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The illusion of limited war: chancellor Bethmann
Hollweg's calculated risk, July 1914
Jarausch, Konrad H.
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Jarausch, K. H. (2012). The illusion of limited war: chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's calculated risk, July 1914. Historical
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Historical Social Research, Supplement — 2012 — No. 24, 53-79
The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor
Bethmann Hollweg’s Calculated Risk, July 1914
[1969]
Konrad H. Jarausch
Abstract: »Die Illusion eines begrenzten Krieges: Bethmann Hollwegs Politik
eines kalkulierten Risikos in der Julikrise 1914«. The central figure in the
Fischer controversy about Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of the
First World War was the imperial chancellor Theobald von Bethmann
Hollweg. On the basis of the controversial diary of his personal assistant Kurt
Riezler, this article revisits the policy of the civilian leader of the German gov-
ernment, characterized by a “defensive aggressiveness.” Fearing the growth of
Russian power and closer Anglo-French cooperation, Bethmann was willing to
run a “calculated risk” by backing a local Balkan war in which Austria could
defeat Serbia, while risking a continental war with Russia and France in order
to split the Entente. This gamble failed due to the Russian decision for general
mobilization, German military pressure to invade Belgium and the British en-
try into the conflict that expanded the conflict to a European war which Berlin
was unlikely to win. With such arguments the article tries to sketch a complex
intermediary position between critics and apologists of German “war guilt.”
Keywords: World War One, Fischer controversy, Bethmann Hollweg, Riezler,
calculated risk, German war guilt.
The responsibility for the outbreak of World War I weighed heavily upon Im-
perial Germany’s fifth Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg. “This
war torments me,” he confessed to the Liberal Conrad Haussmann during the
struggle. “Again and again I ask if it could have been avoided and what I
should have done differently.” This soul searching led Bethmann to believe that
“all nations are guilty; Germany, too, bears a large part of the blame.”
1
Arguing
that “our fate is too colossal to have its origins in singular events,” the Chancel-
lor stressed the larger causes of the conflict. Imperialist rivalry, the anti-
German coalition, the growing isolation of Berlin, and Vienna’s relative de-
cline, “all that forced us to adopt a policy of utmost risk, a risk that increased
with each repetition, in the Moroccan quarrel, in the Bosnian crisis, and then
Reprint of: Jarausch, Konrad H. 1969. The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann
Hollweg’s Calculated Risk, July 1914. Central European History 2: 58-76.
1
Note by Conrad Haussmann, Feb. 24, 1918, about his visit to Hohenfinow; Hauptstaatsar-
chiv Stuttgart (cited HStA Stuttgart), J 47, NH 114. Cf. W. Steglich, Die Friedenspolitik
der Mittelmächte, 1917-1918 (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 418.
54
again in the Moroccan question.”
2
But he also admitted candidly: “Lord yes, in
a certain sense it was a preventive war,” motivated by “the constant threat of
attack, the greater likelihood of its inevitability in the future, and by the mili-
tary’s claim: today war is still possible without defeat, but not in two years!
Yes, the generals,” he repeated. “It could only have been avoided by a rap-
prochement with England, that is still my conviction. But after we had decided
for a [common] policy with Austria, we could not desert her in such danger.”
3
Suspecting that “it borders on a preventive war,” Bethmann silenced his con-
science by denying that “we encouraged Austria to attack Serbia, which sounds
as if we had taken the initiative. That is absolutely false.”
4
For fifty years historians have endeavored to resolve the contradictions inhe-
rent in Bethmann’s self-justification. Returned from the sword to the pen, En-
tente and German scholars attacked one another so violently that the ex-
Chancellor cautioned in 1920: “The war guilt question must be treated objec-
tively by all. Any other method is suspect. The partisan polemics are beginning
to nauseate the public.”
5
But his call for moderation went unheeded and during
the inter-war period the Kriegsschuldfrage became a symbolic focus of natio-
nalist sentiments.
6
The Second World War confirmed the verdict of Versailles,
but in the early 1950’s the questioning of nationalism produced a Franco-
German declaration, assigning a share of the responsibility to all.
7
More recent-
ly Fritz Fischer’s rediscovery of Bethmann’s annexationism reopened the old
wounds, allowing East German and Western historians to affirm what they had
long suspected: The war “was deliberately provoked, not stumbled into.”
8
Most
2
Bethmann to Bülow, June 10, 1915; Bundesarchiv Coblenz (cited BA Coblenz), Nachlass
Bülow. Cf. O. Hammann, Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit (Berlin, 1922), pp. 122ff.
3
Conrad Haussmann, loc. cit.
4
Bethmann to Jagow, June 11, 1919; Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Bonn (cited
AA Bonn), Nachlass Jagow.
