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Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance

TLDR
In this article, the authors examine the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time.
Abstract
Examines the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time. Institutions are separate from organizations, which are assemblages of people directed to strategically operating within institutional constraints. Institutions affect the economy by influencing, together with technology, transaction and production costs. They do this by reducing uncertainty in human interaction, albeit not always efficiently. Entrepreneurs accomplish incremental changes in institutions by perceiving opportunities to do better through altering the institutional framework of political and economic organizations. Importantly, the ability to perceive these opportunities depends on both the completeness of information and the mental constructs used to process that information. Thus, institutions and entrepreneurs stand in a symbiotic relationship where each gives feedback to the other. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient institutions ought to be rapidly replaced. This symbiotic relationship helps explain why this theoretical consequence is often not observed: while this relationship allows growth, it also allows inefficient institutions to persist. The author identifies changes in relative prices and prevailing ideas as the source of institutional alterations. Transaction costs, however, may keep relative price changes from being fully exploited. Transaction costs are influenced by institutions and institutional development is accordingly path-dependent. (CAR)

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Entrepreneurship in Emerging Economies: Where Are We Today and Where Should the Research Go in the Future

TL;DR: A special issue on entrepreneurship in emerging economies examines the literature that exists to date in this important domain and reviews the research that was generated as part of this special issue as mentioned in this paper, concluding with a discussion of the critical future research needs in this area.
Posted Content

Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth

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‘Governance’ as a bridge between disciplines: Cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and problems of governability, accountability and legitimacy

TL;DR: In recent decades, a number of changes in the forms and mechanisms of governance by which institutional and orga- nizational societal sectors and spheres are governed, as well as in the location of governance from where command, administration, management and control of societal institutions and spheres were conducted as mentioned in this paper.
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The institutional environment for infrastructure investment

TL;DR: The authors performed a two-century long historical analysis of the determinants of infrastructure investment in a panel of over 100 countries and found that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure.
Journal ArticleDOI

Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives

TL;DR: The authors show empirically that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences, in particular, that without taking social preferences into account, it is not possible to understand adequately (i) effects of competition on market outcomes, (ii) laws governing cooperation and collective action, effects and the determinants of material incentives, which contracts and property rights arrangements are optimal, and important forces shaping social norms and market failures.