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Perfect versus imperfect observability---An experimental test of Bagwell's result
Steffen Huck,Wieland Mueller +1 more
TLDR
An experimental test of Bagwell's claim that the first mover advantage vanishes completely if this action is only imperfectly observed by second movers finds some support for the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium emphasised by van Damme and Hurkens (1997).Abstract:
In a seminal paper Bagwell (1995) claims that the first mover advantage, i.e. the strategic benefit of committing oneself to an action before others can do, vanishes completely if this action is only imperfectly observed by second movers. In our paper we report on an experimental test of this prediction. We implement three versions of a game similar to an example^? given by Bagwell, each time varying the quality of the signal which informs the second mover. For experienced players we do not find empirical support for Bagwell's result. Instead, we find some support for the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium emphasised by van Damme and Hurkens (1997).read more
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Book
Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned
TL;DR: This book is claimed to be the first and only study of long-term deployed applications of game theory for security for key organizations such as the Los Angeles International Airport police and the U.S. Federal Air Marshals Service.
Journal ArticleDOI
Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: an extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness
TL;DR: It is shown that the Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus alleviating the equilibrium selection problem and proposed an extensive-form game model that makes the defender's uncertainty about the attacker's ability to observe explicit.
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Stackelberg Beats Cournot — On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition, and find that both of them yield higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency.
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Vertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs: Experimental evidence
TL;DR: The authors showed that markets with a vertically integrated firm are significantly less competitive than those where firms are separate, which is consistent with the quantal-response generalization of Nash equilibria.
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Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and 'Weak Link' Coordination Games
TL;DR: In this article, the authors extend this work by varying the timing of unobservable moves in ultimatum bargaining games and weak link coordination games and find that timing without observability affects behavior in both games, but not substantially.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation
TL;DR: This article showed that if a fraction of the people exhibit inequality aversion, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish, and they also showed that when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperations are maintained.
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ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Gary E. Bolton,Axel Ockenfels +1 more
TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, and demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people were motivated by either their payoff or their relative standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern, which explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is played a role and games where competitive behavior is observed.
Book
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games
John C. Harsanyi,Reinhard Selten +1 more
TL;DR: Harsanyi and Selten as mentioned in this paper proposed rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any non-cooperative game, and applied this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games, bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides.
Related Papers (5)
Does noise undermine the first-mover advantage? an evolutionary analysis of bagwell's example
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