The Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of Incident Command Systems

TLDR: In this paper, the authors examine the application of a structural innovation known as Incident Command Systems (ICS) in different crises, which seeks to coordinate multiple response organizations under a temporary hierarchical structure.

Abstract: This article examines the application of a structural innovation known as Incident Command Systems (ICS) in different crises. The ICS seeks to coordinate multiple response organizations under a temporary hierarchical structure. The ICS is of practical interest because it has become the dominant mechanism by which crisis response is organized in the United States. It is of theoretical interest because it provides insights into how a highly centralized mode of network governance operates. Despite the hierarchical characteristics of the ICS, the network properties of crisis response fundamentally affects its operations, in terms of the coordination difficulties that multiple members bring, the ways in which authority is shared and contested between members, and the importance of trust in supplementing formal modes of control.

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Table 3: The Impact of network characteristics on crisis response

Figure 1: Hierarchy or network? Competing views of the ICS

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Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs
1225 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706
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info@lafollette.wisc.edu / http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu
The La Follette School takes no stand on policy issues;
opinions expressed within these papers reflect the
views of individual researchers and authors.
Robert M.
La Follette School of Public Affairs
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
Working Paper Series
La Follette School Working Paper No. 2008-020
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers
The Network Governance of Crisis Response:
Case Studies of Incident Command Systems
Donald P. Moynihan
La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison
dmoynihan@lafollette.wisc.edu
An abbreviated version of this paper is forthcoming
in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

The Network Governance of Crisis Response:
Case Studies of Incident Command Systems
Donald P. Moynihan,
La Follette School of Public Affairs,
University of Wisconsin-Madison
dmoynihan@lafollette.wisc.edu
An abbreviated version of this paper is forthcoming at the Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory

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Abstract
This article examines the application of a structural innovation known as Incident Command
Systems (ICS) in different crises. The ICS seeks to coordinate multiple response organizations
under a temporary hierarchical structure. The ICS is of practical interest because it has become
the dominant mechanism by which crisis response is organized in the United States. It is of
theoretical interest because it provides insights into how a highly centralized mode of network
governance operates. Despite the hierarchical characteristics of the ICS, the network properties
of crisis response fundamentally affects its operations, in terms of the coordination difficulties
that multiple members bring, the ways in which authority is shared and contested between
members, and the importance of trust in supplementing formal modes of control.

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INTRODUCTION
A crisis occurs. How to respond? The crisis could be like the Oklahoma City bombing in
1995. Government and nonprofit responders were on the scene minutes after a massive truck
bomb destroyed a federal building. Using a management system called the Incident Command
System (ICS), one person was appointed incident commander, responsible for directing all other
responders. An after action-action report argued that “(t)he Oklahoma City Bombing should be
viewed as ultimate proof that the Incident Command System works” (ODCEM n.d., 36).
As a result of its perceived successes in situations like Oklahoma, the ICS has been mandated
by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for all crisis situations. The DHS characterizes
the ICS as a command and control style of management, emphasizing the importance of a clear
hierarchy of authority. But if we look closely, the portrayal of the ICS as a hierarchy is
misleading. The incident commander at the Oklahoma City bombing was a local government
fire chief. He was directing not only his own employees, but responders from other
organizations, other levels of government, the non-profit and private sectors. Numerous
interdependent organizations were working together toward a common goal – these are the
definitional characteristics of a network (Hall and O’ Toole 2000; Provan and Kenis 2008, 231).
This article examines the ICS, and in doing so, addresses two research questions. First, how
do we categorize the ICS as a structural form? Crises generally demand the capacity of multiple
organizations working together, and crisis response therefore reflects a network structural form
(Boin and ‘t Hart 2003; Dancyzk 2007; Kapucu, Augustin, and Garayev, in press; Kiefer and
Montjoy 2006). But practitioners have used the ICS to coordinate multiple response
organizations under a temporary central authority with a hierarchical structure. Any crisis
response using the ICS therefore reflects an intriguing mixture of network and hierarchy. This

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first research question is addressed by examining the evolution of the ICS, describing its
characteristics, and by reviewing competing perspectives on the ICS. While almost all previous
treatments of the ICS focus on its hierarchical aspects, this article suggests that it is better
understood as a means of network governance, designed to coordinate interdependent responders
under urgent conditions. Network theorists propose that networks can vary in the distribution of
authority between members (Provan and Kenis 2008; Provan and Milward 1995), and the ICS is
an example of a highly centralized mode of network governance.
A network governance perspective leads to a second research question: How do network
characteristics influence ICS operations? Answering this question is the primary theoretical
contribution of the article, and is done by examining the ICS in practice in multiple settings.
Case evidence suggests three specific ways in which the network aspects of crisis response
affected ICS operations. First, the ICS faced a problem inherent to networks, greater
coordination difficulties as the number and range of organizations involved increased. Network
members brought their organizational views to the ICS, and the ICS especially struggled to
incorporate new members who represented the emergent aspects of the network. Second, the
ICS assumes a clear command and control mechanism, but the cases illustrate the shared nature
of authority in crisis response networks. The question of who is in charge can be a contentious
one, negotiated among network members. Third, the cases illustrate the critical importance of
network values in the form of working relationships and trust for the operation of ICS.
The final section discusses the case evidence and emerging theory. What are the implications
for managing crises? What are implications for network theory more broadly? The particular
history and nature of the ICS also makes it a source of unusual insight for issues that network
theorists have identified as important (Provan and Kenis 2008; Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007).

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What was the key innovation that emerged in the creation of the ICS?

While centralization of authority normally occurs within organizations and on a relatively stable basis, the critical innovation that emerged in the creation of the ICS was to temporarily centralize response authority to direct multiple organizations. 

Q2. What is the second impact of network diversity?

The second impact of network diversity arises from the emergent nature of crisis response,and the difficulty of incorporating new members once a crisis begins. 

Q3. What can be done to improve the governance of networks?

In the world of crisis response, this can be done by bringing together relevant actors for simulations, and other forms of cooperation; creating and ensuring the continuity of interorganizational liaisons who act as boundary spanners; and, encouraging the mobility of organizational actors within the network. 

Q4. Why did the Bush administration weaken the relationships between the Pentagon and the Arlington County Fire Department?

The Bush administration weakened these relationships, in part because federal political appointees lacked state emergency backgrounds, because there was turnover among experienced career staff, but also because FEMA had less to offer state governments. 

Q5. What is the reason why the ICS is flexible?

This suggests that while the ICS is flexible, the risk of a mismatch between governance form and task has become greater in the mandatory diffusion period because responders no longer have discretion in choosing governance form, and many of those expected to use the ICS have little experience with it. 

Q6. What is the problem with the command and control view of response?

In short, the problem with the command and control view of response is that it fails toincorporate relevant criticisms about the need to foster collaboration among relatively autonomous actors, but the coordination and communication literature fails to acknowledge the imperative for some form of centralized direction. 

Q7. What is the importance of a common language and set of management concepts?

Given network diversity and the distinct backgrounds of responders, it is critical to have a common language and set of management concepts to bridge these differences. 

Q8. What is the evidence on network diversity?

The evidence on network diversity suggests the first of three propositions made in this article: Proposition 1: Even with centralized network governance, network diversity makes crisis response coordination more difficult. 

Q9. What is the evidence for the bias against inclusiveness?

The evidence suggests that the bias against inclusiveness may increase under a) conditions ofmission urgency and, b) when the emergent component is very large.