Investor Protection and Corporate Governance
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TLDR
In this article, the authors argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems, and discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform.About:
This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 6387 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Corporate governance & Private benefits of control.read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries and propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders.
Posted Content
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
TL;DR: In this article, the authors disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect.
Journal ArticleDOI
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-f low ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms and test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies.
Journal ArticleDOI
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
TL;DR: In this article, the authors disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect.
Journal ArticleDOI
Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China
TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors examined three sectors of the economy: the State Sector (state-owned firms), the Listed Sector (publicly listed firms), and the Private Sector (all other firms with various types of private and local government ownership).
References
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The journal of political economy
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore a hypothesis, based on acIcumulating evidence, regarding the character of inventions likely to issue from the research laboratories of the large industrial corporations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Banks and Corporate Control in Japan
Randall Morck,Masao Nakamura +1 more
TL;DR: The authors found that Japanese banks act primarily in the short term interests of creditors when dealing with firms outside bank groups, and that corporate control mechanisms other than bank oversight appear necessary in these firms.
Journal ArticleDOI
The balance of power in closely held corporations
TL;DR: In this paper, a closely held corporation characterized by the absence of a resale market for its shares is analyzed and it is shown that the founder can optimally choose an ownership structure with several large shareholders to force them to form coalitions to obtain control.
Posted Content
Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms
TL;DR: In this paper, the influence of banks on the performance of German firms was investigated taking account of banks' equity holdings, the extent of bank's proxy voting rights, and the ownership structure of the firms' equity.
Book ChapterDOI
7. Which Capitalism?: Lessons from the East Asian Crisis
Raghuram G. Rajan,Raghuram G. Rajan,Raghuram G. Rajan,Luigi Zingales,Luigi Zingales,Luigi Zingales +5 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors suggest that relationship-based systems work well when contracts are poorly enforced and capital scarce, and that while there may be some short-term benefits for these economies to revert to the pure relationship based system, in the long run they will be held back unless they have the greater disclosure, contract enforcement, and competition of the arm's length system.