Book ChapterDOI
Rational secret sharing with repeated games
Shaik Maleka,Amjed Shareef,C. Pandu Rangan +2 more
- pp 334-346
TLDR
The concept of repeated games in the rational secret sharing problem is introduced for the first time, which enables the possibility of a deterministic protocol for solving this problem.Abstract:
This paper introduces the Repeated Rational Secret Sharing problem. We borrow the notion of rational secret sharing from Halpern and Teague[1], where players prefer to get the secret than not to get the secret and with lower preference, prefer that as few of the other players get the secret. We introduce the concept of repeated games in the rational secret sharing problem for the first time, which enables the possibility of a deterministic protocol for solving this problem. This is the first approach in this direction to the best of our knowledge. We extend the results for the mixed model (synchronous) where at most t players can be malicious. We also propose the first asynchronous protocol for rational secret sharing.read more
Citations
More filters
Book ChapterDOI
Socio-Rational Secret Sharing as a New Direction in Rational Cryptography
TL;DR: The authors show that, in a setting with rational players, secret sharing and multiparty computation are only possible if the actual secret reconstruction round remains unknown to the players.
Journal ArticleDOI
Socially-conforming cooperative computation in cloud networks
TL;DR: The notion of social conformity is applied to show that under certain assumptions rational parties belonging to a cloud will choose to cooperate and that party in fact cooperates and achieves fairness in secure two-party computation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Belief and fairness: A secure two-party protocol toward the view of entropy for IoT devices
TL;DR: This work devises a new utility function based on beliefs and entropy, which are extracted from IoT devices and defines the utilities based on entropy formally especially in the key round, which is the first time to relate utilities with entropy and meanwhile achieve desirable security properties.
Journal ArticleDOI
Secure computation protocols under asymmetric scenarios in enterprise information system
TL;DR: The new definition of utilities is proved to be coincident (and compatible) with the former definitions under asymmetric information scenario and the achievement of security properties in enterprise information systems is worked towards.
Posted Content
Rational Secret Sharing AS Extensive Games.
TL;DR: In this paper, a 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing game with imperfect information is considered, and a strategy for achieving secret recovery in this game is provided, and it is shown that the strategy is a sequential equilibrium.
References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
How to share a secret
TL;DR: This technique enables the construction of robust key management schemes for cryptographic systems that can function securely and reliably even when misfortunes destroy half the pieces and security breaches expose all but one of the remaining pieces.
Journal ArticleDOI
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
TL;DR: In this paper, a non-cooperative equilibrium concept for super games is presented, which fits John Nash's noncooperative solution and also has some features resembling the Nash cooperative solution.
Book
An Introduction to Game Theory
TL;DR: An Introduction to Game Theory International Edition, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economics, social, political, and biological phenomena as discussed by the authors.
BookDOI
Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2000
TL;DR: This paper introduces the XTR public key system, a new method to represent elements of a subgroup of a multiplicative group of a finite field that leads to substantial savings both in communication and computational overhead without compromising security.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Distributed computing meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation
TL;DR: K-resilient Nash equilibria, joint strategies where no member of a coalition C of size up to k can do better, even if the whole coalition defects, exist for secret sharing and multiparty computation, provided that players prefer to get the information than not to get it.