5
Bethmann to Rassow, Aug. 18, 1920; Privatnachlass Rassow, courtesy of Mrs. P. Rassow,
Cologne.
6
A. von Wegerer, Bibliographie zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges (Berlin, 1934), and M.
Gunzenhäuser, “Die Bibliographien zur Geschichte des ersten Weltkrieges,” Schriften der
Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte (Frankfurt, 1964). See also P. Renouvin, Les Origines im-
médiates de la guerre (Paris, 1925); S. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (2 vols., New
York, 1928); B. E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War (New York, 1930); A. von Wegerer,
Der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (Hamburg, 1939); and L. Albertini, Le origini delta guerra
del 1914 (3 vols., Milan, 1942-43).
7
James A. Corbett, “France and Germany Agree – on the Past,” Historical Bulletin, XXVII
(March, 1955), 158-62.
8
Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf, 1961; 3rd ed. 1963), now translated as
Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967); “Deutsche Kriegsziele,” Histo-
rische Zeitschrift, CLXXXVIII (1959), 249-310; “Kontinuität des Irrtums,” ibid., CXCI
(1960), 83-100; “Weltpolitik, Weltmachstreben und deutsche Kriegsziele,” ibid., CXCIX
(1964), 265-346; Weltmacht oder Niedergang? (Hamburg, 1965). Cf. K. Epstein, “German
War Aims in the First World War,” World Politics, XV (1962), 163-85. The most judicious
summary of the controversy is W. J. Mommsen, “The Debate on German War Aims,” in
55
West German scholars, led by Egmont Zechlin, rallied behind their dean, the
late Gerhard Ritter, claiming in spiritual defense of their fatherland that it was
not a preventive but a defensive war.
9
Now historians must once more face the
perennial question: Did Germany unleash the war deliberately to become a
world power or did she support Austria merely to defend her weakening ally?
Curiously enough, one of the obvious avenues of investigation has hitherto
been neglected: the study of Germany’s constitutionally responsible statesman,
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. A fascinating new document, the diary of his
personal adlatus in the Wilhelmstrasse, Kurt Riezler, offers fresh perspectives
on the motives of Bethmann’s policies in the July crisis.
10
Scion of a family of
prominent South German scholars, Riezler worked as a free-lance writer after
completing his doctorate and entered the imperial foreign service in 1909.
Three years later this gifted and spirited young man was detailed to serve as
Bethmann’s special assistant, drafting directives and helping to shape and
clarify policy. To systematize his experience Riezler wrote two books on world
politics before 1914, arguing for the necessity of a unified theory of interna-
tional relations and sketching the general outlines of German Weltpolitik.
Source of ideas, partner for thought-provoking discussions, and confidant of
the Chancellor, he lacked any firm place in the governmental hierarchy. Hence
his diary is an artistic record of moods, feelings, and conversations, rather than
the enlarged paperback edition of Journal of Contemporary History, I, No. 3 (1966), 45-70.
See also E. W. Lynar, Deutsche Kriegsziele 1914-1918 (Berlin, 1964), and K. Barthel, “Be-
obachtungen am Rande der Kriegszieldiskussion,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unter-
richt, XVI (1965), 83-88. For the East German view see F. Klein, “Die westdeutsche Ge-
schichtsschreibung und die Ziele des deutschen Imperialismus im Ersten Weltkrieg,”
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, X (1962), 1808-36, and W. Gutsche, “Erst Europa –
und dann die Welt,” ibid., XII (1964), 745-67.
9
Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, II, III (Munich, 1960, 1964); Der
Schlieffenplan (Munich, 1956); “Der Anteil der Militärs an der Kriegskatastrophe von
1914,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXCIII (1961), 72-91; “Eine neue Kriegsschuldthese?”
ibid., CXCIV (1962), 646-08; “Bethmann Hollweg im Schlaglicht des deutschen Ge-
schichtsrevisionismus,” Schweizer Monatshefte, XLII (1962-63), 700-708. Unfortunately
Zechlin’s contributions are scattered: “Deutschland zwischen Kabinettskrieg und Wirt-
schaftskrieg,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXCIX (1964), 347-458; “Friedensbestrebungen und
Revolutionierungsversuche,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, supplement to Das Parlament
(1961), Nos. 20, 24, 25; (1963), Nos. 20 and 23; “Probleme des Kriegskalküls und der
Kriegsbeendigung im ersten Weltkrieg,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, XIV
(1963), 533-55.
10
The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Kurt Riezler’s daughter, Mrs. M. White,
for making the diary available to him. Cf. K. D. Erdmann, “Zur Beurteilung Bethmann
Hollwegs,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, XV (1964), 525-40, and Die Zeit,
Jan. 16, 1968. See also F. Stern, “Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Respon-
sibility,” in L. Krieger and Fritz Stern, eds., The Responsibility of Power (Garden City,
N.Y., 1967), pp. 252-85, and Die Zeit, Jan. 2, 1968.
