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Global Games: Theory and Applications

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In this article, Mertens and Zamir have shown how one can give a complete description of the "type" of a player in an incomplete information game in terms of a full hierarchy of beliefs at all levels.
Abstract
Many economic problems are naturally modeled as a game of incomplete information, where a player’s payoff depends on his own action, the actions of others, and some unknown economic fundamentals. For example, many accounts of currency attacks, bank runs, and liquidity crises give a central role to players’ uncertainty about other players’ actions. Because other players’ actions in such situations are motivated by their beliefs, the decision maker must take account of the beliefs held by other players. We know from the classic contribution of Harsanyi (1967–1968) that rational behavior in such environments not only depends on economic agents’ beliefs about economic fundamentals, but also depends on beliefs of higher-order – i.e., players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs, players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs, and so on. Indeed, Mertens and Zamir (1985) have shown how one can give a complete description of the “type” of a player in an incomplete information game in terms of a full hierarchy of beliefs at all levels. In principle, optimal strategic behavior should be analyzed in the space of all possible infinite hierarchies of beliefs; however, such analysis is highly complex for players and analysts alike and is likely to prove intractable in general. It is therefore useful to identify strategic environments with incomplete information that are rich enough to capture the important role of higher-order beliefs in economic settings, but simple enough to allow tractable analysis. Global games, first studied by Carlsson and van Damme (1993a), represent one such environment. Uncertain economic fundamentals are summarized by a state θ and each player observes a different signal of the state with a small amount of noise. Assuming that the noise technology is common knowledge among the players, each player’s signal generates beliefs about fundamentals, beliefs about other players’ beliefs about fundamentals, and so on. Our purpose in this paper is to describe how such models work, how global game reasoning can be applied to economic problems, and how this analysis relates to more general analysis of higher-order beliefs in strategic settings.

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Global Games: Theory and Applications
by
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
August 2001
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1275R
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/

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