing the ‘importance’ of each relation.
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Minimum MSE estimation of a regression model with fixed effects from a series of cross sections (Revised version)
M.J.C.M. Verbeek,T.E. Nijman +1 more
Journal ArticleDOI
An axiomatization of the disjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure
TL;DR: In this article, players that participate in an acooperative game with transferable utilities are assumed to be part of apermission structure being a hierarchical organization in which there are players that need permission from other players before they can cooperate.
References
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Book ChapterDOI
A Value for n-person Games
TL;DR: In this paper, an examination of elementary properties of a value for the essential case is presented, which is deduced from a set of three axioms, having simple intuitive interpretations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Graphs and Cooperation in Games
TL;DR: Graph-theoretic ideas are used to analyze cooperation structures in games, and fair allocation rules are proven to be unique, closely related to the Shapley value, and stable for a wide class of games.
Book
Graphs, Networks and Algorithms
TL;DR: This book presents a meta-analsis of the network simplex algorithm and a section on the five color theorem, which states that the color theorem can be rewritten as a graph representation of a network.
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Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study allocation rules, which are functions mapping conference structures to payoff allocations, and describe how the outcome of a cooperative game might depend on which groups of players hold cooperative planning conferences.
Journal ArticleDOI
On the position value for communication situations
TL;DR: An axiomatic characterization of the position value is provided and relations with the Myerson value are discussed, and, for special classes of communication situations, elegant calculation methods for their position values are described.