Side-channel-free quantum key distribution.
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Citations
Trusted Noise in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution: a Threat and a Defense
Field Test of Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution through Sending-or-Not-Sending over 428 km.
Simulating of the measurement-device independent quantum key distribution with phase randomized general sources
Two-photon interference: the Hong-Ou-Mandel effect
Security proof of continuous-variable quantum key distribution using three coherent states
Related Papers (5)
Frequently Asked Questions (13)
Q2. What is the implicit assumption in quantum cryptography?
The implicit assumption in quantum cryptography is that the authors could always improve technology in such a way that Alice’s and Bob’s private spaces are not affected by the presence of parasite channels, so that the legitimate participants do indeed have access to absolutely privatespaces.
Q3. How can Eve extract information about the mea-2 surement apparatus of Bob?
In particular, if Alice and Bob can access quantum memories, then they can extract a secret key at a rate which is at least equal to the coherent information between A and B.
Q4. How can Eve use the BB84 protocol to attack the quantum communication ports?
Eve can potentially send trojan systems through Alice’s and Bob’s communication ports and detect their reflection to infer both state preparation and measurement settings.
Q5. What is the meaning of side channel attacks?
By their nature, such attacks may be of classical or quantum degrees of freedom and are insidious because even quantifying their threat appears to involve understanding what have been called unknown unknowns about the vulnerability of the experimental set-up.
Q6. What is the procedure for obtaining the classical variable X?
once Alice has received all the classical communications, she applies a collective quantum measurement on her quantum memory to retrieve the classical variable X.
Q7. How can Eve retrieve information about the mea-2 surement apparatus of Bob?
Eve can probe these ports by using two trojan systems e and f , which can retrieve information about Alice’s and Bob’s distilling and detecting apparata.
Q8. What is the key point of the paper?
Their paper shows how to overcome the problem of the open quantum communication ports, therefore making feasible the notion of absolutely private spaces.
Q9. What is the simplest way to retrieve information about the reduced states of the two public systems?
By exploiting reflections from the ports, Eve can only retrieve information regarding the reduced states ρA′ and ρB′ of the two public systems A ′ and B′.
Q10. What is the conditional state of the mixed state?
Let us purify the mixed state ρABE|L′ into the pure state ΦABEẼ|L′ = |Φ〉 〈Φ|ABEẼ|L′ by introducing an ancillary system Ẽ which is assumed to be in Eve’s hands (so that Eve’s global system consists of EẼ).
Q11. What is the quantum mutual information of A?
(6)For A = X, the quantum mutual information I(A : X), which is computed over the CQ-state of Eq. (2), corresponds to the Holevo information I(A : X), computed over the ensemble of Eq. (1).
Q12. what is the simplest way to compute a conditional state?
(18)Because of Eq. (16), the conditional state ΦBEẼ|XL′ can be used to compute R′ viaR′ ≡ I(X : B|L′)ρ − I(X : E|L ′)ρ= I(X : B|L′)Φ − I(X : E|L ′)Φ, (19)where ρ = ρBE|XL′ and Φ = ΦBEẼ|XL′ (the computation is exactly the same up to a trace over Ẽ).
Q13. What is the simplest way to denote a quantum system?
(8) List of other useful elements:• Given a tripartite quantum system ABC, the authors can use the “chain rule”I(A : BC) = I(A : B) + I(A : C|B). (9)•