Investor Protection and Corporate Governance
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TLDR
In this article, the authors argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems, and discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform.About:
This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 6387 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Corporate governance & Private benefits of control.read more
Citations
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Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries and propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders.
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Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
TL;DR: In this article, the authors disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect.
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Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-f low ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms and test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies.
Journal ArticleDOI
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
TL;DR: In this article, the authors disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect.
Journal ArticleDOI
Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China
TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors examined three sectors of the economy: the State Sector (state-owned firms), the Listed Sector (publicly listed firms), and the Private Sector (all other firms with various types of private and local government ownership).
References
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The Separation of Ownership and Control
TL;DR: The separation of ownership and control refers to the phenomenon associated with publicly held business corporations in which the shareholders (the residual claimants) possess little or no direct control over management decisions as discussed by the authors.
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Universal banking and the performance of German firms
TL;DR: The authors empirically investigated the influence of German universal banks on the performance of German firms and found that bank control rights from equity ownership significantly improved firm performance beyond what nonbank blockholders can achieve.
Finance, Investment and Growth
Wendy Carlin,Colin Mayer +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the relation between the institutional structures of advanced OECD countries and the comparative growth and investment of 27 industries in those countries over the period 1970 to 1995.
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The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies
Masahiko Aoki,Hugh T. Patrick +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the main bank system of Japan has been examined, its roots, development, and its role in the hey-day of its rapid growth, and how the system has performed and at its strengths and weaknesses.
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Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms, and test this model using a sample of 371 large firms from 27 wealthy economies.