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The logic of collective action :public goods and the theory ofgroups
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The article was published on 1971-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 6455 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Public good & Collective action.read more
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The Impact of Perceived Loafing and Collective Efficacy on Group Goal Processes and Group Performance
Paul W. Mulvey,Howard J. Klein +1 more
TL;DR: Two studies investigating the influence of social perceptions (perceived loafing, collective efficacy, and cohesion) on group goal processes (difficulty and commitment) and group performance and the mediation hypothesis was supported.
Journal ArticleDOI
Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
Marco Archetti,István Scheuring +1 more
TL;DR: The existence of mixed equilibria in public goods games is a fundamental result in the study of cooperation that has been overlooked so far, because of the disproportionate attention given to the two- and N-person prisoner's dilemma.
Journal ArticleDOI
Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs
TL;DR: In this paper, an economic theory of the effectiveness of industrial pressure groups in obtaining favorable tariffs is developed and tested for the United States Tariff Act of 1824, and it is found that the ideal industry pressure groups had low proprietorial income shares and geographically concentrated production units, but that political effectiveness required the group to speak for many establishments with output spread fairly evenly across states.
Posted Content
Analyzing collective action
TL;DR: In this article, structural variables affect the core relationships of reputation, trust, and reciprocity as these affect levels of cooperation, and the need to base future work on collective action on a more general theory of human behavior than has been used to model collective action over the last five decades.
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Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation
TL;DR: In this article, the authors build a model where individual firms determine the amount of resources to allocate to political contributions and show that, in the presence of a fixed cost of channeling political contributions, it is efficient for a lobby to be formed by the largest firms in a sector.