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Open AccessJournal Article

The problem of fair division

H. Steihaus
- 01 Jan 1948 - 
- Vol. 16, pp 101-104
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This article is published in Econometrica.The article was published on 1948-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 491 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Fair division.

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Journal ArticleDOI

An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining

TL;DR: In this paper, the ultimatum bargaining games with two players and two stages were investigated. But the authors focused on situations with two agents and two stage bargaining games and only one agent has to decide and the set of outcomes is restricted to two results.
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The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes

TL;DR: This paper proposed a combinatorial assignment mechanism based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) in which incomes are unequal but arbitrarily close together, and the mechanism is approximately efficient, satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness, and is strategyproof in large markets.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods

TL;DR: In the presence of indivisibilities, it is shown that there exist allocations in which the envy is bounded by the maximum marginal utility, and an algorithm for computing such allocations is presented.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare

TL;DR: It is proved that the maximum Nash welfare solution selects allocations that are envy free up to one good --- a compelling notion that is quite elusive when coupled with economic efficiency.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

The combinatorial assignment problem: approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes

TL;DR: A solution to the combinatorial assignment problem by proposing two new criteria of outcome fairness, the maximin share guarantee and envy bounded by a single good, which weaken well-known criteria to accommodate indivisibilities and formalize why dictatorships are unfair.