Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas.
Attila Szolnoki,Matjaz Perc +1 more
TLDR
It is shown that, regardless of the source of heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes emerge if the masses conform, and that leaders must be able to create a following to be optimally augmented by conformity.Abstract:
The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective influence, or other traits, an unanswered question remains who should conform. Selecting conformists randomly is the simplest choice, but it is neither a realistic nor the optimal one. We show that, regardless of the source of heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes emerge if the masses conform. On the other hand, forcing leaders to conform significantly hinders the constructive interplay between heterogeneity and coordination, leading to evolutionary outcomes that are worse still than if conformists were chosen randomly. We conclude that leaders must be able to create a following for network reciprocity to be optimally augmented by conformity. In the opposite case, when leaders are castrated and made to follow, the failure of coordination impairs the evolution of cooperation.read more
Citations
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Statistical physics of human cooperation
Matjaz Perc,Jillian J. Jordan,David G. Rand,Zhen Wang,Stefano Boccaletti,Attila Szolnoki,Attila Szolnoki +6 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors review experimental and theoretical research that advances our understanding of human cooperation, focusing on spatial pattern formation, on the spatiotemporal dynamics of observed solutions, and on self-organization that may either promote or hinder socially favorable states.
Journal ArticleDOI
Statistical physics of human cooperation
Matjaz Perc,Jillian J. Jordan,David G. Rand,Zhen Wang,Stefano Boccaletti,Attila Szolnoki,Attila Szolnoki +6 more
TL;DR: Experimental and theoretical research is reviewed that advances the understanding of human cooperation, focusing on spatial pattern formation, on the spatiotemporal dynamics of observed solutions, and on self-organization that may either promote or hinder socially favorable states.
Journal ArticleDOI
Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
Han-Xin Yang,Xiaojie Chen +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a mechanism of punishment, in which individuals with the majority strategy will punish those with the minority strategy in a public goods game group, and both theoretical analysis and simulation showed that the cooperation level can be greatly enhanced by punishing minority.
Journal ArticleDOI
Evolution of cooperation on independent networks: The influence of asymmetric information sharing updating mechanism
TL;DR: Interestingly, it is found that interdependence by means of asymmetric information sharing function can dramatically promote the evolution of cooperation by restraining negative feed-back effect to provide a better environment for cooperators to mushroom.
Journal ArticleDOI
Coevolution of Vertex Weights Resolves Social Dilemma in Spatial Networks.
TL;DR: A new coevolution setup of game strategy and vertex weight on a square lattice is considered, on which the role or influence of each individual is depicted by vertex weight, and it is concluded that intermediate value of δ enables the strongest heterogeneous distribution of vertex weight.
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