56
a systematic exposition of fact; but precisely its intuitive quality helps resolve
the enigma of Bethmann’s aims in the July crisis.
11
Grandson of Bismarck’s liberal opponent Moritz August von Bethmann
Hollweg and younger son of the gentleman farmer Felix, Theobald was born in
1856 on the family estate of Hohenfinow, barely two hours from Berlin.
12
Raised more freely than a typical Junker, he was tutored at home and sent to
the elite school Schulpforta where he graduated as primus omnium in 1875.
After the customary year with the dragoons, he studied law at Strasbourg,
Leipzig, and Berlin and entered the Prussian civil service in 1884 as Landrat in
11
Theodor Heuss, “A Word in Memory of Kurt Riezler,” and L. Strauss, “Kurt Riezler, 1882-
1955,” Social Research, XXIII (1956), 1-34. Recently Riezler‘s writings have been
rediscovered: Die Erforderlichkeit des Unmöglichen: Prolegomena zu einer Theorie der
Politik und zu anderen Theorien (Munich, 1913) and, under the pseudonym J. J.
Ruedorffer, Grundzüge der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart (Stuttgart, 1914). Cf. A. Hillgru-
ber, “Riezlers Theorie des kalkulierten Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzep-
tion in der Julikrise 1914,” Historische Zeitschrift, CCII (1966), 333-51, and H. Pogge-von
Strandmann and I. Geiss, Die Erforderlichkeit des Unmöglichen (Hamburg, 1965). To
prove the inaccuracy of the latter’s charge that the Grundzüge are pan-German, one only
has to point to their condemnation by “Sg” [Franz Sonntag] in Alldeutsche Blätter, XXIV,
Dec. 19, 1914, and XXV, Jan. 16, 1915. According to Bethmann’s son Felix, the relation-
ship was that of a bright young man and a skeptical elder statesman whose difference in
age, temperament, and responsibility made for scintillating discussions while riding in the
Tiergarten. But Riezler’s liberal imperialist writings cannot simply be taken to express the
Chancellor’s more cautious foreign policy. After resigning from the diplomatic service,
Riezler was a professor of philosophy at Munich, Rektor at the University of Frankfurt, and
emigrated to the U.S. in 1939 where he taught at the New School for Social Research until
1952.
12
There is no biography of Bethmann. The editor of Die Grosse Politik, F. Thimme, gathered
material for such a work and wrote numerous articles on the Chancellor until his premature
death in 1938. “F. Thimme zum Gedächtnis,” W. Frauendienst, Berliner Monatshefte, XVI
(1938), 821-26, and the Thimme Nachlass, BA Coblenz. The material in Bethmann’s per-
sonnel files in the Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Merseburg (cited DZA Merseburg) and, after
1905, the BA Coblenz is disappointing. The Chancellor’s Nachlass was destroyed in 1945
in Hohenfinow. Except for the adulatory H. Kötschke, Unser Reichskanzler (Berlin, 1916),
and G. Egelhaaf, Der fünfte Reichskanzler (Stuttgart, 1916), contemporary accounts are
virulent diatribes against him: “Junius Alter” [pseud, for Franz Sonntag], Das deutsche
Reich auf dem Wege zur geschichtlichen Episode (Munich, 1919); W. Kapp, Die nationalen
Kreise und der Reichskanzler (Königsberg, 1916); and H. von Liebig, Die Politik Bethmann
Hollwegs (Munich, 1919). The unpublished dissertations by B. Haberland, “Die Innenpoli-
tik des Reiches unter der Kanzlerschaft Bethmann Hollwegs 1909-1911” (Kiel, 1951); R.
Koschnitzke, “Die Innenpolitik des Reichskanzlers von Bethmann Hollweg im Weltkriege”
(Kiel, 1952), and Johanna Schellenberg’s just completed thesis (East Berlin) lack full
documentation. More serious contributions are H. G. Zmarzlik, Bethmann Hollweg als
Reichskanzler, 1909-1914 (Düsseldorf, 1957), and K. H. Janssen, Der Kanzler und der Ge-
neral, 1914-1916 (Göttingen, 1967). To date the best monographs are the Habilitations-
schriften by W. Gutsche, “Die Beziehungen zwischen der Regierung Bethmann Hollweg
und dem Monopolkapital in den ersten Monaten des Weltkriegs” (East Berlin, 1967), and
W. J. Mommsen, “Bethmann Hollweg und das Problem der politischen Führung, 1909-
1914” (Cologne, 1967).