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The Value of Information

TLDR
In this paper, Trueblood and Maffei state: "Accountants and other information producers must play a key role in deciding which information should be produced. However, the methodology for making these decisions is lacking."
Abstract
IN RECENT years accountants have increased the emphasis on their role as suppliers of information for management decisions. This is partly a broadening of the scope of accounting and partly a recognition that more and better information can be produced. Furthermore, management can make effective use of more and better information when it is produced. These increased capabilities result mostly from great advances in the equipment used in information and decision processes and the development of management science. Accountants and other information producers must play a key role in deciding which information should be produced. However, the methodology for making these decisions is lacking. Trueblood and Maffei state:

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Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI

A Real Effects Perspective to Accounting Measurement and Disclosure: Implications and Insights for Future Research

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide an analytical framework to illustrate how real effects arise in accounting measurement and disclosure rules, and how marking-to-market the asset portfolios of financial institutions generate procyclical real effects.
Journal ArticleDOI

Uncertainty, Information Acquisition and Price Swings in Asset Markets

TL;DR: The authors analyzes costly information acquisition in asset markets with Knightian uncertainty about the asset fundamentals and shows that when uncertainty is high enough, information acquisition decisions become strategic complements and lead to multiple equilibria.
Book

Handbook of Data Quality : Research and Practice

Shazia Sadiq
TL;DR: Researchers and students of computer science, information systems, or business management as well as data professionals and practitioners will benefit most from this handbook by not only focusing on the various sections relevant to their research area or particular practical work, but by also studying chapters that they may initially consider not to be directly relevant to them.
Journal ArticleDOI

Investment in concealable information by biased experts

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study a persuasion game in which biased experts strategically acquire costly information that they can then conceal or reveal, and they show that information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes when experts have linear preferences over a decision maker's beliefs.