Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: What Do We Really Know?*
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TLDR
In this article, the authors presented an estimation of the shadow economy for 145 countries, including developing, transition and highly developed OECD economies over the period 1999 to 2003, showing that shadow economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries.Abstract:
Estimations of the size and development of the shadow economy for 145 countries, including developing, transition and highly developed OECD economies over the period 1999 to 2003 are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (as a percent of “official” GDP) in 2002/03 in 96 developing countries is 38.7%, in 25 transition countries 40.1%, in 21 OECD countries 16.3% and in 3 Communist countries 22.3%. An increased burden of taxation and social security contributions, combined with a labor market regulation are the driving forces of the shadow economy. Furthermore, the results show that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries. Finally, the various estimation methods are discussed and critically evaluated.read more
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References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences
TL;DR: In this paper, the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing, transition, and OECD countries is estimated using various methods, and the average size varies from 12 percent of GDP for OECD countries, to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries.
Book
Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation
TL;DR: In this article, a wide-ranging discussion of personal movitation that opens out traditional eonomics to provide a more mature view of individuals as being sensitive to private and moral motives as well as market incentives is provided.
Journal ArticleDOI
The unofficial Economy in Transition
TL;DR: The authors of as mentioned in this paper show that the countries that have had the healthiest public finances, the smallest unofficial economies, and the best records of growth are also the countries with the highest political control of economic life.
Journal ArticleDOI
Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries
TL;DR: In this article, the authors found that higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity, and that corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates.